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OPENING REMARKS BY THE RECTOR
OF THE STATE HIGHER EDUCATION
ESTABLISHMENT «KYIV NATIONAL
ECONOMIC UNIVERSITY NAMED AFTER
VADYM HETMAN»
Under conditions of the increasing globalization of the world economy, the
socio-economic convergence of neighboring countries is essential, because the
establishment of good neighborly parity relations or the reinstatement of the "iron
curtain" depends on this. Quite revealing in this case are relations between
Ukraine and Poland, countries that have passed a difficult and in many respects
contradictory way to understanding their new positions in United Europe. In view
of this, the joint paper by Ukrainian and Polish economists, which is proposed to
the general reader, deserves praise and deep appreciation for the great work
conducted by scholars, editors and translators of both countries.
A separate mention should be made of the cooperation between the academic
schools. Science, particularly economic science, should unite and encourage
governments and political forces to their consolidation for the purpose of
increasing national competitiveness, and thereby also the living standards of their
people. Quite meaningful thereto is cooperation between the Polish and
Ukrainian scientific schools, which are considered among the largest in the
megaregion of Central and Eastern Europe. I am convinced that the further
development of our cooperation will be of value not only for the countries that
we represent, but to others as well.
Most Ukrainian authors of this book work at the Kyiv National Economic
University named after Vadym Hetman (KNEU), which is considered to be the
cradle of economic personnel for our country and for decades (since it was
founded in 1906) educates specialists in different economic sectors, including
International Economics and Management, a specialty that has recently become a
priority in our educational institutions. Of the many Universities — partners of
KNEU, the Cracow University of Economics is of particular importance; good
academic relations have developed between them, as evidenced by this
fundamental economic work.
We are deeply grateful to the Polish party for its patience, tolerance and
understanding of our problems and scientific talent, which together, transformed
a good idea to a brilliant result.
Anatolii Pavlenko,
Rector, State Higher Educational Establishment «Kyiv
National Economic University named after Vadym
Hetman», Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor,
Academician, Hero of Ukraine
OPENING REMARKS BY THE RECTOR
OF THE CRACOW UNIVERSITY
OF ECONOMICS
Development of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation is a key objective of the
foreign policy of both countries. Although during the initial period of
transformation of both economies this postulate was not implemented
sufficiently, in recent years a clear acceleration in this area has been observed.
However, to preserve this positive trend in the deepening of relations, such
cooperation should increasingly rely on grassroots community initiatives and
manifest itself in different forms: political, economic, scientific and cultural.
With this in mind an Agreement on scientific and educational cooperation
between Kyiv National Economic University of Ukraine (KNEU) and Cracow
University of Economics (CUE) was signed in early 2008. An important initiative
of this collabouration was the research project "The Convergence of Economic
Models in Poland and Ukraine", resulting in this monograph. The fact that this
first joint project addresses problems that are fundamental to both economies, and
at the same time is a large-scale initiative, is clearly positive evidence of the
prospects of Polish-Ukrainian scientific cooperation in the future.
The authors of the monograph presented a thorough diagnosis of convergence
and divergence processes, which took place between Poland and Ukraine after
1990. Primarily they performed a difficult task of identifying the systemic and
institutional conditionalities of economic development and reducing differences
in development. These issues are particularly important for Ukraine, which is an
example of a post-socialist country that has yet to make decisive steps in
selecting its own model of development, while the reforms that have been
implemented, which are based on proven designs of a competitive system, the
information and telecommunications revolution, globalization and integration
trends, have not brought the expected results. This paper proves that the most
applicable model for Ukraine is that of the EU, because it is based on the
harmonization of economic efficiency, social justice and ecological balance. As
such, this model is more understandable to the post-socialist society and can get
its approval. We also hope that this publication will be an important voice in
support of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, as it presents substantial scientific
arguments in favor of this view.
The authors of the monograph deliberately sought to move away from the
purely professional language used by economists, so this work is understandable
to a wide range of readers. I also believe that this publication can be a valuable
resource for students, and also shall be circulated widely beyond academic
centers. For this reason, it could become an effective tool for distributing the idea
of European integration in Ukraine, as well as for gaining a deeper understanding
of specific problems in Ukraine, Poland and other EU countries.
Roman Nestrój,
Rector of the Cracow University of
Economics, Professor, Habilitated Doctor
PREFACE
TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION
OF THE MONOGRAPH
«CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
IN EUROPE: POLISH AND UKRAINIAN CASES»
For almost a quarter of a century the transition of economies of Poland and
Ukraine to the market economy has been in progress.  Production capacities have
been updated, democratic political structures have been developed, and the civil
society has also evolved. The results of these efforts, however, are quite diverse,
notwithstanding the fact that starting potentials for the development of the two
countries have been quite similar. Poland has chosen a firm pro-European
orientation, whereas Ukraine has been following its own way. The experience of
these two nations proves that profound systemic transformations may result in
considerable social and economic advantages, or, in case of their suspension, may
turn into the source of troubles, deepening technological and civilization gap, as
well as the emergence of various obstacles, which interfere with the generation of
the new wave of national economies integration.
In general, there are numerous other reasons, which call for the profound
analysis of the problems of systemic reforms implementation in Poland and
Ukraine. The challenges of the competition of a new type, requiring the search
for the synergies of a combined influence of technological, production,
managerial, financial and other innovations are intensifying. The emerging
markets’ competitive pressure from China, India, Brazil and some other rapidly
developing nations is getting ever stronger. More over, financial and economic
crisis, which broke out in August 2008, caused severe debt problems for many
countries of the world. Nevertheless it made obvious, that some countries,
including Poland, were still better able to overcome the consequences of the
crisis, and therefore to raise the competitiveness of their economies.
For this reason in our monograph we tackle not only the problems of
similarity and divergence of Polish and Ukrainian economies in the context of
real systemic transformations, which take place in both countries, but also
consider the issue of general applicability of Polish experience in the field of
market transition and EU accession for Ukraine.  We also made an attempt to
answer the question, whether the existing social-and-economic system meets the
requirements of progressive development of Ukraine.
Our deliberations are grounded on the argumentations of neo-institutional
theories and some endogenous growth models, as well as deep conviction of
the authors, that development via globalization of neo-liberal type is not the
optimal trajectory for Ukraine. Simultaneously we arrived at a conclusion, that
Russian market transition experience is not able to cause the catch-up
development in case of Ukraine, even though it may be suitable for the solution
of several social-and-economic problems. The hybrid systemic solutions, as
well as those, grounded on the Washington Consensus, can not be regarded as
the alternatives because of the heterogeneous logics of their components, and in
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view of the threats posed by the devaluation of social and human capital and
immanent for many post-socialist states, and firstly for Ukraine, development
paradoxes.
We assert, that economic model of the EU may be suitable for Ukraine, as in
spite of being hyper-bureaucratic it is aimed at harmonization of conditions of
economic efficiency, achievement of the proper social standards, as well as
environmental sustainability. From this viewpoint it makes more sense for the
post-socialist society, and may be approved by it. We have also focused on the
dependence of the market transformation outcomes on a set of cultural
determinants, such as traditions, thinking, personal and collective behaviour,
grounded on the historically formed rules and patterns.
Thus the outcomes of our joint research may be summarised in the following:
1. Modern convergence processes, which are dominant in the world, are quite
controversial, as they often unusually combine with divergence of some states,
which, being part of the integration union, after a long period of mutual
convergence habitually demonstrate rapid growth of divergences in relation to the
social-and-economic postulations, which until recent had been regarded as
unquestionable assumptions. The similar developments may be typical for two
neighbouring nations, which might illustrate both common and distinct features
of their economic systems, revealing in certain periods of their modern history
both convergent and divergent trends. The Central European location of the two
large in terms of population and territory nations — Poland and Ukraine, transit
through their territory of commodity flows of continental importance, and
potential contradiction of the European and post-soviet visions of the integration
prospects on the both sides of the border extends the matter of identification of
qualities of the two economic models far beyond the framework of the traditional
analysis of trans-border economic systems.
2. There are reasons to presume, that transformation processes of Polish and
Ukrainian economies by themselves don’t lead to the convergence, growth and
efficient economic development of these two countries. Its routs are rather
complicated, whilst endogenous and exogenous factors are multifaceted and
controversial.  The considered economic divergence of the two countries is, first
of all, a function of differentiation of market transition processes, as well as one
of institutional changes. The identification of common and different features of
economic development of Poland and Ukraine allows defining the factors of
harmonization of their development, as well as impediments holding up this
process.
3. Although Ukraine is not one of the EU Member States, the exploitation of
Polish experience in the domain of the EU Acquis communautaire
implementation could provide it a plenty of advantages, such as economic, social
and political ones. The possible economic benefits might comprise the achieving
of real convergence of economic growth and development of Ukraine and the
EU, as well as the intensification of effective markets formation in Ukraine.
Social advantages might include the establishment of institutional framework and
the development of social capital, which altogether would lead to the growth of
economic performance and implementation of the policy, built on the system of
social-and-economic cohesion of the EU. Political gains might be associated with
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guarantying political stability, improving the level of security in the region. There
could also be several discrete improvements, such as the expansion of spheres of
self-responsibility for the one’s own wellbeing among the economic agents of
Ukraine.
4. The problem of the post-soviet states’ economies adaptation to the global
market environment is rather challenging for them, as the established theoretical
postulations and traditional managerial technologies are discredited. The
economic and social motivations of Ukraine are not an exception, as any
regulation of its economic system, even after the ratification of the FTA+
Agreement, requires an adaptation period, clear identification of gains, risks and
losses, born by the new status of this European state.
As a result of publication of the present monograph in Polish (2009) and
Ukrainian (2010), and from now on — in English (renewed and revised edition)
we expect the spread, at least within the academic environment, of knowledge
concerning the systemic factors and barriers, suspending the process of
convergence of the two countries, as well as opportunities and threats, connected
with the use of Polish experience in the process of adaptation of economic, social
spheres, and institutions of Ukraine, which are responsible for the decision-
making in the process of Ukraine’s accession to the EU.
Imperative is the comprehension by the society of the need to create a better
climate to enhance the process of accession of Ukraine to the large family of the
EU Member States. Therefore a decision was made to publish the outcomes of
the research of the Polish and Ukrainian economists in English, which will
greatly expand the audience of readers, not indifferent to the European integration
processes.
Viktor Chuzhykov,
Dmytro Lukyanenko,
Michał Gabriel Woźniak,
May 2012, Poland — Ukraine
CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BASES
OF CONVERGENCE OF COUNTRY MODELS
UNDER CONDITIONS
OF GLOBALIZATION
OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
1.1. The Essence and Fundamental Features
of the Evolution of Country Models (late 20th— early 21st centuries)
1.1.1. Introduction
In the modern system of the social and economic science the
interpretation of the term «model» is quite broad, i.e. it covers virtually
all major areas of social development, as well as the mechanisms and
tools to control it. Often referred to as methods of calculation of some
proportions in both the economic and social spheres, enabling the more
informative determination of the nature of transformations in a country or
group of countries and with a high degree of probability; in this case, they
also refer to elements of simplification or, conversely, complication,
which enable the provision of expert opinion to processes that occur in
the extensive system of economic relations. At the same time,
international comparisons of the «successful implementation» of systemic
reforms often require not only the use of the traditional macroeconomic
indicators, but also the synthetic ones, among which the most frequent are
the portion of private property, rate of corruption in society, «ease» of
doing business, and the economic openness of society. In totality, they
can claim to be called a «model». In economic blocs, non-standard
analytical models of state convergence, which enable to identify possible
ways of approaching economies and acceptance (or rejection) by their
people of the values that dominate in the interregional Community, have
recently begun to be implemented.
The many attempts of numerous researchers to isolate exclusively
religious determinants of the «success» or «failure» of national
economies are interesting in many respects, but can hardly serve as the
only explanation for what is happening in a particular state over a specific
period of time (indeed, Ireland entered the EU, being among the outsiders
of the European economy, and in early 2007, its GDP per capita was
second in the European Community after Luxembourg. South Korea’s
development has undergone a long and difficult path from the agricultural
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country it was in the mid-50s, to a superpowerful industrial-banking
«chebol» model in the 70s and its subsequent systemic crisis in 1990s,
and relevant new quality of innovative restoration in the early 21st
century). However, the most essential for a country in a globalized world
economy is the acceptance or non-acceptance of the relevant paradigm
for further development — «Homo economicus» or «Homo sociologicus».
This option requires great responsibility from society for all spheres of
life, it should be made taking into account the mentality of people, the
specifics of the regulation of macro-economic proportions, and thus, the
selection of the optimal model for reaching their goals. Despite the fact
that in Poland this value orientation is more precise and consistent in
character than in Ukraine, the possibility of the convergence of the two
economies, in view of the common problems, ethno-cultural and in part
mental, economic and geographic priorities, seems quite urgent.
1.1.2. The Paradigmatic Vacuum of Country Models
The transfer of mankind to the post-industrial model of development was in
many ways paradoxical and such that had not always contributed to the
convergence of economic models of leading states and «third world»
countries. If in the early 90s they were dominated by the paradigm «Homo
economicus», after global recognition of the concept of sustainable
development at the conference in Rio de Janeiro (1993), most economists
and politicians began to gravitate toward a new paradigm, «Homo
sociologicus», while anticipating that an economic crisis could be
overcome via the balanced development of its three components: economic,
social and environmental. It was assumed that such a model would be the
most justifiable, and therefore the success of the global economy in the
early 1990s (especially of post-industrial countries) had inspired mankind
with the hope for rapid transformational changes in society. Naturally, it
gave rise to a new theoretical search in the conceptual guidance of the
future global order, which was clearly defined by R. Svedberg
(R. Svedberg, 1991), as made evident in the table below (see Table. 1.1).
The author summarized the main methodological achievements of the
economists and philosophers of the late 20th century (Samuelson,
Schumpeter, Mitchels, Friedman et al.), which enabled him to make a
navigable channel between neoclassical (Homo economicus) and social
(Homo sociologicus) paradigms. It was anticipated that the latter would
become dominant in the near future. It brought with it a change in the
number of its components, and more specifically, it was claimed that the
principles of actions rather than individual ones had every chance of
acquiring collective attributes. In the early 1990s, experience of social
convergence in the European Community and many social programs that
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were approved at the time by the US Congress, and finally the activity of
the World Bank, aimed at overcoming poverty in «Third World» countries,
united both theorists and practitioners in their belief that collective
interaction would become dominant in a global economy. From our
perspective, it is not entirely consistent with the real state of affairs,
especially on the level of TNC and TNB1, which in the 1990s started the
process of mergers and acquisitions, which was in essence paradoxical in
the achievement of significant competitive advantages in the global
economy, and therefore collective action was soon replaced by corporate
action, often referred to as a kind of individual action (or rather its
synergistic option). The principle of action also changed, when the existing
social structure of leading states severely limited the use of investment in
them, which until recently had been proud of their achievements. In its
motives, modern global capitalism (or turbokapitalizm, as it is sometimes
called) largely uses rational calculations, nullifying (or substantially
limiting) irrational perception, traditions and mental values.
Table 1.1
NEOCLASSICAL AND SOCIAL PARADIGMS AS A REFLECTIION
OF THE WORLD (SECOND HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY),
ACCORDING TO R. SVEDBERG
Homo economicus Homo sociologicus
Action Individual Collective
Principle of action Freedom of action Limitation of action through theexisting social structure
Motives of action Rational calculations Irrational perception, traditionsand values
Field of action Market The whole Community togetherwith the market
Determining
principle
Multiplicity,
decentralization of
decisions
Decision caused by social and
political power
Types of concepts
used
Analytical and abstract Empirical and descriptive
Tasks of analysis Prediction as anexplanation
Description as a concept
Relation to other
sciences
Self-sufficiency Self-sufficiency
Source: Socio—economics. Toward a New Synthesis / A. Etzioni, P. R. Lawrence. —
N.-Y. — London: M. E. Sharpe, 1991. — Р. 22.
                     
1 According to various sources, transnational corporations accumulate from 2/3 to 3/4
of the world financial resources. The intensification of global competition leads to the fact
that many of them are used to carry out expansionist policies rather than to develop human
capital. The intentions of the majority of governments to change this situation through their
own financial instruments are not always effective.
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The use of the market as the principal, or more accurately, the only
arena with relevant restrictions in the «social market economy» of
Scandinavian countries and Germany and the less regulated market in the
Anglo-American model does not call forth any doubts either. An analysis
of economic growth in these countries over the last decade demonstrates
convincingly: greater economic risks and low GDP growth is
characteristic of socially oriented models of economic growth, which
makes them very vulnerable in the global competition of countries for
investments, labour markets and resources.
In our view, the types of concepts used in society can be regarded as
being quite important. If in the «Homo economicus» paradigm the most
common are analytical and abstract consepts, «Homo sociologicus» is
dominated by the empirical and descriptive ones , the latter of which are
constantly criticized for their inadequate perception of «state — trade
unions — employer» triangle.
Global economic system crises in the late 90s, harsh criticism of the
concept of sustainable development, which was more like a will (dream)
than reality, a new interpretation of the Kondratiev cycles theory (full
amplitude of fluctuation decreased from 70 years to 10—15) caused a
certain theoretical vacuum in the already «traditional» «Economics», by
means of which until recently they tried to explain almost everything.
These contradictions in modern economic methodology were somewhat
clearly revealed by Professor A. Leijonhufvud (A. Leijonhufvud, 2006)
from the University of Trento (Italy).
Taking into account the abovementioned parametrial characteristics,
as well as the «standardized» (if such a word can be used for science)
views of «neoeconomists» A. Leijonhufvud identifics, that the tasks of
the two theories, — the classical one and the modern one, — are quite
different. If the issue in the first case is the detection of the system’s laws
of motion, then in the second one — it’s only the principles of the
efficient allocation of resources. It means that the very existence of the
categories of «law» and «trend» is put into question, which, in our view,
cold threaten our perception of economic theory in general, because the
detection of principles (we will add that they are temporary in the context
of globalization) cannot serve as evidence of the scientific substantiation
of the interpretation of any socio-economic process, and therefore a
question arises, that is quite understandable, on the selection of a specific
model of the development of society with an appropriate methodological
interpretation of its effectiveness, since the next category — utility
maximization of both intentions (according to the classics) or results
(according to neoeconomists) is significantly different. I am not sure that
entrepreneurs from the times of J.B. Sei or or K. Marx did not rely on the
results of their activities, they merely declared their intents. We think that
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A. Leijonhufvud is right in determining the behavior of the individual that
changed from adaptive to the optimal one, which the author defines as
«substantive rationality»: it must be focused on the future. Vivid evidence
of this could possibly be the behavior of many Japanese banks, which in
the early 90s actively secured their positions on many financial (both
geographical and sectoral) markets of the global economy, but the
systemic crisis of the economy of Japan, the country of the «rising sun»,
which took place in the late 90s, forced them to change to rational
behavior, resulting in the formation of financial and industrial capital
associations, known as «koho syudan» («Midzuko», «Sumitomo-Mitsui»,
«Mitsubishi-Tokyo», etc.), which were, in essence, superpragmatic and
superrational. However, even this was not a panacea.
In our opinion, the interpretation of the role of institutions in modern
methodology is quite controversial. The famous theories of
institutionalism and its modern modification — neoinstitutionalism as
compared with the classical (I would also add neoclassical) theory did
indeed make development strategies predictable for both individual
countries and entire sectors of the national, and to some extent, the global
economy, and the consequences of their implementation seemed quite
predictable. Sometimes it assumed relatively simple forms of the
development and implementation of national strategies and programs
(USA, Canada) and envisaged the limited scope of regulation by the state,
sometimes it meant the application of more substantial government
mechanisms and instruments of influence, for example — indicative
planning in France. In time, international institutions (the IMF, European
Central Bank, European Commission) began to assume the functions of
supranational regulation. The strengthening of global organizations
disturbed the balance on the macro and micro level, which led to a
dramatic debate on the general feasibility of their existence in market
conditions. However, this was not the only way in which the balance was
disturbed. In Germany, the number of supporters of the «Homo
sociologicus» paradigm has decreased recently, primarily through the
destruction of the population’s traditional notion of the dominance of
social development in the country. The latest national statistics data show
that average annual GDP growth in the country over the last ten years was
only 1.5 %, while the number of recipients of social assistance in view of
poverty — «socialamt» increased by 7 % per year. The coming to power
of Nicolas Sarkozy in France was not a coincidence, since his main
election slogan was the regulation of social assistance, the recipients of
which were almost 10 % of the population, mostly immigrants from
around the world. Naturally, tax increases, as a simple arithmetic
operation to solve social problems, resulted in further outflow of
investment according to the principle of the firm «Tefal». The crisis of
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the social model of society in the global economy had already become
apparent in the late 20th — early 21st century, and it started, oddly
enough, with leading countries. It is natural, that it was followed by the
economic crisis (2008—2009).
To identify trends and thus to identify specific «extremes» of the
impact of globalization on all spheres of social and economic life, it is
vital to determine the critical levels of the most vulnerable aspects of this
process. Given that the term «globalization» appeared relatively recently
(late 1980s) and the phenomenon itself, to a certain extent, has existed
since the transition of humanity to the slave society, it would be expedient
to concentrate only on the parametrized identification of selective
components of this process, directly resulting from different approaches
to the interpretation of the two paradigms, «Homo economicus» and
«Homo sociologicus». The avant-garde work of L. Marks,
N. Kalaitzandonakes, S. Konduru (2006), might be very useful to develop
the understanding of the process, as they after a thorough analysis of the
major publications on the mentioned subjects, managed not only to detect
the critical places of the taxonomy of modern terminology, but also
determine their hierarchical and conclusive nature.
The contradictory nature of the globalization process, as noted by the
above-mentioned scientists from the University of Missouri-Columbia
(USA), is quite clearly reflected on the dendrogram in two blocs — positive
and negative, and clearly illustrates the changes in society, which the
phenomenon brings with it. World trade, for example, increases access to all
the benefits of civilization, while reducing poverty in post-industrial countries
and in fact encouraging its growth in «Third World» countries , thus creating
a negative environment in some coutries and positive one in the others.
Uneven economic development is strengthened, in spite of the fact that there
are new poles of growth in both «Third World» countries (India, China), and
in some regions of post-industrial countries (Silicon Valley in the USA,
Stockholm — Kista in Sweden), which in the mid-20th century were not
distinguished by the best combination of production factors, but now differ
from the global periphery with their high dynamism, relevant preferential tax
regime and new rules (in spite of everything, they exist) of the innovative and
investment flow of capital, which have yet to be adequately studied by global
economic science. Thus, it becomes obvious that the explanation of M. Porter
on the competitiveness of the national economy through the competitiveness
of firms that are part of it, does not appear to be very convincing. It follows
that the author’s famous «diamond» will shortly have to become a polygon.
The hyperdynamic business of global networks correlates weakly with the
traditional interpretation of production factors and the estimations of the
competitiveness of firms according to Porter, which until recently have been
admired by his numerous followers.
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The interpretation by L. Marks and his collabourators of employment
seems quite strange, which should be compared to the negative and
positive migration rather than with localization, which, incidentally, has
no antipode. Transborder migration will undoubtedly intensify in the 21st
century and serve as a «compensation» response to the challenges of
innovation and investment globalization. With this, it is possible to
predict that the income of the citizens of post-industrial countries will
grow more slowly, the supply of surplus labour from developing
countries will grow and the social package for new migrants will
decrease. This means that the situation wherein mankind will shortly find
itself in, will most likely be determined according to the communist
slogan from past years improved by the Russian professor L. Miasnikova
(2006), — «from each according to his abilities — to each according to
his needs, determined by abilities», i.e., as the author herself notes, the
situation will be formed, when «people are equal before God and law, and
in all other respects they will not be equal»2. The first part of this forecast
does not raise any doubts, which cannot be said about the second part,
because laws are written by people and supposedly for specific groups of
people, whose interests they protect. The experience of former Soviet
countries demonstrates the high probability of the dominance of this
particular position.
At the same time, in our opinion, another L. Miasnikova’s assertion
on the existing paradigms of economic development is quite important. In
her opinion, they clearly fit three categories: networks of netocracy,
networks of bourgeois and consumerate, as well as world networks;
hierarchical relations exist among them.
Netocracy is the intellectual elite of the middle class, using its
intellect as a means of production, which is backed by a personal
computer. The finished product here is the organization of a new network
or the upgrade of an existing one, the strengthening of their competitive
advantages or, conversely, the reduction of the influence of other
networks. People belonging to this class are at the same time producers of
networks, and their powerful consumers, which clearly follows from the
next block — bourgeoisie and consumerate networks. Today, post-
industrial society is a multistructural consumer model, in which the use of
new generation advertising technologies, armed with an in-depth
knowledge of human psychology, leads to the diversification of consumer
demand (or even to the excessive consumption of so-called «cheap
things»). How is it possible to estimate the movement of aggregate
                     
2 Prof. N. Birdsall (2006), President of the Center for Global Development (USA),
gives his data on country asymmetries, whereby nowadays the USA, the EU and Japan are
100 times richer than Ethiopia, Haiti and Nepal, while in the early 20th century, this ratio
was 9:1.
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demand or supply curves in the economy of a specific country, where
psychologists of the highest qualification have taken on the case?
World networks in a globalizing world economy will become
increasingly used not only in terms of availability via e-commerce, but
also in terms of easy access for most customers to different information
sources, data banks, etc.
The new paradigm proposed by prof. L. Miasnikova, which is often
called «Homo informaticus» in the West, however, shall be considered as
a separate component of the «Homo economicus» paradigm, in which
another link of netocracy has appeared, consisting of top managers
(curators), scientists (eternalists), managers (nexilists) and others.
However, it does not bring new changes in behavior, area of activity,
principles of action and other aspects that define the reference to
«Sociologicus» or «Economicus». In our opinion, the answer to the
question whether a paradigm can have a regional and sectoral hierarchy is
quite important, because its component structure, global identification
and applied orientation depend on it.
The identification of the most significant features of the modern
paradigm is impossible without a clear definition of its parameters, which
were determined for the first time by the American, T. Kuhn, back in
1962, who is rightly considered to be the second author since ancient
times, to implement this term in modern methodology. Despite all the
criticism of many followers and opponents of the «Chicago-based»
interpretation of the definition of a «paradigm», it has still not lost its
relevance in the economy. T. Kuhn defines a paradigm as «... recognition
by everybody of the scientific achievements, that for a certain time offer a
model for posing a question and its resolution by the scientific
Community» (T. Kuhn, 1975 : 11). The above interpretation envisages
the existence of models, and thus their detailed description, which is
recognized by everyone and can be considered as a model (standard) for
the most rapid implementation. Given this, there may be (in fact, it
already exists) a sectoral interpretation of a paradigm (e.g., innovation,
recreational, social development), and regional (the world as a whole, the
EU, Ukraine, Poland, etc.), and inter-sectoral, international, and thus any
other. What are the consequences of this fragmentation? Most likely it
will lead to a complete blurring of its interpretation. With this in mind,
the system definition of a paradigm offered by the outstanding American
and Hungarian economist, J. Kornai (2002), who we feel best defined its
main characteristics, deserves attention: the identification of the system as
a whole and the relationship between its components; the interdisciplinary
nature of research; the institutionalization of society; the evolutionary and
historical nature of the studied process (phenomenon); individual
preferences; the use of statistical models due to the existence of
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methodological problems; the study of internal dysfunctions that are
inevitable; own methods of analysis and methodology.
It is possible to agree with J. Kornai in terms of identifying the
components of the «system paradigm» concept, because he defined its
methodological bases in detail, but there are serious doubts in terms of the
detection of a single interdisciplinary paradigm that is not substantiated in
any way and is unlikely to ever be realized, since even theoretically it
cannot meet the above-stated criteria, which will be recognized
simultaneously by political scientists, sociologists, economists, culturologists
philosophers and other professionals. Under conditions of the increasing
globalization of the world economy, it is vital not only to state the multiple
structure of the studied phenomenon (no doubt, J. Kornai is right in this
respect), but also the polisystemic nature of socio-economic processes
taking place in the global economy. Thus, it is clear that it is not really
possible to expect the emergence of a single system paradigm in the near
future, instead (we take responsibility for this forecast) local industrial
paradigms will be reproduced intensively, and their effectiveness, as
follows from T. Kuhn’s theory and the «characteritics» of J. Kornai, will be
determined by the existence of highly valid socio-economic development
models of country and megaregional levels.
Under conditions of the increasing globalization of the world
economy and shaping of the dominant development paradigm, the
detection of the correlation «global» → «local» will be of utmost
importance in the near future. The well-known slogan of the recent
years; «Think globally — act locally» quite meaningfully reflects the
essence and the main components of the three approaches of world
economic development in the 21st century, which David Held and
Anthony McGrew define as neoliberal, liberal international and
institutional reformist, global transformation, protectionist and radical
models, each having the appropriate criteria basis (basic ethical
principles, proposed management system, key reforms, preferred form
of globalization and a political transformation course). In another part
of his book «Globalization/ Antiglobalization» (D. Held, 2004 : 106)
the authors suggested quite a successful synthetic globalization policy
model — «cosmopolitan social democracy» (crossed social position).
From our point of view, it seems quite convincing, as it allows the
integration of at least three different conceptual positions: of liberal
internationalists, institutional reformers and supporters of global
change, i.e. movements that both support globalization (the first two)
and oppose it. The main features of the newly created model of
global/local development should be:
1. Human rights and shared responsibilities. Political equality (basic
ethical principles).
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2. Management on the part of individuals through market relations.
Minimized impact of the state. International institutions, a polistructural
system of relations: global — supranational — national — regional —
local (management system).
3. International free trade. Expansion of political participation, full
access to ensure global public goods. The strengthening of diverse
membership in political communities. The dominance of international law
(key reforms).
4. The acceleration of interdependence through free trade, integration
in corporate forms of intergovernment relations. The regulation of global
processes together with democratic global governance. A multi-level
cosmopolitan state structure and the regulation of global processes to
achieve equal autonomy for all (preferred form of globalization).
5. Strengthening observation of human rights, environmental regulation
as well as the reform of global governance. Increasing the share of
collective action. Decentralized country management. Reconstruction of
global governance through the democratization of states, civil society and
transnational institutions (political transformation method).
Naturally, the socio-economic model of the country cannot be isolated
even in cases when it is closed to outside influences, instead the
development concept adopted by society should be open for discussion
both during its development and approval, as well as during its
implementation. However, the success of the model will depend on how
well it will be integrated in the global paradigm, the formation of which
will significantly affect the nature and directions of internal
transformation of virtually all world countries in the near future.
1.1.3. Transformational Models of Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEE)
The transition from the administrative command system to a market
society in CEE countries was in many ways complex and controversial,
because there were no theoretical and applied models of fast (slow) or
any other transformation of society in the world, and thus, nobody could
propose ready transition scenarios, taking into account the specifics of the
national economy. However, the advice of many supranational
institutions — the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and some
European institutions for the countries with transforming economies were
quite helpful, though not as ideal as the population and governments
counted on. In fact, during this period the two main strategies (models) of
socio-economic transformation were formed: the «shock therapy» of
Polish economist L. Balcerowicz and gradualism (evolution), one of the
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authors of which was the previously mentioned Hungarian Professor J.
Kornai. The principal difference between them was in the terms and
methods for transition to a market economy.
Initial conditions for the beginning of reforms were quite clearly
defined by Polish economist Grzegorz Kołodko (2000 : 24), which he
called «Socialist freudianism or galbraith’s socialism» (2000 : 24),
hinting at the vacuum of theoretical and practical developments for the
implementation of a relevant model. Post-Soviet countries experienced
similar, though with some specifics, initial conditions, however,
approaches to transition differed mainly in the following: lack of a clear
certainty of people and governments as to the kind of society they were
going to build (there were plenty of options, «market socialism»,
«socialism with a human face», «Christian socialism», etc.), the
inconsistency of reforms, the naive attempts of governments to initially
provide aid to all segments of the population, bearing in mind that there
was actually nothing to share, hypertrophic non-transparent
privatization and so on. In the Asian countries of the former Soviet
Community it was accompanied by the purely antidemocratic
usurpation of power, when the former Secretary of the Communist Party
actually became a lifetime president and at the same time, the richest
person in the state. Nevertheless, the shock, gradualist and «post-
Soviet» models of transition to a market economy had a number of
common transformation activities.Back in 1995, A. Gelb and C. Gray
identified four main elements of system transformation, including:
macroeconomic stabilization and control; pricing, and market reform;
the development of the private sector, privatization, reform of the
industrial structure; and redefining the role of the state. J. Marangos
(2005), a modern researcher of the problems of transitional economy,
distinguished seven of such blocks (price liberalization, privatization,
institutional structure, monetary policy and financial system, fiscal
policy, international trade and foreign aid, social policy) and determined
the conditional duration of each, with a total time lag, which in his
opinion does not exceed ten years.
Author concludes that, the most difficult and therefore the most
protracted process in all countries of the megaregion was the privatization
of large enterprises, which was most effectively conducted in Hungary
and the Czech Republic, but significantly delayed in Ukraine, the Russian
Federation and Kazakhstan.
The formation of an institutional structure had a different content
in post-socialist countries. For example, while in Central and Eastern
European countries, at the end of the 1990s, governments began to
fulfil a merely regulatory function, in post-soviet countries they still
focused on management, directive and distributive functions. Many of
CHAPTER 1. Theoretical and empirical bases of convergence… 29
them sought to maximize their powers, using fiscal pressure,
numerous inspections and regulation, attempted to gain almost
complete control of business. This significantly separates the post-
Soviet bloc from the European countries.
The budget deficit problem is typical of any country, however its
various indicators in CEE countries, together with the rate of inflation
and government debt, play a restrictive role during a country’s
accession to the EU and, in accordance with the «Stability Pact» — to
the Eurozone.
The system of social assistance in CEE countries, is still different on
the state level, both by nature and scale. For example, the minimum
pension in most countries exceeds the subsistence level (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia), but in others it is equal or even below it
(mostly in CIS countries). Similar budget deficit problems in almost all
CEE countries are specifically resolved at the expense of limited funding
for the social sector, causing the well-known «compensation migration
effect», when a Polish doctor goes to work in Sweden or Germany, and a
Ukrainian doctor takes his place.
Transfer to J. Marangos’ (2005) neoclassical gradualist model was
based on different regulation instruments and mechanisms, but had
similar consequences. Considering the results given by Marangos, one
can argue that the most successful reforms were those in Hungary, and
the least successful ones — in Romania. Slovenia, for example, was
more of an outsider, but all CEE countries would envy the
macroeconomic results it achieved after becoming an EU member. In
our view, this is not so much because of the scale and dynamism of
reforms (although it also plays an important role), but because of the
size of the country and degree of adequacy of the reform (acceptance)
of its economic complex; the reforms taking place in society. (The two
smallest CEE countries — Estonia and Slovenia achieved quite high
performance results. The former has competitiveness indices that allow
it to be included in the group of high-level countries (together with
France). The latter has GDP per capita at a level that even today
exceeds that of Portugal, and its human development index (HDI)
places it among the European leaders.)
Naturally, the further development of socio-economic models in
Central and Eastern European countries will largely take place under the
influence of the strengthening of globalization processes in the world
economy as a whole and continental integration in particular, and the
model proposed by Polish economist G. Kołodko (2002 : 15), to describe
these processes is called «post-socialist capitalism.» The period 1990-
2000, which was considered to be transformational, had different national
strategies for CEE countries, but despite the implementation of similar
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measures, that were compressed or, conversely, stretched in time, actually
brought the same results. The actual GDP in 2000 relative to 1989
(1989 = 100 %) was only exceeded by Albania (104.2 %), Poland
(107 %), Slovakia (103 %), Slovenia (113.7 %) and Hungary (104 %).
Ukraine and Moldova had a ten-year recession (the longest among CEE
countries), while it only lasted for 2-3 years in Poland and Slovenia.
During this period, many countries had a secondary recession (Albania,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Croatia), and
Moldova, Romania and the Czech Republic had three minimal falls (G.
Kolodko, 2002 : 71).
At the same time, the above complications did not influence the
possibility of EU accession for most CEE countries, thus dividing Europe
into two parts: an integrated one, and the one that is still undergoing
transformation. The overall difference in quality and time of reforms
conducted in Ukraine and CEE countries, as well as time lags and their
stages (accession to the GATT/WTO, application for accession to the EU,
establishment of a free trade zone with the European Community and the
beginning of the implementation of the EU «acquis communautaire») in
early 2001 constituted 6 years, while in 2007 it increased to 10-11 years.
The need for diversification in the European direction and completion of
transformation reforms in Ukraine is an urgent requirement for transition
to the innovative development model, which largely corresponds to the
wishes of the peoples of Ukraine and Poland.
1.1.4. Can Country Models Converge?
The transition to a market economy while preserving social determinants
of development always encounters some very important circumstances,
which can subsequently determine the nature of relations between
countries and directions of future convergence. In addition, according to
Horst Siebert (Horst Siebert, 2006) from the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy, increasing local competition is inevitable in the context of a
new paradigm of the international division of labour. Ukraine, which, by
its geographical location is between the European Union and the Russian
Federation, will, in the future, experience the civilization, economic,
social and demographic impact of the two major megaregional «magnets»
— the European and the Eurasian ones. According to the poles theory of
Canadian researcher Alex Bettler (2002 : 73) the geo-economic structure
of the world in the 21st century will be determined by the economic
weight of countries reflecting their economic potential, which on the
aggregate level, is evaluated via the GNP/GDP indicator. According to
the calculations of the above author, there are two poles in Eastern
Europe — Russia with its USD 400 billion GDP and Poland with more
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than USD 200 billion GDP3. The resulting bipolarity is quite complex for
Ukraine, because, under the conditions of convergence of Russia and the
EU, Ukraine and Poland will benefit from their high transitive potential,
conversely under divergence conditions — Ukraine will lose, because a
high degree of integration of Poland into the EU and the expansionist
strategy of Russian TNCs will stretch regions of Ukraine on different
sides of the border. What could happen then? The gravitation of western
and southwestern regions to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania,
and of eastern regions — to Russia will form an unstable balance that
could harm the integral unity of the state. Possible benefits could include
the creation of a new harmonized model for Ukraine’s economic
development, which would be a diffusion system of socio-economic
factors for the megaregional transformation of civilizations. Under these
conditions, the benefit for both Ukraine and Poland would be obvious.
From our point of view, the main directions for the convergence of the
economic models of Ukraine and Poland could soon be as follows:• the further development of economic relations and transferring them
to a pragmatic direction; the establishment of joint ventures in priority
sectors of the economy;• implementation of Polish experience in Ukraine as regards SMEs
support;• the establishment of international financial and industrial groups in
innovative sectors;• the diversification of Euroregional cooperation;• joint participation in EU technology programs (especially in the
Seventh Framework Program);• development of scientific and technological cooperation between
the leading scientific schools and the commercialization of the achieved
results;• strengthening of humanitarian contacts in the social sphere;• Polish support of the European aspirations of Ukraine and lobbying
of common interests in EU institutions.
Many other ways of strengthening cooperation between Poland and
Ukraine will be addressed in other chapters of this book.
                     
3 There is one contradiction in A. Bettler’s model. The fact is that the increasing
homogenization of the European economic area is inevitable under conditions of the free
movement «of four European freedoms», and thus it is possible to speak not about the
Ukraine — Poland, Ukraine — Russia correlations, but about the Ukraine — EU, Ukraine
— CIS models. If you anticipate that the total GDP in the EU now exceeds USD 12 trillion
and the same indicator in the CIS is USD 700 billion, which is less then the GDP of Spain
it is clear that the gravitation of Ukraine to the EU will be dominant, despite all
contradictions of a mental, ethical and civilizational nature. Such evidence can be found in
the migration model of Stewart, which is based on differences in the incomes of the
population. Based on these calculations, the volume of migration to the Russian Federation,
will decrease, but they will increase in the direction of EU states.
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1.2. Criteria for the Evaluation of the
Functionality of Economic Systems
1.2.1. Introduction
The functionality of the economic system should be understood as the
ability of mechanisms controling the national economy or any component
thereof (enterprises, households, individual markets, etc.) to effectively
achieve economically desirable objectives. Thus, a functional economic
system is characterized by two attributes: the efficiency of the
implementation of goals and the effective use of resources. Thus, it is
impossible to answer the question: is an economic system functional, if
desired objectives are not achieved and if there is no definition of
effectiveness.
Liberal mainstream economic theory, derived from classical and
neoclassical economics, is based on the paradigm of methodological and
meaningful individualism. This theory recognizes that society is
composed of atomized individuals who maximize personal benefits,
calculated and defined by market categories. However, the assertion that
human behavior can be altruistic when they perform any role, other than
an economic one, is denied. In fact, individuals will be characterized by
ever-growing needs. This means that fewer and fewer tangible resources
have to circulate in the environment over time. In this approach,
heterogeneity of preferences does not prove the heterogeneity of selection
criteria. Sure, it is personal interest that unites a worker, an entrepreneur,
the head of a family, a statesman or even a monk, but each person
understands this interest according to the hierarchy of values defined by
him/her.
A perfect competition model takes into account the fact that a person
is an individual. As a creature that maximizes his/her own profit, he/she is
quite intelligent, well-informed and can immediately make rational
decisions. By doing so he/she is able to minimize the cost of his/her
objectives. Based on these principles, the thesis of the market that meets
all the criteria of the functionality of the economic system is widespread,
particularly: efficiency, increased production per capita, balance, stability
and equitable distribution. However, the simulated market functions in a
social vacuum, and has no educational, informational and emotional
limitations. You can guess that the rules of the competitive environment
are formed spontaneously by trial and error, and therefore the intervention
of government is unnecessary or aimed only at taking care of the
competitive system.
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1.2.2. Economic Growth Criterion
The ability of economic systems to achieve the objectives of economic
management is the evidence of their effectiveness. The efficiency of an
economic system depends not only on decisions in the field of micro- and
macro-regulation, but, in short, on existing mechanisms of interrelations
and the coordination of the behavior of economic participants. The
effectiveness of economic systems is demonstrated by their ability to reach
the objectives, towards which society, groups thereof and individuals
gravitate. This fact causes the great difficulties in assessing the
functionality level of individual economic systems, because it is impossible
to make evaluations regardless of what goals people are seeking and by
means of what criteria they organize always complex structure of goals.
From the viewpoint of individual participants of economic
management, only those economies are recognized as functional, which
are beneficial for each of them or enable them to reach their own
objectives. In this case, functionality is identified as efficiency.
According to ever growing needs and a growing population, effective
economic systems should have such control mechanisms that guarantee
the growth of social welfare and quality of life. However, the
fundamental problem is the duration of the national economy’s
production growth per capita. Hence there are the main criteria of
efficiency and economic growth. However, economic growth, as
measured by GDP per capita, cannot be an apt sign of the condition of
the national economy, social welfare and quality of life. In order to
eliminate deficiencies that arise as a result of the underestimation or
overestimation of the value of the national as compared to foreign
currency, it is necessary to set the value of GDP according to the so-
called purchasing power parity. Instead, to reflect economic
development to the cost of GDP better, it is necessary to add the
estimated production cost of the shadow economy and deduct the cost
of estimated damages associated with the contamination and
degradation of the environment. To determine the influence of the
structural effects of economic growth on the quality of life, it is
necessary to use a package of analytical indicators. Currently,
international statistics operate using synthetic indices of economic
development and the quality of life, such as the Index of Sustainable
Economic Welfare (ISEW) or Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW).
However, none of the indices of economic development and quality of
life has gained universal acceptance and is not published regularly.
Historical experience shows that long-term economic growth cannot
be achieved without increase in productivity factors. Continuous
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economic growth is associated with technological progress, which allows
going beyond the boundaries that limit the growth of production in
accordance with the law of diminishing marginal productivity.
The classical theory of economic growth proves that to maximize
long-term production and welfare per capita, the economy needs to show
continuous sustainable growth. This means that the economic system
should be able to balance supply and demand at any time. In this case the
criterion of balance will apply.
The measures of governments that intervene and the desire of
society usually give preference to high economic growth, which
threatens the stability of actual processes. The philosophy of high rate
of economic growth has almost never been opposed, until the formation
in 1968 of the Rome Club, which dealt with the issue of the research of
economic growth limits. As a result, it became clear that high rates of
economic growth cannot be interpreted as the only effective way to
increase the wealth of nations, eradicate poverty and improve the
quality of life. It could happen that the factor limiting public welfare
becomes the cause for the disruption of the ecological balance and
subsequently also an environmental crisis, caused by the excessive
expansion of the global economy. Hence the question arose about
finding a new means for economic growth, which will increase social
welfare to the maximum for a long period, but taking the ecological
balance into consideration. Supporters of investment growth models
pointed out the limit of economic growth, acting according to the
efficiency criterion, this limit being connected with the so-called golden
rule of accumulation4, but the supporters of growth, who professed the
ideas of lasting and balanced development, spoke in favor of zero
growth. Contrary to currently popular literature, pointing out the
dangers that threaten the survival of man and derived from the
philosophy of expansive growth (threat to the ecosphere, exhaustion of
non-renewable resources, etc.), there are many supporters of high rates
of economic growth. Such appeals are heard from supporters of a
possible immediate reduction of differences in the development of post-
socialist countries.
However, the concept of zero growth is extremely controversial not
simply because of the interest of poor societies. It does not give
incentives to find ways to reduce growth costs. To reduce the growth rate
of all production is a very simplified solution and socially less optimal
than to intensify the search of the ways to reduce the cost of economic
growth.
                     
4 Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) was studied by G.E. Daily and J.B.
Coob Jr. in 1989, see more: Gil, Śleszyński, 2000.
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Forces on a global scale could be directed towards reducing the cost
of economic growth to support the foundations of long-term and balanced
development. However, it requires the replacement of GDP as the
criterion of performance of economy by a new measure, which would
cover the full set of factors that affect the quality of life in the economic
development programmed by governments and the social assessments of
the program5. However, more adequate measurements of the quality of
life will not solve the problem of the selection of the desired rates of
economic growth and the economic development model, which are
always the result of the autonomous decisions of market participants and
other entities that regulate economic activity, because these decisions are
based on specific value systems that facilitate or limit the definition of the
foundations of long-term and balanced economic development. In this
respect, the efforts of governments should be focused on education,
teaching people to be aware of environmental protection and the
promotion of long-term and balanced development.
In Poland, a high rate of economic growth, which would have helped
to reduce the lagging behind of development to the average GDP per
capita in EU countries, will only be possible when all components of
global demand, i.e. household consumption, investment and export, is the
driving force of this development growth, which means that the strategy
for reducing the gap in development and drawing closer to EU countries
will be very difficult to implement.
Judging by experience, an economic growth rate of less than 2.0 %
per annum is not enough to meet many basic needs, and leads to the
deepening of social conflicts. Such economic growth is not sufficient for
developing and underdeveloped countries, which include Poland and
Ukraine, as it results in a deepening in the difference in development as
compared to developed countries and a further increase in unemployment.
It is difficult to modernize the economy with low GDP growth, because
attempts to do it would lead to a sharp increase in already very high
unemployment. Given the problems arising from high unemployment, at
the very least, Poland needs for the GDP to grow by 5 % per annum and
this figure should stay stable for a long period, since at present, according
to estimates, GDP can reduce the unemployment rate by 1 %, and the
country’s development gap, compared to the EU average will reduce over
two generations. According to many economists, a delay in growth, or in
other words, zero growth, is meaningless. «Humanity has experienced
long periods of actually stagnant state only because technology has not
changed or changed very slowly» (Sauvy, 1973).
                     
 5 The reasons for increasing the difference in development between the EU and the
US, I analyze in the article: Woźniak, 2000.
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1.2.3. The Balance Criterion
The long-term inequality of supply and demand, which exists both in a
market economy and in an economy controlled by the state, gives the
impression that disbalance is typical and ubiquitous. It even seems that
there are some forces inherent in this type of economy, the result of
which as regards the system, is that once disturbed, it is unable to return
to balanced growth. According to the Keynesian theory of fixed prices,
it can be concluded that in actual fact, there are only unbalanced
systems. Market coordination creates restrictions on the part of demand,
and the state creates a restriction (central coordination) on the part of
proposals, or, in other words, the resources of production factors.
There are major qualitative differences between unbalanced growth,
which is realized through markets, and controlled growth (Mishan,
1986), (Kornai, 1985). Unbalanced growth in the economy, managed by
the state, reduces the efficiency of production and consumption, quality
of life and spurs economic development. In this case, a buyer becomes a
visitor, who has to make considerable efforts to pay for the basket of
goods and services that meet his needs. Their deficiency bows to
distribution, which in turn bows to inefficient disputes about access to
resources and the distribution of other opportunistic practices. Their
side effects are the widespread violation of rules of social coexistence
(selling under the counter, abuse of power in order to find outlets for the
selling of products, sales of shelf warmers, loss of free time in the
search for goods, etc.), the psychological tension of a person, moral
damage and numerous conflicts. Such distribution of income, which
differs from the previously planned tasks and initial benefits, is also
mandatory.
In this case, the reduced efficiency of production is concerned with
the forced replacement of resources or the structure of production, poor
labour discipline, interruption in work, excessive pressure on
quantitative growth, the deterioration of the quality of goods and
services, the high cost of production, lack of motivation for technical
progress and improving the quality of products. The inefficient use of
resources involved in manufacturing is softened by the significant use
of all human and material resources in manufacturing, thus, we have:
exhaustion, in time, of driving forces of economic growth and the long-
term nature of the deficit in the centralized planned economy.
Countering the trend towards the reduction of economic dynamics is
possible, as long as there are still unused production resources, or as a
result of the less effective regulation of production.
Restriction of demand, which is characteristic for a market
economy, diametrically changes the positions of a seller and a buyer.
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In such a situation, a manufacturer and a seller are forced to look for a
buyer, which takes a lot of different, both productive and
organizational efforts. However, unbalanced growth under these
conditions has some negative consequences, such as: unemployment,
the excessive expansion of non-elementary needs and in view of this,
the violation of the sovereignty of a consumer and the imposition of a
«to have more» life style, materialization and the dehumanization of
social relations. Thereto, conditions for maximizing profits and risks,
feelings of insatiability are created and a hedonistic mood begins to
dominate. There also appear to be many other diverse side effects, such
as environmental threats, the depletion of natural resources and more
conflicts on an international level due to the lack of feasibility to
implement consumption standards borrowed from highly-developed
countries on a global level, difficulties arise both in societies where
generations, accustomed to live in surplus wealth and in those where it
is considered appropriate to abandon the path of economic growth.
Following theoretical interpretations, accepting a simplified image
of economy, which enables the creation of its theoretical model that is
limited by three factors: knowledge, the effective result of which is
productive labour, capital and labour, this model makes it possible to set
conditions for sustainable growth. Modern economy can boast
achievements in this field in the form of models which can lay the
ground for economic policies based on Keynesian, classical and
endogenous theories, which indicates the possibility of accelerating
economic growth and convergence to highly developed economies due
to skilful investment in human capital6.
According to the Keynesian approach, balanced markets only happen
by chance. This is due to pricing agreements between parties to
transactions, which make it impossible to discount for certain shorter
periods (stability of prices). Solid prices arising from the obligations
stipulated in the agreements in the case of falling demand, result in a
balance, provided that productive forces are not used in full, and in the
case of growing demand it is possible to achieve a balance for the full use
of productive forces in each instance. Achieving a balance at the level of
the full use of production factors may be due to rising incomes, and,
therefore, demand. The initiation of this process through centralized
strategic coordination by using instruments of fiscal and (or) monetary
policy is essential, because markets without government intervention can
come to standstill at this level of balance, which does not guarantee the
full use of productive powers and economic growth.
                     
6 Overview of representative models of economic growth for the above theories can be
found in: Woźniak, 2004.
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In a market economy, sufficient flexibility in prices is a condition for
the deviation of the actual level of economic growth from sustainable
growth. In market models based on the classical economics paradigm, it
is guaranteed by the free market, and intervention from outside the
market (country) is not necessary for actual economic growth to occur by
means of balance. The only justification for non-market regulation is the
elimination of sources of the inviolability of accompanying processes,
related to information constraints and the limitations of free choice.
1.2.4. Stabilization Criterion
The stability of actual processes in the economy can also be called the
consistency of changes or their similarity. Stabilization is the process of
bringing the aggregate of actual processes or its components in line with
the uniformity of changes in these processes in terms of time and subject
fields. Their synthetic expression is the stable nature of changes in the GDP
and its components (consumption, production growth of individual sectors
of the economy, etc.), as well as the relationship between them, for
example, the level of investment and capital intensity ratio. Instead,
instability is associated with fluctuations in GDP growth levels and other
characteristics of economic growth over time. The stability or instability of
actual processes in the economy may be related to different time and
subject fields. In practice actual processes in the economy are caused by
fluctuations in the state of affairs, resulting from demand or supply shocks.
In a narrow interpretation, stabilization can pertain to prices,
employment, receipt of investments, equilibrium on this market, public
sector, external trade, etc. In a broad interpretation, stabilization is
identified with the equilibrium providing labour resources are used in full.
This is why the stability of the economy requires that in order to preserve
the balance, the level of economic growth must at least correspond with
the level of population growth. Thus, the stability of economic growth
levels is identical to their sustainable level per capita. This means the
stagnation of living standards. In order to ensure an improvement in the
population’s standard of living, long-term GDP growth should exceed the
average level of population growth, and growth stability should be
considered in accordance with the level of GDP growth per capita.
The level of economic instability, according to some segments of the
economy, can be manifested by means of the rate of inflation,
unemployment, budget deficit, current turnover deficit and others, and
its total measure could be the difference between the level of actual and
potential GDP, i.e. such, which can be achieved on condition of full job
placement and the full use of production powers.
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A high level of instability in the economy raises a number of negative
consequences in the form of additional public spending and the waste of
resources (unemployment, unused production apparatus, bankruptcy of
inefficient enterprises, fall in interest to make investments, etc.). This is
why economic policy should be directed towards reducing instability, i.e.
to a level that does not restrict long-term development and the growth of
economic welfare.
The development of statistical analysis instruments and spreading of
awareness of the fact that the interdependence of development and its
high ranking driving forces, which cannot be easily identified and which
are of a complex nature, caused a departure from the tenets of the
sustainability of economic growth in the deterministic sense, i.e. stability
of the level of changes. In this regard, the stability criterion can be stated
as the lack of significant changes in the formation of the values of
individual variables during the entire analyzed period. The intangibility of
these changes is demonstrated by the ease of their control. From this
perspective, acceptable limits of the dynamics level of the major
characteristics of economic stability are defined for the purposes of
economic policy.
The role of some factors and growth conditions, as well as factors that
difficult to measure, which are variable over time, the role of which is
determined by the so-called random component in the growth model, lead
to the fact that the stability of growth, even in terms of its sustainability,
can be spoken about according to certain time limits, within which
growth conditions are not subject to significant change (for example,
within the scope of the identical creation of technologies, types of control
mechanisms, similar level of scarcity of some resources).
There are no ready-made samples of stabilization policy that take into
account the specific structural deficiencies of post-socialist countries. The
inadequacy of concept provisions, focused around price adjustments that
contribute to the development of monetarism or other scientific trends,
and moreover of quantitative constraints associated with Keynesianism,
leads to the recommendations associated with these concepts being highly
controversial.
The exclusive set of stabilization purposes causes difficulties in
setting proportions between these purposes, particularly between the scale
of the inflation rate limitation and appropriate measures, guaranteeing
support of economic growth processes. In this case, the controversy also
concerns the priorities of maintaining an external and an internal balance.
An interesting concept for the stabilization of actual processes is
provided in the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty designated for EU
Member States. They are aimed at slow long-term growth, which
corresponds with the desire to develop similarly to the societies of leader-
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states. In this respect, its usefulness for the states that have to cut a
significant development lag is sometimes questioned in economic policy.
Concerns when attempting to apply these criteria are not accepted by the
supporters of liberal economic policy. It should be noted that the
possibilities of accelerating economic growth in poorer EU Member
States to facilitate the convergence process occur on the basis of
subsidiarity, which provides support from the structural funds, and the
cohesion of development processes. There is also a certain lag of freedom
in fiscal regulations, which can serve the stabilization of the economy and
accelerate its growth.
The stability of economic dynamics lays the foundation for balance as
a state, which is generally rare, instead stability, as a process of an
approach towards balance, can be inherent in long-term economic growth
if macro regulation mechanisms have instruments with stabilizing
features (flexible prices, automatic stabilizers established by economic
regulation centres).
Trends of periodic increase in the pressure of changes of actual
processes in a market economy have become an impulse to study
economic conditions and the stabilization policy, facilitating the path
towards sustainable growth.
In recent decades the trust of scientists, politicians and society in
forecasts, based on the analysis of development trends has decreased
significantly. This is because such forecasts require an unrealistic basis
with a high degree of similarity in activity conditions in the periods
subject to forecast, or a good awareness of possible changes in these
conditions. Meanwhile, the experience of the postwar period provides
enough evidence that activity conditions change very quickly, so science
and society do not have time to recognize and regulate them. This is due
to the spread of new generation technologies, caused by the information
and telecommunications revolution, and the liberal regulation
mechanisms that result in an increase in tension as regards a change in
consumption, lifestyles and other social processes. This new process is
called globalization, and the resulting global capitalism raises the
question of the optimality of stabilization programs inherent in the
technological stage of a post-industrial economy and the rules of thought,
as well as the activity of modern society (Stiglitz, 2002; Giddens, 1991).
If the business cycles had not been deformed by the intervention of
the state, there would have been some grounds for forecasting market
conditions, using theoretical models proposed by economists, which are
based on an acceptable level of forecast probability. However, this is
quite difficult in practice, because economic processes involve different
types of shocks, most of which are the result of decisions of regulation
centres which are important for the national economy, but those that do
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not always realize the consequences of the long-term effect of these
regulations. In other words, under conditions of cognitive, informational
and emotional constraints people make mistakes, which result in the
accumulation of events and processes causing fluctuations in the
development processes, including economic growth. People learn from
their mistakes, so there is changeability in the causes for development
processes, generated by the actions of people. It is this changeability of
causes in time, together with random shocks arising from economics-
related processes (climate change, sudden bursts of social conflicts, new
technologies, etc.), that makes it extremely difficult to forecast economic
conditions.
1.2.5. Economic Efficiency Criterion
Economic systems that force the minimization of costs for reaching the
set objectives are also an economic efficiency criterion. Effective
behavior means the reasonable use (based on scientific approach) of
scarce resources and requires the systematic calculation of costs and
benefits for available alternatives choices and the adoption of the most
useful decisions for the manager. In terms of praxeology, effective
behavior means maximizing the function of objectives at a defined cost.
Efficiency on the microeconomic level is measured by using the
synthetic and analytical indicators of profitability, productivity or
efficiency. In case of ex post analysis, such simple indicators objectively
measure effectiveness in various aspects of management.
On the macroeconomic level, efficiency means the movement of the
economy towards economic growth, which ensures the full use of
production powers and employment for everyone, who agrees with the
wages formed on the market. As for the national economy, GDP p.c.7 is a
synthetic measure of its efficiency. Instead, systematic and long-term
differences in the dynamics of GDP p.c. between national economies can
be interpreted as measures of the performance of these economies and the
convergence or divergence of actual processes. However GDP in terms of
population in the productive age is a more accurate measure of the
effectiveness of the economic system. GDP p.c. can also be calculated per
unit of working hours. The original measure of macroeconomic efficiency
is the so-called Solow residual (TFP — Total Factor Productivity), which
is calculated as the surplus of the actual level of GDP p.c. growth over the
contribution of physical capital and labour in it (Woźniak, 2004).
In neoclassical economics, economic efficiency, which is understood
as the general ability to minimize costs during the achievement of
                     
7 Р. с. — per capita, per head of population. (Note of editors)
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objectives, suggests that society is composed of isolated individuals, who
maximize their own benefits, defined by market categories. Thus, in
accordance with this approach, an effective economic system should be
directed towards the reproduction of individuals, which means that it has
to be based on a competitive system.
If you take for granted the assertion that selfishness is a long-term,
essential feature of human nature, it is necessary to recognize that the
nature of the human individual cannot be transformed in the process of
the execution of private, market, political or other public roles. It means
that simulating each of these roles, the individual seeks to maximize
his/her own profit within existing constraints8. As we can only be sure
that the most common and strongest motive of human activity is
selfishness, then it should serve as a basis for the coordination
mechanisms of economical efficiency and justice and the bases of social
organization. According to this interpretation of human nature, markets
function not only in the economic plane, there is also the political market
(democracy), intellectual property market (patents, licenses, copyrights),
there are also restrictions on their distribution in other spheres of human
life, including the spiritual sphere or the sphere of nature and living of
«biological man» (trade in rights for the emission of environmental
pollution, commercialization of axiological values and the recognition of
moral relativism, commercial use of genetic discoveries). The effect of
these processes is the distribution of competitive logic, which should
civilize the struggle between the stronger and the weaker and force the
latter to be self-responsible, and thereby destroy the sources of unfair
gains on human altruism.
The intensity and prevalence of the pursuit of excess profits is a
determinant of the level of efficiency of an economic system. It also
means the spread of cheaper methods of production. An efficient
economic system will spread and intensify the effectiveness of human
behavior. It should also be noted that the maximization of usefulness by
consumers, in other words, the pleasure of consumption compels
manufacturers to target production to the needs of users, since the only
profitable products are those, which will be approved on competitive
markets. On this basis, it is possible to conclude that to ensure the
performance of an economic system it is unnecessary to apply strategic
centralized coordination, which forces manufacturers and suppliers to be
effective, and moreover requires the coordination of the hierarchy of
goals. The level of efficiency determines the nature of competition.
Targeting efficiency in a competitive environment is the initial and
necessary condition of survival. The more acute and widespread the
                     
8 The basics of the theory of social choice are provided in: Buchanan, Tullok, 1962.
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competition is, the more efficient the economic system will be. Since
economic efficiency becomes the main criterion in a market economy, the
tendency to spread its mechanisms in different spheres of human life
becomes more evident.
Treating human nature as individualistic, it is also possible to
formulate requirements to a liberal state, not a solidary one. At present, it
serves as a basis for the formulation of arguments for liberal economic
thought — from restrictions on the function of the state to ensuring the
free choice of the individual, private property rights and the execution of
contracts. By doing so, the supporters of such views, state that for public
interests the best is a status, whereby each individual does that which is in
line with his interests.
In modern economy, the Pareto efficiency criterion is used, which is
understood as a sharing of resources as a result of which it is impossible
to improve the situation of any participant of economic management
without simultaneously deteriorating the situation of at least one of the
participants of this process. Thus, the art of effective management means
searching for the situations existing in practice, when it would be possible
to increase the benefits of individuals without reducing the benefits of
anyone else. Instead, the task of the economy is to find new distribution
mechanisms, which would accompany the above Pareto benefits.
In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the Pareto efficiency
criterion overlap with individuality and a human, reduced to the scale of an
individual. The theory of welfare deduced from its behavior is based on the
evaluation of welfare formulated by individuals, whose opinions on this issue
are the most reliable, since no one else is better oriented in this field of
interests. Formulated in such a way, the efficiency criterion only treats
inequality as a comparison of benefits and funds that are unconditional. As a
result, the allocation of resources, whereby the welfare of the richest
improves, but welfare of the poor does not, is perceived as effective, or such
a situation is considered efficient, when the welfare of the wealthier increases
faster than that of the poor.
In the context of the welfare theory, it is possible to make some
important conclusions concerning the above effectiveness.
1. If the economy is competitive, it is efficient in terms of Pareto
definition.
2. According to efficiency formulated by Pareto there are many
options for distribution, serving as its criteria.
3. Any effective distribution in terms of the Pareto interpretation can
be achieved by guaranteeing competitive markets.
4. The existence of non-market coordination is not a necessary
condition for the efficient distribution of resources and its coordination
with the fair distribution among individuals.
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5. In the matter of coordination of efficiency and fair distribution,
according to Pareto efficiency, the only and fundamental action of the
state is to change the original structure of property distribution, and
competitive markets ensure its maintenance as required.
6. The fundamental functions of the state are associated with its
concern for effective competition to ensure efficient production,
changes and the effective structure of production, should it be violated
in practice.
According to the above conclusions it follows that if economic
subjects had the nature of a one-dimensional individual, would have
functioned under conditions of perfect competition and relied on the
provision that the initial state of distribution is treated as fair, it would be
possible to agree that in an economy formed in this manner, there would
have been a status that would guarantee social and economic cohesion or
effectiveness and fairness. It should be emphasized that it would be the
state of balance that meets the requirements of the Pareto optimum.
Unfortunately, it would be a state of static balance, devoid of incentives
to increase production, which would not have transitions from one state to
another.
To maximize efficiency, it is necessary to have unlimited access to all
material information and the possibility to process it, and this information
has to be reliable. Since information is asymmetric, then in actual
markets, the leader usually stops optimization calculations at the time
when he finds the best solution or implements satisfactory efficiency. It
should be added that in practice, the situation of «trash bucket» is also
possible, which means that accidental and unsystematic decisions are
made that seems to be associated with the emotional limitations of
people, the nature of social capital and poor investment in human capital.
Even now there are studies that explain the importance of emotion in the
ways of understanding value (benefit). They are used to manipulate
public attitudes and the decisions of consumers. Recent studies of
«emotional rationality» (Fineman, 1993; Nelson and Quick, 2000) focus
on: dependence between actual and imaginary emotions, the creation of
rules in the field of the expression of emotions, the identification of
deviations from behavior that are recognized as exemplary, playing on
emotions to compel obedience. Despite irrefutable evidence that indicate
the cognitive, informational and emotional limitations of people, latest
research trends of the 1990s reject any deviation from the desire for
efficiency in the classical sense. A rational decision-making process
cannot offer lower economic efficiency as an alternative, if the hierarchy
of objectives is known.
Regardless of material conditionality (e.g., technology, infrastructure),
the above informational, cognitive and emotional limitations are the
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source of incomplete rationality. Since they are connected with the
institutional operation of regulation mechanisms of human processes and
social capital development, these characteristics of the economic system
at the present stage should be interpreted as determining economic
efficiency.
1.2.6. Social Equality Criterion
Social equality is the most controversial postulate in the economic
system. Economists agree as to its limit, i.e. search for such methods of
income distribution, which would not influence economic efficiency. This
is the only solution of economically grounded inequalities. Instead, there
is still no unity as to the extent and conditions under which more than a
marginal decrease in efficiency would be desirable.
The welfare theory envisages the settlement of the efficiency and
justice coordination problem to maximize social welfare in the long run.
According to this theory, the economic system implements a fair
distribution, if it is able to reach the Pareto optimum (1927). Actual
markets usually do not reach the Pareto optimum due to the widespread
asymmetry of information because of the time lag and impossibility to
avoid cases associated with risk and uncertainty. It results, among other
things, in allocation, distributive and stabilization failures of the
markets. However, even when the free market is efficient, the
differentiation of income, which has taken place in it, can be regarded as
unfair. The world of individuals, who maximize their own profit, has no
need for solidarity, similar to that in Darwin’s theory of the struggle for
welfare, limits the possibilities of the weaker to use resources and may
deprive them of this, even when they make their own contribution to this
prosperity. Only the similarity of conditions (perfect competition, perfect
information, the absence of time lags) leads to equitable distribution,
which evens out income and minimum requirements.
The adoption of coordinated relations between the spheres of
economy, technology, consumption, social, political, intelligence, human
body and nature, in which it exists, and finally of axiology, means that in
practice, it is necessary to think on the problems of such relations, which
are difficult to resolve, even for the entire human intellect. In practice,
this discussion is limited by some aspects, such as: a liberal or solidarity
state, individualism or collectivism, selfishness or altruism, self-
responsibility or social responsibility. Thus, reduced perception is only
partially associated with a single multidimensional human development
and its uniqueness in objective, subjective or territorial systems. The
selective nature of this discussion that de facto accepts moral relativism
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases46
leads to the fact that concepts spread like simulacrums9 and can be used
easily as a means for reaching specific goals, especially in the struggle for
power on the global, supranational and national levels.
Natural human desire, according to the holistic approach inherent in
system analysis, cannot merely be value measured by market categories,
or personal gain, instead it is the minimization of the risk of survival and
ensuring the quality of life, which meets all the requirements of human
life. Thus, the function of objectives of human existence becomes more
understandable, fitting into its natural essence, since it comes from an
unreal spiritual sphere and the aspiration for a just social order. This
means that justice is an integral part of human nature. Its main function in
terms of personal gain is to minimize the risk of survival. So the fact that
the awareness of the risk of survival may not be in the minds of some
people is not crucial.
Making the choice between efficiency and fairness requires the
evaluation of state aid programs, as well as mechanisms and instruments
for their implementation. For the economist, only such mechanisms for
achieving social goals, which minimize the losses of economic efficiency,
are fair. Unfortunately, there is still no consensus regarding the extent to
which efficiency should reduce in order to reduce social inequality. There
is also no common view on the relative value of a decrease in efficiency.
In a welfare economy, fair inequalities emerge as a result of the equal
distribution of primary welfare, but in the more pronounced varieties of
liberalism we have equality of resources, equality of rights in the freedom
of choice (Nozick) (1974), as well as the equality of legal and political
interpretation. For D.M. Buchanan, J.E. Stiglitz and other supporters of
economically reasonable justice, the primary cause of injustice is
asymmetry of information, the elimination of which reduces market
failures and non-market coordination.
It is not enough to seek for fair inequalities based on the usefulness
criteria, that forces the maximization of own benefit, since victims of long-
term failures and shortages have no reasons to complain about the
unfairness of distribution and moreover, they cannot do it effectively.
Equality of chances due to freedom in everyday life, though it means a lot
to limiting inequality, in the opinion of A. Sen (2000) does not explain the
reasons of such an increase in resources. The founders of the German
version of the social market economy (CPE) connected the resolution of
                     
9 Theoretical models do not solve the problem of the helplessness of a man, who is free
to make his own choice. It is associated with the informational shock caused by the
essentially unlimited heterogeneity of models that organize the rules of this choice,
provided that moral relativism serves as a basis. Therefore, such models highly dramatize
the problems of selection, that is influenced by the perfectionism of the human mind. See.
more: Baudrillard, 2005.
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this problem with the protection of dignity, which is derived from Christian
social science. For H. Jonas it is not enough that markets are responsible for
actual injustice. The need to protect human life also means the protection of
a good life, the necessity to eliminate poverty (Jonas, 1966) as a result of
the awareness of social responsibility.
According to the utilitarian approach, society consists of individuals
and, therefore, favors the reduction of income received by the poor, only
if there is simultaneously a significantly greater increase in the revenues
of the rich. Under these conditions there is a tendency to increase income-
property inequalities. According to J. Rawls (1994), no improvement in
the welfare of a person, who lives better, can justify a deterioration in the
well-being of a person, who lives in the worst conditions. This statement
gives rise to the postulate of the more rapid increase of welfare of the
poorest than of the richest, at the same time, going back and forth in the
absence of poles as the first foundation of justice. However, in practice,
the implementation of what at first sight appears to be such
comprehensible justice depends on the play of interests in the political
arena and the development of civil society. Legal regulation and
democratic procedures for resolving problems of inequality generate
doubt, because societies are different. There are also a number of issues
connected with the unreliability of the state as a regulator of economic
processes and coordinator of social and economic cohesion, which are
extensively described in economic literature (Stiglitz, 2004).
The perception of a man, following orthodox economic thinking
through the prism of personal gain and the formation of an institutional
system with regard to the understanding of human nature inevitably leads
to the understanding of a democratic state, which is essentially harmful to
the competitive structure of the political market, which is unable to
eliminate market imperfections in distribution, allocation and
stabilization spheres. Such limitation of human nature means the
artificial creation of the asymmetrical logic of thinking that has an
adverse effect on the human aspiration for justice. Even if this asymmetry
did not exist, the formation of an institutional system based only on
utilitarian faith to meet needs and interests10, will pose the question of
their urgency and justice. Since there is a close connection between
human nature and human understanding of justice, morality and laws that
follow from them, the institutional system cannot ignore it. Thus, a
necessary criterion of the functionality of the economic system should be
equal rights and justice, i.e not only economically sound, but also
                     
10 D. Bentem defined the statement written in the Declaration of Human and Citizens’
Rights as «nonsense squared», and the discoverer of DNA, Nobel laureate D. Watson calls
conversations about rights as fantasies and advises that talks about rights should be left to
the creators of movies and similar cultural works. See. more: Fukuyama, 2004.
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ethically correct social inequalities. However, it is impossible to evaluate
ethical justification abstracting from the rules relating to cooperation or
social capital.
Under the liberal approach, civil and economic freedoms are
fundamental and basically comprise sufficient condition of success in life
of a human individual. Thus, the task of institutional order is to protect
and strengthen these freedoms. Many thinkers were engaged in solving
the basic dilemma of the functional institutional system, but they have
always remained something of a Utopia. An attempt to harmonize justice
and the competitive system, based on maximizing the individual’s own
benefit, was made by J. Rawls (1994). Justice derived from Rawls’
postulate of the absence of poles cannot just be confined to the equality of
chances. Its necessary supplement is equal opportunity (Sen, 2002). The
implementation of these social objectives, which cannot be guaranteed by
a market mechanism, requires the regulatory actions of the state.
The palette of choice of a system for the regulation of relations
between economic efficiency and social equity is reduced to the
following samples:
1. A liberal state, where economic efficiency criteria are
unconditionally initial (Anglo-Saxon capitalism, a model of which
operates in the USA and extends worldwide in the form of global
capitalism).
2. A liberal and united state that coordinates economic efficiency and
social equality (EU, Asian capitalism realized in Japan, South Korea and
other Far East countries).
3. A liberal and united state that considers social equality criteria to be
primary (the so-called third course).
4. A united and authoritarian state that subordinates efficiency and
social equality criteria to political objective (communist, fascist states).
The societies of Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of
Belarus, rejected the extreme model of a united and authoritarian state,
devoid of market coordination that had been practiced for several
decades, currently replaced by state property with central planning. This
was due to the complete fiasco of the economic system that ignored the
efficiency criterion. The even dispersal of poverty did not meet the
functional interests of a single large social group.
The third course, though attractive in terms of public relations, cannot
be taken into account, since it is characterized by theoretical controversy
and a lack of practical examples. The societies of post-socialist countries
have previously paid a huge price for the risk in system creativity.
The Anglo-American model received the most recognition during the
information and telecommunications revolution. It inter alia was
manifested in proclaiming by the most reputable representatives of the
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theory of economics, politics and business of the rules of the Washington
Consensus, which had to guarantee the sustainable long-term economic
growth and the formation of functional markets in post-socialist
countries. Unfortunately, the deliberate lack of interest in social issues as
a result of the clear priority of the economic efficiency criteria
strengthens the competitive advantage of large corporations and the
distribution of market rules in all spheres of human life. The economic,
technological, cultural and political spheres remain in this version of
capitalism under the influence of transnational medial corporations. As a
result, all aspects of human life are subject to commercialization, i.e. the
dominance of economic efficiency criteria. Democracy turns into
telecracy, lacking the public control of a fourth power, which
monopolizes the information sphere. It becomes an instrument and a
source of the sudden distribution of the rules of thought and activity, and
especially of the consumption patterns, lifestyles and utilitarian axiology
proposed by global capitalism. Unfortunately, its main products are: a
vast information noise, moral relativism, the displacement of the institute
of civil society and the resulting decline of public trust. Under such
conditions the decision-making process on social issues becomes
complicated. The subordination of social decisions to the economic
efficiency criteria leads to increased global threats11.
According to the holistic approach, that accepts the competitive
system, while based on the harmonization of social and economic
cohesion, there is the concept of social market economy. Coordination of
economic effectiveness and fair social inequalities is stated in EU
legislation. It is reflected not only in party-states subsidiarity, which is
mandatory and its possible interpretations, but also in structural and
regional policy, with competition viewed in the light of social and
economic cohesion. In the axiological plane, regulatory actions in favor
of the above-mentioned unity are codified in the EU as obligations to
respect human dignity, which are ideologically enshrined in the European
Convention of Human Rights. The financial guarantee of social and
                     
11 25 % of the world’s population (1.2 billion) lives on less than USD 1 per day, about
58 % (2.8 billion) — less than USD 2 per day, 114 million children do not go to school
(family poverty), every 3.5 seconds one person dies of hunger, 400 richest U.S. taxpayers
received revenue of USD 69 billion in 2004, USD 120 billion covers the program to
combat obesity in the United States, U.S. aid to poor countries comprises 0.15-0.18 % of
GDP as compared to the 0.7 % of GDP declared by developed countries, the difference in
salary of managers and workers in 1950—1969 was 20—30-fold, and in 1990—1999 it
increased to 150-180 times, the difference in salary in the EU is 30-50 times higher than in
Asia. Annual working hours comprises: EU — 1,600 hrs, Asia — 2,200 hours; the average
annual salary: EU — USD 30,000, Asia — USD 1,000. 44 % of the world population (59
countries) is experiencing a demographic crisis (negative natural increase), there are
forecasts that by the end of the 21st century, 20 % of the total population of the Earth will
be able to produce goods and services that meet global demand.
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economic cohesion policy at the level of the European Community, are
structural funds and a cohesion fund set up to support the regions lagging
behind in development.
Polish society, like most post-socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, has chosen the model of harmonization of economic
efficiency with fair social inequalities substantiated by the acceptance of
those criteria of social equality, which are mandatory in the EU.
Moreover, in Poland, this model is supported by the constitutional
postulate. The transition course of this model and its actual results are
described in chapter 2.
1.3. Theoretical Issues of Economic Convergence
1.3.1. Introduction
The term «convergence» first appeared in economic literature in the
1940s and 1950s and was borrowed from the theory of systems and the
theory of convergence. Excessive attention and growing skepticism
connected with the possibilities to quite easily achieve sustainable
economic growth in developing countries and in undeveloped countries,
led to the recession, and later also to the marginalization of these fields of
scientific thought (1960—1970). Repeated interest in the problem of
differences in economic developments emerged in the 1980s, when a
significant contribution was made to the identification of the mechanisms,
factors and conditions of convergence by the theory of economic growth.
It should be noted that even though that fifty years has been spent on
identifying the causes, factors and obstacles, and the conditions under
which the difference in the development of countries is manifested,
convergence is still associated with many problems of a theoretical
nature. There are several reasons for this.
Firstly, it refers particularly to the relevant definition of this term,
since it is not found in literature, the same can be said about
systematization, because they would consider the system context of
changes occurring in so-called catching-up economies. Secondly, if one
considers that the thesis that the manifestation of differences in the
development of countries is not accidental is valid, and is, in fact, the
result of projected economic policies, the convergence in the real
economies of rich and poor countries results from the application of
macro regulation means. Therefore, questions arise about the key factors
and conditions of the manifestation of differences in the development of
countries.
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1.3.2. Interpretation of Convergence
In Polish and foreign economic literature there is no clearly defined
notion of «convergence». The most common can be considered the
definition, in which the words «convergence», «similarity» or
«assimilation» are used during the analysis of the socio-economic space
of individual countries. In the interdisciplinary approach to convergence,
it can be identified with the similarity or also assimilation of countries in
specific areas of existence of the individual and society as illustrated in
Figure 1.1.
Spirit
KnowledgeBody
Social Technology
Political Consumption
Economy
Integrated
development
Figure 1.1. Spheres of Existence of the Individual and Society
in the Context of Integrated Development (Horx, 2000)
In the macroeconomic interpretation, the relevant prospects for the
definition of the notion of convergence give rise to speculation about the
economic system. If in the economic system of any country, the sphere of
regulation and the factual sector of the economy12 are shaped, then the
convergence of economic systems should be understood as assimilation
occurring in both spheres. In addition, there are grounds for
distinguishing the convergence of the spheres of regulation, and
convergence of the factual sectors of economies and the separation of the
political sphere.
                     
12 The factual sphere covers long-term determinants of economic activity, i.e. the
material basis of production together with natural resources and manufactured industrial
and consumer assets, population and changes in its structure. The regulation sphere covers
the activities of people as producers, representatives of centers of state power, separation
principles, consumption changes, legal rules and social norms related to economic
processes (Woźniak, 1993 : 16). Therefore, the sphere of regulation can be identified with
the economic system in a narrow interpretation by L. Balcerowicz (1989 : 15), which other
authors define as «systemic factors» (Pajestka, 1975 : 47-48), «system for the functioning
of the economy», «economic mechanism» (Kornai, 1977 : 70) or «economic order»
(Leipold, 1985 : 37). Given according to: Balcerowicz, 1989 : 15.
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Convergence of the regulation sphere in economies can be considered
in the context of a legal order, generally accepted and approved rules,
examples of social, ethical, religious and family values that determine the
economic processes. That is why this type of convergence can be
understood as a process of the assimilation of countries in the sphere of
functioning social and economic institutions, i.e. formal institutions and
informal institutions that are mandatory in state economies. Formal
institutions of social and political life are associated with the rules and
patterns of conduct set forth by laws, i.e. the political (democratic or
undemocratic) system, competitive type model (socialism and capitalism
models), etc. Therefore, they belong to competitive market institutions. In
turn, informal institutions connected to economic processes result from
the spread of the axiological system based on religion, culture, the
established traditions and beliefs that generate the fundamental values of
social order, lifestyle or family model.
If the convergence of the regulation sphere is a fairly homogeneous
conceptual category, the convergence of real economies is much more
differentiated. This emerges from complex processes in real modern
economies, and in the separated space for research connected with the
real sector in the economy. Hence, the likening of the real sectors
between countries, and then it will be possible to talk about the prospects
for both real and nominal convergence.
The real convergence of real sectors can be identified with the process
for limiting differences between countries on the level of economic
development and that of the quality of citizens’ lives. However, it should
be noted that the similarity process, as defined above, can be viewed in
the dual theoretical and empirical context. Firstly, the real similarity
between the economies can be regarded as a prospective area to study the
economy of growth, which lies in the analysis of growth rates and levels
of production/income of the countries surveyed. Secondly, it may refer to
the space for the study of the economy of development, which along with
the level and rate of change of income, including per capita, also takes
into account other economic variables that have a significant impact on
the level and quality of life. Therefore, given the distinct methodological
differences existing between the economy of growth and the economy of
development, the difference between real convergence in the narrow
sense and real convergence in the broad sense seems essential.
Real convergence in the narrow sense can be understood as a process
of limiting inequality between countries in the field of the generated
growth rate and production level. This interpretation allows the
identification of convergence, based on the economic growth model.
However, the detection of growth similarity or lack thereof on the
theoretical basis, is due to an analysis of changes in the levels of basic
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units of macroeconomic growth models, such as physical and human
capital resources, labour, technology and knowledge resources.
It should also be noted that the above definition of convergence does
not convey the full essence of this notion with reference to the real
economy sphere. The main characteristics of economic growth, despite
the fact that they cover fundamental effects and production resources, still
do not include many components, sufficient for the assimilation process.
In addition, the changes taking place in the real economy should be
analyzed in the context of consequences for the development process,
which includes a set of changes made in the structure and functioning of
the economy and society (Stacewicz, 1988 : 28—30). As a result, the
comparison of changes taking place in different economies should be
treated as a multidimensional process that covers the reorganization and
reorientation of the whole social and economic system. Along with
changes in national income and production, it is also expedient to take
into account institutional, social and administrative changes, changes in
social relations and types of behavior as well as the evolution of habits
and beliefs (Tadaro, 1986 : 61—62, given by: Kozak, 2001 : 17—18).
Therefore, to guarantee economic development it is necessary to ensure
(a) a systematic improvement of living conditions, and, thus, guarantee
real income at a level that is not lower than the one currently in existence;
(b) material conditions for further development, or defined payments for
the return, modernization and increase of property, and (c) an adaptive
capacity of the economy, and therefore, the accumulation of property and
financial reserves (Stacewicz, 1988 : 28—30; Piasecki, 2003 : 15).
Accordingly, real convergence in the broadest sense can be understood
as a process of limiting economic inequalities between countries and
regions (Marini, 2004 : 1). This interpretation of convergence is
connected primarily with the question of the similarity of indices
reflecting economic development, especially those that characterize the
growth rate and GDP per capita; budget deficit; social spending; current
revolving account; balance of foreign trade; the aggregate of other
structural changes in the socio-economic domestic economy belonging to
the technical infrastructure and environmental protection, industry,
agriculture and service sector, labour market, technology market, market
for the distribution of public subsidies and so on.
In the narrow sense of the real convergence of the real sector there are
several notions identified with convergence. It refers first of all to
conditional and unconditional convergence, the convergence of growth
stages and income levels, β and σ-type convergence, global convergence
and convergence clubs. It should be emphasized that the clearest
distinction is between conditional convergence and unconditional
(absolute) convergence (Solow, 1988 : 307—317; Islam, 2003 : 309—
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362). Instead, other types of convergence are separated as a result of the
modification of the primary principles of R.M. Solow’s model and
conducted empirical research.
Unconditional or absolute convergence refers to a situation, whereby
economies characterized by similar structural parameters, i.e. technology,
degrees of saving, natural growth or degree of the depreciation of
physical capital, are passing through balanced growth with stable levels
of capital and production per worker. The result is unconditional or
absolute convergence between the economies of the world (Islam, 2003 :
309—362; Woźniak, 2004).
Conditional convergence, in turn, opens up many ways for
harmonized growth. With this expected perception of convergence, it is
considered that individual countries differ according to economic
structural parameters. Therefore, any economy is inclined to have a
unique course of balanced growth (Barro, 1992 : 202).
As mentioned earlier, nominal convergence can also be considered
within the convergence of the real economy sphere. In an economic
analysis of the development of financial markets, mainly in the European
countries, this type of convergence is associated primarily with the
convergence criteria that were formulated in the European Community’s
(EU) Maastricht Treaty. It focused on achieving similarity between the
EU Member States in the sphere of inflation rates, interest rates and
monetary aggregates13, i.e. speaking about exchange rate criteria, each
country must join the ERM II exchange rate system within at least two
years14 (Chielewski, 2003 : 7, also see Herrmann, Jochem, 2003 : 323—
327; Holmes, 2002 : 6—20).
1.3.3. Dilemmas of Measuring the Similarity Process
Empirical studies of convergence lie in the quantitative presentation of
the phenomenon of similarity, assimilation or limitation of economic
differences between the countries analyzed. The proposed definitions and
ways of perception of economic convergence may necessitate complex
analytical operations to establish this phenomenon. Most studies that
                     
13 The inflation rate cannot be higher than the level determined by average inflation as
calculated for the three states with the lowest inflation among the EU Member States,
increased by 1.5 percentage points; the budget deficit cannot exceed 3 % of GDP; public
debt cannot exceed 60 % of GDP; long-term interest rate (calculated on the basis of 10-
year treasury bond with the constant accrual of interest) cannot be higher than 2 percentage
points of the average relevant interest rates in the three EU countries with the lowest
inflation; the country should observe the regular deviation in fluctuations (+/– 15 %) of its
currency within the ERM.
14 ERM-II — exchange rate mechanism. (Note from the editors)
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confirm the hypothesis of convergence consist of assessing the existence
of the similarity of beta (β) or sigma (σ) type. In addition, these studies
are often limited to the analysis of the level and rate of change in
output/income per citizen (GDP per capita).
The difference between β-type and σ-type convergence is attributed to
R.J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (2004). β-type convergence is based on
the fundamental principles of the neoclassical growth theory, where the
factor of physical capital is characterized by decreasing marginal revenue.
Therefore, the accumulation of this production factor brings larger
benefits in the form of growth of income per capita to countries that are
poor rather than rich. With identical savings, which are understood to be
part of unused income, poor countries will approximate the level of their
income per capita to that of rich countries. Given this, the correlation
between the level of initial income and degree of economic growth should
be negative15.
Instead, σ-type convergence manifests itself in a situation, whereby
disproportions measured, e.g. by the standard deviation of logarithms of
income per capita or production between countries, decrease over time
(Próchniak, 2004). In addition to a clear distinction between β and σ-type
convergence, there are cause-effect relationships between them. This
means that β-type convergence (poor countries are characterized by
higher degrees of growth than rich countries) is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for σ-type convergence (reduction of generated
inequalities of income or production per capita between countries)16.
However, it should be noted that the distinction between these types
of similarity is connected with problems of an analytical nature.
R.J. Barro and X. Sala-i-Martin (2004 : 242) found that upon the presence
of β-type convergence, the dispersion of income per capita should not
decrease over time. This means that β-type convergence may take place
in the absence of σ-type convergence. Therefore, we can conclude that σ-
type convergence is a better evaluation criterion of similarity.
In addition, M. Friedman (1992) proved that β-type convergence to a
lesser extent reflects the process of similarity in the case of the so-called
Galton’s fallacy17, or a different regression towards the mean. The
impermanence of initial income per capita fluctuations in the researched
group of countries can result in a negative coefficient of regression,
even when a variation of income per capita shows no tendency to
                     
15 Therefore, negative value of β regression confirms the presence of β-type
convergence, which equally applies to the stages of growth and income levels (Barro, Sala-
i-Martin, 2004 : 242).
16 This problem, however, is very controversial, see: Barro, Sala-i-Martin, 2004 : 242.
17 «Galton’s fallacy» originates from the surname of a French statistician, who
analyzed the height of fathers and sons. He discovered that sons of tall fathers grow shorter
than their fathers, while fathers of tall sons seem shorter than their sons.
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decrease. β-type convergence implies that countries with lower than
average initial income per capita are characterized by more rapid
growth than countries with higher than average initial income. In
addition, β-type convergence can be accompanied by a constant or
increasing value of standard deviation or variation coefficients, which
exclude the presence of σ-type convergence. Therefore, according to M.
Friedman, convergence studies are not indicative because of the the
existence of the «Galton’s fallacy».
To better highlight the similarities F. Lichtenberg (1994, given by:
Paschaloudis and Alexiadis, 2006) proposes the use of the SiT indicator:
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1, σˆ,σˆ Tii  — variability of income per
capita according to the first and last study periods.
The SiT indicator takes into account correlations between the decrease
in the inequality of income per capita and the differentiation of the stages
of its growth between the countries studied18. The results of evaluation of
β and σ-type convergence may be acceptable if the level of the SiT
indicator is statistically different from zero. If SiT is equal to 1, then the
studied countries reach full convergence in view of the studied variable.
Given these differences connected with the difference and
interdependence between beta and sigma convergence, it only seems
surprising that most authors ignore both the observations of M. Friedman
and the proposals of F. Lichtenberg.
1.3.4. Factors and Obstacles to Reducing the Difference in the
Development of Countries in Economic Theory
During the laying of the scientific system of economy in the 18th century,
land resources, which included natural raw materials and lands, were
considered the key enrichment factor of states and people. Classical
economics, in turn, perceived the accumulation of physical and financial
capital as the fundamental role in economic development. Classical
scholars of economics (A. Smith, A. Marshall, 1920; given by: B. Pazza-
Georgi, 2002) also noted the significant impact of the skills that
                     
18 It should be noted that in spite of the the benefits of the SiT indicator, several authors
use it to conduct empirical research. See more: Paschaloudis and Alexiadis, 2006 : 233—
249.
CHAPTER 1. Theoretical and empirical bases of convergence… 57
employees were endowed with on economic growth. However, they
failed to find out how a man and his personal traits affect the flow of real
processes (Kondonassis et al., 2000 : 17-23). This is why, further
observation of the human factor (other than physical labour) was made
with regard to future capital in a broad sense, which along with physical
capital also included justice, religion, literature, art, education and
creativity (I. Fisher, 1906 : 55). This homogeneous interpretation of
capital in the economy existed until the mid-20th century.
In the 1950-1960s, physical capital began to be interpreted as a
necessary and sufficient condition for the development of undeveloped
and developing countries19. Economists of that time, mainly
representatives of modernization theory, were primarily interested in the
problem of the creation of surplus capital, required for the emergence of
self-supporting economic growth. A special contribution to the
modernization theory was made by W.W. Rostow (1960, 1971), who
proposed the concept of staged development, i.e. the transition from
traditional to modern economies. He proved that the «start» of an
economy to self-supporting growth occurs sensu stricto with the
accumulation of physical capital. During the start period, which lasts
about 20-30 years, the increasing degree of physical capital accumulation
accelerates the growth rate of the economy, causing positive changes in
production technologies. P. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) proved that the
minimum (basic) level of physical capital, which leads to the
development of an infrastructure and the beginning of entrepreneurship,
is a critical condition for overcoming gap barriers in undeveloped and
developing countries. However, R. Nurske (1962) saw lack of savings
and investments as key barriers to the accumulation of capital in these
countries. It should be noted that these authors considered factors and
growth conditions in different ways. W.W. Rostow emphasized the
crucial role of social and political structures, cultural values and the open
or closed nature of international markets. A.P. Rosentein-Rodan pointed
to some socio-economic aspects. However, representing an exclusively
economic point of view, scholars skirted around or avoided the analysis
of various social or institutional conditionalities and factors of economic
growth. From this perspective, the concepts presented were the subject of
severe criticism from economists of the school of dependence (Kozak,
2001).
Some economists, who became famous in the 1950s and 1960s as the
founders of general development theories, stressed that accumulation is a
necessary, but insufficient factor of development (Kozak, 2001 : 88-89).
                     
19 A special role is attributed to M. Kalecki, R.F. Harrod and E. Domar, who first drew
attention to the accumulation of physical capital in the context of mathematical models of
economic growth. See more: Piasecki, 2003; Piasecki, Wolnicki, 2004; Wiarda, 1999.
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For example, A. Lewis (1953) draws attention to the necessity of support
for private enterprise and the simultaneous development and support of
the state’s economic functions. However, K. Clark (1953) and
H. Liebenstein proved that the obstacle to capital accumulation and,
therefore, economic development, especially in undeveloped countries, is
very high natural population growth. In addition to physical capital,
economists also paid attention to other development and growth factors,
which caused a wave of reflections on optimal production technologies
that began to be recommended to the undeveloped and developing
countries (Piasecki, 2003 : 22-23).
It should be noted that the above concepts were developed on the
basis of previous models of economic growth (M. Kalecki, R.F. Harrod,
E. Domar and R.M. Solow). The dynamics of Keynesian growth models
was based on the equal participation of workers (physical labour) in the
resources of physical capital. However, R.M. Solow proved the essential
role of technical progress in long-term growth and the convergence of
economies, but in his model, the accumulation of physical capital per
worker remained a key mechanism for reducing the difference in the
development (convergence towards balanced growth) of an economy.
In the 1960s, the view gradually spread, that the accumulation of
physical capital is an insufficient factor for economic development.
Works of J.H. Boeke (1953), D.C. MacClelland (1962), E.F. Hagen
(1962), T.W. Schultz (1962), and A. Lewis (1966) showed that the
effectiveness of physical capital components depends on whether citizens
have the necessary knowledge and skills, or in the modern sense — from
human capital in the economy. Reasons related to the mutual
complementarity of the components of physical and human capital are
that the development of physical capital resources will always require the
anticipatory improvement of quality of human capital, because it is
particularly responsible for the acceleration of technological progress
(Kondonassis et al., 2000 : 17-23).
In the expansion of human capital as a fundamental factor of growth,
development and reduction of lag, a special role belongs to the founders
of the human capital theory, G.S. Becker (1975), P. Romer (1986) and
R.E. Lucas (1988), whose works formed the endogenous direction of such
research.
According to endogenous growth models, it was found that human
capital has a much stronger effect on the growth rate and its
convergence in the medium and long term, than the physical capital
resource (Caballe, Santos 1993; Galor, Moav 2004). Human capital
influences the economy directly, i.e. the rate of economic growth (level
effect), and indirectly through the accumulation of other growth factors,
i.e. physical capital and technological progress (economy of scale)
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(Rogers, 2003). In addition, they described the significant role of this
factor in the: (a) determination of income inequalities (also equivalent
during the completion of movement, and in the process of movement
towards sustainable growth), (b) deepening of the financial sector and
credit market (Barro, Sala-i-Martin 2004), (c) internationalization of the
national economy and the inflow of direct foreign investment
(Grossman, Helpman, 1991; Young, 1995), or (d) shaping of fiscal
policy by establishing taxation, as well as the level and structure of
public expenditure (Rebelo, 1991).
The human capital factor is also attributed a significant role in the
structural and demographic changes of economies. Models with a
separated human factor describe the mechanism according to which
developing countries replace the quantity of children by their quality,
i.e. the relevantly equipped higher level of human capital is achieved.
This substitution effect may be connected to technological changes,
the specialization of production or urbanization, which results in a
decrease of operating costs (e.g. for transport) and the increased
mobility of labour resources, consequently promoting a better
interaction of supply and demand for labour and accelerating the
diffusion of knowledge.
An achievement of economic theory in the 1980s and 1990s was
securing convictions about the fundamental role of human capital in
the formation of the long-term economic growth of countries and
reducing the differences in their development. However, the
experience of many countries did not confirm the optimistic
conclusions that emerged to the same extent as from the theory of
human capital and in a broader sense — from the main paradigms of
economy, i.e. neoclassical, Keynesian, structural or, finally, the
modernization theory. Many development programs based on the
modernization theory, which are implemented in undeveloped and
developing countries, for the most part, show only partial results. The
world did not become more equal and richer in all its parts, but
increasingly divided into the rich countries of the North and poor —
of the South. The inefficiency of the development theory, which is
based on the traditional paradigms of economics, arose at the turn of
20th and 21st centuries, based on its helplessness in solving the most
pressing social and economic problems of many developing countries,
i.e. growing property profitable inequalities, violence against
backgrounds of ethnic and religious conflicts, long-term civil wars,
financial crises and ubiquitous corruption (Woźniak, 2005; Radcliffe,
2004).
Differences between theoretical conclusions and the actual facts
inclined economists to seek sources for the differentiation of economic
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development dynamics in the institutional environment and thus, in the
characteristics of social capital. The institutional theory of economic
development is derived from the same conceptual bases of the nature of
human behavior and social changes that characterize the institutional
interpretations of the evolutionary history of modern industrialized
countries of the world. Institutionalists interpret development «more as a
complex cultural process rather than a stable system of counterbalanced
forces regulated by a self-correcting market mechanism» (Street,
1987 : 1861-1887). The institutional theory of economic development,
representing an advanced form of general institutional theory, sees the
causes for the underdevelopment of undeveloped or developing countries
in archaic social institutions that create obstacles in the use of available
intangible resources, i.e. technical knowledge and technology as well as
the training of employees, or existing human capital resource. Specific
forms of interdependence that exist between public institutions and
knowledge (technology and human capital) arise from traditionally
established cultural conditionality, which depend on geographical
location, cultural history and the available production resources of
individual countries (Jameson, 2006 : 369-375).
According to this approach towards economic development, social
capital was an essential factor in reducing the difference in development.
Given its special role in the transition to a market economy, the broader
interpretation of the role of social capital in the process of reducing
differences in the development of a post-socialist economy will be given
later in this chapter (paragraph 1.7).
It should be noted that the current dominance of institutional
economics in the debate on the development and reduction of economic
inequalities in the developing countries does not diminish the role of
other growth factors, such as human capital. Many Polish and foreign
authors emphasize the inseparability of issues related to human and social
capital. These two types of capital are clearly reflected in the human
individual. This is why interdependence, inseparability and the mutual
supplement of both economic categories is constantly emphasized (Shu-
Chi Lin, Yin-Mei Huang, 2005; Wallis, 2004; Bueno et al., 2004). This
conclusion is also confirmed by the main thesis of institutional
economics, that the ’human dimension of economic development should
be the leading context of socio-economic changes in developing
countries’ (Jameson, 2006 : 369-375). Therefore, social capital, which
includes informal social institutions that are established culturally and
have the relevant traditions, ’should be a part of the process of social and
economic development’ (Jameson, 2006 : 369-375) and dominate in the
structural and qualitative changes of economies, lying in the relevant use
of physical capital, human capital and technology.
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1.3.5. Overview of Policies Aimed at Reducing the Difference
in the Development of Countries
In 1940s, the founders of the economy of development (M. Kalecki,
O. Lange, W. Kantarovych) emphasized the need of planning,
management and interference of the administrative state in the economy
to overcome obstacles of underdevelopment and the reduction of lag in
developing countries. Government intervention in the economy, caused
by the use of the Keynesian intellectual canons of 1940-1960’s that were
mandatory in capitalist countries, was recommended equally to the
European economies that survived military destruction and to the
countries that obtained independence at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s,
liberating themselves from colonial hegemony. In particular, as regards
the latter group, special attention was paid to the significant shortcomings
of local markets that made it impossible to reduce the development gap,
relying only on the market mechanism or uncontrolled (unregulated) price
mechanism. For the most part structuralists, including Gunnar Myrdal,
Ragnar Nurske, Raul Prebisch, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and others,
characterized developing countries as a space of «structural inelasticity»
and significant time delays in stimulating the increase of aggregate supply
and demand. This is why the market mechanism was not developed
sufficiently enough to generate large savings and manage investment
benefits for the development of the infrastructure, processing industry or
the modernization of traditional sectors of the economy. Since then the
dominant point of view was that without strict government intervention in
the economy, undeveloped and developing countries can become trapped
in underdevelopment and/or «vicious circle of poverty» and the central
budget became the main instrument of national economic planning.
It should be noted that the general skepticism of the capitalist world as
regards central planning applied in the USSR did not reduce the
confidence of Western theorists to the effectiveness of intervention in the
field of industry, import, the development of agriculture, improved
functioning of the public sector or quantitative and qualitative changes in
the economies of the 1950s and 60s. For the countries, which became
independent in 1959—1961, the centralized planning of economy that
existed in the socialist countries of the Eastern bloc, was a kind of
«running a short distance to the present». As a result of the
implementation of a policy of forced savings, which reached 40 % of
GDP, the forced collection of food from the peasants and the large-scale
processing of natural raw materials, socialist countries developed
according to the relevant degrees of economic growth. In the 50s and 60s,
representatives of socialist countries expected that in the short-term per
capita income of the population of the USSR would exceed the same
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indicator in the United Kingdom or even the United States. In their turn,
the countries of Eastern Europe had, as exemplified by Romania, such a
beast as modern Asian tigers (Przeworski, 2003 : 42—47). This is why
many economists, who joined the movement of the methodological
school of dependence, tended even to the Marxist-Leninist ideology,
attributing the so far unknown ability of the effective combination of
resources that allows the termination of the vicious circle of
underdevelopment to socialism (communism). Such propaganda of the
success of socialist countries was cause for some concern, even among a
group of economists and democrats in the West, who repeatedly
acknowledged that democracy and free market are a luxury, which only
the developed part of the world can afford 20. However, the experience of
the last two decades of the 20th century proved beyond all doubt, that
even though the countries with an ideological dictatorship had economic
success for a certain period of time, these modes certainly became the
cause of the subsequent degradation and decline of these economies.
In addition to emphasis on performance of a strong and active state in
overcoming internal obstacles to development (the development of
industry, trade and pricing) and the activation of economic progress, it is
often also recommended, particularly to developing countries, for them to
be independent of the global economy. In the 1960s, highly developed
countries advised to undeveloped and developing economies to open the
way to international trade. However, for the most part, representatives of
the school of dependence and economists of Latin America urged that
such recommendations are not followed, because highly developed
countries, when they were at lower stages of economic development i.e.
similar to those of the modern undeveloped and developing countries, did
not open their markets to agricultural production from the «Third World»
countries. Therefore, these economists, concerned about trading
conditions becoming even worse, advised developing countries to reduce
their dependence on the global economy, using customs barriers and
creating government monopolies in banking, transport, key industry
sectors, as well as the import substitution strategy (Piasecki, Wolnicki,
2004).
As a result of failed economic policies in many developing countries
(Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil), supporters of the economy of development
became increasingly skeptical in their views on the ability of the state to
                     
20 Walter Galenson admitted in 1959 that the more democracy there is, the greater is
the pressure on the transfer of resources from investment to consumption. Karl de
Schweinitz also stated that if poor and undeveloped countries want to have development
success, they must limit the democracy mechanism in political life. Finally, Samuel
Huntington and Joan Nelson argued that the political participation of citizens should be
limited, at least for a specific period, to support economic development (Przeworski,
2003 : 42-47).
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solve economic problems. In addition, the actions and competence of
local politicians and bureaucrats, which often represented the interests of
only a narrow group, were evaluated negatively more and more often. In
the 1980s, criticism of governments as regards support of economic
development (Piasecki, Wolnicki, 2004; Piasecki, 2007) proved that: (a)
in many poor countries, government measures had litte effect in solving
problems connected with education and literacy, health care, provision of
food and transport, as well as combating drug trafficking, which reduced
public confidence in governments and local administrations, becoming
increasingly corrupt; (b) elite and privileged groups are largely the
recipients of foreign aid, not the poor or people who needed help.
Experience of the 1980s highlighted the weaknesses of the strategy,
which relied on state intervention in the economy both in capitalist
countries (the strategy of import substitution in Latin America) and
countries with administratively controlled systems (Central Eastern
Europe). Moreover, the economic success of Malaysia, Indonesia or
Singapore confirmed the arguments of liberal lobbying in favor of the
primacy of the market mechanism and global liberalization, deregulation
of local goods and services markets as the most effective means of
reducing the backlog of undeveloped and developing countries. As a
result, in the 1990s, theory and economic practice were dominated by
liberal and neoliberal concepts proposed within the framework of the
Washington Consensus. This congress envisaged pursuing tough fiscal
and monetary policy, deregulation and the liberalization of capital
turnover and trade, restriction of state subsidies, moderate taxation, the
liberalization of interest rates, keeping inflation low and, above all, the
openness of national economies within the framework of the global
economy and competition (Castels, 1986). These decisions were
supposed to have led to the better optimization of the localization of
production resources. A special role in the advancement of undeveloped
and developing countries was also seen in global corporations and the
inflow of direct foreign investment to less developed parts of the world
(Wiarda, 1999).
The economic policy proposed by the Washington Consensus also and
possibly most particularly pertained to developing countries and Central
and Eastern Europe, where the implementation of systemic reforms began
in the 1990s. They lay in the implementation of the golden standards of
capitalism, i.e. rapid liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and setting
the course of the economies towards international competition with a
restrictive fiscal and monetary policy (Woźniak, 2002). Already in the
first years of transformation it was found that this means of transition to a
market economy led all these countries to regress, the depth and duration
of which exceeded the expectations of many economists (Kołodko, 2000).
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For example, in Ukraine, transformational regression continued until the
end of the 1990s. We can assume that most of the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe had no other alternative for systemic change. Post-
socialist economies increased their debt to international financial
institutions to a level that threatened their solvency, as a result of wrong
planning decisions in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, at the beginning of
the transformation, international financial institutions (World Bank,
International Monetary Fund), which had neoliberal views on economic
changes in post-socialist countries, required the partial or full repayment
of these countries’ debts for the acceptance of the system reform scheme.
The neoliberalism that dominated in practice and theory of the 1990s
brought at least partial success for most of the countries that transformed
and developed and undeveloped countries. In most of these countries the
immature local markets functioned, which did not meet the challenge
global competition. However, the efforts of local authorities in designing
macro regulation providing for the socio-economic conditions of
functioning of these markets were too limited due to the significant liberal
lobbying of the supporters of the IMF and World Bank stabilization
program concept. This is why the school of dependence often expressed
the reproach, particularly in scientific literature, that the Washington
Consensus acted in the interests of only the richest economies of the
world (Woźniak, 2005).
The weak points of economic strategies based on the Washington
Consensus were particularly evident in the 1997—1998 financial crisis in
Southeast Asia. It also affected countries that were closely connected with
the global economy, i.e. Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
However, paradoxically, in contrast to the previous recommendations, IMF
and WB representatives saw reasons for the crisis in these countries as the
«excessive openness of the global economy for these countries and the lack
of possibilities to manage this openness» (Piasecki and Wolnicki, 2004).
In addition to failures of economic policies based on neoliberalism,
the progression according to the Washington Consensus, or its newest
version, i.e. the Post-Washington Consensus, is lobbied intensively in a
large group of developing countries. The representatives of international
institutions such as the UN, recognizing «the right to development» for
undeveloped and developing countries, de facto force the strategies of
openness to globalization, which, as the experience of many countries
proved, often bring the greatest profit to leaders of the world economy,
i.e. highly developed countries, at the expense of the developing ones.
Given all cautions as regards the policies implemented in accordance
with the neoliberal Washington or Post-Washington Consensus, it should
be noted that in many countries, their recommendations yielded positive
results. It applies mainly to those countries that when opening their markets
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to global competition, took appropriate steps for the development of human
resources, made investments in education and developed and embodied
new technologies in life. The group of countries that over the past few
decades have significantly reduced the lag in development, include Ireland
and South Korea, which invested quite a large share of their income (GDP) in
national human capital (Development planning in a market economy, 2001).
In European countries, specifically in the group of EU Member States,
the above-mentioned economic policies are clearly different from those
proposed by the paradigm of the modernization school. Member States,
bound by relevant requirements, must achieve strategic objectives in
accordance with the Lisbon strategy adopted in 2000, which was later
revised and corrected. The only exception is the economic dimension, as
the politicians of the Community also try to add social and environmental
dimensions for the establishment of economic prosperity. The theoretical
bases of a more holistic approach to development are connected not only
with the key recommendations of neoclassical or liberal economics, but
they are still less connected with the concepts of a social market
economy, social and economic cohesion and sustainable development.
Quite clearly outlined difference of the European model of development,
including reducing differences in development, faces harsh criticism from
representatives of the school of modernization. It is emphasized that the
attempt to join economic efficiency with social justice requires large
resources due to low productivity, slower economic growth or the weaker
expansion of the so-called sectors of new economy, resulting from large
bureaucratic and fiscal pressures. However, it should be noted that in the
group of EU countries, it is possible to find both the example of countries
that have not only been able to significantly reduce the difference in
development, but also consistently maintain stable and high economic
growth. It refers not only to the economy of Ireland, which is compared
with the Asian tiger and often perceived as a kind of exception. Of special
interest are primarily Scandinavian countries, where the implementation
of the concept of a welfare state, so criticized and in some sense
dethroned in the context of, for example, the German economy, did not
prevent or hinder effective competition with strongly liberalized
economies in terms of economic growth, development of new
technologies, expansion in the so-called sectors of new economy. There
are symptoms that indicate that some new EU Member States are able to
use the EU acquis communautaire21 and the concept of the Lisbon
strategy for reducing differences in development. By the way, Poland
now belongs to these countries.
                     
21 The EU acquis communautaire, which currently includes over 80,000 pages of
typescript. It is mandatory for all members of the European Union. (Note of editors)
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1.3.6. Conclusions Regarding Post-Socialist Countries
Having drawn attention to some theoretical dilemmas connected with
economic convergence, we can make several outlines.
Firstly, reflections on the economic system offer the relevant research
prospect of economic convergence. The definition of the notion of
«convergence» and its proposed classification in terms of consistency
allows a better understanding of the nature of this process. Convergence
between economies is the result of interdependence between changes in
real the and regulatory spheres of comparable countries. The selective
description of the convergence phenomenon, i.e. in the context of
economic growth and/or development, markets and market structures or
financial systems and subsystems of the economy, seems to be an
unnecessary simplification. Instead, the distinction of the convergence of
real and economic regulation spheres allows the better identification of
key spaces of the economy, which should be influenced by an economic
policy directed towards advancement.
Secondly, a brief overview of economic theory makes it impossible to
give a definitive answer as regards the factors of economic growth and
development, which accelerate the process of reducing differences in
development in undeveloped and developing countries. For the evolution of
economic theory that existed prior to that time, the search for ever-new
factors and conditionality of lag reduction are traditional. By the mid-
1950s, physical capital was on the one hand, perceived as a key factor, and
on the other, as the main obstacle to economic growth and development. In
the following decades the representatives of different economic schools
substantiated the essential role of human capital, social capital or ultimately
the broader application of institutional conditions for development.
However, shifting emphasis from the complexity of physical factors to
those connected with a human individual (human capital) and the
interdependence between micro economic subjects (institutions, social
capital), does not diminish the leading role of the former. The activation of
benefits connected to the individual knowledge, skills and competence of
microeconomic subjects (human capital, workers, enterprises), and with the
confidence or willingness to cooperate (social capital) will not be available
separately from physical capital (machinery, installations, infrastructure). In
addition, the elaboration of theoretical scenarios of convergence for a
«catching-up» economy should not rely only on new, non-material factors
of economic growth and development, i.e. human capital, social capital or
functioning institutions. The resources of physical capital are also a
significant component of these structures.
The third conclusion concerns recommendations regarding the
economic policy directed at reducing differences in development. As
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noted, changes in the real economy (production process, combination of
production factors, the economic efficiency of microeconomic entities)
occur within the framework of formed, sanctioned and functioning
market institutions, which determine allocation, exchange, distribution
and coordination processes. Moreover, if we consider the idea that
reducing the gap in development is not a matter of accident, but the
results of applicable economic policies to be reasonable, it raises the
question of key spheres, which should be influenced by such policies.
This can only be answered after considering some key provisions. Firstly,
in setting policy framework it is expedient to avoid universalism, which,
as shown by criticism of the school of modernization and the experience
of many undeveloped and developing countries, is a harmful
simplification. Therefore, it should be considered that: (a) between the
countries being compared, no significant differences appear at the level of
economic development, measured, for example, by GDP per capita, i.e.
these countries are developed and/or such that are developing; (b)
according to W.W. Rostow, these countries have sufficient (tangible)
coexist resources to begin gradual development; (c) the economies in the
same or similar integration systems, for example, the EU, WTO, OECD;
(g) these countries evolved in similar cultural circles (Christianity, Islam,
tribal communities), thus having a common understanding of the
philosophy of money, wealth and enrichment, the same approach to social
structures and their role in the development of these structures
(individualism versus collectivism).
Therefore, taking the thesis set out in the presented monograph, we
can assume that the first approximation of the proposed policies of
convergence for the «catching-up» countries should be connected with
the evaluations of economic regulation sphere.
Subject to the above provisions it can be expected that comparable
countries, participating in global economic relations, have equal access
to the resources of physical and financial capital and technology.
Therefore, policy aimed at reducing differences in the development of
«catching-up» countries should influence changes in the field of the
regulation of the economy. It should be emphasized that changes in the
sphere of the regulation of this economy should be focused on how to
be similar to a more developed country. It rather concerns the formation
of such coordination mechanisms (market institutions and informal
institutions) that would give the opportunity to receive greater benefit
from the allocation and division mechanism (real sector of the
economy). Only in this situation, can we hope that the economic system
of a «catching-up» country can achieve faster growth in the real
economy and thereby reduce the difference in development as compared
to a more developed country.
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1.4. Legal Aspects of Convergence within
the Acquis сommunautaire and Lisbon Strategy
1.4.1. Origin and instruments of acquis communautaire
Unlike federal states, which are formed on the basis of a Constitution,
the Community and the EU were founded on the basis of international
treaties. EU objectives are implemented by the Communities, or — if
they do not fall within the competence of the Communities — by the
Member States. This is because the EU Treaty does not vest the EU
with legal capacity22. Only Article 49 of the EU Treaty envisages a
procedure for gaining membership in the EU rather than membership in
the Communities. This means that new states seek membership not only
in economic organizations, but also in joint cooperation structures that
operate in the field of foreign policy and security (pillar II of the EU)
and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (pillar III). The
Maastricht Treaty (1992) intensified the process of European
integration, but instead, the result of new integration activity was as
follows:
1. The Amsterdam Treaty, adopted on October 2, 1997 for an
indefinite period, replaced the Treaty on the European Community
(1992), treaties establishing the European Communities and some related
legal acts.
2. The Treaty of Nice, dated February 26, 2001 made necessary
clarifications to the founding treaties of the EU and the European
Communities, thus creating a real chances of their effective functioning in
EU enlargement from 15 to 27 countries which took place on the
accession of former post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and Cyprus in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania — in 2007.
3. The Constitutional Treaty of October 29, 2005 which following its
rejection during the referendum in France and the Netherlands, was
renamed the Reform Treaty. This agreement can take effect as early as
2014.
A new EU Member State must accept all the legal property of the
integration group. Hence is the need emerges to harmonize national
legislation with the EU legislation and, thus, the pre-entry period of this
complex process will take years.
Poland took the first steps towards joining the EU already on
November 26, 1991, when it signed the European Convention on Human
                     
22 The states-parties to the Treaties decided on the expediency of the establishment of
the three Communities: EUBiS in Paris on April 18, 1951, the EEC and Euratom on March
25, 1957 in Rome.
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the European Agreement
on the Association of Poland with European Communities and their
Member States, which came into force in 1994. For two five-year periods,
Poland prepared comprehensively to gain full membership, which became
a reality on May 1, 2004.
Membership in the EU primarily means economic integration,
associated with the duty to reform the legal system, resulting in the
possible approval of relevant Community legislation. In the case of post-
socialist countries, to avoid many negative effects of the introduction of
acquise communautaire in the real economy, a number of measures must
first be taken to increase competitiveness, and sometimes also the
strengthening of control over subsidizing enterprises.
The unified system of legal relations among EU Member States is
designed to ensure the effective functioning of the single European
market and reach the Community’s common goals. Given this, a
prerequisite is the introduction of a single Community law, which is
binding on all Member States. It is also important to harmonize individual
national legal systems. This process takes place through various channels
and may be continuous or gradual in nature. In order to smooth its course,
it can be done via mutual recognition, coordination, harmonization and
substitution.
The basic method for the unification of EU legislation, as noted
above, is its harmonization. Under the provisions of the Treaty of
Rome, the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality is applied during
harmonization activities. The subsidiary it principle limits the
intervention of the Community in the implementation process of
integration tasks, because it is allowed only in such cases and the
extent, to which the objectives of actions cannot be achieved effectively
through national regulation. Due to the subsidiarity principle, each
Member State shall have the necessary sovereignty, and harmonization
measures that are limited to what is necessary for the effective
implementation of tasks. The proportionality principle means the use of
appropriate measures necessary and appropriate and at the same time
the least burdensome to achieve these goals. Under the Treaty of Rome,
harmonization means the process of regulatory convergence of the legal
systems of member states to ensure the proper functioning of the single
European market. The difference in the legislation of the EU Member
States is liquidated only in those administrative provisions, which refer
to integration processes. It uses legislative techniques officially
accepted in the EU. The product of the Community’s legislative activity
are binding and not binding legislative acts. The first group consists of
directives, regulations and decisions. The second group comprises
recommendations and conclusions.
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The main regulation used during the harmonization of legislation is
directive. According to the Single European Act, the Commission shall
only use directives if the actions of the Community cause a change in the
legislation in most of the Member States. Directives are aimed solely at
the Member States and require the bringing of the national legislation in
conformity with them within a specific period. They are exclusively
directed towards the state. A directive is mandatory for the purposes and
effects to be achieved, but does not directly establish any rights and
obligations to individuals or legal entities. Because of this, each Member
State shall have the right to choose the implementation means, forms and
methods of implementation of tasks set by the directive, and choose the
regulation by which the provisions of this document will be implemented
in national legislation. However, a directive obliges national legislators
not to approve laws that contradict its contents. Member State shall apply
such forms and methods that ensure the practical efficiency of directives.
This means that a Member State cannot invoke an argument, whereby
Community law is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
In Community law, mandatory and optional directives are applicable.
For example, the sphere of indirect taxes is regulated by mandatory
directives, and direct taxes are subject to optional regulations.
Another legal at — regulation — is completely binding for the
Community, Member State national courts, institutions and individuals.
They do not require prior transformation or incorporation into the legal
system of a Member State and are effective with the same legal force as
the country’s domestic law. The addressees of regulations are entitled to
refer to their provisions before both national authorities and courts. In
case of legal conflict between national law and the provisions of a
regulation, the principle of the priority of Community law, according to
which in some cases it is impossible for a Member State to unilaterally
reject a given regulation, is applicable.
Decisions are of a clearly defined regulatory nature. They cause direct
effects only when it is clear that the set duties and principles of their
implementation will have a clear and unconditional nature. Since
decisions are aimed at a specific recipient, as a rule, they cannot be used
in the process of the harmonization of law. Instead, recommendations and
conclusions, despite their optionality, can promote harmonization,
because they contain the viewpoint of a Community body on the mode of
action, for example, in tax matters.
EU acquis communautaire (a.c.) in its substance, includes the
legislation and policy established by knowledge and life experience
concerning the affairs of the Communities in economy, social policy,
health care, consumer protection, environmental protection and others
(pillar I) and cases that go beyond the Community and are connected
CHAPTER 1. Theoretical and empirical bases of convergence… 71
with common foreign policy and security (pillar II) and with
cooperation in justice and internal affairs (pillar III) (Brodecki S.,
Derezińska B., 1999). In the dynamic meaning a.c. also formulates the
end economic, political and social order, the total content of which is
provided in the EU Reform Treaty. The three EU pillars are supported
by OECD and NATO. The idea of a.c. is the effect of the convergence
of legal cultures and national law (British, Roman, Germanic, Nordic
and Slavic), continental law and economic and political doctrines
connected with continental liberalism. The EU a.c. is the result and
manifestation of the internationalization of law on a global scale as well
as the role of the European Court of Justice and the political control
exercised by the European Parliament.
All a.c. sources are only examples that help the states willing to
become EU members and associate members to implement the
convergence of domestic legislation with European standards. The EU
a.c. promotes the integration of national legislation with EU legislation.
The convergence of national legislation with the EU a.c. happens in
accordance with the principles of order as well as the system and general
principles of the EU legislation. The principles of law in the axiological
perspective are deemed supreme and play a special role in the process of
the application and interpretation of law. The Court of the European
Communities, which ensures the compliance and interpretation of law,
plays a special role in formulating the principles of Community law. It
follows the principles of Community law resulting from founding treaties,
the legal systems of Member States and international law.
1.4.2. Organization Principles
Of the organization principles, the following should be singled out: primacy
of Community law, direct effect, subsidiarity and proportionality.
The principle of primacy of Community law was first formalized on
October 24, 2004 in the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe
(Articles 1-6). This principle is often called the principle of supremacy of
Community law over national law. In fact, contractual provisions enjoy
supremacy only in the scope of Community law. Only in this sense is
there a duty to ensure the compliance of national regulations with
Community law. The primacy of Community law in domestic legal order
operates on the basis of the fact of its approval, despite national
legislation. In case of the conflict of Community rules with national law
the latter, despite its rank, should be avoided and Community law should
be applied. Member States applying the principle of primacy of
Community law retain freedom in the formation of state bodies, defining
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their forms, competencies and activity principles. Nevertheless, EU
members can only carry out those activities that comply with the
Community’s legislation. The uniform application of EU law does not
permit the application of provisions of national law, except those
necessary for the implementation of regulations.
The implementation of the principle of primacy of Community law is
connected with:
— the cancellation or revision by the relevant bodies of Member States of
the provisions of national law, which do not comply with Community law;
— the obligation to create internal legislation if required by
Community law to ensure its effectiveness;
— the ban on the creation of legislation contradicting the Community law;
— the obligation to apply Community law;
— the obligation to recognize the interpretation of Community law by
the European Court of Justice and interpret domestic law in accordance
with Community law;
— national authorities, including Constitutional courts, being
prohibited from analyzing the legitimacy of Community law.
Addressees of the rules of Community law are not only Member States,
but also their citizens and legal entities. This means that these rules must be
suitable for their direct application. Therefore, Community legislation
provides for the principle of direct application and direct effect. From this
principle it follows that this Community rule grants direct rights to subjects
that can protect those rights in a national court. The principle of direct effect
gives the citizens and institutions of the Community an opportunity to invoke
the rules of Community law and apply these rules without additional national
regulations. Under the principle of direct effect, on the basis of Community
law, subjects can commit legal acts, refer to its provisions and, based thereon,
protect their rights in courts. However, direct application means that the
applicable provisions of Community law are applied automatically by national
authorities, regardless of national law.
A rule is deemed directly effective if certain rights for an individual
are established, it is absolute, and its meaning is clear and sufficiently
exact. According to the interpretation of the European Court of Justice, a
rule is sufficiently exact and understandable if based on it, it is possible to
determine the range of subjects, which were granted some right, to set
content of rights held by the subjects, to identify the object or subjects
responsible for the execution of certain obligations. Certainty of rule
means that the provision of a right should not depend on an assessment of
the authority of the Community or Member State. The rule of Community
law only becomes directly effective after coming into force.
To maximize the effectiveness of European legislation the principle of
indirect effect is additionally applied. According to this principle, national
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courts and authorities have an obligation to interpret domestic law in the
light of Community law. This principle applies to all sources of
Community law, as well as those directly effective, and even those that
refer to optional recommendations.
The main task of the EU is to organize relations between Member
States and their peoples (Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU)), in a manner demonstating consistency and solidarity. The
implementation of this task is connected with the need to cooperate and
interact during the implementation of EU objectives. The implementation
of the solidarity principle becomes possible as a result of the adoption by
EU Member States of obligations to:
— implement any measures to complete the tasks defined by the
Treaty establishing the European Community;
— assist the EU in performing the tasks;
— abstain from any activity that could harm EU objectives.
This principle implies that measures to achieve EU objectives shall be
carried out conscientiously, diligently and in a way that the goal can be
achieved as soon as possible. Based on the solidarity principle, Member
States shall cooperate with EU institutions in cases where they have problems
with the implementation of Community law. Also, institutions should
provide support to Member States in matters of attaining EU objectives.
In the context of international solidarity, two concepts were formed in
the EU, focusing on the solidarity or sovereignty of state power transfer
to supranational organizations. In the debate on the Constitutional Treaty,
the concept for the transfer of state power to international organizations
that followed from supranational essence and spirit of cosmopolitanism,
won. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch
referendums seems to return the balance between sovereignty and
solidarity. However, the direction and form of harmonization between
solidarity and sovereignty are still determined by the concept of the
protection of human rights. The EU has already overcome the problems
of the first and second generation of rights, i.e. the dispute about equality
and freedom, and currently is at the stage of implementing the idea of
solidarity (III generation of rights), which aims to preserve peace and
sustainable development. Therefore, the formation of legal order largely
focuses on citizens and building of developed regions in Europe by means
of the common interests of political parties in individual countries. The
combination of sovereignty and solidarity should result in a new
supranational organization — a product that arises from the voluntary
commitment of states to reduce their powers to preserve peace and
sustainable development.
A special feature of the EU system is the combination of spontaneous
coordination with the coordination that takes place on the Community
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level, the essence of which is manifested in the implementation of the
subsidiarity principle. According to Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (TEEC), «in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community». The principle of subsidiarity is applied
not only in the sphere of social benefits (education, health, research and
technological development, environment), but also as regards consumer
protection, cooperation directed towards development or even industry.
Subsidiarity is the reaction to a failure of economic and political
markets. It aims to implement a state mission to support civic initiatives.
In the case of the EU, a state mission in this area is implemented by the
decentralization of power as follows: State — Community — region.
Thus, the substance of subsidiarity implies that power shall not only
interfere with subjects or social groups dealing with their own problems,
but shall primarily promote and encourage activity and, in extreme cases,
support and complement the activities of entities that are not self-sufficient.
The authorities should only intervene when the situation goes beyond the
capabilities of lower-level authorities and will be more effective.
This approach to the subsidiarity of power does not breach the
concept of a liberal state, but rather gives it specificity, resulting from the
continental liberalism. Its principles emphasize the need to limit the
extreme individualism that is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon capitalism.
Thus, using the subsidiarity principle, it is proposed that economic
efficiency is combined with fair distribution rules and a restriction of
disbalance in regional development. In practice, this principle is
implemented through structural and cohesion funds. Regional policy
plays a special role in applying the subsidiarity principle, under which,
national cohesion strategies are formulated on the basis of the Lisbon
strategy.
The principle of subsidiarity also conditions the proportionality of
measures to achieve a particular purpose. It means that measures used for
the implementation of Community law must be appropriate and
necessary, and therefore cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.
If there is an alternative, it is necessary to choose the one to be the least
problematic. The inconvenience associated with its use should also be
taken into account. Regarding the imposition of penalties, the
proportionality principle requires different types of sanctions pursuant to
the nature of the violated obligation.
Differences of opinion concerning the dynamics of integration
processes, and resulting conflicting interests among EU Member States,
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led to the emergence of the «Multi-speed Europe» concept. At present a
monetary Community uniting the countries with higher integration
dynamics that are ready to join the single market, adopt a common
currency and implement a common monetary policy is considered as its
practical manifestation. The dispute about the form of the constitutional
treaty also gave rise to other concepts, such as the «Europe of
Motherlands» or «Europe of Regions», cosmopolitan superpower or an
integration of solidary states, which can simultaneously limit their
sovereignty for the sake of stable, sustainable development and peace.
Given the difficulty of reaching a consensus in such matters, there
was a need to conduct a branching out in the concept of the unity and
uniformity of Community law, in accordance with Art. 43 of the TEU.
Along with the concept of unity and homogeneity, it is also possible to
implement the principle of enhanced cooperation as regards the group of
Member States that are ready for deeper integration, provided that the
enhanced cooperation:
a) supports achievement of EU and Community objectives, protects
and serves their interests and promotes their integration processes;
b) respects the Treaties and the uniform institutional structure of the EU;
c) respects acquis communautaire and the measures adopted pursuant
to the provisions of the above Treaties;
d) remains within the competence of the Community or the
Community and does not apply to areas that are within the exclusive
competence of the Community;
e) does not harm the domestic market, as defined in Article 14 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community, or economic and social
cohesion, established in accordance with Chapter XVII of the above Treaty;
f) does not create barriers or discrimination in trade between Member
States and does not distort their competition;
g) involves at least eight Member States;
h) respects the competences, rights and obligations of the Member
States not taking part in it;
i) does not violate the provisions of the Protocol on the Schengen
integration domain to the EU structure;
j) is open to all Member States, in accordance with Art. 43 b of the TEU.
1.4.3. Structural socio-economic principles
A strong a.c. core is comprised of a set of rules in the field of commercial
law. It specifically concerns the free movement of goods, individuals, capital
and services. These four fundamental freedoms are derived from the axiology
of economic liberalism. In continental Europe it is slightly different from the
Anglo-Saxon economic liberalism, which became the doctrinal basis of the
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principles of global capitalism (Albert M., 1994). The European version of
liberalism emphasizes a competitive environment, thus approaching
ordoliberalism and emphasizing the role of the law of other institutions in the
formation of efficient markets and overcoming their actual shortcomings.
Another feature of the EU economic system is a combination of
autonomous market coordination within the competitive system with central
strategic coordination, which is realized at the Community, state and regional
levels, directed towards sustainable development as well as social and
economic cohesion. In this sense, the commercial law of the EU approaches
the model of a social market economy. The harmonization of economic
efficiency and the principles of equitable distribution in the EU goes beyond
the concept of a human individual, whose function is to maximize personal
gain in market categories. Unlike Anglo-Saxon liberalism, in which
economic criteria are higher than social ones, a man in the system of EU
economic law is the subject of an economic process that applies to both
economic and social criteria during decision-making. According to such
axiology, Article 2 of TEEC identifies the following key objectives:
harmonious, balanced and stable economic growth, high employment and
social protection, economic and social cohesion, inflation-free economic
growth, high level of competitiveness and convergence of economic
performance, high level of environmental protection, increase of the level and
quality of life, equal rights for men and women, solidarity between Member
States. For the implementation of these tasks, it is necessary to create a
unified and harmonious European and national economic legislation.
The fundamental freedom connected with the functioning of a common
market, is the freedom of free movement of goods23. It was ensured by
establishing a customs Community (Article 23 of TEEC), which covers all
goods trading. Within its scope it is prohibited from applying export and
import duties and any other charges having an equivalent effect between
Member States and a common customs tariff is applied in relations with third
countries, which is declared in the form of regulations.
To ensure the full freedom of movement of goods, Article 90 of
TEEC introduces a ban on discriminatory and protectionist taxation and
Article 25 — a ban on the introduction of fiscal customs duties.
According to the European Court decision, the principle of the mutual
recognition of standards is also effective, whereby a product, which was
manufactured in one Member State, is allowed in the trade turnover on
the territory of other Member States.
In exceptional cases, the free one-way movement of goods may be
subject to restrictions. It refers to cases substantiated by the principles of
                     
23 A goods item is any product that has its own value, expressed in monetary terms and
may be the subject of trade transactions, except for official payment means (coins and
banknotes), to which the provisions on free movement of capital apply.
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morality, public order, public safety, protection of national cultural
heritage, artistic, historic or archaeological values and the protection of
industrial and commercial property (Article 30 of TEEC).
The EU governs the free movement of services somewhat
differently24. The general provisions of the Community on freedom of
movement of services exclude those that are directly related to the
exercise of state power. In addition, a person who provides services must
confirm the qualification necessary for these types of services, recognized
by the state of origin and practice of the given profession. However, the
free movement of services is impeded by about 90 different barriers. It
follows from the fact that currently, the services market provides more
than 90 % of newly created jobs and generates over 70 % of GDP, and
thus becomes a powerful instrument to limit unemployment. «Old» EU
states, fearing unfair competition from the providers of services in new
EU Member States, apply transitional periods and thus restrict the free
movement of services.
According to the Bolkenstein Directive, which was considerably
altered in 2006, new rules for the provision of services were adopted.
They retained the general principle of access to the services market,
based on the laws in force in the country of origin of a service provider
and, simultaneously, provided for the introduction of some exceptions
and permanent control of the state, in which these services were
provided. During the imposition of exceptional restrictions, the criteria
of expediency, proportionality and necessity are taken into
consideration.
Regular amendments to this directive, which were introduced in 2007,
involved a departure from «the principle of the country of origin» and
established an approach on the free movement of services, which are
provided «in general economic interests». The updated directive excludes
public services from the principle of freedom. Art. 53 of TEEC envisaged
the possibility of a broader liberalization of services than required by the
directives, but only if it is possible given the general economic situation
and the situation in the relevant sectors of economy.
Barriers to the freedom of movement of services, existing as a result
of many exceptions, do not contribute to progress in economic
convergence as they restrict free competition, the use of advanced
technologies, the creation of new business entities, opportunities to
reduce unemployment in the new EU countries and do not counteract the
«brain-drain» phenomenon to richer countries.
                     
24 According to Art. 50 of the TEEC, «services» in terms of this Treaty are services
normally provided for remuneration, insofar as they are not subject to the provisions on the
free movement of people, goods and capital.
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1.4.4. Freedom of Movement of Capital
Art. 56 of TEEC prohibits any restrictions on the movement of capital
and payments between Member States and between Member States and
third countries. Capital transfer is connected with financial transactions
aimed at the investment or deposit of funds. Instead, payment is the
transfer of currency values through sale and purchase transactions. The
prohibition of restrictions on the movement of capital also refers to any
other «related transactions», such as those associated with the
establishment of mortgages, bank loans for investment purposes, as well
as sales of real estate and stocks.
Exceptions from the general principle of the free movement of capital
cannot comprise its concealed limitation. In order to prevent financial
crime a duty can be imposed to declare the amount of money, which is
brought to third countries. Also, if there are «exceptional circumstances»
which, for example, may be a hindrance to the functioning of the
economic and customs Community or there are important political
circumstances, it is possible to use protective measures as regards third
countries, but for no longer than six months. These restrictions can only
be imposed by the Council by a qualified majority of votes and the
previous submission of the Commission and after consulting the ECB.
The Member State, which has problems with its balance of payments or
struggles with the financial crisis, may also exercise the right to restrict
the freedom of movement of capital and payments (Art. 119 and Art. 120
of TEEC).
1.4.5. Freedom of Movement of Individuals
Art. 39 of TEEC prohibits different treatment of its citizens and foreign
nationals in access to labour market, conditions of employment and
training and access to all social benefits. This protection also refers to a
potential foreign worker. Just as in the case of other European freedoms,
the freedom of movement for workers also has some limitations,
particularly with regard to public order, public safety, health, as well as
public service.
Freedom of movement of persons promotes European integration and
convergence by providing facilities for the study of languages, customs,
culture and patterns of activity. Unfortunately, in practice, if there are
significant differences in the amount of wages, as observed in post-
socialist countries, the economy of a poorer country is threatened by the
temporary dominance of losses over the benefits of freedom of movement
of persons. This is particularly so in the case of the «brain-drain»
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phenomenon, i.e. the excessive outflow of a skilled labour force and the
emergence of problems in various segments of the labour market, related
to the lack of some professions and pressure towards rapid wage increases
that, in turn, causes inflation trends and problems in balancing the state
budget. Freedom of movement for workers is also accompanied by
negative phenomena, such as unfair mediation and labour camps that do
not comply with the European standards concerning the conditions of
employment.
To counteract abuse in connection with the free movement of people,
the government of the state accepting immigrants, has the right to
establish the necessary conditions and restrictions, provided that they
meet the standards of EU law.
Art. 39 of the TEEC lists the rights of a foreign worker, particularly
to: job search, employment, non-discrimination based on sex and
nationality, right to education, access to social benefits, residence on the
territory of the employer state after the termination of work and
professional activity, receipt of a five-year residence certificate, reunion
of the husband/wife or partner with a migratory worker, with children
under 21 or those who are dependent on parents, immediate family
members of the worker and his wife/husband. All these individuals are
granted social guarantees and rights to education in the same scope as
granted to the nationals of the state accepting immigrants.
Some «old» Member States introduced transition periods regarding
access to their labour markets by citizens of countries that joined the EU
in 2004. After the completion of a five-year period, only states that
proved the existence of serious problems in their labour market were able
to extend it for another two years.
To ensure the free movement of workers, EU Member States had to
harmonize requirements in the field of professional qualifications and
diplomas. There are general and sectoral criteria in this field. If the latter
are based on the tacit recognition of qualifications acquired, the general
system of criteria applies to the professions that do not fall within the
sectoral criteria. This system covers the professions for which secondary
and higher education are required. Each Member State shall perform the
specification of professions regulated by EU directives, and clearly define
the characteristics of the qualification requirements applicable on its
territory. Meeting qualification requirements is the basis for obtaining a
work permit according to profession. Foreigners, who do not have this
right, can prove their skills in an exam organized by the authorities of the
receiving state in its official language. This examination is limited to the
topic of a candidate’s diploma. It is also possible to implement an
adaptive period under the supervision of a qualified representative of the
profession selected in the accepting country.
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The freedom of movement of persons is also connected with the
coordination of social protection systems. It covers the following
services: medical and maternity, connected to disability and old age, the
breadwinner’s death, accident during working hours, occupational
disease, as well as payment for funeral, unemployment and family. Due
to the fact that in Europe there are different systems of social security,
their coordination is based on the principles of respect for existing
differences and the implementation of such solutions that can ensure the
protection of the migratory population in the EU. The persons, who were
or are covered by social protection in the country of origin (workers,
pensioners, self-employed persons), shall be subject to coordination.
Students are entitled to medical care in accordance with the principles
applicable in the accepting country. The general social welfare principle
means equal treatment of its citizens and the nationals of other Member
States, i.e. the application of identical principles concerning rights and
obligations in the field of social protection. In addition, they apply the
principle of adding periods of employment or residence, which determine
the level and scope of social guarantees. According to this principle, the
rights obtained in the state, making the additions, are recognized. These
benefits are appropriate regardless of residence, i.e. they cannot be
reduced, deprived of or limited, taking into account the place of
residence. Only unemployment benefit is paid to those who are outside
the state, which granted such aid.
Citizens, who temporarily stay in another Member State, shall enjoy
only the right to minimum health services, the calculation of which is
conducted later.
Social aid, an additional pension system and benefits for war
victims are outside the system of coordination. The persons who,
seeking a permanent residence, move from the territory of one
Member State to another and are not potential employees or an
employee’s family members, have maintenance allowance, a valid
medical insurance policy, clearly identified in the receiving state (Art.
18 of TEEC).
Freedom of entrepreneurial activity is one of the forms of ensuring the
effectiveness of the freedom of movement of individuals and legal
entities other than non-profit organizations and enterprises not operating
on the basis of the legislation of one of the EU states (Art. 43-49 of
TEEC). The restriction of freedom of entrepreneurial activity to nationals
of Member States is prohibited. A subject that enjoys the freedom of
entrepreneurial activity is entitled to use any benefits and opportunities
associated with business activities without discrimination and in
accordance with the principle of equality. The general principle of
freedom of entrepreneurial activity also provides for some exceptions
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(Art. 45 of TEEC), which is related to the implementation of the
government’s tasks, because the person exercising them is granted special
guarantees and privileges connected with doing public service and the
application of state coercion against citizens.
1.4.6. Community Law in the Area of Competition
The following are distinguished within the framework of competition
law: unfair competition, antitrust and subsidies law. The main objective
of competition law is to provide irrevocable competition on the domestic
market and overcome its restrictions or obstacles (Arts 2, 3 and 81 of
TEEC). EU competition law applies to enterprises that have a tangible,
visible and quite likely impact on trade between Member States.
Should there be a conflict between European and national competition
laws the general principle of the priority of Community law applies.
Under its provisions, where Community law applies or its legitimacy is
recognized, Member States alone cannot prohibit enterprises from
performing approved arrangements and practices, and business
associations — from making decisions. With regard to abuse by
enterprises of their dominant position, Member States can introduce
restrictions that are more restrictive than provided for in EU legislation.
The issues of competition protection can be regulated by: European
Commission, one public body for competition protection, which is
supported by other state bodies, or some state bodies acting concurrently.
State bodies cannot make a decision contrary to the decision of the
Commission. The Commission shall recognize the independence of
national courts, the decisions of which cannot contradict the decision of
the Commission. Restrictions for breach of competition law are set
according to the principle of proportionality. Functional and structural
measures are used among them. Measures of a functional nature mean the
obligation to take a specific measure or terminate it (e.g. the restoration of
supplies, granting of a license, establishing price at a certain level).
Structural measures (e.g. division of enterprise) apply only in cases where
there are no effective functional measures.
The Commission has the right to impose monetary penalties for the
violation of its decision or default of obligations that it has deemed to be
mandatory. Enterprises and their associations themselves evaluate
whether their measures are consistent with the decisions of the
Commission in the case of an activity that is contrary to Community
competition rules (Art. 81 and 82 of TEU).
The Commission can also apply regular fines not exceeding 5 % of
average daily turnover to enterprises and their associations. The statute of
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limitations on the right of the Commission to impose monetary penalties
or regular fines expires three to five years from the date of breach of
Community competition law.
To ensure effective competition, the TEEC introduces the
prohibition of some agreements between enterprises (Art. 81) and the
prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position (Art. 82). The
prohibition of agreements particularly applies to: direct and indirect
pricing for purchase or sale, or any other trading conditions, limitation
or control of production, technical development or investment, the
allocation of markets or sources of supply, the application of unequal
conditions to equivalent legal arrangements with other trading parties,
dependence of entering into agreements for undertaking additional
obligations of other parties, which are not in essence connected with the
subjects of such agreements.
The prohibition does not apply to internal agreements of smaller
value, in which the share of the relevant market within the next two years
does not exceed 2 %. As regards other agreements of smaller value, the
share of which in the relevant markets does not exceed 5 % (in case of
parallel trade networks), 10 % (in case of agreements that are difficult to
classify as horizontal or vertical) and 15 % (in case of transactions
between entities that are not competitors), it is believed that they cannot
restrict competition significantly.
The operations of enterprises, which have a dominant position and
even enterprises that are pure monopolies, is not prohibited. A dominant
enterprise cannot be prohibited from protecting its own interests, but on
condition that its activities are proportionate to the threats and not in
violation of the principles of fair competition. On the other hand, the
abuse of a dominant position is prohibited.
EU law also provides for the regulation of the permissible level of
concentration within the Community. Member States can take appropriate
measures to protect legitimate interests, other than those listed in
Regulation 139/2004. These include, inter alia, public security, plurality
of the media, and the principle of caution. The Commission punishes the
violation of permissible concentration levels set forth by the Community
law with a monetary penalty of 10 % of total annual turnover.
EU Member States shall not provide state targeted assistance, but this
does not mean that the states must apply the same tax or social
preconditions for economic activity. Art. 87 of TEEC determines the aid
that is permitted by and consistent with the Community law. The first
group includes the following aid:
— of a social nature, granted to individual consumers without
discrimination with regard to the origin of the goods;
— used for overcoming the consequences of emergencies;
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— relating to the compensation of negative economic consequences in
the regions of East Germany that have been united with West Germany.
The following types of state aid can be considered compatible with
the common market:
— that which contributes to the economic development of regions
with very low living standards;
— that directed towards projects of importance for Community
purposes, or to overcome negative developments in the economy;
— that supporting culture and cultural heritage;
— other types of aid established by decision of the Council upon the
submission of the Commission.
1.4.7. The Lisbon Strategy as a Key Factor of Economic
and Social Convergence
The signum specificum of the EU institutional system is its desire to
achieve social and economic cohesion, which is considered an integral
part, a fundamental task and rationale of strategic coordination and the
reduction of a development lag.
As for regulation mechanisms in the economy, all issues of social and
economic cohesion are actually connected with the discussion on the
effectiveness, deficiencies and advantages of the market mechanisms of
social and economic development over those governed by the state, and
the use of their combinations in space, i.e. their operation in a specific
local environment and assessment based on indicators characterizing the
development distance of countries and regions from the sample model.
Alternative examples of socio-economic development model proposed
in the economy are as follows: development through globalization on the
basis of the recommendations of the so-called Washington consensus
derived from Anglo-Saxon liberalism and sustainable balanced growth. In
the European Community, they rely on the latest model, using a complex
theoretical basis that is largely derived from the theory of welfare,
evolutionary and institutional economics and ordoliberalizm. A model of
development was formed as a result of the comparison of these examples,
which was laid out in the Lisbon Strategy. Its supporters believe that the
spontaneous development of markets and Washington Consensus policies
are not sufficient for its implementation. A reduction in the development
distance and the simultaneous harmonization of economic efficiency and
fairness require central strategic coordination. This implies the need for
government involvement by means of development plans initiated by EU
bodies, which set model indices for social and economic cohesion. Since
2000, these plans are developed on the basis of the Lisbon Strategy.
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases84
Although not sufficient, but nevertheless a necessary prerequisite for
the implementation of the above plans is the availability of markets that
are free to develop. In this sense the development mechanisms of the EU
do not contradict the Washington Consensus. However, in this case it is
necessary to involve the state more actively as regards institutional
provision and the improvement of the functioning of markets to ensure a
favorable environment for sustainable development and the harmonization
of economic efficiency with the acceptable social principles of justice.
The necessity to prepare for active membership in the EU and the
debate on the future form of the Community’s system gives rise to
discussions on the adjustment of social and economic policies to the EU
standards. The main determinants of this policy’s standards are the
Maastricht and Lisbon Strategy (LS) criteria. The former determines the
macroeconomic conditions of economic policy, which should result in
stable, long-term economic growth. On the other hand, the Lisbon
Strategy is a set of priorities for the development of the economy of
knowledge and such social policy indicators that in the process of the
reduction of the distance in development should ensure social and
economic cohesion.
Thus, the question arises whether this model of socio-economic policy
— though reasonable and justified on the basis of economic theory —
corresponds to the stage of development of Poland and Ukraine —
countries sharing a common post-socialist legacy and divided by a
difference in institutional provision in connection with the adoption of the
EU’s a.c. by Poland on the one hand, and Ukraine not being in the single
European market, and support of European structural funds on the other.
Before the «Orange Revolution», when Ukraine followed a course
similar to that of Russia, Poland practically implemented the institutional
market system and a.c. of the EU. Ukraine’s accession to the CIS slowed
down the process of the establishment of market principles and state
capitalism with the heterogeneous role of the state in the economy, as
regards requirements for competitiveness. Inconsistency in the process of
the transition to a market economy and the democratization of a state
facilitated merger of the government’s interests with those of powerful
capital and the strengthening of the opportunism inherited after the
centrally-planned economy. An economy without a plan and even without
the institutional foundations of market efficiency resulted in various social
ills, including the spread of social poverty, corruption and the enrichment
of only a small amount of the population. Due to underdeveloped
institutions of competitive order, the general public could not engage
effectively in the establishment of markets using their entrepreneurship.
The institutional system that did not meet the requirements of efficient
markets did not guarantee adequate protection of property rights, free
CHAPTER 1. Theoretical and empirical bases of convergence… 85
choice and compliance with contracts. This institutional environment
opened the way to pathological entrepreneurship, which was often
conducted through the prism of corruption, opportunism, and even crime.
Therefore even now, the level of business risk in Ukraine remains very
high.
A major obstacle during the establishment of efficient markets was
the lack of access to the models, which Poland could use, when it decided
on integration with the EU. For political reasons, Ukraine has not
received such extensive international, intellectual and moral support for
the process of the establishment of the market. Without appropriate
models of state subsidiarity, attempts to overcome the challenges of
global capitalism, alone or in cooperation with Russia, were unable to
bring expected results.
The answer to the question on the applicability of the Lisbon
Strategy (LS) model in the process of the reduction of the distance in
development for a post-socialist country that does not belong to the EU
is complicated by the fact that many economists attribute excessive state
and supranational regulation to the methods set forth within it; the
harmfulness of the state’s social protection for entrepreneurship,
efficiency of markets and competitiveness of the national economy and
enterprises; dominance of the development ambitions of the largest and
richest member states and, in connection thereto, inadequacy regarding
the challenges of global capitalism. There are also accusations that the
EU institutional system is not able to accept the challenge of the
information and telecommunications revolution, global liberalization
processes and increasing competition25.
LS applies planning, that in some ways is close to practices carried
out within the framework of macroeconomic planning, characteristic of a
centrally planned economy. The difference is that the above planning is
indicative and takes place within a market economy. In other words, it is
an attempt to support autonomous market processes by the stimuli that are
driven by the central strategic coordination exercised by the subsidiarity
principle. At the first stage of implementation (2001—2005), the
priorities of LS were aimed at reducing technological lag with the
simultaneous ensuring of social cohesion by:
— the development of knowledge in society (education and human
capital, informatization, support of innovation as well as the research and
development sector), development of human capital and economic growth
in accordance with the social objectives of development;
                     
25 In Poland the system diagnosis of the Lisbon Strategy is presented in the annual
reports of the Polish Lisbon Strategy Forum in the form of a White Paper. 2003 saw the
publication of the «Polska wobec Strategii Lizbońskiej» report, PFSL, Warsaw — Gdansk,
2003.
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— creation of a legal environment, that would be conducive to
entrepreneurship (innovation, investment, reduction of bureaucracy and
cost for the registration of enterprises);
— formation of the labour market (employment growth to 70 % in
2010, increasing the retirement age to 63 years, elimination of barriers to
the employment of women, the provision of pre-school for 90 % of
children aged 3 to 7 years and 33 % of children under the age of 3,
ensuring the stability of pensions, implementation of programmes for the
eradication of poverty);
— execution of obligations regarding the establishment of unified,
liberal markets in the area of: transport business (rail, aviation as well as
the transportation of gas and electricity), financial services, elimination of
barriers to the free movement of services, ensuring the uniform
application of competitiveness principles;
— promotion of measures for the protection of the environment
(ratification of the Kyoto Protocol).
The package of intentions, with the exception of proposals relating to
the information society, was laid down in EU-15 countries earlier, though
some of its parts were not united into a single program. The task of these
priorities is to ensure increased productivity by expanding the ICT sector,
limiting structural unemployment and increasing employment as well as
taking advantage of the common market, particularly through the opening
of markets, which were previously protected, and as a result of the
commercialization of the health care and pension system.
The Lisbon strategy is based on 28 main and 12 additional objectives,
as well as 117 indicators, which are periodically monitored. The question
of funding remains in the competence of the Member States on which the
strategy is focused, provided that it cannot go beyond the a.c. of the EU.
This means the obligation to comply with the subsidiarity and solidarity
principles, through which it is possible to use the financial support of
structural funds and Cohesion Fund.
The advantage of the Lisbon strategy is its integrated, holistic
approach to stimulating development and implementation and the
attempt to harmonize effective economic growth with social cohesion,
ecological development and the expansion of knowledge-based
economy. Priorities are implemented by agreement on common goals
during negotiations, their inclusion (considering specific ways of
achievement) to national and regional programs, coordination of
methods for measuring performance, and the observation, evaluation,
comparison and exchange of experience, also the use of directives
may be permitted to some extent.
The experience of several years of ongoing efforts to introduce LS
indices, priorities and goals showed that despite partial success,
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particularly in the area of performance indices, the distance between the
economies of the EU and the USA is not decreasing and the priorities in
research and development were not implemented. However, the biggest
problems emerged during the introduction of the single market and the
demonopolization of those sectors of the economy that are sensitive to
social pressure and are a priority in view of political considerations
(transport, energy), as well as in the sphere of the reduction in the level of
protection of social security (retirement age, working hours and so on).
Employment priorities, the task of which was to increase the share of
employed persons in the general population, have not been attained
either. In 2000-2004 the unemployment rate rose from 8.5 % to 8.9 %. In
addition, many countries observed the phenomenon of premature exit
from the labour market (retirement) of middle-aged workers, who, in the
case of the USA or Japan, would have stayed at the top of their
professional career (Csaba L., 2005).
Drafted in 2004 the Wim Kok’s Report offers a detailed study of the
causes of problems in implementing the priorities of LS (The Lisbon
Strategy ..., 2005). Its authors argue that social and economic cohesion
may be provided on condition that orientation is directed towards
economic growth and the availability of new jobs. Thereto, social and
environmental priorities should be implemented so as not to interfere, but
rather to contribute to higher economic growth.
The spring session of the European Council (March 2005), concentrating
only on measures regarding full employment and economic growth, did
not introduce significant changes in social and economic cohesion. In
matters of regulatory policy the Council is inclined to keep it at the
current level. This means that the main reason for the failure of the
Lisbon strategy — the reduction of regulation and moreover, deregulation
— was never included in EU goals.
The revised Lisbon strategy is based on the following priorities:
— increase of competitiveness and innovativeness of the economy;
— improvement of the technical and social infrastructure;
— employment and human resource growth;
— regional development, rural prosperity and increased territorial
cohesion;
— establishment of a single social Community and its security.
At the same time it emphasizes the need to strengthen the European
social model based on increasing employment and social cohesion. These
indicators will be achieved through the European Social Fund, which in
2010-2013 will focus on six key areas, particularly:
— strengthening the adaptive capacities of workers and enterprises;
— increasing access to the employment system, combating unemployment
and increasing the duration of professional activity;
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— promoting social integration through the promotion of the
professional involvement of those who are disadvantaged in the labour
market and combating discrimination;
— promoting partnership for reform in the employment and
integration spheres;
— increasing investment in human capital;
— strengthening the institutional capacity and efficiency of public
service.
In practice, it means support for enterprises, especially small and
medium ones, in the field of human investment, the implemention of
systems and training programs, spreading information and communication
technologies, new forms for the organization of work. Another line of
action should be: development of mobility and self-employment,
removing barriers to access to labour market, the professional integration
of women and combating various manifestations of work discrimination
against women. To mitigate the negative effects of demographic
processes the promotion of active old-age and the development of
education throughout life is proposed. Instead, the task of the reform of
education and training, development of lifelong learning, academic
training, establishment of a cooperation network of companies,
educational institutions and research centers is to increase investment in
human capital. The European Social Fund aims to strengthen the
effectiveness of administrative services by supporting the planning,
monitoring and validation of programs and the training of management
personnel.
It should be emphasized that in the case of Poland, the full
implementation of LS priorities by 2013, imposed through the National
cohesion strategies of Member States, could result in a reduction of the
development distance as regards EU-25 to 33 % from 50 % — in 2007.
However, the preservation of these trends would open the prospect of
overcoming lag within one generation.
The supporters of integration in the EU are convinced that all Central
and Eastern Europeean countries participating in European integration
processes, despite temporary problems, will eventually benefit from the
introduction of acquis communautaire and the Lisbon Strategy, which
will surely prevail over the disadvantages of this process, but warn that it
will not happen immediately and automatically. The example of East
Germany, despite its specificity, is an important warning, which indicates
that the process of introducing the whole institutional and legal heritage
of the Community and economic policy, characteristic of EU Member
States, are not always accompanied by convergence, even when a new
technical infrastructure has been built and mass training in the direction
of adjustment of human capital has been conducted.
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Experts share the view that a less developed country should join the
EU for the progress of civilization, strengthening of security and receipt
of support for measures regarding socio-economic development by
opening access to higher quality policy standards, financial support and
the subsidiarity of the state, which is based on economic responsibility of
its beneficiaries, as well as the mobilization of efforts of central and local
authorities for social and economic cohesion.
Still, it should be noted that the application of principles of the Lisbon
Strategy means orientation on high European technical, social and
environmental standards that are developed for economies with a higher
level of development and productivity than Poland or Ukraine. Their
execution requires a conscious and competent reorientation of state
functions, the rationalization of the public sector and overcoming the
pitfalls of public debt. Without the rationalization of budget policy, it is
impossible to free the economy from the paradoxes of human capital
development and the degradation of social capital.
In the case of Poland, the task of new reforms in health care, education or
social protection is the transparent distribution of responsibility for the level
and quality of services between the state, self-government bodies and
subjects of specific industry, to be achieved as a result of public consensus.
This is impossible to achieve without the transparency of policy and the
constant depreciation of the achievements of predecessors. Public debate is a
very effective instrument for reaching understanding and getting the support
of the general public, it helps to protect from the domination of sectoral
interests and is expedient in the debate on the forum of the European
Parliament.
The harmonization of policies regarding direct taxes cannot be only in
the interests of developed countries. Countries with incommensurable
worse prerequisites for achieving high productivity of capital should
retain the right to implement such tax policy that will attract foreign
investment and maintain national savings. The advantage of such a policy
is confirmed by the example of Ireland.
The excessive distribution of state aid also does not facilitate the
developing countries, because they cannot withstand competition with
richer countries. Extensive state support creates an unfavorable
environment for the influx of direct foreign investments. Therefore, it is
more reasonable to apply substantial restrictions to sectoral state aid.
Ukraine and Poland urgently need to modernize the social policy
model. The use of excessive and petty labour standards, minimum wage
and environmental standards is inefficient. Norms and standards often
become a dangerous tool for imposing the rules of the game, as a result of
which, highly developed countries can gain a significant advantage. A
necessary prerequisite for regional convergence is the European cohesion
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policy model, which is realized by means of structural and regional aid on
the principles of subsidiarity. A country that is not an EU member should
find the right way to achieve a dynamic balance between the needs of
economic growth, social cohesion and environmental development.
For social and cultural reasons it is impossible to make a rapid
improvement in the institutional system of Ukraine, to preserve a high level
of social cohesion and simultaneously achieve better economic performance.
In this regard, the question arises of the establishment of a reflexive upgrade
of human capital, which develops ways of thinking and action towards
creativity, entrepreneurship and self-responsibility, as well as the
determination of the role of the state and its institutions in this process.
Fundamental to civilization breakthrough of Poland, Ukraine or other
post-socialist countries is not so much the strategy of correctly identified
objectives laid down, e.g. in the LS, but an effective institutional regulatory
system, which enables the achievement of the competitive advantage of the
economic system. In an information society, liberal goods, financial
services and labour markets and easy access to the latest technology,
competition between national economies represent first of all, competition
between institutions. Each society that seeks to overcome its own lack of
development and implement a policy of social and economic cohesion,
should make an effort to make the relevant legal and regulatory changes.
Their implementation will take place within the market with the support of
central strategic coordination and will be based on the principles of
institutional order, the task of which is to achieve the stable balanced
development, based on social, territorial and environmental cohesion. The
above changes should also be free from those regulations that threaten
economic efficiency. This means that the a.c. of the EU and the Lisbon
Strategy are examples that should be considered in more depth, in the light
of opportunities and threats to the development aspirations of Ukrainian
society. In this regard the question arises on the possibility of using Polish
experience in the field of institutional adaptations and the Development
Strategy it has implemented (2006—2013).
1.5. The Convergence of National Economies under Conditions
of EU Expansion
1.5.1. Introduction
Beginning with the 21st century, the world faced the problems, challenges
and imperatives, to the systemic understanding of which it was not and is
still not ready for. Among them the most important place is given to the
vision of prospects for effective and safe development in conditions of
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globalization, the multidimensional manifestation of which is due to the
increased scale and dynamization of the international movement of
goods, services and factors of production, information, technology and
innovations. Economic globalization is characterized by brand new
conditions and mechanisms for the convergence of national economies
with the systematic internationalization of all spheres of human activity.
Actually, under present conditions we can speak of a new global
economy (O.H. Bilorus, 2003; T.V. Kalchenko, 2006; B.V. Prykin, 2003;
P.W. Daniels, 1998), although today globalization, in our view, is a
process that is not completed in a geo-economic, scientific and
technological, as well as sectoral and functional sense.
In foreign and domestic research, various methodological approaches
are applied, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios of the development of
human civilization are proposed (F. Fukuyama, S. Huntington, J. Soros,
E. Azroyants, Y. Pakhomov, O. Bilorus). However, based only on
theoretical concepts, differentiated according to current practical needs it
is impossible to define the political, economic, social and cultural
parameters of the future global organization of life of people and nations
clearly and unambiguously 26.
In the context of the traditional paradigm of economic development
through the spreading of innovations in technology and management, the
intensive exchange of goods, services and investments globalization
contributes to overall progress. Under conditions of economic globalization,
international standardization and rationalization of production and
technology, investment and marketing operations spread, which leads to
new opportunities of the increased competitiveness of business entities.
1.5.2. Globalization
In recent decades there has been transformation of motivational mechanisms
and business environment, transition from perfect to imperfect and further to
global competition — struggle of global market players for resources and
conditions of sustainable and safe development at corporate, state, regional
and inter-civilization levels. It modifies qualitative analysis methodology
characteristics: macro-and micro-differentiated and functional approaches are
replaced by an integrative approach (Figure 1.2).
                     
26 Modern theory in its traditional paradigms can neither predict the future nor properly
interpret the current reality, i.e. the gap between science and practice increases in favor of
the latter. Methodology of globalistics as a relatively «young» science, although a priori, is
interdisciplinary in nature (schools of universal evolution, controlled global development,
economic sociology, environment and the economy), actually is emerging in a somewhat
narrow range of topical issues and is limited primarily to the research of economic,
political, social and informational globalism, based on diverse analytic tools.
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Figure 1.2. Integrative Model of Global Competition
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In this context economic globalization, on the one hand, facilitates the
global convergence of markets, and on the other — becomes its main
consequence. This is due to the development of transnational business in
conditions of macroeconomic liberalization. At present, about 80,000
companies around the world, controlling about 770,000 foreign affiliates, are
on the transnational stage of development and concentrate the lion’s share of
the global flow of goods, services, investment, innovation, 75-80 % of R&D
activities.
In the mid 1980s global strategies were initially formed in some of the
most active TNCs, then in their wider circle. They were aimed at global
vision of competition in the oligopolistic market structure, operation in
high-tech industrial sectors, coordination of their activities through
flexible production and information technologies, the integration of their
companies and specialized branches into a single international
administration network, etc.
The formation of global corporate structures occurs largely through
mergers and acquisitions. The total volume of such transactions at the
peak in 2000 exceeded USD 720 billion. Thereto, according to
UNCTAD, developed countries accounted for more than USD 670
billion. For a long period, mergers and acquisitions allowed multinational
companies to obtain the strategic assets of other firms, monopolize
markets, achieve synergies, increase the size and diversify risks, extend
the financial possibilities of the implementation of the personal interests
of senior management and others.
In the progressing post-industrial segment of the global economy, the
leadership ambitions of global corporations, coupled with a dynamic
quazieconomic culture generate new quality structural and organizational
transnational changes towards metacorporatization. In the process of
market expansion, metacorporations not only implement the general and
specific features of big business, but also the latent functions of a real
economic power27. In modern business practice there are such forms of
metacorporations as circular, horizontal, shell corporations, quazi
holdings, virtual corporations, network corporate structures that
adequately integrate the connections of elements of the internal and
external competitive environment to global conditions.
It is the metacorporatization of business that conditions its
virtualization as a universal trend, when the traditional physical and
                     
27 The competitiveness of metacorporations and their leadership is implemented on
condition of leading banks, industrial companies and other large structures becoming part
of their composition. Therefore, the most common prototypes of metacorporations are
cartels, syndicates, trusts, consortia, concerns, unions and business associations, pools,
holding companies, strategic alliances, financial-industrial groups, transnational companies
with a divisional structure, etc.
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legal characteristics of companies and their corporate culture are lost.
The network organization (virtualization/decentralization) of the
activity of metacorporations leads to a blurring of boundaries between
companies, the disappearance of delimitations between internal and
external members of an organization, own and foreign resources, large
and small firms, etc.
In general, the global corporations dominating the goods, services,
capital, technology, managerial innovation markets have actually
become the most influential players on the world economy and at the
same time — the most dynamic of its structural elements. By mobility,
ability to adequately respond to changes in external competitive
environment, innovation orientation they surpass bureaucratic, not
only national, but also international organizations and regional
supranational formations. The activities of global corporations, which
will clearly have no alternative in international business, will largely
determine the convergence mechanisms of national economies,
contours of the future global economy, philosophy of global
competitiveness and leadership. At the same time global reproductive
processes within national economies are distorted, thereby discrediting
traditional theoretical concepts concerning macroeconomic
proportions, stability and efficiency.
Despite the obvious, partly phenomenal manifestations, at present
globalization is not comprehensive and universal, because it does not
actually cover all countries, regions and industries, although it has a
progressive development potential in this direction. It is not
straightforward and homogeneous, especially given positive and
negative manifestations, when costs and benefits connected with the
process of economic globalization, are distributed unevenly,
asynchronously and disproportionately, especially between the
countries (Figure 1.3).
An impartial analysis shows that the socio-economic gap between
countries — global leaders and countries-outsiders is progressing,
reflecting primarily gaps in the generation and mastering of technological
innovations in the modern informational environment. Buying and
soliciting intellectuals from the developing countries, leading Western
countries are accumulating the most competitive part of global human
resources (in terms of post-industrial development criteria). The
concentration of intellectual capital and information resources in a small
group of post-industrial countries leads to a kind of technological
«colonialism» when the preliminary expenditures of these countries on
science and education objectively produce the effect of the use of global
technological rent.
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Figure 1.3. Contradictions of Economic Globalization
It is especially important to consider the scale and dynamics of the
process for the establishment of the global management of the planet’s
resources and the redistribution of world income, which is not equivalent
(E.D. Smith, 2004). It makes an ambiguous impact on the vital activity
conditions of people: while doubling gross world product in the last 30
years and improving the quality of life of the majority, the gap in the
income of the wealthiest and the poorest countries is constantly
increasing (one-fifth of the world population living in countries with the
highest income account for about 90 % of world GDP, while the poorest
fifth accounts for 1 %), OECD countries (20 % of the world population)
account for 70 % of world trade, 60 % of FDI, more than 90 % of Internet
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users; there is no trend to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor,
even in highly developed countries, regional social asymmetry is
characteristic of the European Union.
In general, on the one hand, globalization is the source and stimulus of
competition, providing new opportunities for development, and on the
other — generates contradictions, conflicts and crises on a local and general
civilization scale (D.H. Lukianenko, O.L. Bakayev, 2003). In our view, the
theoretical and methodological plan contains a systematic asymmetry of
economic development generated and strengthened by increasing global
interdependence. Global economic asymmetries (financial and investment,
production, trade, infrastructure) should be considered in the context of
technological and information asymmetries that cause geopolitical and
inter-civilization asymmetries in a heterogeneous social and cultural
environment (D.H. Lukianenko, O.M. Mozhovyi, 2006).
1.5.3. Regionalization
The interstate asymmetry of economic globalization becomes more
apparent when countries — global leaders, which as a result of successful
long-term expansion in all segments of the global market, have
accumulated unprecedented financial and human capital, are concentrated
on one pole of the global economy, while most countries — global
outsiders, which cannot be active participants of globalization on a par,
trying to somehow respond to its challenges are concentrated on the
other. In other words, the logic of convergence is transformed into
national strategies of adaptation or even survival.
Under these conditions, interstate regional integration groupings
require special attention — free trade zones, customs unions, which
currently number about 300, as well as common markets, economic and
political alliances. Modern economic regionalism is characterized by:
firstly, the dynamic integration process caused by both objective factors
and the «chain» reaction of countries to the development of integrated
groupings in other regions of the world; secondly, uneven development
and implementation of forms of international economic integration
caused by obvious differences in the economic development of a country
and regions of the world; and thirdly, disintegration processes, which
have deep roots in historical, political, economic and social patterns of
world development.
On the one hand, having original preconditions, developing in
different ways on a voluntary or compulsory basis, economic regionalism,
particularly in its modern continental forms (EU, NAFTA, APEC),
promotes the convergence of national economies and the formation of a
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homogeneous world market. As a response to the competitive challenges
of globalization under the contradiction of national leadership ambitions
and development strategies, the mechanisms for balancing interests and
harmonization of rules of the game emerge in the most important regional
markets. This generates significant static and dynamic effects, and the
natural characteristics of a national state regulatory and protective
function are transferred to a larger legitimately institutionalized
supranational level. The geography of competitive integration ranges is
determined by the centers of power, around which the fields of common
national interests for economic convergence and further consolidated
counteraction to global competitors: Western European, North American,
Asia-Pacific, Eurasian (Table 1.2) are formed.
Table 1.2
INITIAL COMPETITIVE POSITION
OF MAJOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION ZONES
Characteristics EU NAFTA АPЕС CIS
1. Continent Europe NorthAmerica
Asia,
Australia Eurasia
2. Year of
establishment 1957 1994 1989 1991
3. Number of
member states 25 3 15 11
4. Associated
members 12 — 6 1
5. Potential (as a % of the world)
5.1. Territory 2.4 15.9 15.5 16.4
5.2. Population 6.5 6.7 29.8 4.9
5.3. GDP 28.9 28.6 26.9 1.6
5.4. Production of
energy resources 8.3 26.2 16.8 15.3
5.5. Consumption of
energy resources 15.1 29.4 20.9 11.9
6. Integration
centres
Germany,
France USA
Japan,
China
Russian
Federation
7. Secondary centers GreatBritain —
USA,
Russian
Federation
—
8. Potential for
further integration
Eastern
Europe
South
America South Asia
Balkans,
Central
Asian
Countries
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On the other hand, in the context of global competitiveness
interstate integrated regional interests may conflict with the motives of
the global expansion of TNCs, separate block countries from activity
under multilateral universal obligations, and «closed» regionalism
often gives rise to protectionism as regards «third countries» (groups
of countries) discrediting market competition and blurring the
background of global economic convergence. Significant geo-
economic changes are provoked: the line of interaction «West-East»
shifts to «West-South East» along with the weakening of the
competitive unity of the «West» due to contradictions between the
New and Old World. The global competition of the North and South
with the organizational principles of the geo-economic universe,
which are substantially different from the usual ones, is activated
(A.I. Neklessa, 1999).
Powerful integration processes, on the one hand, and increasing
asymmetry in regional development, on the other, form the basis and
environment for global and regional leadership. Thereto, the triad of
leaders of the world economy, the structure of which includes countries
with different levels of internationalization, is transformed into a triad of
systemically interconnected national economies (Figure 1.4).
EU Japan
USA
EU
Japan,
NIC,
China
NAFTA
Europe
an
market
АPЕС
market
American
market
1970—1980 1990—2000 2010—…..
YEARS
Figure 1.4. Evolution of the World Economic Triad
The value of the triad in terms of global development is manifested
not only in its concentration of the largest scale of the flow of goods and
capital, the creation of a field for TNC activities that are unprecedented in
size and quality, but also in the influence of the triad on all other national
economies: on the one hand, their inclusion to the internal markets of the
TNCs’ triad, and on the other — involvement in regional integration
processes.
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1.5.4. Strategic Directions of the EU Policy
Under modern conditions the competitive potential of the European
Community increases significantly. It is important that geopolitically,
European integration has become a priority not only for Central and
Eastern Europe, but also for other countries that will have a common
border with the enlarged EU, in accordance with the concept a «Wider
Europe — Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our
Eastern and Southern Neighbours» (2003).
Thereto, Eurocentrism as the most vivid contemporary integration
process has almost all the asymmetry of development that intensifies
under EU expansion (D.H. Lukianenko, V.I. Chuzhykov, 2007), and the
problems of convergence of national economies in the common European
economic space become much more complicated.
The existence of any social and economic system will always require
internal unity and the creation of a structure that is stable in the face of
external and internal shocks. Thereto, the degree of economic response to
global changes in individual sectors of national economy may differ, but
convergence basis of the integration grouping will always secure the
rapid return of the system to the sustainable, although possibly delayed
development.
The term «convergence», which was introduced in 1970-80s by a
Dutch researcher Jan Tinbergen, meant at that time, the possible merger
of the socialist and capitalist systems, which never happened. Over time it
began to be interpreted as a process for the rapprochement of countries,
industries and regions, with a number of indices being applied as its
indicators.
In the early 90s, the research of convergent processes becomes
very popular, primarily because of the need to determine the prospects
and forecasts of economic growth. Rapprochement of countries and
borders was at the focus of a serious study by R. Barro and X. Sala-i-
Martin (1991). A year later (1992) they published a major work in the
«Journal of Political Economy», uncovering the theoretical results on
the nature of the socio-economic convergence of countries and
economic unions.
Over time, the definition of «convergence» becomes much more
complicated, because the use of economic indices has led to its further
differentiation. The definition of nominal and actual convergence (W.
Andreff, 1998) and its many mathematical interpretations (α; β, γ, δ —
convergence)28 was launched, which henceforth extended to the zone of
                     
28 The types of convergence, described vividly in paragraph 1.3, are purely empirical
in this part of the monograph. (Note of the editors).
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political transformations (i.e. «Copenhagen criteria for accession») and
the relevant economic policies of monetary and fiscal rapprochement. At
that time, the enhancement of theoretical research was connected with the
names of G. Mankiw (1995), M. Buti, A. Sapir (1998) and the previously
mentioned X. Sala-i-Martin (1996) and R. Barro (1997), who from then
on continued their own research.
Ideas of the further expansion of the European Union in the late 1990s
spread significantly, while socio-economic convergence began to be
understood as the only necessary and in essence, a fairly capacious
process of the systemic rapprochement of member states and candidate
countries. The rate of implementation of acquis communautaire could
also be considered as convergence, which, unlike scientific models,
acquired clear formalized forms.
Problems of the transformation of economies in Central and Eastern
European countries (CEE) and their rapprochement with the EU are
discussed widely in the works of many scholars, including
L. Balcerowicr (1994), G. Kołodko, M. Nuti (1997), J. Kornai (1992),
O. Havrylyshyn and R. van Rooden (2000), D. Berkowitz and
D. Delong (2003). At the beginning of the 21st century, interest in the
mathematical identification of the convergence of post-socialist
countries in the region increased significantly. One after another, the
works of A. Warner (2003) are published, who by means of special
tests, managed to assess the nature of the convergence of CEE countries
(by the way the existing English word «convergence» was
complemented by another its analogue — «catch-up») using the
regression analysis of S. Gomulka (2003), who quite aptly commented
on and completed the study of A. Warner. Significant studies were also
conducted in the Finnish Institute of Transitive Economy (BOFIT) and
many other universities and research centers.
Modern ideas of convergence can be viewed from two aspects: the
theoretical and applied ones. If the first one clearly fits into the concept of
the world system with the ideal type of homogenizer (M. Fezerstoun and
S. Lash, 2008), which seeks to avoid the time and spatial distance (as
opposed to heterogenizers), the second is a purely pragmatic model of
actual rapprochement with significant budget funds, as well as clear and
transparent rules and mechanisms for their distribution. This is the model
to be used in the European Union during 2007-2013.
The growth in the disproportionality of EU development due to its
enlargement has led to significant changes in the regional structure of the
member states, because contrasts in the development of territories have
caused their rapid distancing in the demographic, social, economic and
other spheres, and thus convergence (with the exception of the monetary
sphere) began its identification on the monetary level.
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Despite the significant success of the EU regional policy in past
years, not all Europeans treated it as a standard for further imitation,
because the overall low economic growth rate of the old Member States
forced the EU to treat «encouraging results» differently. A critical
assessment of its activities led to the formation of new approaches to the
implementation of the idea of regional harmonization (also called
homogenization), which clearly fits the mainstream of the neoliberal
economic model, which is not adequately perceived by everyone. The
main factors that influenced the transition to the modernization of
regional policy (henceforth it was called the «policy of regional and
local development») were as follows:
• sharp reduction of fund allocation for agriculture (governmental
grants, subsidies) that until recently actually was equal to this sector’s
share in GDP of the European Community;
• low technological level of development of peripheral regions of the
EU, which changed their economic structure very slowly, therefore
government subsidies acquired of a chronic nature;
• the «revolt» of rich regions against the poor (members of the European
Parliament from some developed territories raised the albeit rhetorical, but in
general dangerous question for the EU of whether, for example, «not the
whole of» Italy become part of an integration grouping; recently to this was
added the problem of two, and since 2008 — even of three Belgiums);
• the need to coordinate uniform transport, communication and other
policies relating to both regions and the EU as a whole;
• an extremely high level of unemployment in some regions of the EU
(Spain, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, France, East Germany, etc.), the
development of «consumer» attitudes among the New EU Member States
from the perspective of the Old Members States;
• major expansion of the EU and significant expenditures from its
consolidated budget, related to pre- and post-accession adaptation periods;
• reluctance of some EU leaders to constantly pursue the
«maintenance of New Member States» policy.
The main events that influenced the change in EU regional policy
were as follows:
• adoption by the European Council (2005) of the proposal for a
compromise budget for 2007-2013, in which EUR 347.410 bln were
allocated for the cohesion policy (official website of the European
Commission ...)
• conclusion of the Interinstitutional Agreement on cooperation in
budgetary matters for 2007-2013 (May 2006) between the European
Parliament, the council and the European Commission (which also
included Rules for the regulation of structural funds, which became
effective on August 1, 2006);
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• adoption by the EU Council of «Common Strategic Guidelines for
Cohesion» (October 2006), which clearly identified the principles and
priorities of rapprochement policy.
What changes in the EU? First of all, this pertains to EU objectives
and financial instruments that henceforth are determined exclusively by
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. The following Table 1.3
gives a systematic understanding of the fundamental changes in the EU.
Table 1.3
CHANGING PRIORITIES AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
IN THE EU COHESION POLICY
Architecture of the cohesion policy
2000—2006 2007—2013
Objectives and
initiatives of municipalities’
Cohesion Fund
Financial
instruments > Objectives
Financial
instruments
Objective 1. Promotion of
the development and
restructuring of regions
that are lagging behind
ERDF
ESF
EAGGF
FIFG
>
Cohesion Fund Cohesion
Fund >
Convergence ERDF
ESF
Cohesion
Fund
Objective 2. Support of
regions with structural
problems in the sphere of
socio-economic
transformation
ERDS
ESF
>
Objective 3.
Modernization of policy
in the education,
vocational training and
employment spheres
ESF
>
Regional
competitive-
ness and
employment
ERDF
ESF
Interreg ІІІ ERDF
Urban ІІ ERDF
Equal ESF
>
European
territorial
cooperation
ERDF
Leader + EAGGF
Rural development and restructuring of
fisheries under objective 1
EAGGF
and FSFG
4 objectives
4 joint initiatives
Cohesion Fund
6
instruments — 3 objectives
3
instruments
Source: Cohesion policy 2007—13, 2007, p. 10.
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As follows from the Decision of the European Council (2005), the
relevant Interinstitutional Agreement (May 17, 2006) and «Commutity
Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion» approved by the EU Council (October
6, 2006), approaches regarding the implementation of the EU regional
policy are changing fundamentally. The main goal of the EU for 2007-
2013 becomes the convergence (rapprochement) of regions, which hence
becomes the key objective of the Community. Thereto, the financial
instruments are as follows: the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund. It should
be noted that previously there were six instruments. In other words, the
objectives of regional policy become more specific, and quite significant
financial resources are concentrated in only three funds, which partly
assume the main functions. The approach to defining depressed regions
also remains only partially. As you know, in 2000-2006 the regions with
a GDP index equal to 75 % and lower per capita as compared to the
average in the EU-15 (EU = 100 %) were considered depressed. During
2007-2013, this indication will be preserved and the specified limit will
not be recalculated each time the EU is enlarged (e.g. the EU-25; the EU-
27). The Cohesion Fund, whose activities now extend to the entire not
being limited to the outsider Member States, will also use the Union
indicator of Gross national income (GNI) with a «critical limit» of 90 %
as compared to the average in the EU-15 (rather than the EU-25)29. This
approach is likely to be regarded as a compromise, because if the said
index was compared to all of the EU (i.e. all 27 membe-states), the users
of ‘aid’ would also be those regions of NUTS-II level, which are
classified as depressed, although they are located within the leading EU
Member States (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, etc.). As a
result of numerous agreements and calculations, the EU received four
groups of recipients:
• regions that need support for the purpose of «convergence»*,
including:
a) «new» EU Member States: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia (the whole territory), Czech Republic** (7
regions), Hungary** (6 regions), Slovakia** (3 regions);
                     
29 A significant advantage of the «implementation» of the scientific achievements of
economists working in the EU can become the process of the adequate evaluation by EU
officials of the results of their research. Thus, the criticism expressed at one time (2004) of
«development indices» was soon reflected in relevant EU documents. See.: Faina A.,
Lopez-Rodrigues J. (2004).
* The EU approach is to identify the regions by their national names and not to
translate them into English or French. Bulgarian and Greek regions are written with Latin
letters.
** The list of depressive regions lacks the metropolitan region, the macroeconomic
indices of which are well above the depression threshold.
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b) «Old» EU Member States: Germany (Brandenburg—Nordost,
Mecklenburg—Vorpommern, Chemnitz, Dresden, Dessau, Magdeburg,
Thüringen); Greece (Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki, Thessalia, Ipeiros,
Ionia Nisia, Dytiki Ellada, Peloponnisos, Voreio Aigaio, Kriti); Spain
(Galicia, Castilla—la Mancha, Extremadura, Andalucia); France
(Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, ReCommunity); Italy (Campania,
Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia); Portugal (Norte, Centro, Alentejo, Regiao
Autónoma dos Acores); the United Kingdom (Cornwall and Isles of
Scilly, West Wales and the Valleys);
• convergence regions that require a transitive support system (are in
the final stage): Belgium (Province du Hainaut); Germany (Brandenburg-
Südwest, Lüneburg, Leipzig, Halle); Greece (Krntriki Makedonia, Dutiki
Makedonia, Attiki); Spain (Princspado de Asturias, Region de Murcia,
Ciadad Autónoma de Ceuta, Ciadad Autónoma de Melilla); Italy
(Basilicata); Austria (Burgenland); Portugal (Algarve); United Kingdom
(Highlands and Islands);
• states that require funding from the Cohesion Fund (all twelve New
Member States plus Greece and Portugal);
• states that require transitive support from the Cohesion Fund (Spain).
Thus, the activities of EU Structural Funds, which now also include
the Cohesion Fund, are differentiated and clearly identified by application
levels: state and NUTS-II regions. Ireland, for the development of which
substantial funds were allocated in the past fifteen years, is no longer
among the list of depressed regions. It can be also considered that during
the adoption of the new EU development strategy the pan-European
compromise was reached regarding the consolidation of the depressed
regions of the Old and New EU Member States.
Objective 2 «Regional Competitiveness and Employment», which
actually merged two previous objectives from 2000—2006, is also vital.
Most of the Funds in this direction will now be available for the two
major groups of countries and regions: those undergoing early reforms,
but are parts of the Old EU Member States (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy,
Portugal, Finland, Great Britain, and, as an exception, one region from
Hungary and one — from Cyprus, the hyperactive territories of which
have comparable performance) and 16 countries with regions requiring
improved competitiveness by funding measures to optimize the
employment structure in them (thus, the following eligibility:
employment, unemployment, proportion of employed in agriculture, i.e.
the sectors that are subsidized in the EU, etc.).
The «European Territorial Cooperation» objective is also very
important having taken over the main functions of the previous «Interreg
III», «Urban II» and «Leader+» European initiatives. Unlike the previous
objectives the recipients of the appropiated funds will be all EU countries.
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Clearly, the enlarged EU has many problems in the distribution of
funds between «Old» and «New» Member States. However, in our
opinion, the convergent interests of the whole Community rather than
«national egoism» of the most developed countries are more apparent
(Table 1.4).
Table 1.4
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS FOR THE OBJECTIVES OF REGIONAL POLICY
AMONG EU MEMBER STATES FOR 2007—2013 (current prices, EUR mln)
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%
Belgium — — 638 — 1,425 194 2,258 0.65
Bulgaria 2,283 4,391 — — — 179 6,853 1.97
Czech
Republic 8,819 17,064 — — 419 389 26,692 7.68
Denmark — — — — 510 103 613 0.18
Germany — 11,864 4,215 — 9,409 851 26,340 7.58
Estonia 1,152 2,252 — — — 52 3,456 0.99
Ireland — — — 458 293 151 901 0.26
Greece 3,697 9,420 6,458 635 — 210 20,420 5.88
Spain 3,543 21,054 1,583 4,955 3,522 559 35,217 10.14
France — 3,191 — — 10,257 872 14,319 4.12
Italy — 21,211 430 972 5,353 846 28,812 8.29
Cyprus 213 — — 399 — 28 640 0.18
Latvia 1,540 2,991 — — — 90 4,620 1.33
Lithuania 2,305 4,470 — — — 109 6,885 1.98
Luxembourg — — — — 50 15 65 0.02
Hungary 8,642 14,248 — 2,031 — 386 25,307 7.28
Malta 284 556 — — — 15 855 0.25
Netherlands — — — — 1,660 247 1,907 0.55
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Table 1.4, continued
Convergence of
EU regions
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Austria — — 177 — 1,027 257 1,461 0.42
Poland 22,176 44,377 — — — 731 67,284 19.37
Portugal 3,060 17,133 280 448 490 99 21,511 6.19
Romania 6,552 12,661 — — — 455 19,668 5.66
Slovenia 1,412 2,689 — — — 104 4,205 1.21
Slovakia 3,899 7,013 — — 449 227 11,588 3.34
Finland — — — 545 1,051 120 1,716 0.49
Sweden — — — — 1,626 265 1,891 0.54
The UK – 2,738 174 965 6,014 722 10,613 3.05
Interregional
network
cooperation
— — — — — 445 445 0.13
Technical
assistance — — — — — — 868 0.25
Total 69,578 199,322 13,955 11,409 43,556 8,723 347,410 100
Source: Cohesion Policy 2007—13…, 2007, p. 25 and own calculations.
As follows from the above table, the apparent EU priority is the
convergence policy of EU regions, which envisages three directions
within seven years for the allocation of EUR 282.855 bln, comprising
81.4 % of all funds envisaged for structural operations. Judging by
priority, objective 2 is considerably lower, the percentage of which would
be only 15.8 % of total funding.
Numerous European official documents often stated that EU funds are
allocated according to population, the actual state of the economy, as well
as the area and social problems existing in a particular territory. Despite
the disputable provision that the allocation of EU financial resources
should also take into account the interests of leading states, which refuse
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to ever be financial donors, the decision of European Parliament, the
European Commission and the EU Council was still in favor of «New»
Member States. For example, Poland received almost one fifth of the EU
budget and the Czech Republic obtained slightly more than Germany.
Our calculation of the final distribution of funds shows quite clearly that
the Post-Socialist States of Europe account for 50.8 % of total funding,
while four of the largest EU states — Germany, France, the UK and Italy
will receive only 23 %. The comparison used by Spanish economists A.
Faina, J. Lopez-Rodrigues (2004) is quite interesting. They distinguished
the so-called «European Economic Pentagon», which is limited to
London, Paris, Milan, Munich and Hamburg, in which about 50 % of EU
GDP is produced, while its area is only 20 % of the integration grouping
(p. 5). According to table 1.4, it will receive the least funding.
The strategic approaches and programming of regional development
also underwent fundamental changes. Thus, while in 2000-2006 there
were five approaches to implement objective 1 (Development Plan,
Framework Support of Communities, Operational Programs, Single
Program Document, Program Addition), now there are only three —
Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion, National Strategic
Framework Document and Operational programs.
A distinctive feature of EU regional policy for 2007-2013 is its
binding to the Lisbon Strategy (2000), because the levels of its
implementation are regions, countries and the EU as a whole. Therefore,
each year they will monitor the contribution of operational programs to
the national reform program (NRP). A strategic follow-up will include
preparation at the state level of «Annual Report on the Implementation
of National Reform Programs», and since spring 2008, the annual report
on the entire EU is prepared for the European Council by the European
Commission. Since the end of 2009 to the end of 2012, Member States
prepared a «Strategic Report» containing information on the
contribution of all programs to the Cohesion Policy, and since April
2010 the European Commission started summarizing the reports of the
Member States in its «Strategic Report» that should enable the
improvement of the validity of expected results due to the
diversification of control levels.
The above facts are evidence of the pragmatic convergence policy
model, which now extends to all spheres of life in the EU and is identified
at different levels — megaregional (EU as a whole), national (EU
Member States), regional (NUTS-1, NUTS-2) and local (NUTS-3 and
lower). However, the definition of global prospects for Ukraine and
Poland, as well as many other countries, will depend on the nature of
convergent (divergent) processes in the global economy and the
competition of civilizations.
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1.5.5. Socio-Cultural Determinants of Convergence
The research of the problem of the convergence of national economies
in the context of the formation of a contemporary globalization
paradigm obviously requires the qualitative structural renewal of
scientific research towards their interdisciplinary integration. In a strict
sense globalization shall quantitatively cover all countries of the world,
and qualitatively — all spheres of human life. Therefore, only
conditionally, within the method of abstraction, can we speak about
political or economic globalization, ignoring its social and cultural
manifestations and challenges. It is important to realize that
globalization discredits traditional ideas of the conditions, factors,
sources and criteria for the success of individuals, small and large
groups of people in almost all spheres of activities, businesses,
countries, regions of the world. Thereto, mass material and consumer
motivation in the culture of society lacks the diversity of forms, and
vice versa, cross-cultural unification is inherent in it.
Absurd in its ideology, essence and forms «race for the rich» (in its
dollar sense) businessmen, corporations, cities, countries, opens a moral
and ethical niches of spiritual degradation, threatening the progressive
development of human civilization. The point is not even in the fact that
global flows of goods and the unified attractions of a consumer society,
make national boundaries and government regulation increasingly
weaker and less protected. Neglecting national cultures as «cultural
imperialism» is a threat, eliminating differences and reducing them to
external manifestations and folklore, thus undermining the ability to
create an independent culture and society (Smith, E., 2004 : 121).
«Westernization» affects first of all countries and regions, which follow
principally different, e.g. from the American ones, social and cultural
values30.
It is obvious that current «local» conflicts and wars, as well as
international terrorism have both visible and latent not only socio-
economic, but also religious and ethnic inter-civilization origins and will
have solutions and consequences of a global nature. Therefore, the
problems of inter-civilization cooperation become the most important and
yet most difficult to solve. According to Y. Pavlenko, current
confrontation breaks of humanity usually occur at the turn of civilizations
                     
30 The success of the USA, incidentally, is not only in the forefront of science, up-to-
date technologies and innovative business, but also American culture, which is «somewhat
primitive» (according to H. Kissinger), but so attractive to millions,. The concerns of the
American family and religion, which remain the most important institutions of society,
seem quite exaggerated. In addition, American society is the most organized in solving any
kinds of national problems — from the problem of smoking to that of space.
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(Balkans, Caucasus, Palestine, Syntszyan-Uyhuriya, Tibet). In general,
the sociocultural challenges of the 21st century are manifested by
increasing contradictions and tensions between social strata and groups
not only on property, but also on religious, ethnic, clan, regional and
civilizational grounds. Significantly, China, India, Russia, i.e. the states
belonging to fundamentally different civilizations could stand alongside
the USA, the European Union and Japan, the most influential countries in
the world. Prognostic and convincing are the assumptions that the dual
process of the gradual loss of vital forces and a change in the
configuration of the world will be predominant, rather than the
acceleration of economic growth and convergence, which means that the
gap in the first quarter of the 21st century between «winners» and
«participants with no chance of winning» will increase: the USA will
leave the European Union and Japan ever further behind. Russia will fall
away and China could become the unreachable «Asian tiger» (E. Smith,
2004).
Islamic countries are becoming more influential, in view of their
geo-economic importance, population and Muslim communities
worldwide and the availability of a strategic resource — oil. The
problem of Muslim intolerance to Western unification has deep
historical roots, is permanent and is manifested in the opposition of
Islam not only to the ideas of Christianity, but also to the universal
principles of democracy. The latter, by the way, are discredited also in
modern informational medium of countries with a classical democracy.
Most researchers quite reasonably associate the development of a
political democracy with the growing educational and intellectual level
of society and its informatization31.
At the same time, the unprecedented expansion of media influence on
all spheres of life of people and nations (global massmediation, according
to O. Zernetska) brings qualitatively new problems and challenges. The
redistribution of power is taking place in leading Western countries: the
media, personified by powerful mass media companies, is no longer
subordinate to political parties, and the latter are becoming increasingly
dependent on them. Thus, an information oligarchy is emerging — a new
and really powerful «class», capable of «shooting down» the Western
liberal democracy which generated it. Similar processes are observed in
Russia and Ukraine (electoral PR-technologies) in a somewhat
                     
31 It is known that secondary education was a key factor in the effectiveness of
democratic electoral systems, and significant increase in the stratum of people with higher
education has expanded the issues that can be settled by direct voting (referendum). In the
advanced information environment, an unlimited number of people gained the opportunity
to access pre-election programs, texts of draft laws, diverse analytical information, etc in a
timely manner.
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exaggerated form. Isn’t this the reason why in almost all countries, there
is a low level of social trust in political and public institutions, which was
especially characteristic of transition economies.
In terms of civilization, it is important to realize that not only «virtual
economy», but also «virtual politics», «virtual diplomacy» and «virtual
culture» have their roots in the depths of the Internet. Globally organized
multimedia companies, through non-economic and non-coercive
influence, actually directly inhibit personality and intelligence in the mind
of people, while mercilessly exploiting them. The illusion of the lack of
limitations, obvious to traditional consciousness, makes a man more free
to realize his economic potential, which improves social performance.
However, the possibility of unprecedented operational mass media
influence on the consciousness, formalizes elective procedures in policy,
directs the ordinary citizens to support a particular course of development
of states and economic blocks within the «necessary» social and
economic ideology32.
At the same time, «virtual reality», created by ultra-modern technical
achievements, does not apparently form the «global culture» predicted by
some researchers, as interpreted in the common civilizational sense. In
this context, nationalism does not die away, but becomes
internationalized (Smith E., 2004 : 121, 125-127).
In response to globalization of the neo-liberal type, the protesting part
of many-sided and so far mosaic world society is consolidated,
antiglobalization movements are shaped and structured, which both in
terms of motivation and organization are uniquely versatile and diverse:
from radical conflict to general humanistic. Generally speaking, there is a
clear desire for economic equality and justice and the formation of a
society of competitive cooperation in the structural component
(alterglobalism), rather than competitive struggle. It, in turn, creates an
alternative development: the qualitative transformation (removal) of
existing mechanisms and institutions of the global market or the creation
of a system of global governance, capable of providing «managed»
globalization on the basis of law, dialogue, business cultures and
civilizations. Alternative neoliberal micro- and macro- development
strategies under conditions of globalization are also interesting, focused
not on the resistance to its carriers, but on the creation: a system of fair
trade, local community currency systems, the voluntary limitation of
consumption, a participatory economics and others. It largery refers to
alternatives of global corporatism, which Professor O. Bilorus (2001,
2003) particularly focuses on.
                     
32 This ideology increasingly reflects not the national interests, but those of some
oligarchic groups and even odious personalities, self-sufficient (as it seems to them) even
in the global environment.
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The existing asymmetries of the global interaction of transnational
corporations, countries and regions of the world (in practical terms) and
the global failure of market fundamentalism (in theoretical terms) cause
the obvious need to update the modern market-regulatory system.
Thereto, during a study of regulatory problems and the prospects of
economic globalization it is important to avoid positive euphoria about
the projects of institutional architecture, dominated by traditional actors
— multinational corporations and states acting as if under the auspices of
international organizations. In this context, economic messianism and the
growing financial donations of rich countries and the international
organizations created and managed by them, is a rather «weak» reaction
to the asymmetry of global neo-liberal type development33.
1.5.6. Conclusions for Ukraine
Despite the fact that more than ten-year European integration aspirations
of Ukraine have so far resulted in the status of EU neighbor that somehow
discredited the official European integration doctrine of our country, in
the geoeconomic context, in our opinion, there are currently unique
conditions for understanding the new quality of European integration and
a transition from the policy of European expectations to one of active
European actions. The factors and determinants of this transition are
summarized in Figure 1.5.
In our opinion, after Ukraine attained the status of a market economy,
its entry into the World Trade Organization and signing of the Free Trade
Agreement with the EU34 the traditional (internationalization) integration
factors will largely exhaust themselves and the factors of global influence
will become more important.
                     
33 At first glance, the activities of international organizations seem to concentrate the
global regulatory freedom, enable the resolution of global problems by globally instituted
means. Even with the recent financial crisis, far from global in nature, such powerful global
unifier of world economic development, as the IMF, actually failed. The updated structure
of the WTO, which governs about 95 % of world trade flows, just approached the problems
of international exchange of services and intellectual property. Despite the obvious long-
term efforts of the ILO and other relevant international organizations, the scale of illegal
migration has intensified. The new global regulatory initiatives and current credit policy of
the USA and the IMF, prioritizing help to poorest countries etc. have so far failed to
adequately solve the global problems of poverty and unemployment, while changing the
configurations of wealth and power, according to the theory of systems, predicts an era of
selective prosperity for some of the great powers, which will be accompanied by increased
social injustice, inequality and conflicts (S.Rosefield, 2005 : 265).
34 Here it is necessary to adapt national standards to EU requirements, upgrade the
customs procedures, improve antimonopoly legislation, optimize the external frade in
services, especially in the sphere of transport and energy. In the new pragmatic European
integration format, Ukrainian-Russian interests may finally harmonize, needless to say, on
condition of the all-civilization orientation of Eurasian ambitions of Russia.
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Figure 1.5. Determinants of European Integration Expectations
and Actions of Ukraine
In the medium term, two interrelated processes are critical for the
European integration prospects of Ukraine. Firstly, from the economic
point of view, the new Ukrainian integration policy should take into
account the peculiarities of the functioning of the enlarged European
Union, considering not only the scale of enlargement (an unprecedented
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number of countries), but also its quality, because it is necessary for
countries that are not self-sufficient in the market and with a different
socio-economic mentality, to adapt to the European environment35.
Secondly, in terms of civilization, the solution of the problem of
accession (non-accession) to the EU of Turkey will be crucial. If positive,
Ukraine and Russia can get the most tangible signal of European
integration with the changing of the priorities of quite a firmly established
system of European views and preferences.
New Ukrainian European integration initiatives should be based not
on the contemplation of these processes, but on the prognostic estimates
of the varied consequences of their development. In general, a new
configuration of the European Union seems very likely as a response: on
the one hand, to the European integration claims of neighboring countries
(political and economic borders of the EU with a traditional ideology and
regulatory instruments, discrimination and exceptions are treated by them
as unreasonably violent in a democratic civil society); on the other hand,
to the growing competitive pressure of American and Asian-Pacific
markets (as a universal integrational community, the European Union
should not turn into a «European fortress» on the near and distant borders
of which, new confrontations are provoked).
In general, the modern international policy of Ukraine should focus on
the positive aspects of European integration — the openness and global
competitiveness of the European Union, its willingness and ability to
confront new challenges and crises, solidarity with economically less
developed countries to share progress. Obviously it is formed and
implemented in an environment that is complicated by the influence of
objective and subjective internal and external development factors36. To
overcome their «blocking» effect, our country’s well-prepared and
ambitious EU strategy, directed towards full EU membership is required
more than ever before. Equally important is social European optimism
and relevant social consolidation — political, economic and spiritual. If
in political and economic spheres the inconsistency of state-corporate
interests is of a generally understandable origin and nature, the socio-
mental component of European integration throughout the years of
                     
35 No wonder that recently, requirements regarding the necessity to take the
«absorptive capacity» of the European Community and enlargement policy reform have
been activated in the European Parliament (European Economic Area Plus).
36 According to Ukrainian experts (Common European Economic Space, 2007, p. 463-
466), the prospects of Ukraine’s further European integration will depend primarily on the
internal European factor — practical formal rejection of EU expansion (after Bulgaria and
Romania) without the determination of the European Constitution (statements of J.M.
Barroso and A.Merkel), when the Ukrainian question is not a priority for the EU with
recommendations to focus on internal reforms and the consistent implementation of the
«Ukraine — EU» Action Plan.
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sovereign development of Ukraine is overlooked, not only by national
business and political establishment, but also by the intellectual one.
However, these issues are relevant only in a broader civilizational
context, because Ukraine’s European choice is, in fact, the choice of
prospects in a globalized world.
1.6. An Analysis of the Similarity of Polish and Ukrainian
Economies according to Changes in Labour Productivity
1.6.1. Introduction
Growth is a natural feature of economies, but this statement requires further
theoretical study. The nature of growth is multifaceted, but the main thing
is what grows and how fast? The thing that can grow by nature is the
capital of natural, material and human resources serving, as an abstract
category, which can nevertheless be measured. Capital by means of labour
is concentrated in human resources and material assets. Hence it follows
that the economic growth of states should not be considered one-sidedly,
relying only on a selected indicator. If, for example, the population of a
given country migrates for domestic and financial reasons, it describes the
growth of GDP as a single measure, as additionally changed property
relations (foreign capital and investment) — i.e. most likely it is prank
propaganda in favor of a future political option in power than an objective
evaluation. Economic activity is based on man’s ability to perform work
and, therefore, the possibility to devalue human capital is the main reason
for which the problematics of growth may be considered.
It is clear that state economies can grow at different rates and show
proximity or divergence in some indices. The following theoretical
considerations vividly show the correlation of the universal productivity
factor and economic growth estimates, taking into account the
consistency of remuneration with the cost of labour, corresponding to the
law of human capital movement. This coefficient comprises a share of the
actual GDP of the amount of labour costs and shows the value of product
per monetary unit of labour costs. The parity of labour productivity is also
the main factor resulting from currency fluctuations, and it can therefore
be stated that there is a possible proximity of labour productivity indices
in the economies being compared. Parity of equilibrium can be reached in
case of adequate results in respect of contributed capital, such as those in
Germany, the USA, Ukraine, France, Japan and others. Clarification of
the nature of capital and currency fluctuations is a direct reason for the
research.
CHAPTER 1. Theoretical and empirical bases of convergence… 115
1.6.2. Capital as a Synthetic Measure of Economic Growth
Speaking of growth, it is necessary to clearly identify its driverss. Given
the intensification of economic globalization, GDP value is often
regarded as the main criterion of growth. When many young people look
for jobs in other countries, it means that they do not have work in their
country, and that labour costs in it are too low. Under such conditions,
foreign enterprises obtain so-called labour investment, instead profit
derived by investors will not necessarily be used on the territory it came
from. There is also a general question. What exactly increases in the
economy and what is its source? Is it assets or human resources that
grow? We would like to note that the first and the second bear the risk of
rapid devaluation. There may be only one response to these questions:
growth can pertain to capital or the ability of abstract talent to do the
work. This figure increases when old machinery is replaced by new,
improved machinery, or by the relevant training of employees, which
increases their intellectual capital. When the environment is more
favorable for life and work, when infrastructure enables work to be done
better and cheaper, it naturally promotes the growth of capital, the overall
ability to perform work and use natural, human and material resources
effectively.
The economy can be treated as the result of restructuring capital,
consisting of human, material and natural resources. In addition, capital
also restructures itself, since it strives for an optimal composition in a
given condition, and its structure will optimally match the capabilities of
its multiplication, which, oddly enough, is contrary to the natural
phenomenon of spontaneous diffusion. It is also worth asking the
question about the sources of capital growth. Where does energy and the
ability to work, which do not arise from anything, come from, according
to the first law of thermodynamics? The answer is simple. Energy comes
from the Sun that every second converts 700 million tons of hydrogen
into 695 million tons of helium, i.e. expends 5 million tons of its mass,
which is transformed to radiation energy in fusion reactions (Arnett B.,
2006). The mass of the Sun is 99.8 % of the mass of the Solar system, so
the consumption process is almost unlimited. A small percentage of solar
radiation reaches the Earth, where assimilated thermal energy is the basis
of photosynthesis. Every source of energy, other than nuclear, start from
the Sun. In addition, it is known that the Sun is also a source of
psychological energy needed for the regular functioning of the human
psyche.
With a constant flow of energy from the Sun, which stimulates and
enables the development of life on Earth, the economies of states reach
smaller or larger growth. Social and economic processes can be viewed as
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a game with a non-zero sum. In this game, all the participants can win,
unlike games with zero result, where the consequences of the activities of
the players are inversely proportional. Therefore, mankind can thrive in
the economic and social sense, natural, human, material capital also
grows, although the history of economic development has seen many
failures. G. Wright wrote (2000 : 13): «Do not think that playing with a
non-zero result always ends in a win — win, not defeat — defeat. It is not
that the strong and treacherous do not use the weak and naïve; this kind of
parasitism is possible in games with a zero result, after all, history has
many examples of this. But in the long run, when everything is taken into
account, situations with a non-zero sum will create more positive than
negative results, more mutual benefit than mutual loss and exploitation ...»
Economic activity is based on the human capacity to perform work,
thus the prevention of the devaluation of human capital is the main
condition to consider growth conditions. The theory of human capital and
remuneration, which is adequate to the cost of labour, is an instrument of
dynamic balance between «capital and labour» in the traditional
interpretation of the category «capital». Therefore, economic balance
shall ensure the preservation of human capital by determining hourly
remuneration. It is possible to achieve this state by applying the known
theories of human capital (Cieślak, Dobija, 2007; Kozioł, 2005; Kurek,
2007).
In this context, capital is the abstract ability to do the work, so this
category, borrowed by us from physical sciences, is identified as energy.
By the way, physical sciences often serve as a model for other sciences
that seek to clarify the nature of reality. Physical theories, epistemological
views of physics theorists comprise the standard, which scientists
working in different fields of economics try to approach. This situation
has long existed in economic sciences. As Myrovski (1989 : 224-225)
notes, researchers like T. Veblen, W.S. Jevons, J. Fisher, W. Pareto,
L. Walras and others treated value and utility only through the prism of
the physical understanding of energy, and mechanical understanding was
recognized as a model for economic sciences (mechanical thinking turned
out to be completely wrong.) V.S. Evons wrote that the concept of value
in our science is what energy means to mechanics. In 1926 J. Fisher
published the table of the correspondence of physical and economic
categories (Mirowski, 1989 : 224-225). In his understanding, energy is
the equivalent of utility, which is right, because utility is the ability to do
work. Cost is the concentration of capital in an object, thus, it comprises a
smaller or greater ability to do work. Nevertheless, the above economists
failed to clarify the nature of capital more deeply. Combining capital and
cost with energy, they could not find appropriate analogies between the
parameters that control energy, which are defined exactly in physical
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sciences, and the category of capital — in economic sciences. Nor did
they find the correct interpretation of the law on thermodynamics with
regard to economy. In view of the above, the renowned scientist,
C.J. Bliss (1975 : VII), who studies the theory of capital, notes that «when
economists reach common ground as regards capital, the resolution of
other issues will only be a matter of time». However, he acknowledged
this possibility as unlikely.
Another well-known law of thermodynamics, which is the
fundamental law of physics (Atkins, 2005), is reflected in economic
sciences in its most direct version — the phenomenon of the spontaneous
diffusion of starting capital cost. This principle is limited to the recognition
that cost decreases in time naturally if rational countermeasures are not
taken. In other words, there is a phenomenon of natural losses, which is
manifested not only through capital assets, but is related to everything
that exists. This natural loss is also the source of: firsty, uncertainty, and
secondly, profits if in conditions of this uncertainty there is a deliberate
action and exchange in the free market. Under these particular conditions
the value called «risk premium» arises, which is offered by the market to
the participauts of exchange, in order to compensate the natural loss.
Given that the loss is random rather than deterministic in nature, a market
participant can minimize it, which presents the possibility of gaining
profit. As we see it, the interpretation of the second law in economic
sciences is quite specific to them, and is not based only on the
achievements of physics. There are many examples of the identification
of physical formulas in economics. The value of the capital market
known as risk premium has long been considered as economically
unchanged (constant). Many studies show that risk premium amounts to
8 % of starting capital (Goetzmann, Ibbotson, 2005; Dobija, 2005;
Cieślak, 2006; Kurek, 2007).
As follows from the works of the above-mentioned authors, the model
of capital during time t is defined as the product of three elements: a
variable s, which determines the natural loss of starting capital, a fixed
premium p (p = E (s)), E — the designation of the average cost of
levelling loss, which is supported by the market under the terms of market
exchange), as well as management variable (Z), which can restrain the
natural loss or diffusion of capital. In t years, capital has the mathematical
form of interest, but the definition of the interest rate structure also
follows from the model.
Ct,s,p,Z = C0e–st· ept ·e Zt = C0ert,
where r = – s + p + Z, p = Е(s); t — number of years, t = m — time
measured in years; r — applicable annual interest rate. The rate r can be
presented as r = p – sa, where sa is the amount of actual losses.
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Sources of profit can be defined based on the capital model. This
profit is regular, so starting capital will increase within a year to:
C1 = C0(1 + p – z) = C0 + C0 (p – z), where z = s – Z.
Thus, regular profit or loss is identified by the following formula
Financial result = ∆C = C1 – C0 = C0 + C0 (p – z) – C0 = C0 (p – z).
It appears that the sources of regular profit are: action (capital per
year), direction that reduces the natural loss of capital and risk premium.
This formula also identifies the limits of useful profit, since the value p is
constant. The interpretation of the profit formula shows vividly that
management is particularly focused on controlling risk costs and their
reduction to save most of the risk premium. Realizing that an effective
market guarantees exchange according to the value or each contractor
(employees, suppliers) receives equivalent of energy in exchange, it can
be stated that profit arises from risk control.
The amount of the profit of business entities allows setting a degree of
capital growth. The ROE coefficient (return on equity, E — own capital),
calculated on the basis of financial statements leads to the formula of
collapsible percent, which identifies the capital growth rate. If ROE is the
average rate, which is unchanged over n years, we can state the following
relationship:
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Thus, in n years:
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The situation seems optimistic, when the running of the economy
results in a rapid growth, according to the corresponding formula of
compound interest. This growth is used by all contractors of an
enterprise: creditors, owners, employees, government agencies, banks and
others. The usefulness of workers is known to be subject to due
remuneration, or the adequacy of wages and labor costs. This issue is
solved by the capital theory, which allows the measurement of the human
capital of an employee and the determination of the remuneration, which
guarantees each employee necessary insurance in case of the depreciation
of his human capital.
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1.6.3. Human Capital and Adequate Labor Costs
The correct evaluaton of capital as an abstract ability to perform work
naturally ties this category to the categories of labor and labor costs. It is
well known that the definition of the process of labor and labor costs are
still far from perfect in economic sciences. This is due to the absence of
physical analogies, as in physics, the nature of work is clarified better in
the general and specific method of its measurement, however labor is also
based on active energy.
Let us note that for a man to be able to work, he must have some
initial energy, i.e. his human capital as the ability to do this work. For
example, a teacher has collected intellectual capital that is the source of
the implementation of an educational process or transfer of knowledge to
students. Knowledge transferred to students is gathered and being
concentrated, increases their intellectual capital. The same happens when
a shoemaker makes shoes; his human and intellectual capital are
concentrated in the products of his labor.
The physical and mathematical description of labor can be presented
using the category of scalar product of the force vector and shift vector
(Kurek, 2004 : 43-46; Dobija, Kurek, 2005) that can be shown using the
abovementioned equation:
( ) α⋅⋅=α⋅⋅⋅=⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛== >−>−>−>− coscos00 tPtvFtvFsFL ,
where L — is the scalar of mechanical work; F — vector of acting force
according to the direction of movement; s — shift vector (the course
passed by the object of the application of force); F0 s — scalar product of
the force and shift vectors; v — vector of the speed of shift; t — time
used to complete the work; F — scalar of force; v — scalar of speed; cos
α — cosine of angle alpha between the direction of force and the direction
of movement; P — scalar of force.
In the economic description, the key category of force is applied (P),
which we call productivity of labor having a full economic interpretation in
theory and practice. In the economic interpretation, the equivalent of the
unit of force is the coefficient of the force of an employee, called the
coefficient of labor productivity. Time, in terms of physics, corresponds to
the working time of the employed worker. The coefficient of cosine α in the
economic interpretation takes the form of the coefficient of the social utility
of the work performed. The result of applying the above analogies and their
economic interpretation is the equation for identifying the cost of the
employed worker’s labor, which may be presented in the following form:
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Labor costs = Worker’s coefficient of productivity ×
× Time of work × cosα .
It is well known that in physics, force, e.g. the power of an electric
current, is identified by the standard unit called W, which allows the
recalculation of the time of work per unit of labor. In a practical economy
there are recalculations that enable the conversion of the time of labor of
the employed worker into the number of units of work, or costs of his
work. This recalculation is clearly defined through the current system of
remuneration. If payment rater has, say, fifteen accounting positions and a
particualr employee has, up to the seventh position, his performance ratio
is 1/7. If an employee worked 210 hours a month, the costs of his labor
comprise 1/7 × 210 h = 30 units of labor (er). If we assume that this
employee earns 3,000 (zloty) (zł), then according to 30 er = 3,000 zł it
follows that 1 zł = 0.01 er, so the zloty also serves as a unit of labor.
There is no other method of measurement, because the employee gets a
certain number of zlotys.
The coefficient of social utility (cos) identifies the coordination of the
work performed and the expectations of the employer, in a broad sense —
of the society where a man lives and works. This coefficient is within the
range between minus one and one, bilaterally closed. The work, which
corresponds with accepted standards, performed by a competent
employee within the action plan of the organization, comprises work with
a coefficient equal to one. Incompetence and diversion should be
evaluated by a coefficient of minus one.
Let us assume that the employee worked, doing work of public utility
for 280 hours with a productivity characterized by the fraction 3/5. Thus:
Labor costs = (3/5) × 280 h × 1 = 168 еr,
i.e. this employee spent energy equal to 168 units of labor. The same
applies to his consumption of energy, as did the increase of food cost, and
this value determines the appropriate remuneration. Maybe he will get
more on account of another employee, who will be paid less, or due to
growing inflation. Let us note that this applies to every employee, not only
a manufacturer, but also teachers, doctors, civil servants or bank managers.
The general model of capital becomes a model of human capital,
because capital attributed to a person is his/her property during its
appearance, from birth to the beginning of work, all kinds of costs and
possible losses burden parents or society, and not the owner of capital.
For each person, the amount of capital, with the exception of creative
capital, is only defined by the necessary expenses, such as funds for
support and education, risk premium, etc.
CHAPTER 1. Theoretical and empirical bases of convergence… 121
Human capital is vividly described by the following formula
H = H0 e pt,
where Н — is human capital, H0 —  flow of costs for a definite period,
when this capital appears. The specifics of cost flows and the
determination of the functions that increase capital as a result of the
accumulation of experience, results in the already proven model of human
capital (Dobija, 1998, 2000).
The sum of this value is identified by the following formula
H(T) = (K + E) · [1 + Q(T)],
where Н(Т) — is the cost of capital attributed to the person with the
experience of Т years of work; К — capitalized maintenance costs; Е —
the capitalized costs of education; Q(Т) = factor of experience growth in
Т years. The experience factor is expressed by the function of time
(modified learning curve):
Q(T) = 1 – T ln2
w)ln(1−
,
where w — is the coefficient of learning; Т — years of professional work,
Т > 1. According to the above, the employee, who will perform the same
work next year, will do it easier and cheaper.
Based on the model of human capital allowing the measurement of the
potential employee’s ability to perform work, it is possible to define the
basic formula for the remuneration of labor. In this case we use the
equation of degree of labor costs per year. It has the following form:
H(Т) · (1 + r) = W + H(Т + 1),
where W — is annual labor cost; r — the rate of capital increase. Hence
we get the basic model of remuneration:
W = H(T) ⋅ r – H ⋅ [Q(T + 1) – Q(T)] = H(T) ⋅ r – H ⋅ΔQ(T).
It follows from this model that remuneration is to be determined by
the percentage (r) of an employees’ capital, but during the first years of
work, the employer may hold back remuneration, given the fact that the
employee is acquiring experience through work. The value H ⋅ ΔQ(T)
reflects the experience gained in the process of work, and decreases
rapidly over time T. However, the experience gained increases the
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employees’ capital, and in the following year, he can count on relevant
compensation. Practice confirms that the variable ΔQ(T) significantly
affects the compensation of persons who just begin a professional career,
and disappears over time. However, the decisive influence still has the
first element, which is the essence of the theories of payment based on the
value of human capital, which explains the difference in earnings by
different values of accumulated capital. We have the product H(T) ⋅ r,
where the percentage of return r is equal to the risk premium p. The basic
payment p ⋅ H(T) balances the risk costs, thus, the employees’ capital
does not depreciate. In the work process, there is a transfer of capital of
the employed to the products of labor, i.e. there is the concentration of
human capital that increases the value of products. In the process of work,
human capital expenses are expressed as labor costs, which coincide with
the assets, creating end products. Examples of the evaluation of human
capital and basic payment are clearly presented in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5
APPROXIMATE BASIC SALARIES OF PROFESSORS AGED ABOUT 40*
Values Poland USA Ukraine
Number of years of capitalization of cost
maintenance 25 years 28 years 23 years
Costs per month 500 zł USD 400 UAH 400
Number of years of capitalization of cost for a
professional education
Poland (Master’s degree — 5 years +
Candidate of Sciences 5 years + Doctor of
Sciences 5 years = 15 years)
USA (Bachelor’s degree 4 years + Master’s
degree 2 years + Candidate of Sciences 4 years
= 10 years)
Ukraine (Bachelor’s degree 4 years + Master’s
degree 1 year + Candidate of Sciences 3 +
Doctor of Sciences 5 = 13 years)
15 years 10 years 13 years
Education expenses per month 350 zł USD 850 UAH 200
Years of professional work Т 15 years 16 years 17 years
Parameter of education 10 % 10 % 10 %
Percentage of insurance at university 20 % 15 % 35 %
Capitalization coefficient 73.1059 zł USD95.3388
UAH
60.89329
К 438,635 zł USD457,626
UAH
328,824
Е 114,039 zł USD147,763
UAH
51,589
Percentage of experience Q(T) 35 % 35 % 32 %
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Table 1.5, continued
Values Poland USA Ukraine
H = K + E 552,674 zł USD605,389
UAH
380,413
H(T) 746,110 zł USD817,276
UAH
502,145
Annual labor costs W = 0,08 · H(T) 59,689 zł USD 65,382 UAH40,172
Monthly labor costs (:12) 4,974 zł USD 5,449 UAH 3,348
Payment withoyt insurance 4,145 zł USD 4,738 UAH 2,480
Annual payment without insurance 49,741 zł USD 60,077**
UAH
29,757
Evaluation payment per month 4,250 zł USD 5,300 UAH 1,200
Decrease in payment – – UAH 1,280
* The calculations listed in the table may cause many discussions. In our view they are
quite appropriate (Note of scientific editors)
** It would be wrong to compare payment using exchange rates, as evidenced by this
example, which also outlines the relevant method of the comparison of remuneration of
labor.
Source: own calculations.
Let us note that maintenance costs are the maximum permissible
levels required for the restoration of human capital. The overall Polish
minimum rate was calculated at about 400 zł per person per month in a
family of five persons and the rate increased for the city, which
respectively accounted for about 500 zł. The actual payments in this
professional group range in the USA from USD 55,000 to USD 80,000.
The lower is usually reached by university lecturers with doctoral degree,
which are traditionally in high demand, e.g. in the field of English. A
higher level of remuneration is formed by market conditions and the level
of accreditation of a higher educational establishment. However, the
above-mentioned level is nevertheless dominant. Let us note that the
salary of a professor in Poland, who has a doctoral degree, should vary
between 3,270-7,000 zł at the rate of the overall Polish rater set on
December 28, 2006.
Table 1.6 provides a comparison of legal minimum payments in the
listed countries with minimum payments to the people with no
professional experience, i.e. those who have just completed their
education.
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Table 1.6
AN ANALYSIS OF MINIMUM SALARIES BASED
ON THE MODEL OF HUMAN CAPITAL
USA
(t = 17)
Poland
(t = 18)
Ukraine
(t = 17)*
Great
Britain
(t = 18)
Maintenance costs 375—425
USD
450—550
PLN
380—420
UAH
275—325
GBP
Value of human
capital Н
162,001
USD
224,701
PLN
162,001
UAH
134,820
GBP
Annual labor costs
(Н. 8 %)
12,960
USD 17.976 PLN
12,960
UAH
10,785
GBP
Monthly labor
costs 1,080 USD 1,498 PLN 1,080 UAH 899 GBP
Mandatory
minimum payment
5.50
USD/hour
936.0
PLN/month
400
UAH/month
5,05
GBP/hour
Monthly payments
for work at
minimum wages
5.50 USD
176 = 968
USD
936.0 PLN
1.20 = 1,123
PLN
400 UAH
1,366 = 546
UAH
5.05 GBP
171= 863
GBP
Difference between
the actual
mandatory payment
and payment arising
from the value of
human capital
90 %
100 %
75 % 51 %
96 %
100 %
* Data on maintenance allowances in Ukraine were submitted by the Candidates of
Sciences Olena Voynalovich and Catherine Romanchyk of the Zhytomyr State University,
January 23, 2007.
Source: own calculations.
Regarding the USA it should be noted that the state minimum
payment currently amounts to USD 5.15 per hour, but many states raise
this minimum, even up to USD 7.0 per hour. In the future, the raising of
the state minimum is not ruled out. It should be noted that such payment
is based on the evaluation of human capital. The situation in Ukraine is
similar. All calculations show that the Western countries with a capitalist
democracy apply minimum payments based on the theory of human
capital, i.e. in economic terms an employee’s capital is protected. These
standards are not followed in Poland and Ukraine, and in Ukraine — to
greater degree. In these countries’ employee’s capital declines, and
energy transferred to work is not compensated sufficiently by
remuneration. Therefore, there is migration activity to the West, where an
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employee can expect reimbursement of expenses of his energy in the
process of work, or higher remuneration. The states that do not
compensate for the cost of labor do not use the standards of Western
countries in their socio-economic relations.
1.6.4. The Nonparametric Function of Production
and the Economic Growth Model
It is known that the function of production shows how production factors are
arranged to create a product. Even Adam Smith presented the growth model
in the form of a production function: Y = f(L,К,Т), where Y — is the product,
L — labor resources, К — capital and Т — land. Thus, the increase of
product is caused by the increase in the human population, capital
investment, land resources and overall labor productivity. Such general
considerations are the basis for the classical growth theory, modified by the
authors named below. Philip Wicksteed (1894) proposed the function of
production for welfare (y) in a general form y = F(x1, x2, ..., xm).
The production process ending in the market exchange of product for
money can be represented using the function of many variables, given the
fact that production factors are summarized in the product according to the
principles of the calculation of costs. Then the choice of variables to the
model will be clearly defined and will not be identified with capital assets,
or the property contained in them to do the work, instead the natural loss of
natural capital will be taken into account consistently. There is another
approach that is more popular in economic sciences. Econometric models,
which are called the functions of production, such as the Cobb-Douglas
model or Soln model (Romer, 2000, p. 23-53), differ as production factors
in them are measured in natural rather than monetary units.
This approach does not take changing consumption into account, which
does not reduce value, as believed by classics, but is an integral part of
human capital. In this sense consumption allows the support and increase in
the value of human capital. However, the destruction of capital is brought
about by the arms race, war and natural disasters. Thus, destruction covers
the capital contained in natural, material and human resources.
As a starting point to describe production processes let’s take the
function of production, which characterizes production in market selling
prices as the sum:
P = K(1 + r) (1 + I),
where Р — is the annual production in selling prices; К — costs for
organizing production; r — level of profit, r = Р/К — 1; I — level of
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profit above the average. Variable I appears when the enterprise has
intellectual capital. Production cost factors include W — labor costs, КP
— other costs, caused by technology and the management process, КR —
accidental, higher than average costs of risk, therefore К = W + КP —
КR. After calculating these dependences, we can write the formula
P = (W + z · A – s · A) (1 + r) (1 + I),
because (W + КP – КR) = (W + zА – sА), where А — assets in current
balance prices, z = КP/А — the coefficient of annual asset turnover, s =
КR/А — loss of assets in production processes.
After conversion, the cost of production is as follows:
P = W·[1 + A/W · (z – s)] (1 + r) (1 + I).
Labor costs W are a derivative of human capital, hence W = uH, where
u — is the degree of payment of human capital, and H means full value of
employed human capital. After substitution we obtain the model:
P = W·[1 + A/H · (z – s)/u ] (1 + r) (1 + I).
Values r, s, I — are small, close to zero, so using an approximate
equality: 1 + x = е, the function of production can be expressed by the
following formula
P = Wer + I [1 + A/H · [(z – s)/u] ] = W · WP,
where WP — is labor productivity, defined as labor costs multipled by
the identifying cost of production, and at the same time it is a value of
production per monetary unit of labor cost. Thus, we obtained a
functional correlation in the form of nonlinear dependence between the
system of six variables and the production expressed in market prices.
Attributing the above formal description of production to existing
models of economic growth represented by M.G. Woźniak (2004, p.
126 — 147), we can say that this model is multifactoral, which would
indicate the formula P = W · WP, because labor productivity WP — is a
function of six variables, especially of the technical equipment of labor
А/Н, the rotation of assets, etc. It is worth noting the place of
remuneration of labor on the scale (u). This variable is in the numerator,
because W = uН, and in the denominator, which indicates that its
optimal value exists. Knowing that u = 0,08 and determines basic
payment, you can find the expedient amount of the premium fund as
proposed by W. Kozioł (2005). The analytical function of production
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may be, in addition, the instrument of causal economic analysis in the
application of differential calculation.
Based on the function of production, it is possible to introduce the
model of production with the synthetic control variable M. It takes the
following formalized form:
H
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Variable М integrates the effect of all previous variables, marked by
small letters, i.e. rotation (z), degree of remuneration of labor (u), costs
(s), profit (r) and intellectual capital (I), if such exists. These variables are
connected with the current decisions of management. According to this
model it is possible to calculate the variable of control M, selecting
human capital H from the dependence L = p · H.
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where W — is labor costs, and L — permanent labor costs (basic
payment). As follows from the last formula, the variable of control is
proportional to the logarithm of labor productivity and inversely
proportional to capital intensity measured by the coefficient А/L.
Now it is possible to connect the formula of capital growth with the
model of production to obtain one synthetic model of changes influencing
the growth of capital. Assuming that Z = α  · M, α  — scale parameter,
we obtain the model:
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Interpreting the last formula, we can say that to achieve a high capital
growth rate the following is needed: action (capital multiplied by time),
labor with high productivity (the composition of six variables) and the
relevant assets that meet the proper technical equipment of labor. We
agree that the employees should be properly paid, but not too highly, in
order to keep productivity high. Risk premium (p) reminds us that fair
payment is determined by the value p = 0.08.
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1.6.5. Labour Productivity as an Equation:
the Exchange of Money for Products
In terms of the whole economy, the product made and sold, is nothing
like GDP, so this feature can be put in the basis of macroeconomic
research. In this presentation, labor productivity means how many zloty
of GDP fall per monetary unit of labor costs. As it turns out, this value
has the main influence on the exchange rate.
The following model of commodity and money flows (Figure 1.6)
shows that payment is determined by the flow of money that is
synchronized with the flow of goods during exchange in the free market.
These two flows can be determined quantitatively through the relevant
function of production and the function of money formation, and then to
hold their market comparison.
The nature of a commodity-money economy, and comparison of two
flows, the source of which is human capital and the measure of which are
labor costs, is shown in Figure 1.6, according to which labor is comparable
with assets (the function of production) that creates the product. Finally, it is
assessed at the market exchange of product for money. At this stage, the final
cost of funds is also established, i.e. wages for work that is connected with
the creation of product. The figure shows that human labor generates two
flows simultaneously. Work product used during labor, is the component of
labor, costs of labor and assets, i.e. materials, instruments and machines. On
the other hand, the same labor costs comprise the wage of a worker. These
payments may be presented in the form of entry onto a bank account or be
available to a worker in the form of banknotes. In each case a worker will
change it for goods according to his/her needs and the available amount of
payment for the work. It follows that work gives money, and skillfully
organized productive work creates wealth. The more job offers a country has,
the more money is accumulated in its banks37.
Realizing that the market mechanism reimburses the cost of product
and money flow that is the essence of the market, based on Figure 1.6, it
is possible to write down a polynomial equation, or the payment
equation of exchange. It has the following form (PKBR38 — actual PKB,
WP = PKB/W — labor productivity, RWP = PKBR/W, W — labor costs, і
— rate of inflation, WК — function of money receipt in banking system):
PKB = PKBR · (1 + i) = W · WP = MK = W · WK.
                     
37 In view of the above we should consider quantitative theories, the surplus of which,
provokes inflation. This is a result of the inconsistency of payment and cost of labor.
Excessive amount of goods for military purposes (not for sale) also reduces payment and
ultimately increases inflation.
38 The author uses Polish abbreviation in the following formulas, where PKB is GDP,
PKBR — real GDP. (Note of editors)
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(market mechanism)
PKB – MK = 0
Production
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Equation
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(market mechanism)
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system
Figure 1.6. The Market as a Mechanism
that Recovers the Cost of Product and Capital Flows
Source: own study.
Hence is the following equation identifying the essence of inflation:
RWP
WK
RWP
WPi
PKBR
PKB ==+=1 .
In view of the above, inflation depends on actual labor productivity
and equals zero if actual and nominal productivity are identical. In
addition, obtaining credit funds is determined by the level of actual labor
productivity. If i = 0, then RWP = WP = WK. According to this equation,
the direction of actions that stabilizes the economy and purchasing power
of money become apparent, and nominal productivity must be equal to
the actual one. This situation is achieved under conditions of the
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consistency of payment and labor cost, which also manifests itself as a
guarantee of order in the economy. It should also be noted that inflation
may disappear by itself if no new impulses arise. Let us note that each
investment project that does not worsen labor productivity may be
granted credit assistance.
Functioning in the existing theory of money and monetary policy
(Duwendag and others, 1993), (Galbright, 1982) the quantitative
equation of exchange consists of the artificial basic concept of the
amount of money M, circulating at rate V:
PKB = PKBR · (1 + i) = M·V.
This equation shows that inflation is proportional to the quantity of
money M, thus the raising of the interest rate lowers inflation, since it
reduces the amount of money. The concept of the amount of money is
completely false and boils down to the accumulation of metal coins as
money, like the whole quantitative equation of exchange. It actually
appeared as a reaction to the economic consequences of surplus flow of
silver to Europe. Silver is a commodity, not money.
If you rely on monetary concepts, it is possible to reduce inflation, but
only by destroying the economy. Therefore, the following appeared in the
monetarist circles of the relevant phraseology: overheated economy (we
will cool it), shock therapy, firm monetary policy and others. The
followers of the quantitative «theory» of money have a wide arsenal of
means and many «merits» for «cooling» the economy, i.e. unemployment
and lower living standards. The appropriate understanding of a
commodity-money economy suggests that inflation disappears by itself if
its sources disappear. Distortions and inflation appear only when there is
a growing number of people who earn well, but do not produce
equivalents of work. Or there is an arms race, or worse — wars, and, thus,
the destruction of assets and capital contained in them. Preventing
inflation is in line with pay under labor costs.
Remuneration in the system of a commodity-money economy has an
abstract view of the record of the transfer of energy spent by a worker to
be measured by the number of units of energy or the number of units of
work. Such record can be made in the form of banknotes or in a now
more popular electronic record on the accounts of banks. In any case the
owner is entitled to receive the equivalent in market exchange of his
wage, or money for goods. Apparently, money does not constitute
«means of exchange», but is subject to exchange for goods. The main
thing that follows is: work is a source of money.
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1.6.6. Comparison of Labor Productivity
and GDP per Capita during the Application of an Exchange Rate
The question of the comparison of international values - payments,
labor costs and gross domestic product — is an important theoretical and
practical problem. We come across this kind of comparison more and more
frequently, such as recently in Poland in the case of the protests of nurses and
doctors. The evaluation of GDP per capita in euros or dollars is quite
difficult. The above complications often lead to different misinformation.
Thus, e.g. if a doctor earns in the USA, say, USD 5,000 a month, his
colleague in Poland should earn 5,000 • 2.85 zł / USD = 14,250 zł, but earns
just 3,500 zł, i.e. four times less. However, this comparison is wrong. To
make the right conclusions, the nature of monetary unit, and its
dependence on labor productivity must be clearly understood. G. Kołodko
(2004 : 188) suggests using PPS (Purchasing Power Standard)39. This is an
attempt to replace the exchange rate by such value that better corresponds
with international comparisons and is an index that prevents distortion
when using the exchange rate. The PPS unit is not based on theory, but is
supported by the confidence that a comparison of food baskets gives more
objective results than using the exchange rate. Only scientific theory can
justify whether it is appropriate.
The theory is expected to give explainations and methods for the
analysis of empirical data to achieve a comparison in terms of economic
value. Relying on the basis of clear theories, you can get more reliable
information necessary to make economic and political decisions. False
theories lead to false information about earnings, the results of the economy
and of course are breeding grounds for some propaganda purposes. In
international comparisons the key issue is of currency exchange and its
proper use in economic analysis that is a difficult and complex matter. The
main issues raised in this regard relate to the cost: how, during the
application of the exchange rate, to achieve consistency or the
transformation of value, expressed in a specific currency in a contiguous
value expressed in another currency. This was expected by scientists when
formulating the law of one price that turned out to be wrong, and its
falsification was expediated by the product of McDonald’s.
The exchange rate is the effect of the market, in which the unrestricted
exchange of currencies takes place, if it identifies the numerical value of
the monetary unit of one country as regards the value of the monetary unit
of another country. It is this and nothing more, because we get money for
work and actually it is payment for work, so the value of a monetary unit
depends on the results of this work, its productivity and efficiency. The
                     
39 Purchasing Power Standard. (Note of editors)
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influence of supply and demand is minor, it only influences the cost of
current rates, and the trend of the exchange rate primarily affects labor
productivity. However, the exchange rate is primarily the resulting value, it
is a synthetic indicator of changes in labor productivity in a specific
country. Productivity can increase due to reasonable business decisions, the
better organization of labor, the avoidance of work that has no value, thank
to favorable conditions, etc., but it can also increase by lowering wages, or
at the cost of human capital. In the changes of the free market exchange
rate lies information about important processes in the economy. Therefore,
no reasonable economic policy can be based on exchange rates in an
authoritarian way. If this happens, it means victory for the group the
interests of those who benefit from this state of affairs. Society as a whole
loses out in this, as evidenced by the examples of Poland in the 1980s, and
today — Argentina or Ukraine.
Possibilities for a speculative description of the phenomenon of the
market evaluation of a specific monetary unit as compared to another unit
only appeared in the 1970s, following the failure of the Bretton Woods
agreement. This is a very important moment in economic history, because
then market forces broke the bonds that arose from the erroneous
convictions of politicians and leading scientists about money, that the free
market had to be restrained and money had to be managed in each case. It
should be noted that it was alleged by politicians and economists who
proclaim and glorify the free market. R. Mundel is undoubtedly one of the
epigones of such views. This scientist, Nobel laureate, gave lectures in
Krakow and Warsaw, in which he recognized the free market exchange rate
as impractical and disseminated the opinion on the need to manage
exchange rates by central banks40 (Mundel, 2000a, 2000b). In his
statements, R. Mundel completely omits the Japanese experience of
productivity growth and sees no connection between labor productivity,
money and rate, and while mentioning this connection wants to limit
market forces as soon as possible. The question arises, what for and for
whom: can exchange rates not be correctly determined by the free
market?
Since 1973 exchange rates have been determined by the market, i.e.
conditions emerged for serious scientific research and the subsequent
variation of the exchange rate theory, particularly since the expansion of
McDonald’s constantly supplied data from around the world to falsify the
law of one price (Pilbeam, 1998; McDonalds, 1999). The free market
exchange rate emerged as the main source of information about the
                     
40 «...Because the dollar and euro areas have each achieved monetary stability, large
changes in the exchange rates are real changes, both unnecessary and damaging. The same
could be said of the dollar — yen rate, whose fluctuation over the past 15 years have
caused a lot of havoc, particularly in the Japanese economy...»
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economy on the international level, and its lack of transparency in a
particular country meant the existence of a curtain behind which dark
political forces make profitable manipulations against one another,
usually at the expense of society. Manipulation of the rate in a country
opens the way to various manipulations in international comparisons, as
described by Z. Hellwig (1997), showing how Poland was growing in the
world exchange rates after the transformation in 1989, despite a falling
GDP.
To come to a new theory, identifying the formal relationship between
the exchange rate and labor productivity, we assume that PKBR — is the
GDP in prices of the last year (real), and W — costs for GDP formation.
RWP = PKB/W and means actual labor productivity. In addition, index P
means Poland, and index А means the country with which the comparison
is made.
PKBRP = WP · RWPP
PKBRA = WA · RWPA
Let’s make a proportion:
A
P
A
P
A
P
RWP
RWP
W
W
PKBR
PKBR ⋅= ,
we obtain the equation:
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P
A
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Dividing labor costs (W) by the number of employees (L), we obtain
the formula for an average payment (АP):
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APzlPKBR ⋅⋅⋅=
In turn, dividing PKBR by the relevant number of employees, we
obtain the equation:
[$]][ A
A
P
A
P
P PKBRERWP
RWP
AP
APzlPKBRE ⋅⋅= ,
where PKRBE — is the actual GDP per employee.
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Since the ratio of average payments adjusted by the parity of actual
productivity, identifies the trend of the exchange rate (Dobija, 2001), we
conclude that the rate is influenced by the purchasing power parity of actual
GDP, which accounts for one employee. Thus, we have the dependence:
[$])(][ AP PKBREERgzlPKBRE ⋅= ,
where g(ER) = ERN · ERP.
The exchange rate combines two factors. The first ERN — the parity
of average payments. If labor productivity is identical in two countries
and the exchange rate, e.g. equals to 2 — this means that the average
payments in one of the countries are twice as big. The second factor
(ERP) shows the difference in labor productivity in the compared
countries. If labor productivity in the two countries is not the same, the
rate is identified by a nominal factor, like the parity of labor productivity.
The above formula shows that the numerical value of the rate is
provided by a form as a product of two parities: nominal and productive,
i.e. the exchange rate has no direct application in the comparisons, but it
is possible to determine the respective manipulation of behavior in this
case. It is on the basis of parities, providing form to the rate, that it is
possible to define the GDP evaluation procedure in a particular country,
using actual GDP in the USA, which accounts for one employee, being a
true value. It becomes possible because the ratio (parity) of real labor
productivity can be calculated, dividing the real GDP of the USA by the
real GDP of Poland, expressed in dollars. Thus, the average value of the
exchange rate is identified by the formula
($)
($))(
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On this basis, we can derive the formula for evaluating the Polish
РКВRЕ($), using the market value of the rate and РКВRЕ($) of the USA:
P
A
A
P
AP
APER
PKBREPKBRE
⋅
= ($)($) .
Taking the average rate in 2006 of 3.07 Polish zloty per US dollar, the
average hourly payment in the USA in the amount of USD 16.5
(Auhustynyak, 2007) and comparable payment in Poland (18.5 zł), we get
the evaluation of a real product accounted for one employee in Poland in
the amount of USD 32,910, with the identical value in the USA
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amounting to USD 90,112. It is important that the presented method
assumes the evaluation of domestic РКВRЕ($) relying only on the
exchange rate and value of the American РКВRЕ. This method was
received theoretically and simply, thus is universal.
To calculate PKBRЕ (per capita) in dollars or actual GDP per capita,
we multiply the last sum by the number of employed people in Poland
(14,359,000 people) and divide it by the number of residents:
21012$00070038:0003591491032$[$] =⋅=PPKBRC
We get the value USD 12,210, which nevertheless is burdened by
error of estimate of share of average payments and number of employed
people. For comparison: the value of PKBE in the USA is USD 44,010.
Parities of labor costs and productivity can also be used in a number of
derivative parities. For this purpose, we present PKBRE as the product of
average payment AP and real work productivity RWP. In turn, we will present
payments as the product of the degree of remuneration of labor and value of
human capital. We will present human capital H in the form of the product of
the cost of maintenance and training (k), and individual labor potential ILP:
,
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where AP = u · H, u — is the level of remuneration of labor, H = k · ILP
— average value of an employee’s human capital; k — cost of
maintenance and training; ILP — individual labor potential; ТWP — total
work productivity. According to the theory of human capital, the level of
remuneration of labor exceeds u = 0,08 that determines the appropriate
permanent payment.
In the formula on the right, the value TWP is difficult to measure,
because it includes an employee’s personal productivity, the impact of the
infrastructure and organization of labor on average per worker employed
in the economy, regardless of whether he is a worker, a teacher or a
minister. Based on the above formula the second method for evaluating
PKBRE in the USD can be obtained. We estimate the ratio of the average
monthly costs of maintenance and training in the following way:
1
89457.2
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This formula shows that labor productivity in the USA is 2.89457
times higher, than that in Poland. Consequently, real GDP per employee
in Poland corresponds to USD 90,112 : 2.89457 dollars or USD 31,131.
This estimate is burdened by an error in the estimate of monthly costs of
maintenance and training, as well as an error in the evaluation of the
parity of level of remuneration.
The assessment of labor productivity in Poland in comparison with
the USA can be determined based on the data in Table 1.7.
Table 1.7
DATA ON CHANGES OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
IN POLAND AND THE USA
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
PKBRE (GDP) (USD) in the
USA* 83,699 85,394 87,575 88,852 90,112
Growth relative to 2002 100 103.3 110.0 116.0 122,4
Average zloty:dollar rate 4.10 3.84 3.55 3.23 3.07
PKBRE (GDP) (USD) in
Poland (deduction) 22,886 24,931 27,656 30,839 32,910
Growth to the 2002 level, % 100 108.9 120.8 134.7 143.78
Percentage of PKBRE of
Poland to the USA 27 % 29 % 32 % 35 % 37 %
* Groningen Growth and Development Centre…, 2007.
Source: author’s calculations.
Table 1.7 clearly illustrates an optimistic picture, because labor
productivity growth in Poland is higher than in the USA. It is adversely
affected by the fact that the level of remuneration in Poland is not always
appropriate, but we can assume that such imbalance will be corrected by
the Government decision (August 2007) to increase minimum wages by
20 %. This decision is quite reasonable in view of the existing state of
affairs.
When a particular state, e.g. Ukraine, does not allow a free market
exchange rate, then regardless of the interpretation of this fact, an
impenetrable curtain falls on the economic affairs of the country and any
evaluations are not very reliable. You can try to penetrate this curtain, but
the rate comprises the final value, which is formed in a pure market and
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nothing changes it. For the analysis of Ukraine, according to the indices
in table 1.7 I am using the results of O. Petryk (2005), an analyst at the
National Bank of Ukraine, who estimated a 76 % depreciation of the
hryvnia against the dollar in 2005. According to the corrected rate, we
estimate the Ukrainian PKBRE (GDP) using the formula
75412$
)0,9:5,16(80,3
85288$($)($) =⋅=⋅
=
U
A
A
U
AP
APER
PKBREPKBRE .
Table 1.8 contains data on Ukraine similarly to Table 1.8.
Table 1.8
DATA ON CHANGES OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN UKRAINE
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Hryvnia:dollar exchange rate 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Coefficient proposed by Petryk 0.83 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.73
Adjusted hryvnia rate 4.15 4.10 3.95 3.80 3.65
PKBRE (GDP) (USD) in the
USA 83,699 85,394 87,575 88,852 90,112
PKBRE (GDP) (USD) in
Ukraine 11,001 11,361 12,093 12,754 13,466
Growth to the 2002 level, % 100 103.2 110.0 116.0 122.4
Percentage of RKBRE of
Ukraine to the USA 13 % 13 % 14 % 14 % 15 %
Source: author’s calculations.
The information value of these calculations and indices depends on
the extent to which the exchange rate is free in the market. If this
condition is not met, then the estimates may be far from reality. The lack
of a free exchange rate is evidence that the economic policy of the
country is neither mature nor managed by the category of value. The
second condition of the quality of results and information is limited to the
proper evaluation of average payments parity 41.
                     
41 Estimated average payment in 2006 in Ukraine is presented according to Prof. F.F.
Butynets, Zhytomyr State University.
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1.6.7. Improving the Theory of Exchange Rate
It is well known that the primary theory of an exchange rate, expressed in
the currently falsified law of one price, was brought to a state of decent
theory that explains the general nature of the Balassa-Samuelson course,
who introduced the PPP (purchasing power parity) method42 during the
determination of the category of labor productivity. The above authors
analyzed labor productivity by dividing the economy into two sectors:
values subject to and those that are not subject to international exchange.
They stated that lower labor productivity is mainly manifested in the
sector of values subject to exchange rather than the sector of values that
are not subject to exchange. In my opinion, this statement is wrong. In
poor countries the second sector has much greater lack of productivity
than the first sector.
Thus, it is essential to take overall productivity into account, because
the exchange of national currency is affected by all employed people. It is
not important for the rate that there is a ministry or some other institutios
in the community of the employed, which are inefficient and spend large
amounts of money, or that active bureaucracy inefficiently absorbs large
amounts coming from the taxpayers. This situation affects productivity
and finally — the exchange rate of the national currency. Therefore, labor
productivity can be defined as a dimensionless value of GDP per
monetary unit of labor cost rather than value of production per working
hour of the employee.
With these considerations and calculations we come to a
conclusion on the exchange rate theory. As is well known, according
to the PPP method, the level of the exchange rate is influenced by
fluctuations in inflation and productivity. Since the impact of inflation
is seen in actual labor productivity, it can be stated that changes in the
exchange rate are caused by changes in this parity. It is also known
that the PPP method does not explain why, for example the current
rate of the zloty to the dollar is 2.835, and for example, not 1.5 or any
other. We find the answer to this question in the following
considerations. The level of the exchange rate is determined jointly by
parities of maintenance cost (or average payments) and actual labor
productivity. With equal productivity, the exchange rate is determined
as a ratio of maintenance costs. Average payments are the function of
maintenance costs, so the parity of maintenance costs can serve as a
parity of average payments.
The integral model of the average exchange rate is determined in the
following formulas:
                     
42 Purchasing power parity. (Note of editors)
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Value ER[P/A] means the exchange rate of country P to currency of
country A, other definitions are the same as above.
Substantiating this theory of exchange rate it is necessary to
consider two arguments: (a) a state when actual labor productivity
RWP = WP/(1 + i)(WP = PKB/W) is the same in the considered countries,
i.e. parity is observed, and (b) a state of the inequality of these values.
Then we get the formula that interprets the exchange rate as follows:
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In addition to research presented in works (Dobija, 2001, 2002a,
2002b, 2003), the fundamental analysis of the above formula was
conducted by Z. Grabowski (2001a, 2001b), the results of which are
presented in Table 1.9. Further research was conducted by M. Jędrzejczyk
(2004, 2007), who obtained similar results.
Table 1.9
EVALUATION OF EXCHANGE RATES ON THE BASIS
OF LABOR COSTS (data as of 2000)
Country Average paymentin USD
Average payment in
countries
Calculated
rate
Actual average
rate
Germany $2,437 4,300 DM 1.765 1.74 DM/$
Japan $2,437 298,900 YEN 122.7 121.00 YEN/$
Ukraine $2,437 1.649 UAH 0.677 0.61 UAH/$
Source: Grabowski, 2001a.
As you can see, consistency of some rates with actual payment cannot
be coincidental, i.e. there is some dependence. Even the fact of ever lower
productivity in Great Briatin as compared to the USA and Japan is also
reflected in figures.
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In the second case RWPP ≠ RWPA. With actual variations in labor
productivity, the dimensionless coefficient U is introduced, and then we
can write the equation as follows:
RWPP · U = RWPA.
Now the previous formula takes the form:
[ ]APER
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PKBREU = .
Poland and Ukraine are countries where productivity is quite different
from the USA, Germany or Japan. Therefore, dividing the Polish
minimum or average payment by American equivalents, we do not obtain
any reasonable approximation of the rate.
Table 1.10 presents data relating to a group of selected countries
confirming the dependence of the rate on the parity of average
remuneration, adjusted by the coefficient U.
Table 1.10
EVALUATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE BASED ON AVERAGE
PAYMENTS AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (data as of 2006)
USA Ukraine Poland
Average hourly labor costs $16.5 9.51Z 18.5 zł
Share of labor costs … 0.5764 1.2569
Actual exchange rate … 0.582 3.07
PKBRE (GDP) ($) 90,112 84,457 34,263
Share of PKBRE (GDP)($) … 1.0670 2.630
Payment value of the exchange
rate … 0.6150 3.3056
Difference between actual rate
and payment …
– 0.033
–5.6 %
+ 0.2356
+7.67 %
Calculation of hereditary dollar
trend (7 %) of determined
exchange rate43
… … 3.069
Source: author’s calculations.
The application of the theory of parity of payments and labor
productivity leads to a more accurate evaluation of the hryvnia to dollar
                     
43 Calculations using the value of average payments and PKBRE leveling the impact of
exchange rate.
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rate. Directly calculating productivity in the USA, we get the value
PKBRA/W = 3,0. In turn, we assume that labor productivity in Ukraine is
at level 1, i.e. is lower; the contribution of payments to GDP is equal to 1.
Using the parity of average payments, we evaluate the exchange rate (ER)
of the hryvnia as follows:
$/64,1
0,1
3
5,16$
9 UAHUAHER =⋅= .
As a result, we get the relevant evaluation of the PKBRE for Ukraine
and Poland:
PKBRE ($) in the USA = 90,112;
PKBRE ($) in Ukraine = 29,970;
PKBRE ($) in Poland = 32,910.
Calculations show that the exchange rate of the hryvnia to the dollar
should be at a level closer to 2.0 than 5.0 (2006). Holding back the
exchange rate at an undervalued level leads to the impoverishment of the
population, because in this case, the dollar receives a premium of more than
150 % during exchange. However, this conclusion has an error in the
evaluation of average payments, because nothing can replace the market
value of the exchange rate. In view of the above the essential similarity of
the Polish and Ukrainian economies can be confirmed.
1.7. The Role of Social Capital in Economic Convergence
1.7.1. Introduction
In economic theory more and more attention is focused on the huge role
of cultural values and the functionality of the decisions of institutional
economic systems in the study of reducing differences in development. At
the present stage, the most important components of these values include
social and human capital. Existing theoretical evidence and numerous
analyses prove that the structure and quality of these types of capital
show the results of the application of identical technology solutions,
economic strategies and reforms that make up the rules of a capitalist
economy. By doing so, human and social capital confirm the thesis of the
results achieved in reducing differences in development. Therefore, many
economists and politicians agree that the specific features of cultural
values cannot be ignored during the reform of an economic system and a
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political system, although in general, there are far-reaching ideas that it is
expedient to form a competitive system operating within a democratic
state, which will act as its guarantor. There are only differences in
estimates of the applicability of central strategic coordination in the
harmonization of economic efficiency and social justice, the pace of
reforms aimed at the formation of functional markets, a democratic state
and actual opportunities to support and improve markets by the state. The
principal solution to these dilemmas in relation to a particular national
economy requires the diagnosis of the human and social capital of the
economy according to changes in resources, its structure and quality.
Special research needs to determine the paradoxes of the development of
the resources that add value to development processes, as well as
implementation of systemic reforms.
Quite developed institutions of civil society contribute to the
formation of social capital based on market values and traditional
axiology in the USA. Figure 1.7 provides the axiological foundations of
social capital and institutional order.
Focus
On personal gain
Global capitalism (USA)
Also
allows
Facilitates,
but does not
fully exhaust
Serving clients
and society
Competitive system based on spontaneous and controlled
coordination of social economic formation
(European Union)
Figure 1.7. Axiological Bases of the Social Capital
and Institutional Order
The productive nature of social capital is a function of the degree of trust
in society, without which, the development of cooperation is impossible.
Trust is an essential competitive advantage based on interaction, speed and
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flexibility. Trust facilitates the emergence of a favorable climate for the
development of partnership relations, the decentralization of decisions and
control, the internationalization of external norms, patterns of behavior, rules
and procedures, increased reliability of co-operation in an unstable (which is
going through tumultuous changes) environment, freedom of handling
information. Through the above processes, trust allows the possibility of
cheaper transaction costs and control, replaces the «corrupt practice of
interaction, loyalty and good faith of partners». Trust also promotes
independent actions (activity of subordinates) and, therefore, unconventional
solutions and the elastic reactions of subordinates. It facilitates the most
effective measures, especially in terms of risk and uncertainty. In other
words, the use of other assets in those groups and places where a large
amount of trust resources is accumulated, is fuller, faster and more efficient,
causing a synergy effect.
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned effects of trust, some
researchers of social capital argue that trust is one of the most important
things that people have, bringing overall benefit. Other production
resources, if there is no trust, become unnecessary ballast (Hardin, 1998,
p. 9). According to K. Arrow (2000), the economic backwardness
existing in the world can be explained by a lack of mutual trust. If this
thesis is true, it is impossible to reduce the difference in development
without improving the form of social capital in the countries lagging
behind.
It can be considered that the climate of trust, which is favorable to
economic and social development, also depends on the differentiation of
income, property and knowledge between the rich and the poor, just as
people belonging to different cultural, religious or mental groups are
dependent on axiological differentiation. Income inequality has a limit,
which is difficult to define, beyond which there is a sense of injustice.
Injustice as a result of human relations in work means their separation
from the ethical purpose (Tischner, 2002, p. 33). Thereby, injustice
concerns faith in moral action and its ethical correctness. The feeling of
injustice gives rise to suspicion and even hostility. Under conditions of
labor exploitation, it is impossible to count on its impartial assessment, in
view of a lack of material grounds of goodwill, because it was rejected,
degraded and replaced by exploitation. Unfair inequality, especially the
poverty, marginalization and even social neglect that accompany it,
destroy trust, devalue social capital and through this, reduce the
effectiveness of human capital and economic growth. Hence, the
emergence of the fundamental question of the justice of social inequality.
Equal remuneration for each is naturally unfair, because it is separated
from labor efficiency, its contribution to value, and most importantly —
from the economic point of view, it is devastating as regards efficiency
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and leads to poverty. In addition, the violation of only material equality
(income, property) is not automatically tantamount to the violation of the
very idea of equality, because inequality can be compensated in the form
of intangible values, such as honor, respect, knowledge, etc. This means
that the division, which is based on material equality that is economically
unsubstantiated, is anti-development and cannot be interpreted seriously.
Its product is a decline of motivation to work and business efforts, and
thereafter — the spread of opportunistic behavior that causes the
recompensation of the anti-efficient effects of distribution, separated from
the contribution of labor in production. This division does not promote
cooperation and replaces the horizontal connections, which cooperation is
forced to replace by vertical connections. The replacement of social
capital as the driving force of cooperation by vertical connections that are
generated by the state, leads to a loss of trust in the institution and
burdens society with huge additional transaction costs related to planning,
verification and the adjustment of this cooperation.
If, following W. Pareto’s theory of inequality, we accept that
economically justified inequalities are those, which serve to increase
social welfare, then we must recognize that fair distribution has nothing
to do with the extent to which equality is realized. However, economic
inequality substantiated by this theory of well-being should not be
accepted at the individual level by the majority in society. In this
situation, it is impossible to improve socio-economic development, and at
the level of the individual, it is even expedient to speak about anti-
development.
Only in case of failed indoctrination or other forms of coercion, does
social approval recognize inequalities as being fair. Justice cannot only be
described in the economic plane, because it would mean its reduction to
the material dimension of human existence, and thus removed from the
field of the perception of intangible inequalities. Justice is a moral
category and should be treated under the axiological dimension of human
life, reduced by individualism. According to J. Rawls (1994, p. 119),
justice requires impartiality. Thus, motivated choice guarantees the
benefit of all. J. Rawls postulates the egalitarian principle of differentiation,
seeking such settlement of social and economic inequalities, «... to be of
greatest benefit for the least privileged, and that these inequalities are
associated with positions and institutions, open to all in a genuine
inequality.» (Rawls, 1994, p. 119). However, J. Rawls does not attempt to
balance out the situations that are in worse positions (principles of
compensation). He speaks only about the adoption of such system
solutions, within which the achievement of the best positions improves,
or at least does not worsen the situation for the weakest social groups.
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In a situation where the market does not make impartiality necessary,
it becomes necessary to support it by solidarity. Therefore, postulating a
solidarity state becomes the primary task. This postulate supports non-
economic values, essential for the social development of an individual.
According to J. Tischner (2000, p. 112), solidarity offers the prospect of
hope that a man is not left alone in his suffering and creates a sense of
community. If people lose the sense of solidarity, the question arises: how
can justice be enforced from above? The decline of solidarity is a
symptom of the decline of social capital that grew from traditional values.
It should be noted that the world of individuals, who maximized their
own benefit, has no need of solidarity, just as in Darwin’s struggle for
survival, it limits the abilities of the weaker to use resources, and may
even eliminate them. It is not sufficient just to search for inequalities,
based on the criteria of utility, which forces the maximization of own
benefit, since victims of long-term failures and poverty have no reason to
complain about the unfairness of distribution and, moreover, cannot do it
effectively.
Freedom of life as a basis of economically fair inequalities adopted in
liberal economic theories, means concentration on resources. This
approach, according to A. Sen (2000, p. 53-54), although it may indicate
a free receipt of resources, does not clarify the issue of freedom of action
— what is the increase of resources for. Materially understandable
welfare will say little about the value categories of life (Filek, 1996,
p. 21). The system of values that motivates the development of
appropriate values for the harmonious development of all spheres of
human life, is basically different from the system of values generated by
the competitive system. The freedoms that promote valuable lifestyles are
denied by ideology, which understands man and forms human capital for
own benefit. This ideology detracts the main aspect of human capital and
perceives only its objectivity or ability to generate profits for the
entrepreneur. Therefore, we should agree with A. Sen that injustice,
which is manifested in the form of poverty, also comprises the injustice
which limits freedom, and being suitable for the idea of democracy, is
favorable for the functionality of markets. Justice manifested in the
destruction of the consequences of unjust division, especially poverty,
exile and marginalization, is concentrated, according to H. Jonas, on what
is already a fact, that has occurred and occurs continuously today,
because the inherent feature of the institutional system is the generation
of negative responsibility (for actual, not potential evil) in view of the
lack of social responsibility in competitive market structures. For Jonas
(1996, p. 186) the very existence of human everyday life requires a
guarantee for its future existence. Each of us, as a result of living among
people, can be brought to responsibility instead of someone else
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases146
(children, subordinates, employees), and from the very fact of existence,
can also become the subject of responsibility. In this sense, being
responsible in everyday life is an a priori thesis, the natural feature of a
man. However, a man may not have this feature under the influence of
ideologies that limit the axiological dimension of human existence. Since
the existence of human everyday life is substantiated by itself, then its
future existence also becomes substantiated. The duty to protect human
life also means the protection of a comfortable life and the need to
eliminate poverty.
Thus, anyone whose actions affect the life of the community (entrepreneur,
politician, representatives of government, self-governments, trade unions
or any group of interests), even when he does not perform actions arising
out of power, the bearer of which he is, is not exempt from objective
responsibility for the negative effects of extreme poverty, the
marginalization of some social groups and even globalization.
Only such actions of each individual can be considered responsible,
that ensure responsible action for future generations. «Therefore,
responsibility in terms of mankind requires not only the further existence
of the category, but also the achievement of the quality of life that would
allow the continuation of this responsibility» (Dobrobyt. .., 2005, p. 103).
The lack of social responsibility arises not in spite of poverty and social
captivity, and at best, exists in a weakened sense of moral responsibility
for one’s life, moreover, it shows lack of responsibility in those, who
avoid self-responsibility or social responsibility.
H. Jonas does not share the hope of solving the problems of poverty
through technological development and fear of an explosion of violence
on a global scale. In his view, those who possess surplus should be self-
restrictive and transfer part of their wealth to the needs of the poor. This
self-restriction is not facilitated by the dominance and radicalization of
neoliberal ideologies, thinking in utilitarian categories and the decline of
the idea of the state as an institution based on moral capital. The moral
scandal, which Jonas understood as a lack of responsibility in those who
are able to improve the lives of others, should be eliminated, even if we
are not sure of the results of efforts in this direction. In his opinion, it is
impossible to do this with the aid of personal ethics, because it has lost its
force in the world, where the pursuit of personal gain is dominant.
Therefore, what is needed is such social and human capital that allows the
tracking of the threat of an outburst of protest by the poor against the
benefits of the rich, before the poor decide to use mass violence.
Only those endowed with the knowledge of these limitations of own
benefit, the representatives of business, politics, technology, education or
upbringing can meet these challenges. In this regard, one should not
ignore traditional values and moral education as factors that affect the
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way of applying knowledge and other resources. Lack of knowledge
about preventive measures against injustice and factors that enable the
comparison of its manifestations in various aspects of life cannot be an
excuse to remove responsibility for decisions relating to the criteria of
equitable distribution.
The course of the reflexive upgrading of human capital is closely
linked with changes in social capital, which determines the directions of
using available knowledge resources in the process of cooperation. The
essence of connections between human and social capital is expressed in
the effects of changes in social capital (i.e. the decline of public trust) on
how to use human capital and the extent of its non-use that follows from
the high level of opportunism, corruption, crime, unemployment, growing
spheres of difficulties, poverty and social exile. For the creative abilities
of human capital to materialize, knowledge, skills and motivation
invested in a man should be involved in the economic process, like other
types of capital. If this does not happen, such investment in a man will
only perform an expensive function of the production process. Only
education and upbringing, which increase the productive capabilities of a
person become human capital. Instead, the knowledge and skills that
increase the possibility of collective actions are transformed into
intellectual capital. For the full use of the productive capacities of human
and intellectual capital, it is necessary to unite them with social capital or
such specific kinds of knowledge and skills that generate trust, as well as
the ability to co-operate and collaborate.
There is also the opposite dependence, which goes beyond the
problem discussed herein. It should be noted that even when the
performance of firms where low and high trust is the same, the work of
the latter brings external benefits in the form of a high sense of security
and satisfaction, as well as self-fulfillment in the non-economic spheres
of personal life. The disadvantages of a market institution not only lead to
the violation of the competitive system, but also cause the improper
functioning of the state and the degeneration of democracy.
Informal institutions, determining the level of public trust,
demonstrate the tendency of people to cooperate, the transaction costs of
some cooperative groups and thus, determine the dynamics of markets,
productivity of factors and economic growth. If their product is growing
public trust, they become the material of positive social capital, because
its products are as follows: the expansion of cooperation and
entrepreneurship, increase of productivity factors, innovation and as a
result, development of markets. If institutional changes open the way for
the expansion of opportunism, corruption, crime, nepotism and the
pursuit of rent seeking, a climate of social mistrust develops and negative
social capital is created, which generates an increase in social conflict,
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social inequality, the degeneration of democracy, cooperation,
competition, and as a result, the use of some resources of human capital
in a manner that causes negative external effects with the simultaneous
depreciation of these resources. All these processes decrease the ability to
cooperate, because its coercive nature by vertical connections increases
the transaction costs of such cooperation. Its synthetic manifestation is the
slowing down of economic growth and increase in the slowing of the
development of countries with higher levels of social capital (Zak, Knack,
2001, p. 295-321; Kumor, Sztaudynger, 2007). Reducing the development
gap in the absence of restrictions in access to financial resources and
substantive factors of production becomes primarily the function of the
quality of human and social capital. In the first case it pertains to the
avoidance of paradoxes in the human capital development described in the
previous sub-section. However, in the second case it is about institutional
changes that make it possible to reduce the transaction costs of the
functioning of markets and spheres of public welfare. This is evidence of
the need to counteract the depreciation of social capital through the
development of the institute of a just state, i.e. one that cares about:• a competitive order, whereby during the first distribution of income,
the economic criterion of justice based on the involvement of the
production factor in the product and productivity, would manifest itself;• implementation during the second distribution of the ethical criteria
of justice spread everywhere;• a reduction of the transaction costs of economic growth through the
elimination of opportunism, corruption, crime and the pursuit of rent
seeking, and thereby, the restoration of public trust.
1.7.2. The Problem of the Depreciation of Social Capital
The formulation of conclusions regarding the role of social capital in the
functioning of an economic system based on its impact on the growth and
development of economic or social inequality, which is analyzed using
mathematical operating and econometric models, would be a very simple
method, which would reduce the actual significance of this important
factor in these processes. It is particularly confirmed by the fact that a
synthetic indicator of this factor of social and economic development has
not yet been found. There are also no sufficiently accurate methods of
measuring manifestations of the depreciation of social capital. The
question that arises, is whether the different impacts of changes in social
capital, obtained through imperfect research, reflect its overall impact on
the functionality of the economic system, or is it only the impact of some
of its functions, components or mechanisms created by it?
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The value of social capital for economic growth and development,
established based on an analysis of the functions of production, is quite
incomplete. Without downgrading the achievements of many authors in
the research of the exact methods for determining the effects of social
capital in social and economic processes, I, however, advocate that a
more cognitive value can have a descriptive analysis of the key
mechanisms by which social capital may influence the effectiveness of
the economic system and which are somehow related to the non-
economic conditions of economic growth and development. However, to
be limited by the conclusions of the analysis based on quantitative
models, would, in my opinion, mean a depreciation of the different
effects of changes in social capital that influence the level and stability of
economic growth, various manifestations of economic disbalance, the
instability of economic policy and continued manipulation by the
parameters of this policy, the deepening of social inequalities, and the
resulting increase in socio-economic heterogeneity in the spatial and
subject systems, on a local and macroeconomic scale44. Lack of
knowledge on the subject or ignoring it was, in my opinion, the reason for
forecasts that are too optimistic as regards the measures recommended by
neoliberal standards, defined according to the Washington Consensus,
stabilization programs and the system reforms implemented in post-
socialist countries.
There is a general unity of views regarding the fact that the process of
the decline of social capital is an indisputable fact identified on a global
level. However, this decline is sometimes associated with the formation
of negative social capital, emerging with the appearance of negative
particular values connected with the need to bribe trusts under conditions
of overall public distrust (Matysiak, 2006, p. 241-247). This process is
undoubtedly connected with the spread of thinking and behavior
according to the categories of the individual who maximizes his/her own
benefit under conditions of lesser or greater poverty in the competitive
order. Based on representative surveys conducted in 32 countries, Zak
and Knack (2001, p. 295-321) confirm that greater trust increases
investment in economic growth, and there also emerges an error circle of
low trust and poverty, but egalitarian distribution and a homogeneous
society increase the level of trust, but discrimination reduces it.
The depreciation of social capital is due to rapid changes in lifestyles
caused by new technologies (the information and telecommunication
technologies used in genetics and in the media that exhibit the culture of
violence), globalization and resulting rapid institutional changes (in
                     
44 Review of research results, based on quantitative models can be found in:
Sztaudynger, 2005
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contrast to the adaptive abilities of people), change of traditions, spread of
unfair and fierce competition, growing social inequalities, connected
primarily with the inheritance of poverty and social exclusion, supported
by corruption and crime, the decline of political culture and the reputation
of politics and even democracy, ineffective self-administration and
government agencies, as well as the privatization of public sphere.
In Poland, the depreciation of social capital is particularly strong, as
evidenced by fast-growing indicators of corruption, crime,
unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, marginalization, number of
prisoners and growing inequality. There are also numerous attempts to
depreciate the influence of social capital on economic growth, as
indicated by the statistically strong negative effects in spheres such as
unemployment, social inequality, crime, investment and economic growth
(Sztaudynger, 2005). If the depreciation process of social capital is
viewed from one side of its distortion — corruption and crime in a broad
sense — in the information provided by International Transparency in
2004, Poland should be referred to the most corrupt countries in the EU
(Kieżun, 2005, p. 121). After two years of Government efforts to fight
corruption and crime, and strong opposition from existing groups of
interest, the impressive progress on this issue becomes notable, as proved
by statistics, although this problem is often reported differently in the
mass media. The situation is similar if unemployment is deemed to be the
source of the decline of social capital. By 2004, Poland was the country
with the highest recorded rates of unemployment in the world. Joining the
EU and good economic conditions have changed this situation. However,
the rapid decrease of unemployment has no substantial effect on the
growth of public trust, although it is expedient to hope that this new kind
of social capital based on market values, will gradually also extend to the
sphere of the employed labor force and temporarily unemployed people45.
1.7.3. Conclusions for the Transition Economies
Counteracting the shock, which was characteristic of the transition to a
market economy, the depreciation of social capital and its replacement by
negative social capital, which led to an increase in social inequalities,
                     
45 Fighting corruption in Poland, as in Ukraine, is very problematic, and for the period
after 2004 no major improvements have occurred. In 2008, Poland was 58th according to
the level of corruption (1st place — lack of corruption) of 180 countries subject to
research. Among EU countries, only Romania and Bulgaria lagged behind. However, it is
difficult to say anything as regards Ukraine. It’s in 134th place (index 2.5). For us, it is not
comforting that Russia is in 147th place (2.1) and Belarus — in 151st (2.0) Just like rust, it
corrodes Ukrainian society, nullifying the national idea and the idea of Eurocentrum (Note
of Ukrainian editors) Source: http://transparency.org/policy-rescarch/surveys. —
Indiceslopi/2008.
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required appropriate institutional instruments that would protect the
deregulation and privatization from possible distortions: impunity of
corruption, liberties of nomenclature and the escalation of the pursuit of
rent seeking. These phenomena open the way to new tax and employment
legislation, the criminal and regulatory functioning of public sector
administration, etc., favorable for the growth of socio-economic
heterogeneity, which preserves some alternative routes for the realization
of personal gain through third parties (which do not participate in
transactions). These additional external instruments inherent to the
process of the transition to a market economy reduce not only the
efficiency of economic growth, but also slow down and even make the
process of economic convergence temporarily impossible. They primarily
act due to the loss of the reputation of politics, politicians and
businessmen and, as a result, there is a depreciation of social capital in
view of the general decline of trust. Institutional solutions that are not
able to ensure a competitive system in this space, promoted the formation
of negative social capital, which increased the transaction costs of the
cooperation process and directed the activities of the persons concerned
towards the escalation of rent seeking, the support of asymmetric
information, «entrepreneurship» outside the law, crime and corruption,
which ultimately reduced labor productivity and deepened social
inequalities.
The problem of the depreciation of social capital in Poland, as in
many other post-socialist countries, is integrally related to the conflict of
rules of global capitalism, defined in the Washington Consensus, with the
post-socialist baggage of overall opportunism, lack of trust of any
government, respect for law and the destroyed epos of labor. In these
circumstances, the vast majority of citizens could not be intellectually and
institutionally prepared to undertake self-responsibility for their own
welfare and the internationalization of the effects of competition rules,
were not limited by the rules of social and economic cohesion adapted
accordingly to these effects. The logic of shock system changes inevitably
had to result in new obstacles in the development and sources of the
further depreciation of existing social capital resources.
The sudden explosion of unemployment as well as the consequences
of decreased productivity paved the way for the rapid spread of poverty.
This gave rise to various social problems in the form of the use of
significant energy in criminal activities, particularly by young people,
deprived of the possibility to work. The state, burdened with debt and
growing poorer, was deprived of the financial ability to counteract these
processes, in spite of effective public policy, the provision of additional
equipment to internal security services, the improvement of requirements
of justice and health care.
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In Poland, as well as in many other post-socialist countries, the launch
of the difficult process of transformation was also connected with a burst
of criminal capital, since it was formed under conditions of the non-
transparency of laws, which did not provide for the restriction of corrupt
practices. Regulations that contributed to the establishment of
nomenclature unions as early as in 1989 were a striking example. This
fact gave specific features to the transformation process. The fierce
struggle of people, who pursued only their own interest, found a great
field to flourish in an unregulated economy, which lacked developed civil
society institutions, legal institutions and social and economic structures,
adapted to the blocking of rules pursuing rent seeking and personal gain
that would comprehensively supervise the observation of recognized
requirements of public responsibility. As a result, there was an enormous
social stratification. This was due to rising unemployment indices, which
were the highest in Europe. The reduction of these indices in Poland after
its accession to the EU is unfortunately connected with the decline of
human capital, caused by the loss of hope for work opportunities in
Poland and obtaining relevant remuneration for it. Another manifestation
of the increased cost of economic growth arising from the depreciation of
social capital is constantly increasing rates of corruption and the lack of
trust in the political class. According to the surveys held by Transparency
International, the corruption index, calculated on a scale of 0-10, with 0
being the most corrupt country, of the 113 taken into account in Poland
the level rose from 5.6 in 1996 to 3.6 in 2003. Rates of public trust in
political parties were notably low (about 10 %), ambassadors and senators
(about 9 %), while indices of sense of corruption and bribery (64 %), lack
of representation of interests (64 %)46 were high.
The conflict between liberal doctrine and liberal policies implemented
since 1989 with a post-socialist system of values aimed at a paternalist
state did not contribute to the social trust climate. Deregulation, subject to
global standards, built on the principles of Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism,
made it impossible to form a strong state with a clearly defined sphere of
competence and transparency laws that would protect citizens from the
abuse of power by the officials and authorities, and employees — from
the purposeful pursuit of the enrichment of the capitalist class being
formed. The subsequent about-turn to restore the licensing of business
activity opened the field for distortions arising from the pursuit of rent
seeking. The heterogeneity of legislation and its continuous amendment
invoked regular channels of distortion at the junction of state and
business. One of them is the spread of the belief that a person is involved
                     
46 Based on the research by J. Grabowski, given according to: Administracja…, 2005,
p. 186—188.
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in public life to maximize his/her own benefits and advantages for
relatives.
Democratization truly opened the space for free choice, but collided with
the system of institutions connected to each other, formed according to the
logic of democratic centralism. The result was the formation of parties in the
state by providing freedom of action to various government agencies so that
they primarily served the interests of groups connected with the party system.
This situation formed the belief that the territory of the country was a kind of
«hunting zone». Trust in those who govern was almost completely
eradicated. Declarations aimed at correcting the situation in the Republic of
Poland, under such state of the destruction of social capital, recommended
isolation from people, who come from the nomenclature of PRP47, from
political influence, these same declarations are interpreted with great
suspicion and the belief that they refer not to the program of institutional
reforms, but only to the capture of «hunting zones».
In a society, where at least 50 % of citizens wished to leave their
country, about 17 % were unable to work, the sense of the lack of
representation of interests dominated, and governments were treated as a
hostile institution, about 70 % of citizens did not want to belong to any
organization (Administracja..., 2005, p. 167), moreover, the media
focused exclusively on addressing negative stereotypes of power and
ethical and moral values; there was no favorable climate for the
restoration of social trust. The depreciation of social capital led to
complications in working on the development of the Polish economy in
the period before its accession to the EU. In addition, low social trust
today does not contribute to the full use of all development opportunities
provided by the adoption of EU Acquis communautaire (social
achievements) and the development of human capital.
A necessary condition for change in these negative processes in the
sphere of social capital, thus one of the major obstacles to high and stable
economic growth is the reform of institutions that would provide:• guarantees of legal institutions, establishments that would protect
the rights of citizens and minorities from the tyranny of the majority, state
and self-governing bureaucracy;• protection of economic subjects and citizens from the abuse of
power and degeneration of democracy arising from continuous
amendments to legislation, licensing and increases in the number of
economic regulators;• protection of authorities from the influence of dominant interest
groups;
                     
47 This refers to the People’s Republic of Poland (PRP) as the socialist country it was
in the early 1990s. (Note of editors)
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• enabling authorities to conduct legitimate governance and policy of
socio-economic unity, without destroying the competitive system;• elimination of the lack of ethical and moral values (Matysiak,
2003).
The necessary components of the institutional system, capable of
resolving conflicts between the interests of public agencies and
individuals, are the functional institutions of civil society. A condition for
the formation and functioning of these institutions, in addition to
compliance with the law, is the relative prosperity of most citizens and a
low level of poverty. The unsatisfactory functioning of the institute of
democracy and high levels of marginalization and social isolation caused
by unjust social inequalities and relatively low social prosperity, create an
unfavorable climate for rebuilding social capital.
Economic liberalism, especially in its extreme forms, is not a
sufficient basis for projecting the institute of civil society. The institutional
condition for the formation of civil society is wide and available for the
execution of civil authorities in controlling public agencies. This can be
served by: transparency and the full responsibility of the authorities for
policies implemented on the basis of clearly defined and transparent
criteria, laws available for holding civic referendums that make it possible
to veto adopted rulings and regulations, making own suggestions. Unity
of law and responsibility is a necessary part of legal management. This is
essential for the civilized rules of a political market, limitation of the
tendency of some politicians to use faulty economic models in various
theories for specific interests and errors manifested in the discrepancies of
implemented institutional economic decisions, which arise due to the
inadequate understanding of this very theory.
The post-socialist economy is burdened with additional transaction
costs, arising from inherited comprehensive opportunism, disrespect for
the law and the numerous obligations of state agencies and local
governments that have yet to be completely determined by law. It is
because of the above positions, as well as through the flawed institute of
civil society, that democratic institutions and the lack of transparency of
laws are used not only by state and self-governing administration, but
also by interested circles as a screen for opportunistic behavior and the
evasion of obligations owed to society. They also complicate and even
make it impossible for actions arising from the need to work on
expanding the area of civil liberties, which are required to increase the
effective coordination or reduction in the pursuit of rent seeking.
The system of institutions in Poland is also the product of changes
occurring in the EU. The market, combined with the central strategic
coordination focused on social and economic unity, can create a system
of institutions that is more useful for the protection of social capital from
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depreciation, rather than the rules of global capitalism. For this process to
take place, meeting the requirements for institutions arising from
Poland’s membership in the EU and many international organizations
cannot be the cause for the implementation of the specific interests of
politicians and government. Although in many cases, institutional
changes connected with the development of market economy require
solutions on the international level, only the activity of the state in the
restoration of social capital cannot lead to the improvement of the
institutional system based only on the EU’s Aquis communautaire.
If a society with a developing economy lacks innovations in the field
of the coordination of socio-economic processes that introduce legal
government, the wandering ghost of the decline of the reputation of
politicians and politics, opportunism, the collapse of democratic
institutions and state, will make impossible the decrease of difference in
development, since the identical production technique and technology of
global capitalism can facilitate an increase of labor productivity only
under conditions of institutional order being the most suitable for the
development of social capital. This means that the stronger the
relationship between people and the ability of the institutional system to
coordinate public entities within an overall project are, the more suitable
are contracting and property rights, and the asymmetry of information,
opportunism and the pursuit of benefits is less, the smaller the transaction
costs and the higher the labor productivity using the same technologies.
On the microeconomic level, the saturation of the element of trust, as
the driving force of cooperation development, is conducted through the
expansion of entrepreneurship, the development of local self-government,
the equitable distribution of social property, social and legal partnership
and various other organizations of public life, functioning under non-
profit principles.
The low level of trust complicates the establishment and operation of
unions and small and medium enterprises. In associations, code
regulations only ensure the rights of shareholders, while business is based
primarily on trust as well as relations between companies. However, it
can be replaced by formalized institutions that create the possibility of
cooperation, but the result of their activity is the high additional costs of
cooperation. Small businesses often lack funds for the services of law
firms and economic analysis. This is why the development of the small
and medium enterprise sector depends on trust. Already at the stage of the
establishment of enterprises, the social climate surrounding entrepreneurship
is evidence of their formation as institutions promoting entrepreneurship.
In the social environment where running a business is tied with
corruption, access to sources of power and obtaining information, which
is difficult to get, concessions are often evaluated as being necessary
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according to the criteria of traditional values. Such a social environment
is typical for developing countries. Therefore, it is very important to form
institutions that promote the development of entrepreneurship. For a
favorable climate around the formation of small and medium enterprises
state and self-government authorities are required to support
consultations, training in entrepreneurship, loan guarantees, assistance to
companies and their products.
The decentralization of public finances enables a better use of social
capital during the production and distribution of state property. In contrast
to the trend towards the growing fiscalism of the state, connected
primarily with an increasing number of tasks in the public sector concerning
environmental protection, education, health care and communication,
which emerged as a result of unemployment, social distortion and
poverty, the problem stands out of the coordination of economic
efficiency and social justice. The development of a socio-legal
partnership is of great importance for the resolution of these issues. This
is only possible in societies which have accumulated the relevant
resources of social capital, enabling the fair sharing of benefits between
the partners of this cooperation.
Non-profit organizations can contribute to the development of social
capital and overcoming of problems connected with its depreciation.
Non-governmental organizations, such as cooperatives, mutual insurance
companies, public funds or foundations contribute to the development of
social capital because of their specific properties, such as:
• voluntary and open membership;
• democratic control by the members themselves;
• combination of interests of members and consumers;
• independence from state power and independent management;
• distribution of economic surplus to statutory individual and social
goals that are viewed as major, compared to objectives relating to capital.
The introduction of these organizations to cooperation with agents of the
public and business sectors contributes to the probability of distribution
processes, and thus, raises the level of public trust in the complete
transparency of public-private partnership contracts and, more specifically,
strict compliance with the law. The introduction of non-profit sector to the
production of state property and privatization of services can also result in
overcoming the barrier of the low level of trust in state power.
It should be noted that the development of non-governmental
organizations is the best form of civic education, because it extends
public participation in the process of economic decision-making related to
the struggle against poverty and social marginalization.
The huge role of non-governmental organizations on the labor market
illustrates the fact that in EU countries one third of the persons engaged in
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independent economic activity are comprised of those involved in the
third sector. Although the income of those involved in this sector was
lower than in the market or public sectors, but thanks to non-
governmental organizations this socio-professional group with over
10 million workers in the EU is well protected against marginalization on
the labor market. In Poland in the 1990s 1.2 % of employees working in
the national economy, excluding agriculture, were involved in the third
sector. According to J. Rifkin, the third sector provides the only practical
constructive solution of the problem of the surplus labor force, resulting
from the expansion of global capitalism and the development of markets
(Rifkin, 2001).
The above facts clearly show that during counteraction to the
depreciation of social capital as a result of the expansion of the rules of
global capitalism, policy and changes in the system of institutions that
promote the expansion of non-profit organizations have an important
place. It is no wonder that their quantity is one of the indices of the level
of social capital.
1.8. Paradoxes in the Development
of Human Capital and Economic Convergence
1.8.1. Introduction
The modern theory of economic growth shows strong evidence that long-
term growth of GDP per capita is the result of investment in practical
knowledge, or human capital, which makes it possible to improve the
quality of life, since it improves the level of skills and professional
experience of employees. In the neoclassical theory of economic growth,
knowledge is the source of new technologies. Innovations manifested in
new technologies, production methods and methods of its organization, and
new or improved products (Schumpeter, 1960), are the source for the
growth of high productivity, but on the exhaustion of opportunities for
increasing the cost of labor and physical capital, they are the only source of
economic growth (Solow, 1956). The development of the modern theory of
economic growth in the last thirty years has enabled the separation of the
impact of changes of knowledge on the growth of production.
According to the methodological paradigms of neoclassical economics,
the introduction of the «human capital» category means the interpretation
of its bearer — the person as a factor of production, in which investment
makes sense only if it will serve the increase of market values. This
understanding of the role of a human individual in the economic process
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explains investments in a person as a factor of capital creation, but only
provided that these investments are the source of additional marginal profit
for the enterprise and (or) personal benefit for the owner of this capital.
This means that only practical knowledge and skills that are the source of
health and vitality, bringing the values defined in market terms, comprise
human capital according to the economic growth theory (Domański,
1993 : 13). To accept human capital in such a way means to accept a person
as a «homo economicus», or a one-dimensional individual whose sole
function is to maximize personal gain in market interaction.
This individualized perspective on human life is criticized by
supporters of holism. However, in the holistic approach the question
arises: what is the mutual combination subject to the above-mentioned
function of the objective of investing in a person with his/her integrated
development that along with the economic sphere, includes the following
spheres: biological, consumption, technological, political, social,
knowledge and spiritual (Horx, 2002 : 45-51). In view of the holistic
perspective, it should be noted that the methodological non-adjustment of
social sciences, the didactic and educational process for the needs of
integrated development of the individual was and will continue to be the
fundamental and universal paradox of general investment of knowledge
in a person, which occurred during the process of the modernization of
Europe, which had already started in the first half of the 21st century, then
spread to the rest of the world. The harmonization of the development of
all spheres of human life should be recognized as the fundamental
purpose of investment in a person. The development of the economy,
based on knowledge (KBE) cannot be subject only to the criteria of the
performance growth of production factors. Its vocation lies in the
continuous improvement of the quality of life during long-term balanced
growth. Only when the economic system is directed towards the
integrated development of all spheres of human existence, can the
following be possible: the harmonization of economic efficiency and
justice through the development of human capital, the elimination of
unjust social inequalities and convergence in a broad sense of the word
with social and economic development.
The attempt to combine individualism and holism is traced in the
institutional decisions of the European Union, manifested as support of
markets by central strategic coordination, aimed at social and economic
unity, among other things, outside pressure on the development of human
capital. For post-socialist countries aspiring to work out the development
distance through fundamental issues, they only have to remove the
specific and universal paradoxes of human capital development, which
are the source of additional funds that do not generate a synergistic effect
on national product.
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1.8.2. Findings of the Theory of Endogenous Growth
Paul Romer (1986), explaining the technological progress as an
endogenous factor, made a pioneering contribution in the modern theory
of endogenous growth. This author sees the reasons for improving
technology in the growth of human capital skills through establishing a
more productive machine park or the replacement of obsolete facilities
and tools. These various technological innovations struck trouble with
their holistic interpretation in growth models. It was this problem that he
was able to solve. In the Romer model, the main driving force of
economic growth is the improvement of knowledge about how to convert
the cost of products or technological progress, which, in his opinion,
serves as the effect of planned actions of business entities that make
decisions based on economic incentives. The incentive for innovation
may also be the subject of targeted decision-making at the enterprise or
through other branches of power aimed at the regulation of economy.
Such a mechanism for the generation of innovation means that
technological progress is endogenous in nature, in contrast to the
neoclassical interpretation. Romer’s approach to the field of technology is
the same as for every other good. Technology and inventions are made,
based on labor and capital. The best places to study the process of
creating new technologies are various research laboratories. Making
inventions in them is a kind of production process. Researchers publish
their achievements in the form of numerous new patents. This
interpretation, however, is general and less formalized, although it does
transfer a certain image of the improvement of technologies.
Despite the global corporations located in them (which do not play a
significant role), developing countries generally do not have the
personnel, as well as the financially and technically supported research
laboratories responsible for creating inventions. Therefore, they are
destined to focus largely on facilitating the diffusion of innovations and,
potentially, on international endeavors in the field of scientific and
technical research.
P. Romer was also interested in the consequences of the spread of
technology. He notes that the innovations created in one scientific
research center can be used in the scientific work of other laboratories.
This is what is done, for example, in Japan. Sweden manufactured the
Hripen military aircraft, based on imported supersonic aircraft technology
and global company Nokia has been successful in Finland. This import of
technology allowed the introduction of new technologies in various
branches of the economy of these countries.
In EU countries, autonomous innovative processes are supported by
the priorities identified in the Lisbon Strategy and funded through budget
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grants of the Community. Within the National Regional Development
Strategy for Poland for 2007-2013 the «Innovation Economy»
Operational Program was proposed, for which a quota of more than EUR
7 bln was allocated.
However, the patenting of inventions means their exclusion from the
process of technological development. However, these exclusions do not
apply to employees of other laboratories. Hence, the characteristic feature
of technology used for the new production of technology is its
inseparability. This feature indicates that you cannot prohibit another
company from using some technology for a certain period of time. Thus,
the use of technological inventions can be general and continuous, in
which the nature of technology as a benefit will differ from other
economic goods. This is due to the following:
firstly, a characteristic feature of knowledge is the absence of
competition in its use. This means that the use of innovation by one entity
does not restrict other subjects’ access to it;
secondly, adherence to the patent rights of inventors will allow them
to gain profit from inventions, but partially restricts general access to
innovations. It is impossible to fully patent knowledge. The creation of
knowledge cannot be fully appropriated by inventors. Thus, the creation
of knowledge causes increasing benefits (so-called external effects). As a
result, the unrestricted growth of knowledge and limited capacity to
patent it, cause income growth according to the scale of production
technology.
All the resources of human capital and part of the capital accumulated
in the field of scientific and technical knowledge influences the level of
economic growth. As the stock of knowledge grows over time, and,
therefore, the overall level of skills should increase, the growth rate of
product per capita in the economy, according to Romer, must be clearly
accelerated. It should also be expected that countries with low relational
resources of human capital should have a relatively low GDP growth per
capita. According to these views, the main source of differentiation of
living standards between countries is a specific transition from knowledge
about technology to knowledge of technology, and as a result, we have a
difference in productivity. Hence, countries that are isolated from free
access to innovative knowledge are doomed to stagnation. This is why the
theory of endogenous growth assumes that the process of aligning the
level of GDP growth per capita could promote the spreading of new
knowledge or the increase of human capital in poorer countries.
The fundamental condition for the development of scientific and
technical knowledge, which are primarily accumulated in the new
technology, is the development of economic cooperation with those
countries, which are better equipped with human capital and new
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technology. Hence the need to develop markets and free trade, support the
inflow of foreign investment as well as scientific and technical
cooperation, including international cooperation. The best conditions for
the development of the latter are created by markets that are not limited
by tariff and administrative barriers, with state protectionist policies,
regulating the free exchange of goods, services, capital and labor. The
creation of better conditions for the development of human capital lies in
the basis of modern integration processes.
More specifically, the EU created good institutional prerequisites for
stimulating this process in underdeveloped countries. Regarding issues
related to development of human capital, it is expedient not to dwell on
only the strategic priorities of the development of human resources.
Removing the paradoxes that they carry in the EU is integrally linked with
the ways of granting state aid and regional policy, which clearly follow
from the objectives and ways to achieve them. These objectives are defined
in the laws of the Community beginning with the Treaty of Rome (1956),
the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty on the European Union and
finally up to the Reform Treaty.
However, the question arises of how an underdeveloped country can
discount benefit based on the inflow of innovative knowledge, since
relevant liberalization for the implementation of this inflow is necessary.
In practice, it leads to the outflow of the skilled labor force to developed
countries, thereby exposing the producers of human capital to spending
resources for its restoration and the high risk of its transfer abroad
without any compensation for the national economy. This paradox of the
development of human capital, which is universal and fundamental for
developing countries, is the result of the imperfection of goods markets.
Under conditions of the liberalization of the labor market, the
acceleration of convergence through the development of human capital in
isolation from the problems of the functioning of the labor market, will
cause the so-called cost effect in poor countries, but in developed
countries, it will lead to the income effect which is not burdened by
investment in education and formalized training. Resolving this paradox
is impossible, due to the state placing obstacles in the sphere of labor
force migration. This approach would mean the simultaneous creation of
barriers to practical training in an environment with a higher intellectual
capital and technical capital of work support. This would also lead to
relevant restrictive practices or even to those that in some cases, make it
impossible to diffuse new technologies and results in the R&D sphere. In
terms of the efficiency criteria of economic compensation for countries
— suppliers of human capital, they are not controversial and could be
resolved in accordance with the logic of markets functioning through the
introduction of standard procedures and those that required all countries
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to acquire such resource, the way quotas are bought in accordance with
the law on the emmission of pollutants or licenses.
It should be also emphasized that in practice there are usually various
barriers to the free flow of capital from rich to poor countries, which
bears a high investment risk. They are:
• macroeconomic and political instability;
• a poorly developed infrastructure;
• an undeveloped educational system;
• excessive fiscal policy;
• widespread corruption, failure to comply with laws, non-implementation
of agreements, weak protection of property rights;
• ethnic conflict against social inequalities.
The above-mentioned phenomena steer the effort of business entities
towards the capture of resources, gaining excess profits, which are not
derived from economic activity, and an increase in the general level of
knowledge.
The involvement of business entities in the creation of innovation
requires the functioning of institutions that: promote technological
innovation, accumulate knowledge, protect property rights, guarantee the
gaining of profit from innovations for inventors thus provide support of
the growth of technologies. Government policy should be directed
towards the support of high-level of scientific research activities through
private and public institutions.
Another universal paradox of human capital was identified by
G. Becker. In his opinion, in addition to the level of education, other
indicators of human capital are important for economic growth in society,
particularly: improving the level of health, increased life expectancy, the
reduction of infant mortality and increased benefits for children. Their
most important determinant is the birth rate, which is also evidence of the
size of the population. G. Becker draws attention to the exogenous nature
of this process. He notes that parents make a choice between the number
of children and their future level of education (Becker et al., 1990 : 145-
149). The correlation between these variables influences the fact that in
poor countries, the Malthus model of poverty remains relevant, because
poor countries respond to economic growth by increasing the number of
children in families. As a result, countries with high inequality and a high
birth rate are characterized by low economic growth, because the high
birth rate reduces the value of human capital (education expenses) (de la
Croix, Doepke, 2003). Thus, we can expect that an increase in the
population of children from the poorest strata will give rise to inequalities
resulting from the distribution of human capital that in future will bring
slower economic growth and not only prevent convergence, but could
also cause further distancing in development.
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Based on the above dependence between the birth rate, education,
social inequality and economic growth, there was a vicious circle of
poverty, which meant that high economic growth with low GDP per
capita leads to an increase in the birth rate, but a decrease in human
capital, which limits future economic growth, strengthens poverty.
Assuming that alternative funds, the number of children or the level of
social welfare, which are characteristic of a typical family model, will
also become inherent in the individuals formed under the influence of the
development of markets, a demographic crisis will be the inevitable
consequence, i.e. the product of the same mechanism referred to by
G. Becker. Its source is the gradual commercialization of all spheres of
human life.
Highly developed countries may, for a while, deal with the adverse
effects of a demographic crisis, one of which is «the pumping of brains»
as barriers to the movement of the labor force. Given the additional costs
allocated for the development of human capital and those related to
raising children, there is a paradox of the development of human capital,
consisting of making future productive effects connected to natural
growth in rich countries, although these types of costs for investment in
people are also allocated in poor and developing countries.
Since in the modern world growth is based on the human and
intellectual capital of the establishment of development distance, it is
complicated by the fact that rapid development requires a high propensity
for thrift and investing in people. However, investment in people is
always associated with social costs as expectations of increased
productivity resulting from these investments will only justify themselves
after an extended period, while productivity depends on many other
factors and conditions of the economic process. Sometimes knowledge is
only a cost, if due to certain circumstances, it does not actively participate
in the development of national productive resources (e.g. through the lack
of demand for upbringing, secondary and higher education for changes in
the economy, the mass emigration of a qualified labor force, imperfect
public infrastructure, inadequate quality of human capital to the
requirements of the economy, based on knowledge and international
competition). The effects of expensive new knowledge always dominate
for a short period, but their productivity is also possible for a long period.
Since poorer countries are characterized by low national savings, they
usually cannot use new knowledge for the acceleration of economic
growth. Meanwhile, as the experience of Japan shows, the development,
which enables rapid approximation, is connected with the extensive use
of both existing and new knowledge.
Since the labor potential of any national economy, especially its
quality, is proven by the scale of investment in people, human capital is,
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to some extent, a function of GDP per capita. Obviously, in poor
countries, the lack of national savings causes major problems in the
growth of investment in people. So, if human capital is the foundation of
sustained economic growth, its high dynamics is possible only when the
economy reaches certain critical parameters that determine the quality of
labor. This is because by increasing the productivity of resources, human
capital prevents tendencies to reduce marginal income from real capital,
and even bringing external benefits, can contribute to income growth
(Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988).
C. Azariadis and A. Drazen (1990) argue that in practice, external
benefits only arise when the stock of human capital is relevant to the high
level of income per capita. Thus, the lower the GDP per capita, the lower
the possibility of investing in human capital and vice versa. Economic
policy, based on rapid increase of investment in human capital (actually
pursned in socialis countries), in the absence of liberalization could not
cause economic modernization that would meet the needs of the global
market. On the other hand, liberalization requires meeting a number of
complex conditions, and although it promotes technological progress, it
also causes the outflow of human capital because of the migration of the
skilled labor force to countries with a higher level of economic
development.
1.8.3. Problems of Measuring Human Capital
A particular problem connected to the study of the role of human capital
and social development of the individual, the differentiation of welfare and
quality of life on microeconomic, local, national and supranational levels
lies in the difficulty of its measurement. The influence of human capital on
the above categories — though it raises no doubts — is quite difficult to
measure. The measurement of this category is complicated not only by the
heterogeneity of the subject areas of investment in a person and its
multidimensional interdisciplinary character. Human capital consists of
many elements, such as: general and specialized skills, accumulated
knowledge as a result of experience and professional practice, as well as the
psychological and physical characteristics of individuals (health and
vitality). Against the background of its complicated structure, there is a
problem of the relevant systematization of personal characteristics in the
framework of this economic category (Woźniak, Jabłoński, 2006).
Proposed by a new theory of economic growth, the quantitative
measurements of knowledge resources, such as: number of persons with
primary, secondary or higher education, R&D funding, health care, number
of new and recognized patents, structure of education, etc., do not take into
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account the main qualitative aspect of human capital, that is decisive and
has a much stronger effect on the chances and opportunities of individuals,
social groups and peoples of the world.
It should be emphasized that it is difficult to attribute objective
quantified values to a large group of its components (Czekaj,
Jabłoński, 2004), which suggests that they cannot be compared to
anything, and in some cases, they cannot be measured. The above
problems and the related inability to express some essential components
of human capital through market categories indicate that there is no
synthetic approach to measuring human capital.
There are also the problems of comparisons on an international scale,
associated with the lack of reliable statistics on investment in human
capital by households and the private sector, and, worse, there is no
information in this sphere over a long period of time. We propose an
original method of measuring the cost of creating human capital, which is
owned by a person from his/her birth until employment as well as
relevant productivity, which states that these funds could be the subject of
national accounts.
Whether productivity growth accordingly impacts the growth of
remuneration arising from investment of human capital in labor
productivity is also controversial. The lack of this mutual combination
observed in many countries proves the incapacity of market mechanisms
in the formation of effective relationships such as: investment in human
capital — economic growth — fair social inequality.
1.8.4. Paradoxes of the Quantitative and Structural Adaptation
of Human Capital in a Post-Socialist Economy
Universal and equal access to primary and secondary schools in the
modern world is not enough for the development of human capital and
the limitation of unequal opportunities for an individual. In post-socialist
countries, including Poland, even education at an academic level is no
guarantee of effective employment. It is limited by the need to restructure
products concentrated in declining industries. After a centrally-planned
economy we inherited:
• old products, not adapted to the requirements of open markets;
• formal education system, not connected with the requirements of a
market economy;
• impaired production apparatus based on a physically and morally
outdated technology;
• hypertrophied employment method connected with policy of full
employment pursued in the centralized planned economy.
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These factors were the source of transformation regress and the
rapidly growing high level of unemployment. In countries where it was
decided to accelerate the development of a market economy,
transformation regress was significantly shorter, but was usually replaced
by fast growing unemployment. However, in countries where the
development of a market economy occurred gradually, including in
Ukraine, transformation regress was continuous, although unemployment
remains largely hidden behind the doors of employment institutions. In
both cases, the development of a market economy had to cause the
temporary loss of human capital connected with unemployment and the
emigration of workers, or the non-adjustment of its quality to the
requirements of open markets. This price of transformation on the part of
human capital was however, inevitable. Without the development of a
market economy, the necessary qualitative changes of human capital
could not take place. According to D. North (1990) (actually it is his
subjective view of the world), a competitive system is created subject to
the effective use of human capital and the effective planning of its
development. Proof of this is the success of economic systems based on
the competitive system, the fall of the Soviet Union and great progress in
education. However, do not give up to the illusion that in countries that
struggle with the consequences of economic growth and decided to
transform the centrally-planned economy to a market system, the
conditions favorable to the adjustment of human capital and investment in
it according to the requirements of open markets, arise by themselves.
One of the main paradoxes of the development of human capital in
post-socialist countries, is the excessive quantitative development of the
resources of people with secondary and higher education with the
simultaneous non-adjustment of the structure and quality of these
resources to the needs of the market and public sectors. These paradoxes
result in the depreciation of human capital as compared with the excess of
a skilled labor force and the emergence of a new space for inequalities
caused by the unemployment of educated people, which leads to
frustration. The excessive quantitative development of human capital also
means extra costs for economic development, difficulties in ensuring the
harmonious development of those sectors of the economy, that are based
on knowledge and traditional sectors and problems in adapting
institutions to the requirements of global capitalism.
At the beginning of the process of the development of a market
economy, all post-Soviet countries were characterized by significantly
higher rates of energy, material, labor and property consumption than
highly developed capitalist countries. Experts estimated that in Poland,
the productivity of GDP was almost three times lower than its average in
the EU. Reducing differences in this field required not only access to
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modern technology, but also meant the need for the radical improvement
of the qualifications of professional personnel in the business sector and
public administration. This is evidenced by the fact that doubtlessly the
level of use of modern technology, management methods and innovation
is influenced by relevant resources, structure and quality of human and
social capital.
In the early period of transformation, it was believed that reforms in
the field of education can be delayed, because the problems of education
were, so to say, resolved satisfactorily under socialism. Unfortunately, the
realities were different. The inherited system of education management
did not meet the criteria of efficiency; there were no equal chances for all,
except for some formal measures, that would ensure such equality.
Education was aimed at highly specialized, ideological knowledge, it
blocked independent thinking and the reflexive modernization of social
capital focused on innovative positions. The product of this was human
capital that could not serve entrepreneurship and the strengthening of
economic efficiency.
The transition to a market economy, that began in 1989 and
democratization created a solid foundation for the implementation of civil
initiatives in higher education. In the 1990s, higher educational
establishments began to conduct independent management, though with
significantly reduced subsidies, as the transformation crisis took effect.
They also lost the support of industry. Consequently, in 1998 there was a
more than threefold drop in real subsidies for daytime students, and
taking full-time students into account, the fall was fourfold.
This problem was partially resolved as a result of the commercialization
of part-time education and the rapid development of private education
establishments. In 1998, about 80 % of students paid in full for their
education48. The significantly increased number of educational
establishments, due to the growing number of students along with
financial restraint, resulted in a sharp decline of interest in the profession
of a teacher of a higher educational establishment, who received such a
low salary, that he/she had to take up two or even three jobs, often outside
of high school. The quality of the educational process decreased
dramatically, as did the dynamics of academic papers and promotion in
an academic career. Only clear signs of the devaluation of the qualities of
the dynamically growing resources of human capital forced the
government to conduct the reform of education and higher education
since the end of 1999.
The reform of the school system in Poland is based on the
decentralization of education management. It has brought significant
                     
48 The causes of the crisis in higher education in Poland, see: Kołodziejczyk, 1998.
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changes in the funding of public school education, the creation of new
types of schools and their reorganization, introduced new principles for
the employment and remuneration of teachers. The introduction and
establishment of educational missions is the responsibility of local
government (for gminas — public pre-school establishments, primary
schools and grammar schools, for counties — primary schools and special
grammar schools, secondary schools that are higher than grammar
schools, teen-age educational centers, for provinces — schools and
education-training establishments of regional significance) .
The so-called teacher’s card (Dz.U. of 2006, No. 97, clause 674) was
introduced in the education system, regulating the promotion of a teacher
(from a trainee — in a year — a teacher working under contract on the
basis of an examination, in the next three years — a teacher, so named on
the basis of an examination and a certified teacher).
The positive results of educational reform were as follows: the
expansion of secondary and higher education, increased educational
aspirations of society, significant improvement of the infrastructure of
urban schools (computer rooms, gyms and swimming pools, subject
workshops).
As before, the accelerated development of human capital resources in
Poland is only the criterion of resources measurable by targets. According
to this criterion it is believed that the desired level of education is so,
when in 2010 as compared to 1990 there will be a five-time increase in
the number of university students, in relation to persons of educational
age. Therefore, the index of education coverage in high school should
grow to 65 % in 2010, as compared to 50 % in 2004 and 11 % in 1990.
The reform of the education system also contributes to the
marginalization of vocational training as a result of a reduced number of
graduates from secondary schools, who get their education in vocational
schools, to 20 % (from 52 % in the 2004/5 academic year). The
marginalization of vocational training will also be facilitated by the
expansion of the so-called generalist education or secondary education
without a professional bias, which should cover at least 80 % of grammar
school graduates (Strategia rozwoju szkolnictwa ..., 2003, p. 6).
The authors of the draft education, who since 1999 intended to open
the way to the transition from vocational training, specialized in the
education system, to continuous education through individualized areas of
vocational training and its reduction to several months. It remains an open
question whether firms in Poland will have access to skilled workers,
guaranteeing competitive professionalism with this four-year cycle of
vocational education, which is common everywhere in the EU and covers
from 40 % to 84 % of grammar school graduates (Kabaj, 2005 : 285).
GUS studies show that already in 2002, firms had trouble finding workers
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with basic vocational education (Kabaj, 2003 : 16). This problem became
more acute due to an improvement in the economic situation and the
liberalization of labor markets in the EU.
Joining the EU in 2004, with all urgency, raises the problem of the
inconsistency of the education system in Poland with the requirements of
open markets. Subsequent years show a growing shortage of skilled
workers trained at a basic level in many fields, particularly in
construction. There is also the problem of the emigration of technical
personnel, medical professionals and specialists from other professions.
It becomes apparent that narrow professional specialization inherited
from a centrally-planned economy was a great barrier to the active
adjustment of the labor market to rapid technological changes in an open
economy, because this adjustment is necessary under the influence of the
information and telecommunications revolution, competition, new
methods of management and changes of market conditions. However, the
adopted directions of reform in the education system ignore the realities
of the labor market in Poland and the EU experience. Politicians and
journalists often cite the success of the Irish economy as an example,
based on the knowledge and determination of development stages, but
they ignore the fact that the development itself of human and intellectual
capital was largely based on the development and improvement of
existing secondary vocational schools (Kukliński, 2003 : 17).
It should be remembered that the development of an economy, based
on knowledge, is an essential condition for improving the competitiveness of
Polish enterprises. One would have expected that it would be
accompanied by the extension of inequalities that are effective and
conductive for economic growth and the improvement of its productivity.
For this to happen, this process cannot be connected with the
simultaneous growth of inequalities in the form of stratification arising
from the expansion of poverty, being an outcast and marginalization due
to high unemployment as a result of the violation of appropriate
proportions for economic growth and the labor market between the
development of sectors with high and low labor intensity. It suggests the
need to observe the proportionality of structural changes in the economy,
in order to avoid negative consequences for the processes of development
due to the growth of irregularities in the form of frustration and the
strengthening of the syndrome of complete helplessness among families
living in lasting poverty and who are social outcasts.
In the economy, as in other sectors of human life, there are
proportions optimal for the social development of an individual. The
violation of these proportions leads to frustration, disappointment and the
creation of barriers for those active people, who are looking for ways to
solve their own problems. Forecasts, unaccounted for in the reform of the
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education system, regarding changes in demand on the labor markets may
lead to huge unemployment among graduates of higher education
establishments. In Poland, already in 2004, graduates of secondary and
higher schools comprised less than 10 % of employed people, while
graduates of vocational and technical schools comprised 90 % of the
workforce (Kabaj, 2005 : 272-273).
Clearly, when there is no opportunity to obtain employment that
meets the qualifications of graduates of higher schools or their execution
of similar work, when it becomes impossible to transform the acquired
knowledge into capital, a state of frustration emerges, unnecessary
personal and social losses appear, caused by expenditure on unproductive
education and consequently, the depreciation of human capital occurs.
There are also additional costs of these distortions in the form of the
encumbrance of business entities by social evidence in favor of the
unemployed and combating of unemployment.
Ignoring the realities of the labor market and the experience of
developed countries presents the achievements of the post-socialist
countries in the field of quantitative development of human and
intellectual capital in a completely different light. To restrain the growing
disproportion between supply and demand for the professions determined
by development trends and corresponding qualifications, it is necessary to
consider the experience of the most developed European countries. This
means the need to introduce a dual education system, which facilitates the
improvement of vocational training, because the following parties have
their own shares in it: the state authorities, enterprises and students. Such
a system preserves the natural mechanisms of education coordination and
labor market, the development of economic sectors based on knowledge
and traditional values, and adapts young people better for work that meets
the needs of business practice. It also enables the limitation of the risk of
frustration due to the depreciation of human capital and the risk of excess
funds.
Increased heterogeneity and accessibility of education and ways to
implement them may be a countermeasure to this destructive effect for
the development of human and intellectual capital. According to the
recommendations of the World Bank, the basis of education and training
system adapted to requirements arising from the expansion of a
knowledge-based economy is the heterogeneity of educational models
and the introduction of the complex of result-oriented elastic standards.
These models should guarantee public or private education, formal or
informal, in higher educational establishments or in the workplace,
remote, synchronous or according to a personally selected schedule. They
will also provide opportunities for students to apply and implement
educational needs at certain stages of life (Kukliński, 2003 : 22).
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1.8.5. Specific Paradoxes of Quality Adaptations
of Human Capital in Post-Socialist Countries
Another significant problem of imposed rapid development of education
at secondary and higher levels comprises the relevant consequences for
the quality of academic and lyceum education. The differences between
the individual schools are huge. Access to the best schools is mainly due
to the high material wealth of parents. Similar differences are observed on
the level of higher education. These differences cause significant
differentiation in the views of young people when choosing a professional
education.
An analysis of the academic process shows that students who come
from poor and rural families, often get a poorer education even in primary
and secondary schools. Since they are less prepared for effective higher
education, often they do not get it at all or study in such academic centers,
which have worse competitive position in the education market. The
lower qualification of this group of graduates, in turn, complicates their
access to the most attractive job offers and is the cause of unemployment,
so the graduates are forced to remain on their social level with less
resources of human capital, which does not keep pace with the changes
caused by the information and telecommunications revolution,
globalization and is slowed down in the development of civilization.
Other problems regarding the use of human capital resources are
connected with the impact of education on remuneration. Some scholars
state that the education obtained at home is much more important.
Accordingly, it raises the question of methods and criteria for the
allocation of resources for training and education. The calculation of
economic efficiency proves that education funding should be
differentiated according to the abilities detected in students, especially in
the domain of exact and technical sciences. Instead, social justice requires
subsidizing the weakest students to improve their future position on the
labor market to avoid deep social inequalities.
Measures that help to increase the optimal level of secondary and
higher schools include increasing the share of young people, who have
problems with obtaining secondary and general education or professional
and technical knowledge, and the enhancement of practical skills of the
young people obtaining a secondary and general education. These
phenomena are increasingly observed in the system of formal education.
It is also pointed out by the companies employing the graduates. The
reasons for this are undoubtedly complex. However, one of the most
significant sources of lower standards of education at the highest level is
a growing proportion of young people, who are not prepared to obtain a
secondary and general education.
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The transition to a market economy will not in itself resolve the
problems of the paradoxes of the qualitative development of human
capital. This transition only shows that knowledge is capital, because the
education system is capable of providing specific knowledge according to
market criteria. The question can be asked: does the transition to a market
economy lead to viable human capital in favor of integrated development
in all dimensions of human existence? We know that investment in
human capital under the laws of market economy undoubtedly means a
real threat to the dedication of social problems on the altar of the
economy (Toutaine, 1998). However, ignoring market signals also
threatens investment in knowledge, which in practice may be
incompetent.
Along with the development of competition and the spread of the
axiology of the market in post-socialist countries, the trend towards the
decline of solidarity and social responsibility for human capital are
intensified. Shock transition to a market economy caused frustration and
unreasonable expectations, based on self-responsibility and excitement
for own well-being, loss of the sense of economic security, the
appearance of deep social inequalities that are felt everywhere, spread of
moral relativism, lack of ready uniform and related decisions. All of this
became the reason that the main players in the arena of public life are
unable to come to terms regarding the key issues, not only those relating
to the functioning of spheres connected with the development of human
capital (education, healthcare, family policy). This complicates state
support of human capital development and the saturation of the process of
its creation by the elements of trust. It makes a negative impact on the
results of formal education and the efficient use of knowledge resources
in the process of cooperation.
Investing in human capital is a huge problem for the poorest families.
According to the data of the Central Statistical Office (GUS) of Poland, in
2004, 19.2 % of households were below the poverty line, giving them the
right to state social aid. 58.6 % of households were below the statutory
social minimum, and below the existence minimum — 12 %, i.e. 4.5
million of people (Dryl, 2005). It should be added that these poorest
families are usually large. At the same time, the pressure of public debt
inherited from the centrally-planned economy and chronic budget deficits
have become the causes of the deterioration of the financial conditions of
formal education and training, and in this regard, there was a chronic
underinvestment of education of citizens. A UNESCO survey indicates
that already at 4 % of GDP expenditure on education the so-called
«threshold of death of education» is observed. In 1997 in Poland,
expenditure on education amounted only to 3.5 % of GDP (Lewowicki,
1999 : 47). The huge educational boom in high school was the result of
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the development of private schools operated on a commercial basis, but it
had adverse effect on the quality of education.
Apparently, many other post-socialist countries face similar problems.
The collision of this state of human capital with the information and
telecommunications revolution, liberalization and related processes of
setting standards proposed by global capitalism, caused the destruction of
education models, the devaluation of the traditional ideals of education
and the foundations of social life. Knowledge and skills formed for the
needs of the economy of an authoritarian bureaucratic state, were not
adapted to the conditions of radical transition to capitalism, the political
market and the technological requirements of the information and
telecommunications revolution. This world is a fertile ground for the
development and strengthening of distortions.
The threat of budget deficit balancing on the threshold of 5 % of GDP
specified by the Maastricht convergence criteria, which existed at the
beginning of market reforms, made the radical change of material
resources in the sectors responsible for development of human capital
(education, higher education, healthcare, the field of interdisciplinary
studies and R&D) impossible. At the same time, extremely modest public
financial resources were distributed according to directions, most of them
were usually allocated for the revitalization of own research and statutory
activities, but this distribution was largely made using primitive methods.
Thus organized process of research did not give grounds for establishing
the professional diagnoses, necessary for intellectual, technically adapted
to the requirements of the economy, based on knowledge and
modernization.
1.8.6. What are the Results
of the European Human Capital Development Program?
In a liberal system, the decentralization of responsibility for
educational decisions and shifting responsibility for the development of
human capital from the state to local authorities is impracticable. The
state must find appropriate means for indirect influence on the subjects of
the education system, that are responsible for resources, structure and the
quality of human capital.
If we assume that the strategies of enterprises are based on such
human capital that increases the efficiency of labor, a reasonable
employer will count on the qualifications of employees, who will meet
the chosen company strategy. He will support the policy that ensures a
return of investments in employee training. It will result in a better
adaptation of the structure of human capital to supply and demand.
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We should also emphasize the positive role of the institution of
competition on the education market between the private and public
sectors, to the same extent in the provision of educational services and
funding, e.g. by so-called school coupons. The need for this competition
is substantiated by the fact that education is not a purely public good, but
some economists point to conditions that promote effective competition,
but do not work in education (the asymmetry of information that is of no
good to the undereducated and poor families, institutional barriers in the
case of the free transfer of students to other schools, the significant
influence of indices of low trust, lack of altruism in a liberalized
institutional order). Hence the need emerges for the establishment of
centralized standards in the quality of education.
The introduction of coupons as a tuition fee would mean, as pointed
out by opponents of the liberalization of the educational sector, the
growth of income inequalities and pumping of resources from public
schools. In turn, the introduction of regulatory factors should prevent
differentiation in the quality of educational services; it would also mean
increased costs of transaction measures against discrimination and for
compliance with rules.
To increase efficiency, subsidies in the public sector of education, the
following is proposed: to transfer school management functions to
specialized companies or individual managers, to establish public schools, to
reward teachers according to their actual educational achievements. These
initiatives improving the quality and structure of human capital are closely
connected with the possibility of working out and introducing exact
evaluation criteria by accurate measuring methods of the results of education.
In response to the new challenges of globalization, the development of
information and communication technologies, the states-parties to Lisbon
Strategy 2000 adopted a joint resolution on the implementation of a
strategic objective, which was to create the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge economy based on instruments that are able to
balance economic growth and the economy with more decent jobs and an
economy that is more socially homogeneous (Biała księga ..., 2004). In
2010, this strategy ensured the implementation of the above objective
through priorities, more or less closely connected with the development
of human capital, namely:• the creation of an information society;• investment in human capital due to increased expenditure on R&D
to 3 % of GDP in 2010;• formation of a European research and innovation area for the
coordination, updating and dissemination of research results between EU
Member States, and the prevention of the duplication of expenditure for
the similar research projects as well as counteraction to the «brain drain»;
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• stimulation of entrepreneurship and the creation of conditions for
the development of innovative companies, particularly with regard to
small and medium enterprises;• the development of an active employment policy to achieve a 70 %
level of employment;• increasing the mobility of employees through the open European
labor market;• increasing expenditure for education as a result of the systematic
increase of revenues from private sources;• increase of the proportion of young people, who finish their
education at the age of 22 or older, up to 85 %;• increase in the proportion of adults participating in further
education to 12.5 %.
However, tasks in the field of the development of human capital that
were put before EU states and defined in the Lisbon Strategy at the time
of its revision in 2004 were only half implemented at best (Szomburg,
2004). Coordination aimed at social activation and reforms in all key
sectors, was not applicable in EU countries. However, a new approach to
education as an important key element, long-term and balanced economic
growth, competitiveness, combating social marginalization and the
elimination of regional disparities seems to be a question for the future,
impossible for implementation in 2010.
This is also illustrated by the following facts relating to the entire EU
space: the share of public expenditure in GDP for education change little,
the share of R&D is about 2 % of GDP, the share of people with higher
education in the population of a productive age barely reaches 21 %, the
international mobility for all professions is estimated at 1.2 %, and in the
academic environment this figure does not exceed 2 %.
New views on the development of human capital are presented in the
revised Lisbon Strategy of 2004. The following practical steps were
planned in the field of human capital development:
• establishment of the European Research Council, an institution that
coordinates the activities of EU Member States in conducting major
research, co-funded by the EU;
• making a decision on the future of the European patent;
• pursuing a policy to attract researchers from outside the EU;
• work on the national strategies of continuous education;
• progress in reforming the labor market.
The education system is of particular importance for the transition to a
globalized information society. The main purpose of modern education is
the education of communicative, well-informed citizens, who learn and
create in ever — growing public access to information and
communication technology. Thus, the priority for Poland is the expansion
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of teleinformation services and skills in the use of teleinformation and
obtaining information.
Increased Internet access, particularly broadband, and the creation of
systemic incentives for investment in ICT is planned. Actions aimed at
development are of particular importance for potential economic growth
and the creation of new services: electronic business (e-business),
electronic administration (e-government), distance learning (e-learning)
and electronic health services (e-health).
The science sector in Poland requires a consistent increase of costs
that will improve its competitiveness. On the one hand, it is necessary
to develop a research base and scientific personnel, and on the other
— manage existing resources for research in priority development
areas of the country. It is also necessary to increase the role of
research in the field of economic development, including through
increased cooperation with entrepreneurs, business-related institutions,
individual scientists, as well as through participation in the initiatives
of European research area.
The key requirement is the more extensive use of the results of the
R&D sphere by business entities, since this is what will ensure an
increase in the transfer of modern technology, production and
organizational developments. Regions, where individual scientists reside,
who are capable of generating new knowledge and technologies and an
economic basis for the commercial use of such knowledge, have the
greatest potential. Foundations are laid for the creation of clear
cooperation mechanisms with scientific-research representative offices
and subjects of social and economic life. To improve the technological
level of the economy, incubators and technological parks will be
developed, as well as centers for advanced technologies in large research
centers (Strategia rozwoju kraju ..., 2006 : 28-30).
Financial, infrastructural and material guarantees of the process for
investing in human capital in post-socialist countries differs from the EU
in all respects by a significant difference in development, and still more
from the USA, which is the world leader in knowledge-based economic
development. In view of such a state of the educational base in the post-
socialist countries, significant quantitative progress in the field of the
development of education cannot be fully capable of providing relevant
functional knowledge, since this human capital is not used in full. For
decades, the development of human resources in the field of relevant
functional knowledge was held back, which led to a situation, whereby
post-socialist countries are now in a situation of the simultaneous
implementation of three modernization strategies in this field:
evolutionary, technocratic and reflexive (Beck, Giddens, Lash, 1994).
Without the first of them, which is based on spreading faith in science,
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technical progress, overall education, scientific and professional
specialization, it is impossible to remedy the situation in rural areas and in
marginalized environments. Technocratic modernization should be
accelerated, which lies in the application of exact sciences, the
replacement of routine work by computer systems, the introduction of a
scientific model of labor productivity in all sectors, including non-
economic, the development of media and communication. However, this
requires qualitative changes in the education process, because they are the
ones that must ensure the compliance of formal education at all levels
with the systems of specific knowledge in households, small and
medium-sized firms and in the self-government and government sectors.
There is also the problem of insufficient personnel training in conducting
modernization. This situation should be corrected by taking on board the
experience of countries with developed market economies. EU
membership requires the setting of educational standards, consistent with
the recommendations of the Lisbon Strategy in matters relating to human
capital development. The implementation of these standards will be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, if the state does not cease to treat
education and science mainly as a field of costs to be got rid of via a
systematic increase in the share of resources for such purposes from the
private sector.
Continuous advanced training during continuous learning is also a big
problem, but effective fiscal stimuli should be introduced here. For
example, in Poland on the eve of its accession to the EU, only a small
percentage of employees (14.5 %) underwent retraining. These were
mostly young people with a higher education (Sztanderska, 2004 : 201).
Joining the EU and the rapid inflow of foreign capital to Poland caused
growing interest in continuous learning.
However, for economic development to be able to serve
harmonization in the development of all spheres of human life, the new
reflexive modernization of human capital is required. Its introduction
requires a new type of organization as a form of the universalization of
education, a new type of person capable of critical and creative thinking,
ready not only to compete, but also to cooperate. This is impossible
without public awareness of the need to adapt the development of human
capital to the requirements of a knowledge-based economy and the
development of an information society. The existence of markets and a
democratic political system is essential, but not sufficient for the effective
use of human capital to achieve the multi-dimensional development of
society and the individual. Along with the spread of specific knowledge,
it is necessary to take efforts to develop the system of values, connected
not only with competitive order, but also with a just state, which respects
the dignity of the individual and is able to combine economic efficiency
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with fair social inequalities. Examples of the development proposed in the
framework of EU legislation and the revised Lisbon Strategy, were
focused on the reflexive modernization. However, the question arises
about the instruments for their implementation, which will allow to
avoide the coutry-specific paradoxes of human capital development. To
date, there is no comprehensive diagnosis of the structure and quality of
human and social capital, without which it is impossible to count on
effective instruments for reaching an objective in this sphere. EU Member
States can jointly finance these developments according to structural
programs focused on the development of human capital. Poland has a
quota that exceeds EUR 8.1 bln for the development of human capital in
2007-2013.
The fundamental importance of human capital as an indicator of
economic growth, the expansion of the possibility of choice and
individual development, innovation, growth of the productivity and
competitiveness of enterprises, development of the knowledge-based
economy, restriction of social and economic inequalities show that its
development cannot be confined to market mechanisms. The state
can support development of some components of this capital49 with
the aid of:
1) investments, that will increase the quality of human abilities related
to education, upbringing, health care, migration, access to information on
the status of companies and professional perspectives in research
(improvement of the quality of human capital and the prevention of its
devaluation);
2) aid during investment in information and telecommunications
technologies (for the creation of relational capital);
3) institutional reforms that will facilitate the increased productivity of
labor and social capital;
4) funding of research and education programs to create innovation
capital;
5) the establishment and support of cooperation programs that will
replenish relational capital.
The establishment of an effective development strategy for human and
intellectual capital, which tends to rapidly reduce the difference in
development distance, requires the definition of issues on raising money,
sources for the devaluation of its huge accumulated potential, especially
in the last fifteen years, and the identification of problems resulting from
paradoxes of its development.
                     
49 This means human capital and organizational capital consisting of the capital of
intellectual property, infrastructure, procedural, innovative, as well as social and relational
capital. See: Bal-Woźniak, 2005, p. 15—18.
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There are two ways in which the development of human and
intellectual capital is being carried out in Poland:
• through conscious improvement by planning the system of education,
upbringing, healthcare, recreation and aid in the development of culture;
• through the approval of independent decisions by the participants of
social and economic processes under the influence of external factors
arising from the market and the social environment, in which these
individuals reside.
Both these ways are influenced by traditional actions that are specific
for Polish society, aimed at the achievement of an objective, regardless of
the invested funds.
This type of action is contrary to the requirements of a capitalist
economy, particularly its modern form — global capitalism. Its product is
the ruthless removal of all forms of the protection of national markets and
the expansion of local markets open to asymmetric competition of
multinational corporations. The process of transition to a market economy
that had lasted almost the life of one generation, brought a sharp increase
in resources of graduates of higher schools. However, this process did not
take place simultaneously with the transformation of criteria related to
quality and the structure of human and intellectual capital. The
membership of Poland in the EU opens a new stage in the development of
human capital, connected with the transformation of its quality and
structure.
In order to realize the creative possibilities of human capital, the
knowledge, skills and motivation invested in a person should be included
in the economic process, similar to other types of capital. If this does not
happen, this type of investment in a person will perform only an
expenditure function in the manufacturing process. Only education and
upbringing, which increase the productive capabilities of the individual
become human capital. Instead, knowledge and skills that increase the
possibility of collective action are transformed into intellectual capital.
For the full use of the productive capabilities of human and intellectual
capital it is necessary to unite them with social capital or the specific
kinds of knowledge and skills that will generate trust, ability to co-
operation and collaboration.
Human capital cannot be regarded merely as an instrument of
economic growth or development. Investing in people would lead to
objectification of the subject of a business process. The development of
human capital should be recognized as a permanent part of individual
and social objectives that occurs directly through the extension of
individual choice, and indirectly, through the extension of the selection
of those, who as a result will benefit from this more reasonable impact
of individuals on institutional and social change, or by uniting human
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capital with social capital and its oversaturation. Only such an approach
towards human capital can fully describe its implications for
convergence with regard to economic growth and the development of
all spheres of human life.
Thus, the understandable functions of human capital generate
problems in education, upbringing, healthcare and other manifestations of
social and individual life. This means that its functions should be
involved in developing skills for action in people, the extension of
possibilities to act so that people can live according to their own values.
The implementation of the functions of education, upbringing and
healthcare cannot divert attention from the unfeasible conservation of
values, which in European civilization is connected with responsibility
for own well-being, moral identification, with the axiological problems of
education (including the economic one), and through its mediation, with
the social responsibility of business, state and self-governing institutions
for the development of human capital.
CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION
OF POLAND’S ECONOMIC MODEL
2.1. The goal and means for a transformation of the economic system
2.1.1. Substance and elements of the transformation
of an economic system
The transformation of an economic system encompasses all changes in
the regulation of the national economy, coupled with the transition to a
new economic system. Recent examples of such transformations are the
changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe, having shifted from
state-run to market economies.
The transition to market economies in these countries should have
been preceded by deregulation resulting in the liquidation of regulatory
and enforcement institutions that dictate the volume, structure, and
technology of production and its distribution. To this end, industry-
oriented ministries and their distribution functions, the central
macroeconomic planning institution, centralized and sector-based ties of
economic organizations should be eliminated. They should instead be
commercialized, privatized, and deregulated, leading to a restructuring of
products and production administration in-line with open market
requirements; those unable to adjust are doomed to liquidation or
bankruptcy. These changes free the space needed to develop horizontal
ties and to establish the relevant institutions for a market economy. The
legal framework adjusts itself to the market economy, new ministries
emerge, and new laws are passed that shape the «constitutional» features
of a market economy. As a result, capital markets, labor markets, a state
treasury, and funds are able to emerge and local bodies of public
economic administration become self-sustainable.
The state’s role in a transition to a market economy cannot be limited
solely to deregulation. Being satisfied with deregulation means delaying
the period of efficient markets formation due to the inertia of economic
agents and state-owned monopolies’ control over the market. To
minimize public spending earmarked for the transformation, the state
must undertake actions that would facilitate and ease the development of
efficient markets. These actions must be comprehensive. The
comprehensive nature of the changes requires the implementation of
initiatives like stabilization, limited macroeconomic control over the
economy, pricing and market reforms, institutional reforms (including
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central bodies of economic administration, the reorganization and
privatization of enterprises, de-monopolization, public sector and welfare
reform, a reorganization of the tax system, a return to true local self-
administration) and a reform of financial markets (Fischer, Gelb, 1991).
The main substance of transformational processes initiated and managed
by the state in all previously mentioned areas comes to deregulation,
deflation, de-monopolization, privatization and microeconomic
restructuring of an economy’s production potential. All of the above
mentioned tasks are implemented on the basis of the reorganized system
of economic institutions.
The transition from a state-run economy to a market economy began
in Poland after the agreements reached during the «round table» and the
subsequent partially democratic elections in June 1989. Poland’s re-
attained ability to set its own economic system also helped accelerate the
political disintegration process in other European socialist countries from
the autumn of 1989 onwards. However, the very transformation of the
economic systems in these countries, except for the territories of the
former GDR, Hungary, and Poland, lagged to some extent.
A transformation based in a transition to a market economy is a
process substantively different from economic reform. Economic reform
is related to the change of modes of a given economic system. Unlike a
transformation, economic reform does not change the logic of the
economic system. It is limited only to changing the method and/or area of
self-regulation and administration. In the case of a state-run system,
changes in regulatory processes led to an expansion of the scope of
economic instruments imposed by the state, namely: prices, interest rates,
exchange rates, and taxes. Regulation is also exercised through
administrative control via orders, bans, limits, and concessions or vice
versa. However, in the case of dual systems formed around the market
with centralized strategic coordination, reform is the process of increasing
or decreasing the scope of state intervention in the economy.
The transformation of an economic system is connected with the
death, elimination or decay of existing institutional structures and the
emergence of new ones. Society and certain economic agents should
benefit in various ways. Nevertheless, the final result is the improved
efficiency in managing production resources. The entire transformation of
an economic system should be organized to optimize the balance of costs
and gains. The search for a path of minimal costs and/or maximum gains
requires answers to many questions. Below we outline the most important
of them.
1. Which one of the existing or theoretical examples of market
economy should be the target of the transformation?
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2. What are the possible ways for a transition to the selected model?
3. Which of the possible ways of transition to the desired market
model would require fewer sacrifices while guaranteeing a realization of
the goals of the transformation?
4. Which package of initiatives should be triggered and implemented
by the state, in what sequence should these initiatives be implemented,
and what pace is needed for their implementation to overcome the
inertia of the old system and minimize the costs and risks of such
initiatives?
2.1.2. The goals of an economic system transformation
A transformation based on a transition to a market economy is aimed at
establishing a stable and clear coordinating mechanism designed to
ensure macroeconomic stabilization, microeconomic efficiency, and
economic restructuring and growth that would meet the needs of a given
country’s society. A review of the readiness and weaknesses of certain
economic systems shows that the desired solution is the proven free-
market capitalist economic model.
One should not pay attention to the proposed so-called «third way»,
meaning a market dominated by non-private ownership and elements of
egalitarianism in the sphere of distribution. The shortcomings of this
concept have been proven not just by economic research, but also seen in
the experiences of certain systemic reforms in Central and Eastern
Europe. Serious theoretical arguments against these concepts are set
forward pointing out the inability of efficient markets functioning, mostly
for capital and labor markets. (Dąbrowski, 1986: 109—115). Although
the Chinese experience disproves this thesis, we must say that at the time
of reforms in the 1970s China was a country with a social capital of a
different cultural set (Kowalik, 2006), with an incomparably lower level
of economic development than European socialist countries. The
historical experience of free-market capitalist economies demonstrates
that depending on cultural specifics, political traditions, the level of the
civilization’s development, and the external economic environment, there
are functioning market models that differ in the degree of state
intervention, the role of the public sector, the scope of guardianship and
the state’s social functions, as well as the level of commercialization in
the public sector.
Practice and historical experience have created market economies
with minimal government regulatory functions (e.g., the USA) and very
powerful regulatory functions (India and certain «developing countrics»).
According to dominant trends in the modern economy, starting from the
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‘90s economies have clearly tended towards deregulation and decreasing
influence of the state on relevant spheres of economic intervention.
However, as before, there are capitalist countries in which the non-private
sector holds a significant though not dominant share (Israel, Finland,
Austria, Latin American countries) and in which the public sector’s share
is limited or insignificant (the USA, the UK, most developed capitalist
countries). Finally, there are also market economies with insignificant
guardian functions of the state in the social sphere, like South Korea and
other nations in Southeast Asia. There are also market economies that
have succeeded in implementing or are implementing the concepts of
social market economy with well-developed guardian functions of the
state (Norway, Israel), and countries belonging to various European
communities where centralized strategic coordination is used within the
market economy to achieve social and economic unity.
The choice of a specific type of capitalism is influenced by
theoretical polemics, as well as by the social and economic realities of a
given country. Problems that emerge during the transition to a market
economy can affect the modification in the area of economic
intervention and the state’s guardianship functions, irrespective of the
idea and theoretical disputes on the matter. In Poland, the first non-
communist government suggested a liberal capitalist state model, whose
features are as follows:
• The prevalence of various types of private businesses;
• The existence of competition;
• External economic openness;
• A strong convertible domestic currency;
• The state does not influence businesses through bureaucratic
regulation, yet ensures a stable framework for their activities. At the same
time, the state is resistant to pressure by various interest groups and trade
unions (Balcerowicz, 1992: 139).
According to the authors, the targeted economic model perceived in
this manner should have been realized through:
♦ A rapid introduction of complete market mechanisms;
♦ A dramatic reduction of the state’s role in the economy;
♦ The privatization within several years of most state-owned
enterprises;
♦ The commercialization of public services;
♦ The introduction of free external trade and a rapid integration for
Poland into the European Economic Community (EEC).
The aspirations of the architects of the transition to a market economy
and integration with the then EEC architects resulted in a search for
examples of economic law and order among the members of this group.
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2.1.3. Mistakes made during the transition to a market economy
Empirical evidence shows that cognitive, informational, and axiological
limitations play a significant role in the implementation of large-scale
reforms. Knowledge of the consequences that are foreseen by the theory
of regulatory mechanisms in the economy can never be exhaustive given
the significant complications, changes of factors in time, and the probable
emergence of new social phenomena. The transformation of an economic
system usually includes a high variability of the main reasons for real
processes and their relationships. Meanwhile, the probability and
correctness of forecasts is conditional at least on the relative stability of
proportions and the factors determining them.
Erroneous forecasts related to a transition to a market economy also
emerged due to the inadequacy of theoretical market models in respect of
specific social, political, and economic factors in post-socialist economies
and a given country. In Poland’s case, an additional problem arose: there
were no prior examples of the selection of a transformation model. However,
there were already examples of certain transformational initiatives that
argued for price deregulation, the elimination of regulatory activities and
distribution, the avoidance of deficit or inflation, the liberalization of foreign
commercial policy in financial markets, or even privatization, at least in the
postwar experiences of some countries. However, those experiences were
generally on a much smaller scale and in a different historical context, i.e. in
an already existing market environment and with far lower levels of control.
The experience in implementing some elements of the transformational
process provided incomplete knowledge about the ways and consequences
of implementing certain reforms in a market environment. At the same
time, the consequences of recently introduced market mechanisms could
be at most a matter for deduction and largely a departure from fact. This
kind of forecasting drama implied that various simulations based on
quantitative analytical methods limited one to a world of competing
hypotheses, each of which could mistakenly have been taken seriously.
Even if an economic theory provided unambiguous arguments in favor of
the ways to realize a permissible area of state economic intervention and its
social functions in society, one should still bear in mind that scientific
argumentation cannot be a sufficient prerequisite for the behavior of all
economic agents that operate mostly with idiosyncratic knowledge and social
capital that do not meet competitive environment requirements.
If one looks at market mechanisms in terms of their conditionality
during a post-socialist economic transformation, it should be noted that
the market in reality is actually the sum of possibilities for increasing
individual and collective benefits, which differs from a centralized state-
run economy with a paternalistic state and the sum of subjects with
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various inclinations as to the use of market opportunities. In this context,
we can easily see a qualitatively different structure of market
opportunities in peripheral capitalist countries, or in the conditions of the
newly established market as compared with regions being the business
centers with many years of experience in using such opportunities.
In 1989, Polish society functioned in the framework of an embryonic
development of market institutions, a significant and increasing de-
capitalization of national property, large foreign debt, a destroyed belief
in joy from labor, and populist sentiment in society and regarding the
budget, overburdened with deficit. In these conditions, it was impossible
to count on mass market profit-making opportunities and the ability of
economic agents to realize existing opportunities. These and other
circumstances became the reasons for motivational dilemmas that
complicated and even made rational choice, as well as business success in
rapidly developing entrepreneurship, impossible among business entities.
Nevertheless, the previously mentioned limitations could not be the
reason for the cessation of the implementation of the program on the
establishment of efficient markets. Save for temporary sacrifices, the
market economic order is the only tested way of ensuring consistent
growth in efficient resource use. However, a side effect of the new
competition and liberalization may be the growth of disproportions in
distribution. From this perspective, some economists believe that the state
must take upon itself the most important social functions: from creating
the conditions for equal opportunities for all citizens to the
implementation of social justice, using methods that will not affect
efficient market mechanisms. According to these critics, in terms of other
mistakes that could emerge during the transition to a market economy, a
state’s intervention policy should be aimed, first and foremost, at
achieving market balance, stabilizing prices, reducing disproportions in
regional development, fighting unemployment, supporting the
development of strategic industries (farming, power production),
promoting exports, and other actions to ensure stable economic
development. In that way, the advocates of acceptable state intervention
referred to the widespread idea of a social market economy (SME).
Although the SME idea was put forth in a speech by T. Mazowiecki,
the prime minister of the first non-communist government, and
subsequently included into the new Constitution of Poland (1997)1, the
start to the reforms followed a path laid out by the Washington Consensus
and its shock recommendations (Castels, 1996).
                     
1 Article 20, Constitution of Poland, confirms: «Social market economy based on
freedom of economic activities, private property and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation
among social partners, is a backbone of the economic order of Republic of Poland.»
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2.1.4. Shortcomings of a gradual transformation
A dose of reforms that contained certain elements of market transition had
already partially taken place in Poland in the 1980s. However, this
experience could not be the basis for a change of the economic system,
although it pointed out the chaos of a slow reform process. It was becoming
clear that the entire process right up to the formation of a complete market
mechanism had to be prolonged. This was a process of migration from
administrative control to administration through economic regulators and a
gradual elimination of external regulation in favor of self-regulation, even
in the environment of dominant non-private ownership and hefty subsidies
of state-owned enterprises. This gradual process of self-regulation took
place in the ‘80s alongside the functioning of the old system with inherent
contradictory internal mechanisms that had no self-regulatory capacity. The
acceleration of reforms in 1988—1989 brought to light the weaknesses of
the gradual, controlled process of market transition. The concerns on the
part of the proponents of a comprehensive economic market transition in
Poland — that the interpenetration of the inorganic elements of different
economic systems leads to a buildup of weaknesses and at the same time a
loss of the advantages of these systems — were confirmed. This occurs
because over the entire period of gradual change, succeeding administrative
instruments die off, while the gradual dismantling of control does not imply
the presence of efficient markets. It is known that the market can function
efficiently if we deal with a market filled with mechanisms, institutions,
and instruments.
Gradual changes lead to the formation of a regulatory system temporarily
deployed between a planned and a market economy, although without an
efficient plan and efficient markets. This economic state is called the system
vacuum. For the sake of explanation, it is worth noting that the elements of
the system vacuum emerged as a result of the actual transformation as well as
the shock process. The same occurred in Poland at the start of the 90s when
there was insufficient time to introduce many significant institutional
changes, while the regulatory mechanisms that had existed were not
functioning. Specifically, this had to do with the financial markets.
Even in an extreme shock scenario of transformation it is impossible
to avoid certain elements of the system vacuum due to the changes’
independent processes, the inertia of the positions of the economic
participants, and the limited competence of  the bodies that control the
transformational path.
The phenomenon of the system vacuum makes it impossible to
eliminate the original reasons of crisis phenomena syndrome inherent to
administration (a growing deficit, inefficient management, growth in
consumer prices, a declining curve of economic growth and living
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standards). The inertia of economic agents’ existing behavioral patterns
also makes it impossible. The pattern of this behavior manifests itself in
the waiting game, populist demands to change self-financing regimes and
the neglect by most economic agents of their active stances in the hope
for forced concessions on the part of the government and a return to
paternalistic practices under the influence of crisis phenomena2. The
increased weakening of administrative control mechanisms, institutional
incompleteness, and certain cultural and infrastructural conditions of
efficient markets functioning results in inefficient non-market
preconditions, a lack of innovation, boundless aspirations for
monopolization, unbalanced demand, and inflation. Although a partial
lowering of the deficit is possible here, it would be replaced by inflation.
The limited regulation and increasing, but incomplete as previously,
independence will not lead to economic balance, sustainable economic
growth, and microeconomic efficiency. It is not out of the question that
the choice of gradual systemic changes would have proven a «Sisyphean
Task». A lack of effect from the current reforms would expose the entire
process to the risk of a return to the earlier tested combinations of control
and market and the contradictory functioning of both forms of regulation.
A gradual transition also requires the adoption of various alternative
regulatory solutions for the transitional period, taking into account the large
number of weaknesses of state-controlled regulators, and the incomplete
functioning on the part of market mechanisms. These hybrid solutions
complicate the behavioral logic of economic agents. The unpredictable side
effects from mixing administrative instruments, economic regulators, and
market parameters result in the need for additional actions. In turn, this
implies more time needed for the transitional period.
A telling illustration of the futility of palliative solutions is the various
versions of excess wage taxes, charges on foreign currency, and regulated
prices in Poland. These and other examples show that until the regulatory
sphere is dominated by instruments and solutions typical for control, there must
be a process for the adaptation of newly introduced instruments and institutions
that cause a decline in the competence of market parameters. Finally, the
gradual process of market transition brings to life the effect of virtual changes.
2.1.5. Reasons for choosing the shock concept of systematic change
To avoid any negative consequences from an accelerating market
transition and to reduce the waiting time for the appearance of positive
effects from the transformation, the architects of the Polish transition
recognized the need for a powerful impact at the start of the process.
                     
2 This process in more details described in: Wozniak, 1998.
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They suggested comprehensive changes of regulatory mechanisms, based
in competitive order logic. The comprehensive nature of the changes was
aimed at making a return to centralized bureaucratic coordination using
administrative regulators impossible, and to clear the way for a
simultaneous formation of all markets.
The shock therapy concept called «Big Bang» was initiated by
International Monetary Fund (IMF) experts. These methods for economic
transition were recognized as the only right way and were being
implemented in most post-socialist countries. According to the IMF
recommendations, the shock therapy experiment was initially carried out
in Poland under the scenario described in the governmental program on
stabilization and system transformation, i.e. the so-called Balcerowicz
program.
The sphere of system changes related to a shock transformation
actually depends on the development of past reforms with a centralized
bureaucratic coordination, the level of shock changes perceived by certain
elements of the transformational process, the scale of accumulated social
and economic problems originating from imperfect past economic
mechanisms, errors in economic policy, and society’s perception of
inevitable sacrifices during capital accumulation and losses as a result of
shock changes.
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia had favorable
conditions for the implementation of shock therapy. In Hungary and
Poland a rather broad sphere of horizontal connections existed due to
years of reforms. Some market institutions and even a small private sector
involved in small-scale commodity production were already functioning.
Many-year experiments on reforming centralized planning and the lack of
anticipated effects led to a decline in the attractiveness of the so-called
«third way». Poland, like Hungary and Czechoslovakia, had the prewar
traditions of the market and parliamentary democracy, as well as well-
developed relations with global markets. Therefore, once political
obstacles for a societal transformation disappeared, the intellectual elite
and politicians in these countries were ready to undertake decisive and
rapid actions to establish market economies. In practice, this primarily
meant carrying out dramatic and swift anti-inflation operations,
deregulation, and initiating a fundamental transformation of institutional
structures, which were to open the way for an accelerated development of
private entrepreneurship, the commercialization of state-owned
enterprises, and a de-monopolization. However, the privatization process
was protracted in time and has not yet been finalized.
Plans to reject a state-regulated market in favor of a social market
economy were announced in Poland on October 12, 1989, in a
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governmental program speech by T. Mazowiecki. However, they had
been working on the governmental program on stabilization and system
changes since the formation of the first non-communist government.
Bringing the stabilization program and the government’s reforms to life
on January 1, 1990 implied that there was only one quarter to prepare the
entire package of required laws (11 drafts of the main laws that would
have changed the legal framework of the economy3) and to agree the
program with the IMF. Prior to that, though, the Sejm and the Senate had
to approve these laws and prepare the implementation of the relevant
regulations.
This record-breaking term for the adoption of the legal framework for
the functioning of a free market was the result of the politicians’ desire to
retain Poland’s leading position in the system transformation process.
Thanks to it, Poland counted on the possibility of discounting this
position with external benefits. Mainly this had to do with maintaining
the western countries’ interest in Poland as long as possible to obtain
funds to launch a planned stabilization fund, to finance a program on
zloty convertibility, and to secure other forms of assistance in order to
cushion the adverse effects of the accelerated  transformation process.
External factors to the start of the transformation process aside,
deteriorating domestic conditions became important, namely: rampant
inflation, increasing economic chaos, and the related concern over
society’s ability to retract its support if the stabilization and
transformation processes were to take longer. The economic situation —
worse in Poland than in Hungary, owing firstly to the rate of inflation, the
budget deficit, and related social problems as part of the consequences of
the transformation — became a decisive factor in the acceleration of this
process.
The possibility to accelerate the transformation also emerged for the
former GDR, which, after being absorbed by Western Germany, could
have almost immediately adopted the mandatory system of economic
regulation and secured hefty financial and social assistance, as well as
staff support.
Other CEE countries, the Baltic Republics, and members of the CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States) began forming the market from
the level of administrative control, with a significant imperfection of
market institutions, a lack of democratic traditions, and in most cases also
from the sudden collapse of existing commercial relations based on the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which was disbanded
in 1990. In this instance, they had no market traditions or the traditions
                     
3 The parliament actually approved 10 laws. The Sejm returned the Law on Combating
Monopolistic Practices for improvement.
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had been lost. In connection with this, a rapid transformation was
complicated by ideological barriers that exist until now, populist
sentiment, and a lack of market economic awareness. In addition, in early
1991 they attempted to introduce more dramatic systemic changes in
Bulgaria. Meanwhile, in Russia after several months of attempts to
implement the shock therapy (in 1992) they developed a three-stage
program to deepen economic reform (1995—1996).
2.1.6. Shortcomings of the shock approach
Poland’s experience shows that the shock method for building a market
economy is accompanied by considerably higher costs and more serious
social problems than expected. First of all, it brings a decline in
production, growing unemployment, inefficient steps in fighting inflation,
declining living standards, and a growing resistance by society to the
reforms. Against this backdrop, the initial euphoria in terms of shock
therapy disappeared under the influence of increasingly broader public
criticism. Conflicting expert opinions began to spread. The feasibility of
the IMF recommendations was criticized. Critics often name the
following as the method’s biggest mistakes:
• The state’s extremely passive role in social policy;
• The lack of a policy of proposals, which, using the instruments of
state intervention and industrial policy, would protect the economy from
excessive regress and society from an overly rapid reduction of jobs;
• The lack of a view to restructure enterprises, whose rapid
privatization is impossible due to various circumstances;
• Deficiencies of institutional provision in the market transition,
which opened the way to power for individuals from secret services and
the nomenclature of the former communist party, and the consequent
development of wild capitalism.
While designing the program for systemic changes, including shock
institutional changes, one should bear in mind that there are two classes
of changes different in the speed of their implementation, namely: pin-
point (evolutionary) changes and periodical changes. Both classes are
formed within the guided transformational processes, but periodical
changes dominate only in autonomous transformational processes.
Discussing methods of implementing autonomous transformational
processes is pointless since they live their own lives and are outside of
state control. These processes are the result of deregulation by the so-
called open space for the initiative, inventiveness, independent decisions,
and risk-taking ability of economic agents. Their course is influenced
only by available market opportunities, their structure, an individual’s
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ability to perceive, analyze, and implement these opportunities. The state
can only play a supporting role, indirectly facilitating the development of
a culture of market behavior, caring about efficient markets, the broadest
possible access to education, by establishing legal boundaries for
economic liberalism and the free functioning of all market institutions.
A description of the mechanisms responsible for the adaptation of
market participants is beyond the problem analyzed herein. That said,
knowledge of the mechanisms and obstacles to an adaptation will be
useful in making relevant decisions as to the speed at which controllable
elements of the transformation process should be introduced.
Unfortunately, the dominant economic theories of the late 80s did not pay
close attention to the role of inherited types of mentality and actions (of
institutions), as well as to the role of social capital in the efficient
adoption of regulatory mechanisms of developed capitalist countries.
Given the economic effects, the scenario for a controlled transformation
process should be chosen based on a comparison of gains and costs from
all possible options. Unfortunately, this type estimate can only be
hypothetical in nature since it is impossible to establish with reasonable
probability the differences in duration of certain autonomous processes. It
would also be difficult to estimate the expected costs and possible effects.
If the effects of the transformation happen to show themselves after
the establishment of efficient markets, while the excessive costs and
benefits as compared with gains are paid over the entire period of the
transformation, the optimal calculation would be reduced to choosing the
option that can be implemented as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, this
situation is not the most reliable one.
A comprehensive treatment of the market as an aggregate of
institutions that enables the free use of market opportunities and the skill
and ability of people to use these opportunities suggests that the timing of
a full and effective market is determined by autonomous processes of
transformation. It would be possible to accelerate the controlled processes
of transformation only when the autonomous processes are also
accelerated as a result of interpenetration.
It should be noted that the process of gaining new knowledge is very
difficult. Various turbulent changes usually complicate this process, limiting
the ability of people to understand these changes and to analyze them using
the categories of rational choice. These restrictions are the reason for the
dominance of conservative attitudes and an unwillingness to take risks.
Under the circumstances, it is possible to concentrate the costs and funds in a
shorter time span. It can be expected, therefore, that a large number of
changes within a short time span creates the risk that society will not accept
the heavy impact of the changes, which could result in social upheaval. To
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ensure society’s acceptance it is necessary to develop a scenario for
sequential changes, i.e. prioritizing the implementation of the changes.
Prioritizing the changes, i.e. a gradual approach, should be subject to the
natural relations with autonomous processes and their dynamics. The
different speeds at which certain elements of the controlled transformation
process can be implemented should also be taken under consideration.
Deregulation (economic liberalization) can be implemented the
fastest. It encompasses an enormous range of initiatives, for example: the
liquidation of regulation and distribution, the deregulation of prices for
goods and services, financial and labor markets, and the liberalization of
foreign trade. It should be mentioned that the process of deregulation also
has to be accompanied by an appropriate stabilization policy given its
consequences in the monetary sphere.
The process of institutional change can be started relatively quickly.
Previous economic legislation is abolished and a new package of laws
regulating at the constitutional level the market economic order is
adopted. The adaptation of other countries’ solutions in this area can
reduce the whole process of the preparation of the relevant package of
laws. However, the institutional changes within the new market order
aimed at the promotion of market thinking and behavior are usually
undertaken in the following generation. Institutional changes are also
coupled with the emergence of private enterprises, banks, stock
exchanges, insurers, self-governing institutions, the treasury, institutions
charged with social and unemployment expenditures, and others. All of
these initiatives require significant capital and the involvement of
professionals with new skills that are acquired only partially during
training, and developed mostly after many years of professional practice.
In this context, a dilemma emerges between the insufficient
professionalism of the management personnel in various spheres of public
life and the need to introduce a new style of work at various institutions.
2.2. Deregulation of economic activities
2.2.1. Substance and basis for deregulation in post-socialist countries
Deregulation, or liberalization, is the process of creating space for the free
operation of market forces by abolishing administrative burdens and
regulations norms set by the state and determining what, how much, and
how to produce and distribute. The centralized coordination of economic
activity based on vertical relations can be replaced with market
coordination based on freedom of transactions (horizontal relations).
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Possibilities for the spontaneous formation of instruments, institutions,
and mechanisms of a complete market are the result of the process. Its
goal is as follows:
• Create the economic basis for rational solutions by enterprises,
employees, households, and the state;
• Purge the economy of economic agents that use resources
inefficiently;
• Reallocate the released resources from less to more profitable
industries, which will be demanded in the future;
• Create the basis for innovation and competitiveness of domestic
entities on foreign markets.
Deregulation is the initial and most basic element of the economic
system market transformation process. Its extended sphere of initiatives is
implemented in two parallel phases.
Phase I encompasses the dismantling of the system of administrative
and regulatory norms, including:
• Abolishing regulation and distribution of property as well as
consumer and producer services;
• Abolishing mandatory intermediation in sales;
• Eliminating the administration of prices, salaries, interest rates,
foreign exchange rates;
• Eliminating trade protectionism (administrative instruments of the
domestic market protection against external competition). This is also the
process of the legalization of the new economic order that facilitates the
free circulation of consumer and industrial goods, services, capital, labor,
and land.
This phase, like the act of nationalization, is implemented
administratively, i.e. based on the decision of legislative bodies (the
parliament). It may be rapid in nature, i.e. radical liberalization, which
covers all areas of the economy. It can also be a gradual process realized
in certain market segments. For example, Poland in 1989 abolished
regulation of the sale of meat and meat products, limited budget subsidies
for food products, and subsequently ended government control over
prices for staple food items.
Phase II — the formation and introduction of self-regulating
instruments, i.e. economic parameters. It is a laborious process during
which the «adjustment» of economic parameters numerical values takes
place, often through a trial-and-error process.
Both phases begin simultaneously, but the second one lasts many
years. It is also accompanied by other changes related to the
transformation like privatization, public sector reforms, and other
institutional changes facilitating the formation of efficient markets.
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At the same time, the adjustment of parameters is mostly autonomous
in nature and in this case is the result of cooperation between economic
agents. This phase can also be influenced by the processes of state
regulation directly (price floors for certain agricultural products,
controlled prices for other strategic goods, concessions for certain types
of economic activities, etc.) or indirectly (active taxation, monetary and
trade policies). An adjustment of parameters may also take place due to
the state’s gradual deregulation or economic activity (government
procurements, investments).
From the elimination of administrative restrictions on economic
freedoms until the formation of justified parameters4 an immature market
economy will function on certain markets. An incomplete set of market
mechanisms at this stage of its development and inaccurate parameters
can lead to additional unwanted problems (correctional inflation,
production setbacks, disruption of traditional cooperation ties, etc.). A
program of macroeconomic stabilization is launched in parallel to
mitigate the negative consequences of deregulation. The combination of
deregulation and stabilization during the transformation is also necessary
because of the significant deficit traditional on all markets. The large
social pain produced by the «double shock» from liberalization and
stabilization connected with the correction in prices and decline in real
incomes gives rise to questions about the sphere of deregulation, the
sequence of these changes and how to combine it with anti-inflation
measures.
2.2.2. Deregulation of the commodities markets
Establishing a complex system of market prices in Poland began against
an already functioning space for certain free-of-control prices which
mainly governed the bazaar trade with goods produced by small
individual farms, small-scale handicraft production, illegal currency
trade, and «under the table» goods. Prices for other goods and services
were imposed centrally or through producers, but based on an algorithm
established by the central government. Prices for most food staples were
only liberalized in June 1989, i.e. 50 % of all goods were free of price
controls. The large-scale elimination of government price control came
only on January 1, 1990. Prices were free from controls on nearly 90% of
goods now. After two years of reforms, the government only controlled
prices for gas fuel, electricity, basic medicines from a state-set
                     
4 The accuracy is connected with authentic, fast and publicly accessible information
about consumer needs and production costs which makes it possible to balance the
markets.
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pharmacological list, central heating, hot water supplies to apartments,
domestically produced alcoholic beverages, utilities, railroad and
Automotive Communications Company rates, and most health care
benefits.
The liberalization and dramatic limitation of subsidies resulted in
changes to the basic structure of prices and transformational hyperinflation
that amounted to 586% in 1990. In 1992—2000 it decelerated to two-
digit growth annually and systematically declined even further5.
The supply system for enterprises together with the liberalization of
prices saw a radical transformation. Centralized balances stopped
regulating the turnover of resources. Mandatory intermediation in the
turnover of materials supplied as well as regulation and priorities systems
were abolished. Also abolished was the centralized administrative control
of foreign trade through the introduction of a cap limit for exports and
imports, foreign currency distribution, extra payments, loads and tax
benefits. The key instrument for the allocation of resources became the
price adjustment mechanism formed under free market conditions.
In the area of foreign trade, entities were given the right to export and
import without licenses. Licenses were retained only for imports of
flammable materials, and trade in weapons, military equipment, and
radioactive isotopes. Licensing trade with those goods is a common
practice globally. It should be also noted that initially, limits were set on
exports of a dozen raw materials. Along with a normalization of the
domestic market situation other restrictions were introduced. State
controls governed exports of coal and certain types of fuel. It goes
without saying that there were mandatory restrictions stipulated by
international commitments like, for example, on certain steel and
metallurgical products (EEC, the USA), advanced technologies,
employment quotas, construction materials (Western Germany), as well
in terms of imports from countries under international embargo, including
alcohol, liquid fuel, toxic waste, some automobiles, and engines.
Free access to foreign currency and export returns from January 1,
1990 were regulated only by the constant currency rate gradually
introduced in 1991—2000. At the same time, the expanded system of
export-related tax benefits was abolished.
Customs tariffs, which were used to spur competition through
periodical suspensions and reductions in customs rates (about two-thirds
of tariff items) became the key instrument for regulating import volumes
and structures. The liberalization of customs rates, however, proved
excessive. It resulted in pushing domestic production out of the national
                     
5 All statistics in this article are from GUS statistics annual, for more details, please
refer to: Wozniak, 2004, p. 81.
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market. In mid-1991, modern customs tariffs (maximum tariffs) were
introduced that adhered to EEC standards and basic norms defined by
GATT. Contrary to the government’s expectations, these decisions did
not spur stronger competition, a slowdown in inflation, and restructuring
due to their negative impact on the already poor financial performance of
domestic producers. In this situation, the actualization and modification
of import customs tariffs seemed necessary. Revised customs tariffs were
introduced together with a tax on goods and services (VAT) on July 5,
1993 after their amendment. From late 1992, a 6% general import tax was
replaced with an additional duty; in 1994, a decision was made to
introduce leveling duties for importers of agricultural products to protect
domestic agricultural producers against excessive competition.
In relations with former CMEA countries, hard currency cash
settlements were introduced instead of the transferable ruble. This
decision, instigated by the decay of the Soviet economy and its exhausted
payment capacity, decreased trade turnover with former USSR countries.
The later rebuilding of economic relations with these countries, however,
ran into serious difficulties. These were caused by the non-convertibility
of currencies and their partners’ lack of foreign currency resources, and in
the case of Russia — by certain incidents at various times, that is by
political factors. In order to improve trade and economic cooperation with
the region, trade and economic agreements with certain republics of the
former USSR were signed.
Also in relations with developing countries, clearing settlements were
eliminated in favor of hard currency settlements. To ease access for
Polish products to global markets the government carried out activities
aimed at increasing quantitative restrictions (textiles and steel products to
the markets of the European Economic Community — EEC) and
reducing tariffs under the GATT system of preferences. The most
important component of these actions was bringing to fruition the trade
section of the Agreement on EEC Accession on March 1, 1992. As a
result, over a 10-year period a free trade zone with restrictions in the
agricultural sector was introduced. The goal of an asymmetric reduction
of customs tariffs in Poland’s favor should have been to temporarily
protect domestic firms from bankruptcy and facilitate competition within
a free trade environment. A similar agreement was signed in late 1992
with countries of the other European community — EFTA and CEFTA.
In September 1993 the government adopted an export support
program that was to create the infrastructure for financial support for
export, which, inter alia, also included providing collateral for loans and
insurance for export credits against commercial risk, as well as supporting
exports in certain areas.
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2.2.3. Deregulation of the labor market
Deregulation in the labor market is based on limiting intervention by the
state and monopolistic structures in its operation to increase
entrepreneurs’ freedom in creating volume of employment, time and
forms of work, as well as wages.
The key areas of labor market deregulation are:
• The minimum wage, its relation to the average wage, regional
differentiation by employee age and qualifications;
• The competence of trade unions in discussing the degree of growth,
differentiation of wages, and employment protection;
• Protection against mass and individual dismissals;
• Social security issues (types, amount, availability of benefits and
their relation to the lowest salary, and the maximum period of
assistance).
These goals are not limited just to the introduction of a competitive
system in the labor market. To limit the inefficiency of free competition
markets, represented by the tendency of very low demand for jobs and
disproportional wages, poor conditions of labor safety and occupational
health, the requirements of international organizations should be used in
the deregulation process. In the case of Poland, this primarily has to do
with the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention from 1979.
Also taken into consideration are recommended social security rules
stemming from the European Social Charter (1969), ratified by Poland in
1997, and from draft OECD decisions that facilitate labor market
flexibility. The efforts undertaken in 1991 to join the EC also required the
adoption of general labor market fundamentals.
The talks that began in 1989 on the development of a government
stabilization program and system transformation gave rise to two
opposing positions on the labor market. They both dealt with the issue of
the deregulation of wage mechanisms. Advocates of comprehensive
market mechanisms wanted to abolish existing labor control methods and
called for a shift from a focus on wage growth deceleration and prices to
monetary policy. Foreign advisors and IMF experts recommended
freezing wages completely in order to efficiently curb the inflation spiral
caused by deregulation in other branches of the economy.
The government modified only the existing mandatory system of
flexible control over wages using a tax on excessive wages. They forecast
an almost fivefold lag of wage growth to prices in order to ease
inflationary pressures and the inherited inflationary addition that came in
the form of consumer queues. Monthly wage growth could not exceed
0.2—0.3 times the expected consumer price growth. In reality, companies
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could raise wages above the centrally established norm, but that would
mean an additional tax on corporate income for excessive wages in the
range of 300—500%.
The dramatic fall in demand and persistent recession, contrary to
government expectations, forced the authorities to temporarily ease the
wage regulation coefficient. Employees’ subsequent re-indexation demands
that included strikes proved that this wage control mechanism cannot be
efficient, since it drags the government into wage disputes and contributes
to wage disparities. Despite the announced liquidation of this wage
regulator, the government’s concerns regarding excessive wage and
unemployment growth resulted in later Cabinets only daring to adjust the
wage growth coefficient and present modified versions of the tax on pay
increases.
The income tax on excessive wages still contradicted the idea of
deregulation, but it was necessary to ease pressure from the workers’
unions on wage increases, which only served to provoke inflation.
However, it appeared that this mechanism countering the inclination to
eat away at profits was very restrictive, depriving enterprises of up to
39 % of total financial income in 1991.
Another limitation of labor market deregulation was the so-called
indexation law that provided for the automatic, general, and complete
indexation of any salary. The hyperinflationary nature of this law became
the reason why — contrary to the trade unions’ position three months
later — they introduced the leveling indexation, which after
modifications prompted by market conditions, is still active today.
While stressing the excessive economic liberalization, inter alia,
critics of Balcerowicz’s Plan pointed out that the adopted wage control
mechanism led to an over-reduction of household incomes. Only after the
finance portfolio was passed to G.V. Kołodko, the author of the liberal
stabilization policy macroeconomic parameters approbation concept
(Kołodko, 1990), a decision was made to reject the wage control
mechanism in 1995. Wage control was entrusted to the Trilateral
Commission which included representatives of trade unions, employers,
and the government. This democratic, but centralized, contractual system
of remunerations made it possible to set the same wage growth rate for all
industries. Centralizing the negotiating process calmed the labor market,
but under the influence of workers’ dominant interests wages increased
irrespective of the companies’ financial standing, often on account of
employment.
Only slower economic growth and a sharp increase in unemployment
from 2000 persuaded trade unions to back down from wage increase
demands in return for keeping existing jobs. Although trade unions take
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part in internal consultations, starting from the employer through the
sector and regional organizations up to the national level, nevertheless,
due to their significant politicization, weak employee unity, and the
significant discord among trade union organizations6, they are unable to
perform their coordinating functions in talks on remuneration and the
demands of conventions. At the same time, the renewed trade union law
from July 2003 limits the powers of trade union organizations that include
less than 10 members.
The protection of workers’ interests improved only after the
implementation of the EU Council’s Directive from September 22, 1994,
94/45/EC through the approval of the European Trade Unions Law dated
May 22, 2002, (Dz.U. no. 62) dealing with transnational enterprises.
In 1998—2003, further reforms aimed at reinforcing labor market
self-regulation mechanisms were implemented. They were provoked by
rapid unemployment growth after a temporary reduction during the
implementation of the program on support for market conditions in
1995—1998. In 2003, the unemployment rate reached 20% of the active
working age population in Poland. At the same time, the labor market
was characterized by the absence of a more prominent reaction of supply
and demand to the institutional changes made for the flexible functioning
of markets.7.
In addition to demographic growth pressures and fluctuating market
conditions, factors that contributed to high unemployment figures were:
• The poor functioning of mechanisms for wage negotiations;
• Unfavorable labor regulations related to social security;
• Prohibitively high labor costs for the creation of new jobs;
• A lack of traditions in using flexible forms of labor organization
and non-standard forms of employment.
A substantial part of Polish legislation dealing with social security
takes the ILO Convention as an example and to a small degree departs
from the norms adopted in the EC recommended by the European Social
Charter.
                     
6 According to European Commission data in 2002 about 15% of all employees were
in trade unions.  However, trade unions were divided into 3 large confederations. At the
same time 7,000 organizations did not belong to any confederation. That type of dispersion
was beneficial for employers.
7 In 2003—2004, after amendments to the Labor Code, Poland permitted all non-
standard forms of employment, including flexible forms of labor organization. They
include part-time employment implying incomplete working hours, dual job-holding,
employment at a temporary work agency and borrowing of employees, benefits related to
remuneration in favor of one's own small enterprise, work on demand, work at home and
tele-jobs, incidental jobs, the performance of a job by several individuals, weekend
employment. It is also possible to perform work without a fixed start and end, with
working hours with breaks, intended for tasks without a mandatory portion of time, with
extended working hours, compensated with days off.
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It should be stressed that the minimum salary in Poland has been in
place for more than 50 years8. Since 1987, the minimum salary has been
indexed annually to prices for consumer goods and services, or quarterly
in times of high inflation. As of 1991, the level of the minimum wage has
been set as a result of agreement. The wage is generally set at 40% of the
average national salary. The return to annual valorization in 1999 was due
to a relative decline in the minimum salary as against the average salary.
Although Poland’s minimum wage is one of lowest among EU countries,
this does not discourage youth from a rapid return to the labor market and
from keeping independent households. In 2003, the minimum net salary
was just 15% higher than the unemployment benefit. This contributed to
an outflow of under-educated and young individuals to the shadow
economy and the formation of high official unemployment numbers.
Unfortunately, there is no unemployment insurance in Poland and
unemployment benefits are paid from:
• Mandatory Labor Fund contributions made along with social
security payments;
• State budget subsidies;
• In pre-retirement benefits payable to those with a legal unem-
ployment status and the prerequisite work experience and age.
Unemployed individuals that meet the criteria can forego registration with
employment centers. This kind of regulation does not inspire individuals
to search for a job.
Like other EU countries, Poland has a well-developed social aid
system that can be used if an individual’s difficult financial situation is
proven by the relevant documentation.
The Labor Fund, financed by employer contributions (2.45% of
salaries paid), additional state budget subsidies, loans, and other sources,
had minimal resources at its disposal9, of which only a small portion was
intended for active unemployment programs. In public debates
concerning the inefficient deregulation of the labor market in Poland,
close attention is paid to the problem of the tax system connected with the
excessive mandatory load on labor. Social security contributions amount
to 45% of the total payroll, while the minimum personal income tax
threshold is 19%. The high employment tax is a negative feature of the
Polish labor market. In the late 1990s, Poland’s wage tax stood at 42.8%,
compared with 19.5% in the OECD and 15-23.5% in the EU. Total
                     
8 When it was set in 1956, the minimum salary belonged to the main salary in the
lowest category as to the wage level.
9 In 2001—2002, only up to 7% of resources were allocated for active programs, while
in the EU efficient programs absorbed 30-50% of resources allocated for labor market
regulation.
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taxation including income and consumption taxes amounted to 80%,
compared with 45% in the OECD and 15-53% in the EU.
Due to the relatively high minimum wage, the tax load represents a
significant obstacle for the creation of new jobs, which to a significant
extent contributes to the development of a shadow economy. According
to some estimates, more than one-fifth of Poland’s population of active
working age is employed in the shadow economy (Schneider, Burger,
2004). Taking that into consideration, in July 2007 insurance benefits
were cut by 3%. Additional labor cost cuts are also expected. At the same
time, requirements were formulated to reform taxes, specifically an
income tax reduction and the introduction of unemployment insurance.
Despite the weaknesses of Poland’s labor market compared with some
EU countries, OECD reports nevertheless say it is liberalized at an
average level for countries-parties of the same grouping, and at a higher
level than in EU countries. This position is supported by a synthetic index
of legal employment protection — EPL (Employment Protection
Legislation), as well as other indexes. In 2001, the EPL in Poland fell to
1.5—1.8 (by 0.2—0.3) compared to 1998 (Socha, Sztanderska, 2004).
However, attaining the level of legal protection in labor markets
typical for OECD countries does not imply that the deregulation process
is complete. Specific features like the highest unemployment rate in
Europe and a relatively high differentiation by region, age and education,
the low professional activity of the population, and the high emigration of
the most qualified part of the workforce questions the efficiency of the
deregulation experience in EU countries. Questions over the efficiency of
this experience are also spurred by fact that Poland’s labor market creates
significant problems related to social policy and the budget balance. The
decrease in unemployment in mid-2007 to 9.8% was the result of Poland
joining the EU and the subsequent emigration of migrant workers, as well
as positive market conditions. Nonetheless, nothing suggests that further
efforts to deregulate the labor market should be abandoned.
The high costs related to employee dismissal limit competition
between the employed and job seekers, and it lowers the chances of the
younger generation entering the labor market.
The centralized mechanism of wage negotiations weakens an
entrepreneur’s bargaining position and contributes to growing labor costs.
In this regard, it is necessary to broaden the possibilities for decentralized
negotiations and depart from the system of collective labor. The
decentralized method of setting wages, which provides for the formation
of wages at the enterprise level and deregulation aimed at cutting layoff
costs, is stipulated by the major institutional conditions of the
liberalization of labor markets, i.e. measures increasing competition at the
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regional level between employed and unemployed individuals and
protecting the latter from prolonged unemployment.
Poland’s accession to the EU came along with increased inflows of
foreign capital and resources from structural funds, and the
implementation of a development strategy aimed at social and economic
unity, whose boundaries are defined by the revised Lisbon Strategy. It
opens the way for faster economic growth and consequently the
possibility for public finance reform. If the fiscal reforms postulated by
business communities and liberal experts are carried out, it will also
immediately increase labor market liberalization. However, there may
emerge a new problem of excessive and rapidly expanding emigration (in
terms of the needs of the economy) of highly skilled migrant workers, as
well as an undersupply on the labor market of industries that ensure the
development of the knowledge-based economy. This suggests that
incentives are needed that would liberalize the labor market and facilitate
immigration to Poland, in order not only to compensate for the outflow of
human capital to EU markets, but also to overcome the consequences of
the demographic decline, which is intensifying.
2.2.4. Deregulation of financial markets
Implementing a system of market signals facilitating the efficient
allocation of production resources would be impossible without financial
market deregulation. The cost of money as a special commodity and its
supply cannot be formed freely on the market, since it stipulates not just
the efficiency of allocation, but also changes in prices, and hence
investment risk, the accessibility of goods and services for consumers,
and for producers — production factors (the general equilibrium), the
level of the budget equilibrium (the internal equilibrium), the trade
balance, and money turnover (the external equilibrium). These various
implications of changes in the cost of money and its quantity in
circulation require centralized strategic coordination adapted to the
functioning of market logic and independent from politicians.
Although economic theory discovered the rules of accommodation of
the quantity of money in circulation to ensure equilibrium on all markets
with planned growth, these rules can only be applied with the legal and
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the central bank. For that reason,
the post-socialist transformation required financial market deregulation
and the introduction of new rules for conducting monetary policy.
It is worth remembering that the socialist economy was specific in
that there was only a partial connection between commodity flows and
cash flow in the sense prescribed to it in the market economy (money in
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circulation). It was due to increasing subsidies to producers and
consumers. Subsidies in the socialist economy led to a declining need for
money in circulation. The turnover of subsidies (allocation of cost-free
funds or partial payments in kind across areas covered by subsidizing)
required no money. Non-monetary mechanisms of distribution, i.e.
various forms of distribution and regulation, were enough for this
purpose. As a result, it led to:
• Understatement of work costs, because only the asset cost to be
paid was reflected in the wage;
• A breakdown in the clear relation between the flow of cash assets
and other subsidized assets and financial resources.
The subsidy system and the lack of capital markets connected with
soft «budget limitation», i.e. the basis for the issuance of money, which
was subject to automatic adjustment to the needs of the budget and
enterprises specified in the plans, resulted in a relative surplus of money
and in suspended inflation, which was clearly seen in long queues for
goods.
The liberalization of prices for property and services, the abolition of
subsidies, and the sale of state-owned companies’ property to domestic
buyers resulted in a situation where there was constantly insufficient money
to service the economy. This had to lead to a disruption in production. In
other words, a crisis emerged connected with a transformation shock.
However, it was caused by the deficit of money provoked by the
liberalization along with the economy entering competitive markets. The
resources required to service flows of goods in the market turnover were
insufficient and difficult to estimate. On the other hand, the abolition of
understated prices (subsidies) through the market mechanism of price
accommodations would bring corrective inflation. Since prices as a whole
are composed of directly and indirectly interdependent elements, then,
accordingly, it would lead to accelerated price growth. Untangling this
complicated knot of correlations that came about due to liberalization and
the introduction of capital markets required an adapted monetary policy
that would take into account a controllable inflow of money into an
expanding sphere of monetary circulation.
In this case, financial market deregulation had to be combined with a
complicated, specific monetary policy. It was necessary to start from:
• Legally guaranteeing the independence of the banking system and
clearly outlining the state’s and its bodies’ competencies in their
influence on money and capital markets;
• Ensuring the organizational detachment of the central bank as an
issuer of currency, banks servicing market participants, and their
economic and mutual independence.
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Due to these initiatives, the state was cleared of economic responsibility
for independent decision-making by banking institutions. Charging the
banks with the economic implications from activities carried out at their
own expense was aimed at introducing a new way of thinking in banking
activity related to efficient markets operation. The implementation of this
logic is a condition for balancing credit markets and achieving balanced
money markets through the function of the interest rate.
Systemic democratic decisions and the state’s consequent control over
democratic institutions that expressed society’s interests and aspirations
were supposed to protect the banking system against attempts on its
autonomy. Nevertheless, this condition is not sufficient. The system and
the organizational detachment of the central bank from the state
administration required that the constitution provided for the positional
subordination of representative bodies to the central bank. This provision
posits that the bank’s governor should be elected for a period longer than
the term of the parliament (in Poland six years to the parliament’s four
years), and be judged and dismissed by parliament. To ensure the
independence of monetary policy it was also necessary to implement
legal restrictions as to financing the budget deficit from the central bank’s
(the National Bank of Poland,  NBP) resources.
Financial market deregulation can be broken down into four phases:
1) The establishment of the institutional base for the functioning of an
independent banking and monetary system (1989—1992);
2) The development of actual financial market deregulation (1993—
1997);
3) The introduction of regulatory financial market standards
mandatory in the EU (1998—2004);
4) Preparation for the possible implementation of regulatory standards
mandatory in the euro-zone (Economic and Monetary European Union).
The first phase was characterized primarily by a nominal convergence
of financial markets towards the standards of deregulation typical for a
market economy. Deregulation in the banking system and the monetary
sphere began in early 1989. The NBP was separated as the central bank
and independent deposit and credit banks were established. At the time of
the adoption of the new banking laws in Poland (December 31, 1989)
there were 15 state-owned banks or joint-stock companies of the state
treasury and over 1,600 cooperative banks combined into the FB (Food
Bank), in addition to the NBP. The new banking legislation allowed
individuals to establish banks as joint-stock companies. Under the new
legislation in 1989-1991 almost 70 licenses were issued for new banks in
the form of joint-stock companies, including with the partial participation
of foreign capital.
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However, the actual deregulation was rather limited. The NBP
stopped lending directly to enterprises, opening and maintaining bank
accounts, and cash settlements. It kept the functions of regulating money
supply, currency issuance, the management of public debt, and the role of
the lender of final resort (providing credit facilities to deposit and credit
banks, setting the interest rate on these credits, and accumulating the
mandatory reserves of credit banks).
The central bank’s operating activity was limited to state budget cash
servicing, accepting reserves of merchant banks, crediting their activity
and settlements, issuing and circulating its own and government bonds,
managing the central foreign currency reserve, as well as performing
foreign currency transactions. The central bank’s exit from credit and
deposit operations involving enterprises required the transformation of its
operational units into separate commercial banks.
A necessary element of financial market deregulation is the
introduction of the interest rate market mechanism. However, this
mechanism is not sufficient to ensure the inflation-free inflow of money
into the economy. Precisely because of it, the market interest rate shall be
regulated by the central bank through the discount rate.
The role of the discount rate and the importance of other direct
instruments for regulating money supply are often underestimated.
Companies’ different reactions depending on their production volumes
and assets, market positions, and the capacity to use technologically
advanced products, as well as the openness of the money market and the
differentiation of domestic and foreign interest rates are the main factors
that can lower the efficiency of changes in the discount rate.
A high interest rate is reflected in the price of goods in relation to the
high degree of monopolization of production. A considerable increase in
the interest rate as the result of a liberalization of prices caused a decline
in economic activity, contributed to a weakening of the domestic
currency, if it was expedient to get rid of foreign currency to increase
imports or limit exports. This created difficulties in balancing the external
account. Allowing for the previously mentioned drawbacks of the interest
rate and its mechanism of control through the discount rate, certain
administrative instruments of control over the money supply were
retained for a certain period. This decision was also motivated by a lack
of experience in the efficient use of monetary policy instruments adapted
to the market economy, and the elevated risk of inefficient monetary
policy suggested by monetary theory10.
                     
10 M. Friedman, the monetary theory author, proved that the nominal pace of change in
the amount of money in circulation must keep pace with real GDP growth. See: Friedman,
1953.
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Limiting control over the monetary base to indirect instruments, as
suggested by economic theories, was not able to protect the economy
from large payment arrears. Unfortunately, difficulties with estimating
the money supply and problems identifying sustainable and short-term
changes also hampered the efficient utilization of direct methods of
influence on the monetary base. From this perspective, it seemed
appropriate to use direct and indirect instruments of control over the
money supply. In practice all they did was limit lending by introducing a
so-called ceiling for loan refinancing for the 14 largest merchant banks,
as well as by setting a floor for the deposit rate and a ceiling for the
interest rate. These additional interventions were in agreement with
annual NBP-set monetary policy principles, which were adopted by the
Sejm and which targeted inflation.
The first phase of financial market deregulation was coupled with the
adoption of a legal framework for the functioning of its other segments,
i.e. jointly with credit markets and markets of production factors, real
estate, and securities in order to ensure the efficient allocation of limited
financial resources. The deregulation of these markets was driven by the
fact that the state administration cannot propose less risky investment
projects than capital market experts.
Securities markets offer larger profits than bank deposits, as well as
the fastest inflows of money and its accumulation from dispersed owners.
The stock exchange, efficient in its capacity for information and
transactions, is a barometer of the signals of an efficient allocation of
resources.
With that in mind, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was established in
April 1991 as the main market for trades with large capital assets.
However, while the stock exchange was dominated by small investors it
was unable to play a significant role. The development of the securities
markets was limited by the degree of private property in the economy.
Meanwhile, the domination of non-private forms of property ownership
restricted the freedom of entering the market, and limited capital and its
turnover, because the investment processes were supported by the state
budget as there is no market turnover of real property between state-
owned enterprises.
Privatization also highlighted problems related to insufficient
institutional money and capital market infrastructure, a lack of experience
in balancing the central budget through open market operations, and a
lack of experience on the part of economic agents in dealing with
securities.
However, certain threats also emerge with the development of a
securities market. The securities market can, although it is not supposed
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to, become a source of inflation due to the accelerated circulation of
money and activation of markets. Besides, weakening financial discipline
on the part of borrowers and inclinations to issue replacing credit money
can emerge, which leads to a breakdown in the monetary equilibrium and
difficulties in regulating money supply. The risk of debtor insolvency and
losses planned by investors can also grow. To minimize these threats it
was necessary to use the experiences of developed market economies and
introduce the appropriate systemic and legislative checks that would
provide protection and determine the required criteria and organization of
the circulation of securities. It was also worth re-examining, at least
during the formation of the securities market, the expediency of
administrative and parliamentary supervision, as well as the participation
of public authorities in market operations. It was impossible not to heed
warnings from experts that this integration, however appropriate it may
be, contains a real threat to over-regulating money and capital markets
given the natural inclination of the administrative machine to expand the
degree of its control. It is also possible that the government was involved
in a game of interests and that there was corruption on the part of its
subordinated institutions’ employees. For that reason, there arises the
need for the legal formalization of the government’s and its bodies’
competencies in their influence on money and capital markets. Due to the
elevated risk that monetary policy could be subjugated to the private
interests of the state bureaucracy and financial technocrats, a decision was
made to leave it under the control of the representative bodies. Supporters
of broad economic interventionism demanded that the authority to issue
directives, supervise compliance, and even plan money supply remain in
the competence of the government and parliament. At the same time,
supporters of broad financial market deregulation stressed that attaining
the final goal would not guarantee the protection of the banking system
from the influence of dominant interest groups represented by democratic
structures. However, they adhered to the interventionism postulates until
the adoption of new banking legislation in 1997.
1993—1997 was the period in which the central bank learned to
implement and use more widely open market operations, which over time
became the most important rapid response instrument to changes in
money supply. This was also the period when mandatory reserves were
gradually losing their significance, and the central bank’s control over
their levels became limited. The transition in 1994 to a strategy of interest
rate control enabled commercial banks to dramatically reduce interest on
deposits, which stimulated the growth of money supply. But a very high
effective interest rate was maintained that considerably exceeded
enterprises’ earnings yields.
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The amendment to the Law on Banks and the Law on the NBP
introduced in August 1997 launched a new stage for the functioning of
financial markets in-line with the principles of the European System of
Central Banks. The newly adopted Constitution (1997) banned the
possibility of covering the budget deficit by delaying liabilities using
central bank resources (article 220, law 2).
An independent executive body was established that determined
central bank policy — the Monetary Policy Council (MPC), including
nine individuals and the NBP chair, for a six-year term, annually
approves monetary policy guidelines and submits them to the Sejm for
examination. Under the new monetary policy the MPC eliminated
intermediary and operational tasks, and curbing inflation was made the
final goal; its consistent implementation reduced inflation in 2003 to
near the levels recommended by the Maastricht criteria. For its
implementation in 1998, a so-called interest rate corridor was
introduced, where the ceiling determined the lombard loanland the
floor determined the reference level. A decisive reduction of the
mandatory reserves level (to 4.5% in 2001) and expanding open market
operations with short-, medium-, and long-maturity securities meant
establishing regulatory standards that met the best international
standards in every respect. As a result, after a dozen years inflation was
fully under control and stopped threatening the stability of real
economic processes.
Financial market deregulation would have been incomplete and far
from sufficient for the stabilization of inflation without a liberalization of
the domestic currency pricing mechanism. After the introduction of a
stable exchange rate in 1990, the domestic currency weakened in May
1991, and subsequently in October 1991 a mechanism of changing the
exchange rate (crawling peg) connected with changes in the interest rate
and CPI was introduced; however, following the year-end they introduced
a crawling band of +/–7 %, which was widened to +/–10 % in February
1998 and +/–30 % in late March 1999. A rate without a fluctuation
corridor was fully implemented on April 11, 2000. This meant that the
Polish currency’s pricing mechanism became completely liberalized in
terms of IMF standards.
In 2001, the Polish currency met the convergence criteria required for
accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)11. Subsequent
changes in the area of Polish currency convertibility were introduced
together with the implementation on October 1, 2002 of the new
Currency Law (Dz. U. 2002, no. 141, para 1178). This legislative act
eliminated the majority of existing restrictions, specifically those
                     
11 Poland did not meet the budget deficit criteria.
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases210
concerning the European Union and other countries from the OECD and
the European Economic Area. The non-market regulations dealt only
with:
• Providing residents with independence in other currencies, except
for converted currencies or the Polish zloty;
• Export and international transfer of gold or monetary platinum;
• Export and international transfer of national or foreign payment
resources exceeding EUR 10,000 in value. Other restrictions existed for
other countries.
Establishing the freedom of capital movement between Poland and the
EU (according to Art. 73b, Maastricht Treaty), together with the
implementation of other freedoms, meant that Poland joined the EU
common internal market. Poland announced its membership in the EMU
(Economic and Monetary Union), compliance with European Central
Bank regulations, and the transition to the common currency — the euro.
EMU membership implies the waiver of sovereign monetary and
exchange rate policy. In 1999, the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB), including the central banks of all the EU members, assumed the
responsibility in this area. The ESCB makes decisions on interest rates,
but without the participation of nations that are not parties to the EMU
agreement. The ESCB’s independence from governments and other EU
institutions is meant to ensure the efficient protection of the value of the
euro. An additional guarantee of stability is the commitment to comply
with the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997, which reflects the Maastricht
stability criteria.
2.2.5. Public sector deregulation and decentralization
Public sector deregulation is currently a common global process. It is
coupled with an expansion of liberalization, intense competition, and new
rules of global capitalism. To cope with competitive regimes imposed by
transnational corporations, the public sector space must be reduced in
countries with extended features of a «welfare state», which is especially
poignant for post-socialist countries and the EU.  However, in the case of
a country seeking EU membership, any changing of the rules of the game
between the state and its citizen must take into account additional
objectives coupled with the need to respect the principles of subsidiarity,
Maastricht Treaty requirements, mandatory rules of regional policy, and
the use of structural funds and recommendations of the European Charter
of Local Self-Government (since 1985).
In addition to deregulation efforts aimed at economic efficiency in
creating public assets, public sector reform should be based on
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decentralization. Its purpose is to reorganize the system of public finances
towards a closer relation with the needs of the local and regional
communities, and to build up the mechanisms of interaction between civil
society, governments, rights, and public control over administrative
activity.
In the case of post-socialist countries, public finance reforms are also
associated with the modernization of the central government
administration and efforts at public sector deregulation in terms of assets
and services, not just those of a social nature, whose production in the
socialist centrally planned economy was not commercialized, but also
significant transfers from the central budget as the cause of economy
inefficiency. This challenge could have been met through
commercialization and privatization, the deregulation of commodity
markets, labor markets, services, foreign trade, and financial markets, and
de-monopolization. As to public finances, the commercialization and
gradual process of a dramatic reduction in subsidies to inefficient non-
privatized enterprises will play a key role12.
In Poland, the real transformation of the state’s status from an owner
to a shareholder of enterprise was enforced based on the Act on Financial
Economy Within State-owned Companies from January 31, 1989. As a
result of these changes, companies were required to pay a dividend. It
amounted to 44% of PPE value, which was treated as the statutory fund,
and after its renovation under the Balcerowicz model this figure was cut
to 33%. As a result of these efforts after the «Balcerowicz Program» this
figure fell to 5.4% in 1991 from 6.6% in 1990.
The Law on income tax for legal entities, introduced on January 31,
1989, unified the basic tax rates for all economic agents irrespective of
their form. At the same time, they eased the fiscal burden on profits from
65% to 40%.
Formally, the government’s responsibility for forming the structure
of production and its financial guarantee was abolished only after the
abrogation of the economic planning law by the Sejm in September
1990. The elimination in 1989—1991 of the so-called intermediary
structures of economy that grouped companies operating in energy,
coal, transport industries, and 20 earmarked funds was of significant
importance. The scale of deregulation connected with reducing
subsidies to enterprises is shown by the fact that in 1989 they
represented 28.5% of total central government expenditures, compared
with just 17% in 1990.
                     
12 Other previously mentioned deregulation initiatives related to production of non-
state assets, require no comments here, as they are discussed in other paragraphs of section
2, this book.
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The decentralization of the public sector is closely related to the
reactivation of local self-administration in 1990. Three stages in its
implementation can be highlighted, namely:
1. The reform of 1990—1998, which can be referred to as the stage of
«trial and error» of municipal self-administration.
2. The implementation of a three-tiered administrative division
launched on January 1, 1999.
3. Attempts to reform the state’s administrative center and achieve
harmonization with the self-administration criteria set by the European
Charter of Local Self-Government.
The legal boundaries of decentralization and its evolutionary
tendencies were defined by amendments to the Constitution from
December 29, 1989, the Local Self-Administration Law from March
1989, and the Constitution of Poland, as well as  the European Charter of
Local Self-Government ratified in 1993 (Law on municipal proceeds and
guidelines…; Law on municipal financing).
The accelerated implementation, connected with the municipal
self-administration elections13, was aimed at implementing a
systematic basis for support to the state and decentralization, and via
them a subjectification of the local community and an increase in the
potential for the efficient administration of state-owned property.
Unfortunately, no financial foundation for municipal autonomy was
created. At the same time, municipalities’ income structure experienced a
decline in internal revenues from 47.3% in 1992 to 33.5% in 199814,
which included part of the inflows from personal income taxes (15—
17%) and corporate income taxes (5%), proceeds from real property
taxes (32—35% of its own income), agricultural tax, and transport
resources.
In terms of the significant increase in orders from the areas of
education and training, and the limited impact of the municipality’s
relevant taxes, they were doomed to a growing dependency on external
support in the form of general subsidies (13.5% in 1991 and 25.4% in
1998), targeted on demand subsidies, additional internal financing, and a
compensation of losses caused by municipal privileges on agricultural
and forestry taxes (18.8% in 1992 and 21.6% in 1995).
Insufficient financing of orders by the state and voluntarily assumed
obligations brought about a weakening of the municipalities’ financial
                     
13 The self-governing system in Poland was liquidated by the communist government
in 1959 in order to make local authorities an instrument of political power and
administration of the supreme level.
14 All figures concerning gminas (municipalities) are from the Statistical Yearbooks
GUS 1991 …., 1998.
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stability15. At the same time, problems related to the debts of the
territorial self-administration units began to emerge.
January 1999 marked the start of the next stage of self-administration
reform, called administrative reform. It dealt with reforming education,
health care, and pension benefits. The three interrelated and significant
reforms were aimed at:
1) Regulating the state’s competencies resulting from the adoption of
decentralization decisions of fixed norms that make a self-
administration’s proceeds the basis of its budget rather than targeted
subsidies;
2) Establishing institutions of civil society according to the 1997
Constitution through the democratic identification of district and
voivodship (province) political elites as a result of general elections.
Regulation of the state’s responsibilities was related to the separation
of the district level and the introduction of new financing principles. The
reorganization of the state center, as well as the adaptation of ministries
and central institutions to a time when operations on the territory would
not be carried out through special administrations, was postponed.
Unfortunately, the freezing of market conditions led to a deterioration of
municipalities’ financial situations. As a result, investment indicators
changed dramatically. The new law on proceeds for territorial self-
administration units passed in 2003 was to have renewed investment into
municipalities.
The regulation of the state’s responsibilities was as follows:
1) Limiting the central administration’s functions, primarily in terms
of managing changes and setting national standards in the area of public
services;
2) Providing self-administration bodies for regional administration
and the implementation of a regional development strategy with the
authority to carry out certain public services (higher education,
specialized health care institutions), supervise legal compliance, and
ensure security and public order;
3) Requiring district and municipal self-administration bodies to
provide general public services at the local level, as well as assigning
them tasks to be performed for its citizens.
Thus, the reformed distribution of the state’s responsibilities
strengthened the autonomy of the self-governing units, not by changing
the system, but by specifying the mechanisms of its functioning by
                     
15 The gminas' (municipalities’) share of national taxes was constant: 5% corporate
income tax, 15-17% personal income tax. The shares of local taxes in their own proceeds
were also constant: 32-35% real property tax, 10% financial charges, 3% motor tax
(substituted in 1995 by a motor fuel excise tax), and agricultural tax.
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eliminating legal loopholes, and confusion and inconsistency between
laws. It opened the way to profound changes in the management of
various public sectors of the economy. Administration was forced out
through a strategic development, and bargaining for the allocation of
financial resources was replaced with actions for the efficient use of
internal funds and legally standardized central budget subsidies. The
decentralization allowed for the actual implementation of the subsidiarity
principles, as a result of which municipalities invested just 20—30% of
their budgets. The autonomy of local self-administration was granted
judicial protection and constitutional support.
According to Article 2 of the Constitution of Poland from April 2,
1997, civil society is a necessary precondition for the efficient
functioning of legitimate governments that implement the principles of
social justice. A complete subordination of administration to the law must
be the cornerstone for organizations and democratic state activity. That
means that the state administration is to fulfill its tasks in a decentralized
way and within its own responsibility through agents that are free from
interference while performing their duties. The legality of activities
carried out by bodies of public administration, voivodships (provinces),
powiats (districts), and gminas (municipalities) is verified through the
Supreme Administrative Court.
Nevertheless, the creation of a civil society after the more than 40-
year experience of so-called democratic centralism by the communist
state is an extremely difficult task. The elites of local self-administration,
which were formed from local social organizations that had no
organizational skills, were very poor representatives of the community’s
interests. Insufficient decentralized also helped little.
However, there is also a «blind spot» in reforming the public
administration in Poland. It primarily has to do with reforms of the state
administration center initiated by new governments starting from 1991
more for propaganda purposes rather than to solve existing problems.
Taking into account the unstable political situation and lack of civil
society, the central state administration was not interested in developing
the basis of subsidiarity and in transferring responsibilities to institutions
that were closer to the citizens. By 1996, the only significant initiative
became the opening of the National School of Public Administration.
Instead of reforming the administrative center, the central state
administration is expanding rapidly, with the simultaneous regulation of
responsibilities related to the second stage of self-administration reform.
This caused an increase in the number of jobs in the central state
administration. The scale is seen in the following statistics of the average
number of personnel in the central state administration (Kieżun, 2000):
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1990 — 46,000; 1999—119,100; 1998—126,200 government officials.
The share of staff in the central administration compared with self-
administration also grew, from 0.89% in 1990 to 0.99% in 1998.
In the second stage of public finance reform, the only factors
stimulating the central state administration were tasks related to the
upcoming EU accession and the regular parliamentary elections.
Unfortunately, EU expectations as to some elements of social security
were not connected with market logic. The chances of agreeing central
strategic coordination with market logic was not maintained at the
appropriate level in-line with the principles of reforming education,
health care, pension, and social systems, which are related to the effective
EU legislation through social and economic unity.
Aside from its success, the decentralization of public finances still
fails to meet certain important European standards:
1. Like before, the system of government purchases is overburdened
with regulations.
2. Harmful provisions regarding spatial order exist.
3. Like before, a very tight and overly detailed set of rules exists that
regulates the performance of certain tasks, especially those dealing with
housing subsidies, household transfers, and financial aid to students,
making it impossible to adapt performance methods to conditions and
local needs.
4. A lack of clear criteria for the consideration of additional financing
from structural funds and the EU Cohesion Fund.
5. The failure to introduce a single road management body on the
territories of cities.
6. The criteria of the task adequacy to the allocated resources is not
being met.
7. Failure to provide sufficient flexibility and variety in terms of
sources of proceeds, primarily those incoming as a part of VAT.
The most complicated problems with deregulation in post-socialist
economies are related to the need to adapt the mechanisms of distribution
to the requirements of a market economy. The resolution of those
problems requires an answer to the question about the harmonization of
social justice institutions with the system of competition. Replacing the
institutions tasked with balancing incomes and employment guarantees
that were inherited following the collapse of the communist economy
associated with the violation of acquired rights that are, in most cases,
recommended by international conventions. Unfortunately, these
conventions cannot accurately define how to implement these
recommendations, which correspond to specific conditions of a given
country. In the case of Poland, as in most other post-socialist countries,
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the harmonization of justice and economic efficiency must take place at a
low per capita GDP16, when the deregulation of the social product, first
and foremost education, health care, and social security, might imply
limiting access to investment into human capital and violating the
principles of equal opportunities for the majority of society. From this
viewpoint, the reproduction of the social product must be based on the
harmonization of high economic efficiency through the system of
competition and market rules with fair social inequalities.
Unfortunately, deregulation in Poland began at a time when
awareness about challenges to a knowledge-based economy and global
capitalism was very insignificant. Instead, two opposing concepts of
deregulation clashed, which tended towards too liberal a system and a
solitary state, and even were inclined to leave the majority of inefficient
regulations of the paternalistic budget and state, fully responsible for the
security of a social unit. The declarations regarding the establishment of a
social market economy and seeking membership in the EU led to the
exploitation in the delayed in this area deregulation actions of patterns
being mandatory, first and foremost, for the EU countries.
The most difficult problem to resolve appeared to be the deregulation
of education, health care, and social security. Economic theory does not
provide an unambiguous answer about the role of the state in these areas,
although it has now become possible to fairly clearly understand the
errors in administering the state and reasons for market inefficiency
(Stiglitz, 2004). In terms of specific problems of the real national
economy and paradoxes of the development of human and social capital
in post-socialist economies, it was not possible to accurately predict
whether the asset deregulation patterns in highly developed countries
would bring the expected economic and social results in an economy
undergoing transformation. Here we refer to an economy being affected
by turbulent changes in the transformational process. The dilemmas of
deregulating sectors related to social security and social product
reproduction are also related to the fact that countries with similar
mechanisms of deregulation in those sectors have seen different results.
As to the previously mentioned problems, political and expert circles held
the belief that the socialist system only needed some improvement and
modernization, but not liquidation or excessive limitation (Golinowska,
2000: 232). That actually implied accepting a competitive system while
rejecting the market principles of distribution. This approach required not
only deregulation, but also rapid changes to the regulatory mechanisms
                     
16 Statistics of GUS and OECD indicate that in 1990, the GDP per capita in PPP
amounted to USD 4,466, in Poland, USD 15,991 — in Germany, USD 11,797 — in Spain,
and to USD 9,187 — in Greece — the poorest EEC Member state .
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and the establishment of a network of new institutions that would
harmonize economic efficiency with the concept of social justice
inherited from the paternalistic authoritarian state, which favored equality
over economically justified inequalities.
In the early period of transformation, the dominant opinion was that
reform in the educational sphere could wait, because the problems of
education had been appropriately resolved under socialism.
Unfortunately, the reality was different. The inherited system of
regulating education did not meet the efficiency criteria, besides, there
was no justice and equal opportunities except for formal regulations that
were supposed to ensure this equality. Education was aimed at highly
specialized, overly ideological knowledge; it discouraged independent
thinking and the reflexive modernization of social capital that focuses on
innovative positions. Its product, human capital, could not serve business
and contribute to improvements in economic efficiency.
In late 1999, a reform of the school system was initiated based on the
decentralization of educational administration. The reform introduced
changes into state financing of education, established new types of
schools and their organization, and set new principles for teacher
employment and remuneration. Local self-administration was tasked with
maintaining and setting up educational institutions (municipalities —
state pre-schools, elementary schools, and gymnasiums; districts —
elementary schools, special high schools, senior high schools, youth
education centers; provinces –schools and educational and study centers
of regional importance).
A teacher’s card was introduced into the educational system (Dz. В. dated
2006, no. 97, para 674), regulating a teacher’s promotion (after one year’s
work from trainee to contracted teacher based on an exam; after another three
years — full teacher based on exam results and certification).
The main achievements of the educational reform were as follows:
expanding secondary and higher education, increasing educational
aspirations in society, a considerable improvement in village school
infrastructure.
In 2007, new educational initiatives emerged aimed at rebuilding
social capital. Centers for educational support for students with schooling
problems were launched. In the near future, a policy of «zero tolerance
for violence in school» will come into effect. Educational programs for
the needs of the establishment of social society and the reinforcement of
practically tested ethical values that contribute to the strengthening of
personal dignity are also being established.
The transition to the market economy, started in 1989, as well as the
process of democratization, created a good climate for the implementation
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of civil initiatives in the area of higher education. In 1990, high schools
introduced independent governance, although their subsidies decreased
considerably as a result of  the transformation-related crisis. They also
lost the option of obtaining support from production. As a result, by 1998
real subsidies shrank more than three-fold for full-time students and four-
fold if taking part-time education into consideration.
This problem was partially resolved through the commercialization
of part-time education and the rapid development of private higher
educational establishments: in 1998 about 80% of students paid for their
education (Kołodziejczyk, 1998). Limited financing decreased interest
in teaching as a profession, where low salaries forced individuals to
work part-time, often outside of the academic environment. Those
factors negatively affected the quality of the educational process,
research efforts, and promotion in academic careers. Only the clearly
lower quality of rapidly growing human capital resources led the
government to launch a reform of the school and higher educational
institution systems (1998).
In the context of a deregulation of economic activity, there was also
an attempt to reform health care, where access to services was limited. At
present, reforms to the pension system appear to be successful in terms of
cutting unjustified budget expenditures, however, the real effects from
this reform can only be assessed reliably once its beneficiaries reap its
benefits.
2.3. De-monopolization of the economy
2.3.1. Characteristics of the monopoly in a non-market economy
The creation of a legal framework and the practical implementation of a
policy governing competition were some of the main elements of the
transformation of a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The
task was given to a state without experience in market conditions and in
the activity of economic players. The de-monopolization process was
complicated by a country’s lack of own experience and theories that
would  describe the patterns of a transition from a non-private centrally
planned economy to an economy dominated by private ownership and the
market allocation of resources. At the same time, examples of legislation
and experiences in developed capitalist countries were not able to address
the problems that emerged from the specifics of a state monopoly. For
that reason, during the transition to a market economy anti-monopoly
legislation could not be identical to similar legislation in developed
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market economies. The legislation also could not perform identical
functions in terms of non-state monopolies created in the course of
successful privatizations and in the constantly emerging monopolistic
structures in the non-private sector.
In Poland in 1989 small enterprises with less than 200 employees
accounted for about 6% of the country’s employees compared with 30-
40% in EEC countries. In 28 branches of industry in Poland, 1-3
companies produced 64-100% of products in which they specialized. In
contrast, in EEC countries, the 100 largest companies in 1986 produced
only 29.5% of GDP (GUS, 1990, page 15).
The start of the transition to the market was coupled with the
adoption of the thinking and behavioral patterns typical for a state
monopoly that existed until private ownership became dominant in the
economy. In Poland, however, it was not as comprehensive as in other
socialist countries, where no previous reforms were conducted to
replace the forced distribution system of planning and the decentralized
planning administration, which was based on gaining a part of financial
resources. Nevertheless, the economic and social consequences of the
state monopoly, irrespective of the method used for the planned
distribution of tasks, remained the same. In terms of the weak
perception of the social effects of this type of monopolization and the
general resistance during its elimination, it is worth noting a few things
about the sources, implications, and specifics of monopolization
inherited from socialism.
State monopolies were neither seeking to reach the Cournot point nor
any other point of equilibrium from traditional neoclassical market
theories. Depending on the type of state administration, non-private
monopolies sought to expand scales of production that were not limited
by economic quotas within the same enterprise trying to secure material
or financial resources from government institutions. The expansion was
aimed at strengthening influence over managerial decisions, maintaining
calm in the workforce, improving employment prospects, and securing
the average wage.
In the case of a monopoly based on state ownership, additional
transaction costs emerge against the increasing scale of production and
the development of hierarchical structures (costs for obtaining and
processing information to improve the performance of centrally planned
tasks, as well as the transmission, monitoring, and adjustment of these
tasks). These additional transaction costs increase the time needed to
make a decision and serve to bureaucratize the decision-making process.
In reality, monopolization within the bounds of private property also
leads to the development of hierarchical relations, but it is limited by
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economic estimates of costs and profits, the development of vertical
relations based on a clear hierarchy compared with the alternative of
cooperation within market transactions (horizontal relations). The
problem is that these additional transaction costs in a state monopoly are
only distributed among the citizens. In practice, it significantly affects
pragmatism in the decision-making process and thoroughness in
estimating these costs. At the same time, when obtaining alternative
benefits, the size of the company becomes especially important. This is
because the management’s prestige grows alongside the company, and
with it grows the possibility for the emergence of easier and more
profitable tasks, as well the possibility to obtain better working conditions
and wages, and acceptance by the workforce.
The above-described depreciation of economic estimates by a state
monopoly tends to lead to excessive government regulation. This happens
because the regulatory processes fall into the sphere of public officials,
the same officials that are the beneficiaries of the profits. From this
perspective, despite the obvious shortcomings of systems managed by the
state, the transition to a market and the process of de-monopolization may
be blocked by the state bureaucracy. In parallel, attempts to introduce
new economic agents to the market can also be blocked through lobbying
by existing monopolies, especially foreign ones, since it is relatively easy
to manipulate irrationally patriotic positions.
Overly bureaucratic state institutions and mid-level administrative
officials show no interest in reducing transaction costs as a result of
eliminating a monopoly because that would lead to questions regarding
the need for their existence. In this regard, microeconomic efficiency
criteria cannot have any material significance in their regulatory activities
and cannot be taken seriously in view of consumers’ interests. The
presence of state-run monopolistic producers is seen in product quality,
hidden price increases, under-the-counter sales, and a deteriorating
culture of customer service.
Excessive state regulation becomes stronger and even develops with
the goal of eliminating the problems that are the product of hierarchical
relations within state ownership. These additional regulations are actually
intended to eliminate the various negative effects of a monopoly based on
state ownership, but they cannot be efficient since they are the cause of
growth in transaction costs.
The aforementioned problems of state economic intervention are
discussed widely in various economic theories in the context of so-called
«government failures», especially in neo-institutionalism (Williamson,
1985). However, no clear position has yet been found on efficient ways to
strengthen competition and enact anti-monopoly policy by the state.
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2.3.2. Discrepancies in de-monopolization initiatives
In discussing the necessity of state intervention in the struggle against
monopolies in a market economy, we make a distinction between two
opposing theoretical trends: institutional and evolutionary.
The institutional theory suggests that growing competition will
inevitably lead to its degeneration. The origination of economic authority
and the subsequent disproportion of economic power is the cause and
manifestation of this degeneration. According to this theory, the
concentration can be determined neither by the market itself nor through
the direct intervention of efficiency criteria. It is necessary for political
decisions to set the allowable level of concentration, i.e. the proportions
of market and bureaucratic coordination. If competition disappears,
market participants will need to constantly adjust economic efforts. This
means that market mechanisms require institutional boundaries that will
offer the opportunity to act competitively. The focus will be on
preserving individual freedom of action as a precondition of efficiency,
i.e. market-oriented individual preferences.
The market and enterprise are two equal mechanisms of control. That
said, competition is the product of horizontal demand and supply
relations, i.e. voluntary transactions to preserve the freedom of entering
the market. However, internal decisions within an enterprise are primarily
of a hierarchical nature (moving vertically). Business growth requires that
certain decisions be given over to the bureaucratic domain. This may
imply the departure of these decisions from market coordination.
Therefore, growth in the scale of a company, i.e. the concentration of
production, leads to a decreasing role for the market.
For proponents of evolution theories, economic authority is irrelevant
in resolving market imperfections because the appearance of
disproportional authority is a feature of the market (economic authority
here is understood as the market mode of operation). Competitive
processes take place according to the principle of authority creation and
erosion, which means that this kind of dominance cannot last for a
significant amount of time. Institutional conditions for competition
include the voluntariness of transaction and freedom of market entry.
These legal conditions create the preconditions for a large number of
voluntary exchange participants, and therefore the guarantor of the
freedom of market entry will be the liberalism of ownership rights over
production resources.
If the previously mentioned conditions of competition are met,
individual market participants’ motives are focused on profits. That
occurs because only producers that maximize profits or at least those that
strive for satisfactory revenues will be able to survive.
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In the evolutionary approach, free market access is the decisive factor
for competitive business. The problem of restraining competition is then
reduced to the question of barriers impeding market entry. However,
competitive restraints may also be caused by external factors, the main
source of which is state intervention that creates or maintains a monopoly.
In the evolutionary interpretation, threats to efficiency and freedom
from the internal degradation of market mechanisms are entirely
impossible.  In reality, monopolistic positions can emerge in the short-
term.  Nevertheless, the previously mentioned theories prove that they do
not restrain competition and efficiency.
Numerous examples of the modern market economy demonstrate that
even when there are no alternative sources of supply, a supplier’s profit
maximization strategy can be based the standard monopolistic practice of
limiting supply and raising prices. Nonetheless, factors can exist that
eliminate these practices, namely: competition arising from existing sub-
institutional interests, large suppliers’ self-sufficient possibilities, competition
from foreign producers, and profits from growing scales of production
that become possible due to stronger demand because of low prices.
It should also be stressed that non-market methods of price regulation,
even in sectors not governed by a natural monopoly, do not ensure the
lowest prices in the long-term. State control over prices or their
administration does not contribute to a decrease in costs and an increase
in production, and leads to a decline in purchasing power, primarily of
final consumers. When taking into consideration the objective difficulties
with reducing nominal wages, it should be expected that once again the
adaptation process will occur under the influence of growing prices,
although it could be prolonged in time.
The introduction of political control over prices and revenues
(nationalization, administrative control methods) instead of economic
regulation in areas where competition cannot exist does not eliminate the
need to answer the following question: is the state capable of managing
public interests and microeconomic efficiency? The numerous
weaknesses typical of the public decision-making process require
restricted administrative regulation in the cases of monopolistic practices
where the price elasticity of demand is extremely low.
When freedom of market entry and exit exist, the tendency to create
boundaries in order to concentrate production in one or several groups of
companies in accordance with the rules of the optimal distribution of
resources becomes very probable, since it is a threat to on-going
competition. Exclusivity in production and distribution is not crucial for
all potential competitors. In light of this tendency, the assertion by M.
Friedman that factors which are crucial for monopolization cannot be
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treated as lasting if some new form of regulation or state monopoly does
not emerge seems appropriate. The economist resolves the dilemma of
choice between the private, public, or the public-private monopoly and
the regulated institution that stands for public interests in favor of the
former.
However, when free access to the factors of production exists and the
price of the monopolistic agreement is high enough, a more beneficial
decision would be to introduce a tender or auction competition (an
institution of open bidding for the right to produce goods and services
based on exceptional rights). Exceptional rights would be granted to the
bidder offering the best prices and standards for the buyers. In view of
that, the assertions about a decline in innovation due to monopolization
seem unsubstantiated; modern practice refutes it. The creation of
innovative products is an important condition in order to succeed in
entering new markets occupied by other companies. However, it brings
the threat of losing the market due to changes in technology.  Its
minimization requires more intensive innovative activities, while
neglecting it would be much riskier taking into account the fact that the
ability to maintain the advantage of exclusivity in innovations will
decrease as a market becomes more monopolized. Finally, one should
consider the fact that an active pro-innovation stance allows for future
market expansion due to the ability to cut prices and thus widen the circle
of buyers.
An increase in the concentration of production should also be seen as
a change in the form of the competitive mechanism’s functioning rather
than its decline.  That is supported by the fact that monopolistic super-
profits perform similar functions in terms of the area and efficiency of
activities, while new signals are seen as a threat of being forcing out of
the market. It should also be taken into consideration that depriving an
enterprise of the ability to make monopolistic profits can destroy related
pro-efficiency motivation, and it becomes especially important in market
conditions to open up to foreign competition.
The above arguments in terms of underestimating the importance of
economic authority for the formation of self-sufficient markets suggest
that steps towards de-monopolization should be taken in moderation.
2.3.3. The process of de-monopolization in Poland
Poland’s first, somewhat comprehensive anti-monopoly regulation was
introduced in accordance with legislation from December 28, 1987 on the
elimination of monopolistic practices in the economy (Dz. В. no. 3,
provision 18 with subsequent amendments). This law contained no classic
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definition of anti-competitive practices banning monopolistic agreement
and abuse of dominant positions. The law only outlined:
— Fines payable to the Market Development and De-monopolization
Fund;
— Actions according to official rules or at the suggestion of the
relevant local voivodship councils and economic agents whose interests
were or could be violated by monopolistic practices;
— The enforcement of the administrative investigation code and
procedures for bringing suits to the Supreme Administrative Court.
In practice this law proved ineffective, therefore in February 1990 the
Sejm passed a new law on counteracting monopolistic practices (Dz. В.
no. 14, provision 88). This new law was amended with new cooperative
legislation and a law on changes in the organization of cooperatives’
activities, approved in January 1990. These legal acts were subsequently
improved many times.
Based on these regulations, the Central Anti-Monopoly Office
reporting to the Council of Ministers defined anti-monopoly policy. The
new policy was aimed at protecting free competition and the public
interests of the competitor and the consumer. This goal can be
implemented through the support of competition, the elimination of
administrative monopolies (divided into large state-owned and
cooperative enterprises that dominated on the market for a long time), and
the prevention or elimination of monopolistic conduct by economic
agents. The law targeted only economic agents. At the same time, it
provided for no sanctions against public authorities (central and local) if
they interfere in the development of competition. As the only law
mandatory among all post-socialist countries, it nevertheless dealt with
agreements reached by employees and trade unions with employers
regarding the protection of employee rights. This law also contained no
provisions concerning invention, i.e. the title to exclusive rights to
trademarks, patented designs, and copyright regulation. It did not define
unfair competition and did not allow for counter-mechanisms. Until late
1993 these issues were regulated by a law dating back to 1926.
The use of monopolistic practices was subject to fines of up to 15% of
an entity’s revenue in the previous fiscal year. In addition, the threshold
for a market share not subject to anti-monopoly control was raised from
30% to 40%. Blame during the investigation into a case of unavoidable
monopolistic practice was shifted onto the accused entity. Control over
the legality of decisions made by the Anti-Monopoly Office was handed
over to the courts.
According to the Anti-Monopoly Office, 87 large companies had to be
broken up in 1988. However, by mid-1990 that number was down to only 34.
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The office actively liquidated middlemen, which, among others, included
local meat and sugar companies, central and local cooperative branches, the
Coal Union, and the Energy and Brown Coal Association.  The construction
and transport industries were also de-monopolized. Overall in 1989-1990, the
division of 290 entities resulted in the appearance of 996 new companies.
However, some of these de-monopolization initiatives were not carefully
thought through — they were accompanied by negative economic side-
effects, including difficulties in fighting unfair competition on the part of
foreign companies and distributors.
With the planned de-monopolization initiatives bringing negative
side-effects, the pace of efforts slowed in 1991. The announced de-
monopolization of agriculture was not carried out, and monopolies
continued to exist in durable consumer goods industries and the banking
sector.
In 1990, the Anti-Monopoly Office considered nearly 200 cases
concerning the use of monopolistic practices. Of 261 rulings dealing with
the establishment, merger, and restructuring of enterprises, in 60 cases the
regulator prohibited the use of unlawful practices. The Anti-Monopoly
Office banned the establishment of 15 new companies, but three of the
rulings were overturned by the Anti-Monopoly Court.
In 1991, the Anti-Monopoly Office initiated 83 investigations of
banned monopolistic practices. Dominant among them were onerous
contractual terms, but guilt was only proven in 20 of the cases. Seventeen
accused companies filed suits with the Anti-Monopoly Court. Out of 13
claims examined eight were stayed, one suit saw a change in part of the
verdict, and four rulings were canceled. By the end of 1993, 100 rulings
banning the use of monopolistic practices were issued.
In the same period, in the framework of the general privatization of
100 enterprises out of 400 initially listed, the Anti-Monopoly Office
banned the commercialization of the energy sector and the transformation
of the state treasury into individual entities. Overall, about 2,000 decisions
were made regarding ownership and organizational transformations. Most
frequently, the Anti-Monopoly Office was called upon to interfere in
cases of onerous contractual terms. Cases of that nature primarily took
place in the telecommunications, energy, and gas industries.
During these years, the Anti-Monopoly Office faced difficulties in
their struggle with price cartels, although individual cases were also seen
in the meat and sugar industries. Since the regulator lacked authority,
their investigations often ended in very mild sanctions. The changes in
the customs regime from August 1991 also did little to help the de-
monopolization of the Polish economy. These changes restrained
competition on the part of import and led to lobbying by various interest
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groups. In these circumstances, the search for efficient compromises
between the interests of domestic producers, consumers, and the tasks set
by the economic restructuring was significantly complicated.
The inadequacy of anti-monopoly legislation concerning the
conditions of the operation of enterprises in Poland forced the Anti-
Monopoly Office to develop a bill on fighting unfair competition, which
came into force in November 1993. This law is still in effect and deals
primarily with civil law. It defines unfair competition (e.g., defamation of
other manufacturers, imitation of brands, alteration of commercial data,
and unfair advertising).
Given the huge scale of the de-monopolization of the state-owned
economy, the constituent bodies of state-owned enterprises and many
agencies (such as the Finance Ministry, the NBP, the Ministry for Labor
and Social Policy) were tasked with implementing the competition
development program designed by the Anti-Monopoly Office. The
governmental program on the development of competition for 1990-1994
was focused on actions that contributed to:
— Pro-competitive changes in the functioning of the economy;
— The liberalization of production and services;
— Counteracting the use of monopolistic and dominant market
positions.
The pro-competitive changes were implemented through support to
the development of small business, the launch of a system of loan
guarantees for new entrepreneurs, de-monopolization and privatization in
technical and utilities-related infrastructure, and the creation of conditions
for competitive import using exchange rate and tariff policies.
The actions aimed at liberalizing goods and services markets were
dependent on control by the Anti-Monopoly Office of mergers,
restructurings, and the establishment of new companies, mostly as it
pertained to the de-monopolization of farming, the production and
distribution of raw materials and semi-finished goods, as well as the
establishment by the relevant agencies of new financial and insurance
institutions. These initiatives were aimed at preventing the re-emerging of
middlemen and making impossible the appearance of new monopolies.
To this end, the Anti-Monopoly Office gained the right to voice its
opinion on privatization initiatives, supervise the establishment of
companies with the participation of foreign capital, and ban the
establishment of new enterprises if they had the potential to become a
threat to free competition. At the same time, companies were obliged to
inform the Anti-Monopoly Office about plans to establish a new entity in
the event that its participation on the market was expected to be
significant or if it would be able to take a dominant market position.
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In order to counteract the use of monopolistic and dominant positions
on the market, a register of economic agents that hold monopolistic
positions is updated regularly and their actions on the market are
monitored. The Anti-Monopoly Office was also required to identify
industries deemed to be natural monopolies and cooperate with the
relevant governmental institutions in de-monopolizing and privatizing the
monopolies.
To increase the efficiency of the de-monopolization initiatives, a new
anti-monopoly law expanded the list of banned practices. They included
limited market access agreements, collusion, monetary and personal
connections, a general ban on price agreements, a ban on the abuse of
dominant positions in setting and increasing prices, setting onerous
contractual obligations, deliberately creating a deficit, etc. In
monopolized market segments, announcing plans to raise prices became
mandatory. This rule governed over 100 dominant economic players.
The Anti-Monopoly Office gained the right to ban certain harmful
practices and impose fines in especially dangerous cases. Fines could also
be imposed on entities and managing individuals for not complying with
recommendations made by the anti-monopoly regulator. The body’s
decisions are binding, although they may be challenged in the Anti-
Monopoly Court.
Far-reaching changes were also introduced through the amendment to
the law on fighting monopolistic practices from May 19, 1995 (Dz. В. no.
41, provision 208). This amendment started the process of gradually
expanding the responsibilities of the Anti-Monopoly Office, which in
August 1996 was renamed to the Competition and Consumer Protection
Office (CCPO). Its chair was given authorities far beyond protecting the
market against anti-competitive activities and protecting consumers’
rights; the office’s autonomy was increased and the legal grounds
established allowing self-governing bodies to elect consumers’ rights
advocates, as well as to ensure the consultancy and legal information in
the protection of consumers’ rights. Consumers’ rights advocates also
have the right to initiate anti-monopoly investigations. The CCPO chair
was also entrusted to oversee social assistance programs.
The amendment of anti-monopoly legislation and legislation on
competition and consumer protection, as well as the granting of
independence to the chair of the CCPO, was based on the Competition and
Consumer Protection Law from December 15, 2000 (Dz. В. no. 60,
provision 704 with subsequent amendments). The chair of the CCPO is
elected for five-year terms through a competition held according to a
special procedure set by the chair of the Council of Ministers among
individuals with higher education in law or management, known for their
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theoretical knowledge and practical experience in the areas of market
economics, competition, and consumer protection. The aim of subsequent
innovations was to finally align the terminology in the sphere of legal
regulation of admissible de-monopolization, pro-competitive initiatives,
consumer protection, etc., with legislated EU standards, and to coordinate
the jurisdictions of the chairs of the CCPO and the European Commission.
Poland’s accession to the EU requires it to assume the community’s
obligations for the anti-monopoly authorities, that is, the possibility for
the CCPO to use both primary and derivative legislation of the
community. It is also said that the CCPO chair loses its authorities related
to control when the transaction occurs at the level of the European Union
(the transaction participants having exceeded the turnover threshold of
EUR 5 billion). The role of the CCPO chair in supervising social
assistance from the European Commission was also limited.
The European Commission can also lift bans on some clauses
restraining competition, but businessmen independently and under their
own responsibility determine if their activities breach the community’s
anti-monopoly rules.
The European Union systematically adapts its competition policy to
changing internal conditions while striving to make the multilateral
guidelines mandatory, for which the most relevant international
organization would be the World Trade Organization. Today, the de-
monopolization should serve, primarily, to protect competition, and
promote economic efficiency, consumer welfare, and the competitiveness
of the European economy. This means that the challenges of globalization
should be viewed in connection with the EU’s strategic objectives, which
are associated with the establishment of a monolithic market community
that ensures the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and labor,
taking into account the specifics of local markets, as specified in the
Lisbon Strategy. Institutional support for the de-monopolization in Poland
from the perspective of these objectives has been very high, greatly
exceeding the standards of many «old» member states.
2.3.4. Conclusions
Poland’s successes in de-monopolizing its economy can be associated
with the following actions brought about by the economic transformation:
— Establishing modern anti-monopoly legislation that meets the
standards of the most developed countries;
— Resolving the problem of currency convertibility;
— The commercialization and rapid privatization of state-owned
enterprises;
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— The noticeable reduction in public subsidies to state-owned
enterprises from 16% of GDP in 1998 to 0.4% in 2005;
— Deregulating foreign trade, which allowed for a sharp increase in
the share of goods imported for final consumption (from 3% in 1989 to
10% in 2002) and an incremental increase in the imports-to-domestic-
consumption demand ratio (from 13% in 1989 to 30% in 2002).
However, the practice does not always keep pace with the
opportunities created by legislative regulation. This primarily has to do
with the protection of the rights of consumers, employees, and the staff of
the so-called political entrepreneurship, whose privileged positions are
often attained through non-transparent contacts with public authorities
(Raczyński, 2003). Anti-monopoly policy, which targets not only direct
monopolists but also subordinated institutions and state functionaries, was
introduced with great difficulty. This means that institutional barriers that
protect the monopoly of political entrepreneurship are universal. They are
connected, first and foremost, with the actions, ways of thinking, and
shared interests inherited from the state monopoly. Inherited informal
institutions are also based on the  justice and health care systems, as well
as on the health care system’s patients. From this perspective, the
standards that were borrowed from anti-monopoly legislation and practice
in the EU and leading developed nations, prove themselves only in
typical monopolistic situations; despite making room for anti-monopoly
practices, they often fail to tackle practical problems.
It should also be noted that another threat is emerging in today’s over-
globalized and information-saturated economy, a threat related to the
emergence of new media-based monopolistic structures able to subdue
not only the consumer, but also the political sphere in the interests of
transnational corporations, and do it with unprecedented speed. The result
would be significant amount of noise in information, the loss of clients,
and the transformation of a democracy into a telecracy. The resulting
problems should be transferred to the competence of anti-monopoly
legislation.
2.4. Transformation of property relations
2.4.1. The basis for an acceleration of the privatization process
Following the introduction in Poland of economic and political patterns
practiced in the USSR, the implementation of the provisions of the
nationalization decree resulted in a lasting degradation of private
ownership of the means of production in the late ‘40s. The adoption of
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the constitution and other so-called norms of «social ownership of
production means» imposed by the communists actually caused the
disappearance of rights to the exclusive disposal of the property and the
liquidity of this property by citizens as their rightful owners. Instead, the
real administrator of the means of production became the state economic
administration. However, since it was not the legal owner, it carried no
material responsibility for decisions made. Therefore, in practice, the idea
of «nobody’s property» emerged, which, given the populace’s widespread
passivity, caused general wastefulness and eventually led to the
responsibility for wrong decisions and their consequences being passed
on to citizens.
Given the inefficient consequences of the system of indivisible and
not freely transferable property rights, questions of finding an efficient
system for transferring decision-making authority were brought up in
Poland again after the outbreak of crisis in August 1980. After several
years of debates, the ideas permeated into public opinion, and pointed out
that the key to a successful transformation of an administrated economy
into an efficient market-based economy lay in the change in the structure
of ownership that would result in a significant increase in the share of
private ownership. These ideas were based on the belief that private
ownership guarantees development on a large-scale and the rational
channeling of activities, initiatives, innovativeness, and creativity. The
theoretical justification that did not contradict the theory’s empirical
evidence was provided by the school of thought of ownership rights.
According to this concept, private ownership is characterized by:
• The exclusivity of an individual’s right to a certain resource;
• The voluntary transfer of those rights.
The constitutional conditions for the domination of private ownership
will arise when the abovementioned principles form the substance of
social relations and are protected by law. The exclusivity of ownership
rights allows each authorized decision to be linked to a certain individual
or individuals. The specific owners as the subjects of ownership will bear
the economic responsibility for choosing alternatives in terms of the
placement of resources and the distribution of revenues, or for refusing
this choice. Owing to the exclusivity clause, private ownership efficiently
associates decision-making risks with the owner. This exclusivity tends to
make individuals act rationally with a given resource. In this case,
microeconomic rationality manifests itself in the highest degree in the
decision-making process. The owner is subsequently maximally
interested in limiting the possibility of profits being transferred to another
individual or of profits being obtained as a result of the resource being
used by another individual.
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Free market entry is the second necessary condition for the
predominance of microeconomic efficiency. Maintaining the principle of
free market entry requires the voluntary transferability of ownership
rights, i.e. the unlimited possibility to transfer these rights to other
individuals. If economic efficiency dominates, the creation of new
economic agents will take place independent of political decisions. It
should instead be the product of independent decisions. The only
restraints here become the available financial resources and an
individual’s inclinations to use market opportunities. If those conditions
are met, the re-production of ownership rights should be of an economic
nature, i.e. based on economic calculations.
In practice, economic rationality also requires a competitive
environment. The liberalism of ownership rights, whose source is the
principle of free market entry, guaranteed by law, is sometimes seen as
insufficient in terms of microeconomic efficiency. Monopolistic tendencies
limit the freedom of entering the market and are constantly seen in practice.
From the theoretic viewpoint, the benefits from the scales of production are
the justification for these monopolistic tendencies.
The theory of ownership rights takes into account the significance of
monopolization in ensuring economic rationality. Alongside private
ownership exists an objective limit for the development of hierarchal
relations, i.e. the monopolization of production. Hierarchical relations,
which are typical for relations inside an enterprise, should develop
according to the logic of profit maximization, i.e. until hierarchal
exchange costs are at the level of market exchange costs. Upon attaining
this equilibrium, it should be expected that the owners of the means of
production will be inclined to use market exchanges, since any further
expansion of vertical relations would lead to losses.
It should be noted that the subordination of allocation decisions
according to the notion of efficiency implies that the public expediency of
these decisions can be realized only through market mechanisms, i.e. ex
post, and not taking into account those needs whose satisfaction cannot
generate sufficient profits for the owners of the capital. From this
perspective, the limited and partial public expediency of allocation
decisions should be adjusted through intervention initiatives by the state.
There are also negative external effects, i.e. undesired consequences for
third parties who hold exclusivity and voluntary property transfer rights;
they sometimes require procedures that restrict these persons’ rights.
The intervention of centers of political authority carried out to eliminate
the previously mentioned weaknesses in allocation processes and private
ownership should be limited. The lack of internal constraints for economic
interventionism by the state would disrupt market coordinating processes
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases232
given the prevalence of political interests over the economic criteria of
choice. The required conditions for economically justified boundaries for
state interventionism are the interests of private owners of production
means, legal regulations that establish the positional prevalence of the state
in respect of economic agents, and the democratic political system. Subject
to the  prevalence of a constitution and laws protecting an individual’s
rights of property, and the disposal and transfer of these rights to
production resources, a privatization can set a manager’s motivation apart
from the game of political interests and political instability,.
The decentralization of allocation decisions, which took place in
Poland as a result of the reforms of the ‘70s and ‘80s, without any transfer
of ownership rights, actually brought with it a far-sighted limitation of the
state’s influence on real processes, but did not entail the subjectivization
of ownership. At the same time, property not belonging to anyone
remains controversial due to the exclusivity of the rights to it and the
voluntariness of their transfer; it belongs to nobody and provides no
microeconomic efficiency.
The subjectivization of property can also be accompanied by a change
of employees at some enterprises due to the development of the joint-
stock form of ownership and the employees’ participation in a company’s
results and the decision-making process.
Privatization is also a prerequisite in avoiding the narrow horizon
phenomenon in decision-making by economic agents (the so-called
managers’ term horizon). Private ownership removes time limitations in
the area of property rights since it links decision-making powers over a
property item to the specific person rather than to social roles. From this
perspective, the capitalization of the expected effects of innovation
(positive and negative) with the current market value becomes possible
and expedient. Under conditions of privatization, economic organizations’
inability to react to changes in areas of technology, internal demand, and
global trade opportunities disappears (this inability exists in a centrally
planned economy).
The efficient course of restructuring processes also depends on
privatization. The freedom of market entry and the voluntary transfer of
ownership rights allow local mechanisms for the circulation of economic
surpluses to be transferred from their place of origination to where they
would be used most efficiently. Thus, competition and private ownership
release the so-called processes of creative destruction, i.e. the bankruptcy
of incapable companies and the absorption of their resources and
revenues by the most efficient entities.
The freedom of capital circulation is a condition for the emergence of
the capital market and the market of managerial talents. A manager
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reporting to a private owner holding at least the controlling stake is forced
to maximize profits, since any advancement on the managerial market
will depend on the size of dividends (company profits).
Privatization allows companies to avoid soft budgetary and financial
restrictions that were prevalent in the socialist economy. It is the only
practically tested efficient instrument that frees government agencies
from responsibility over companies’ financial situations, which cannot be
controlled in conditions of public ownership.
The previously mentioned arguments in favor of privatization prove
that a market without private ownership cannot function accurately and
cannot act as a complete market. Market efficiency requires efforts to be
focused on speeding up the privatization process, while the progress of
many transformational processes will depend on the speed of
privatization. We have already mentioned that privatization stipulates
progress in the area of wage liberalization. It can also help overcome a
recession and strengthen macroeconomic stabilization by improving the
efficient use of resources and stabilizing economic agents’ financing.
There are also historical preconditions that can aid the acceleration of
the privatization process. These preconditions are related to schemes of
the passive and negative adaptations of economic agents, which were
inherited from socialism. In practice, they show themselves in the
tendency to avoid changes in strategy, price increases, and reducing
output to stave off bankruptcy. Instead, a company’s activities are
focused on lobbying for protection against foreign competitors and
finding ways to introduce the benefit rent. Since the source of the benefit
rent is economic intervention by the state, it puts pressure on the state’s
active tax, monetary, industrial, agrarian, and commercial policies.
Inherited monopolistic structures in the economy favor this path of
adaptive processes. From this perspective, the lack of rapid institutional
changes will make it impossible to conduct any further progressive
actions in the creation of efficient markets. A competitive environment
for state-owned enterprises will only be possible once the subjective
structure of the economy becomes dominant owing to the activities of
private companies. Only then will the introduction of proactive and pro-
efficiency strategies become probable.
2.4.2. Privatization and employee participation and self-governance
Privatization is usually associated with the loss by the stuff of its
influence on management’s business decisions. This generally accepted
opinion is oversimplified. In practice, the degree of the socialization of
the decision-making process in a company is determined by the method
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of management and the goals of property use. The extent of a workforce’s
impact on business decisions and hence management’s ability to satisfy
the interests of the workers is the determinant of the subjectivization of
the stuff.
As past experiences of companies established by the state based on
no-private forms of ownership have shown, nationalization leads to the
elimination of many complications arising from ownership rights.
Irrespective of the form of ownership, it eliminates the right to
succession, market turnover with the means of production and profits, the
right of refusal from use, and the avoidance of related losses.
Incomplete decision-making powers are also inherent in non-private
forms of ownership; this  reduces the managers’ disposition to safeguard
the owners’ interests, which can negatively affect a company’s
microeconomic efficiency. On the other hand, incomplete property rights
lead to the separation of these rights from the individual and the related
functions of certain organizational units. In practice, this fact has far-
reaching consequences for the area of the bureaucratization of
management. State bureaucratic structures are not sufficiently motivated
to maximize benefits for the collective. Their private interests require a
maximization of the scale of actions. Subsequently their social prestige,
power, and political influences will increase. This leads to an expansion
of the bureaucracy, and a detachment from the goals and tasks entrusted
to the bureaucracy. Hence, state-owned property becomes nobody’s
ownership, and the authorities in the areas of production and income
distribution become dependent on the decentralized decision-making
process  established by the state.
Private ownership does not exclude the participation of workers in
management. At the same time, the authorities’ scope for direct control
should be smaller than in the case of self-governing property. However,
in the joint-stock form of ownership that dominates in modern capitalism,
the interests of owners (shareholders) can be ensured efficiency only by
once again returning the property rights that were taken away by the
previous nationalization to an individual. The managers of a joint-stock
company must be diligent in providing shareholders with sufficient
dividends, because they can easily dispose of shares that offer no
dividends. A general shareholders’ meeting can also dismiss inefficient
managers. In the event new owners take over a company, managers
should consider the risk of their dismissal, since the establishment of a
market for managers brings with it competition. In practice, this
competition restricts the inefficiency of the bureaucracy.
The belief for the need for privatization took definite shape in Poland
in the second half of the ‘80s through debates about the implications of
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various ownership decisions. Nevertheless, in preparing the governmental
stabilization program and system transformation in September and
October 1989, there was still no plan for enacting this process. The
architects of system changes in Poland recognized the need for as rapid a
privatization as possible. At the same time, they rejected any form of
state-owned property distribution and proposed privatization. These
convictions rested upon theory supported by practical examples, which
specified that the private sector’s dominance is a necessary condition for
the strengthening of competition, for efficient market functioning, for
microeconomic efficiency, and for the ability to adapt to global market
requirements.
Privatization in post-socialist countries is an exceptional process. The
process is based in laying the groundwork for a state in which the private sector
would be dominant. The huge scale of the initiatives related to the creation of
the establishment of the private sector requires new areas of activity. Sticking
by the example of developed capitalist countries in the ‘80s would stretch the
process for decades. For that reason, a new concept of privatization by
proposing (promoting) private entrepreneurship, de-nationalization, re-
privatization, and the privatization of management appeared.
However, discrepancies emerged as to the idea of an accelerated
privatization process. Opponents argued that privatization, like any other
economic initiative, should be based on an estimate of costs and public
benefits; it is needed only inasmuch as it brings efficiency. Efficiency is
also a function of the pattern of changes in the economic agents’ operating
environment and the specifics of these conditions at a given time and place.
Since the populace’s ability to adapt deteriorates with the increasing rate of
changes in the operating environment, the privatization process cannot be
accelerated through government decisions. It was also stressed that the
specifics of institutional, socio-political, and psychosocial conditions in
Poland, alongside economic lag, technological gaps, a general lack of
capital, and the huge scale of the privatization initiatives, would not
contribute to the efficient use of proven examples of privatization.
2.4.3. De-nationalization
Regarding the previously mentioned objective constrains in the sphere of
private entrepreneurship, there emerges the need for de-nationalization, i.e.
privatization of the public sector. However, its main distinctive feature is
the low adaptability of non-private companies to the requirements of the
global market. De-nationalization can be carried out through:
• Direct privatization;
• Privatization of capital;
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• Free transfer of key property to private individuals;
• Re-privatization.
Direct privatization is the sale of certain state-owned property to
private individuals. This type of privatization dealt primarily with small
and medium-size companies. So-called «small» privatization was carried
out by central and local authorities. They privatized housing, land plots,
design bureaus, commercial and service entities and other small
companies. Small privatization transactions were conducted through open
tenders to avoid incompetency in property appraisal.
Direct privatization of large companies requires finding buyers with
significant resources of financial capital, who, at the same time, are able
to carry the economic risk associated with obtaining the property. Hence,
the key role in selling large enterprises is the sale of the larger share of
the property to shareholders.  Fully paid privatization of large companies,
i.e. large privatization, however, faced certain obstacles. They appeared
due to the shortage of national capital. The British experience of the
1980s demonstrated that the 10-year period of privatization allowed for
the sale of barely half of the assets that ensured reproduction of nearly
10% of the GDP. In Poland, the scale of this initiative concerned more
than 7,000 companies that generated approximately 50% of the GDP.
Meanwhile, the savings of the population were estimated at 2-5% of the
value of state-owned assets. It was also expected that declining real
incomes of the population under pressure of rising unemployment would
be spent on daily consumption of goods.  From this perspective, the
process of privatization using methods proven in developed capitalist
countries failed to guarantee the rapid establishment of a market
economy. The sale of companies after their restructuring and thorough
appraisal of their value was slated to take decades.
Equivalent privatization of capital also often runs into obstacles that
are technical, legal, and socio-political in nature. Objective appraisal of
the value of enterprises is impossible in the absence of a developed
capital market. The high level of supply with low demand and the
difficulty of forecasting the future revenues of economies destabilized by
shock therapy means that expert appraisals can easily be considered
incompetent.
Another problem with the privatization of capital is the lack of
precision regarding the legal status of property to which its former owners
could lay claim. In its turn, post-war legislation and cultured principles of
egalitarianism and the strong position of trade unions and the workers’
self-administration was threatened by social claims.
Privatization of capital was also impeded by disputes about the
competence, low efficiency of institutions, lack of a stable tax system,
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and the inefficiency of economic policies of governments that were
constantly changing.
The aforementioned obstacles of equivalent privatization of capital
required the application of simplified appraisal procedures, such as:
• Employee shareholding;
• Public shareholding;
• Management privatization.
Although such procedures were considered acceptable, they are
nonetheless supplementary methods of privatization. The notion of
employee shareholding to its fullest scale, i.e. distribution of all shares in
state-owned enterprises among their employees (Krawczyk, 1988), was
challenged for several reasons, the main ones being that it:
• Does not help attract active investors due to the excessive
dispersion of shares and limitation of their circulation. For this very
reason, it cannot be a target stage of privatization;
• Contrary to the initial objectives it is unfair as it will not allow the
unemployed to participate in property distribution. For this reason, it
cannot be tested everywhere;
• Creates the risk that development of capital markets will be blocked, as
it will freeze the circulation of shares for at least several years.
The theoretically more mature idea of public shareholding is being
implemented in Poland according to the concept of E. Lewandowski and
E. Szomburg (1988, 1990). This concept had the objective of providing
all citizens with shares in companies or state-owned holding companies
established for this purpose by the government, as well as in investment
and pension funds. The advantage of this form of de-nationalization is
that it eliminates state ownership very quickly. This concept of
privatization from the viewpoint of legislation is fairer than the idea of
employee shareholding. Pursuant to the law, this allows for the
conveyance of proprietary rights to every citizen in full without any
exceptions. As a result, there is a possibility that the broad public will
accept the notions of private ownership and capitalism and
simultaneously remove all obstacles to access to capital markets. At the
same time, this will solve the moral problem associated with the need to
justify the sale of assets to citizens who are their legal owners.
The notion of public shareholding, however, has its drawbacks and the
proposed method for realizing the principle of «primary justice» is
debatable. Nationalization also entailed the distribution of social benefits
depending on the volume of spent assets. Due to this the equitable
distribution of shares cannot always be perceived as fair. In this case, just
as with joint employee shareholding, active investors are not likely to show
interest. Therefore, holding a second stage of privatization to identify
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owners that have the financial wherewithal to gain a controlling interest in a
company is imperative. Factoring in the recession, inflation, and the overall
decline in the real incomes of a significant part of society, particularly the
unemployed, the transfer of shares of the impoverished part of the
population becomes inevitable. This transfer takes place at an understated
price due to the disequilibrium on the capital market and unequal access to
information about the profits from owning certain shares.
The trend of substituting property shares with consumer disbursements
would have brought the threat of a strong inflationary effect. From this
perspective, the exchange of proprietary shares needs to be limited by the
state, at least for some period, and the process of distribution of shares
should be gradual. The high price of organizing the distribution of shares
is an additional mechanism that would ease inflationary trends.
As it follows from the aforementioned, public shareholding delays the
formation of efficiently operating enterprises and does not guarantee any basic
qualitative changes in such activity in the future, seeing as it is unknown if the
shares of all companies will be in demand to attract active investors.
Only non-equivalent privatization makes it possible to avoid the risk
of inflationary pressure that originates due to free distribution of shares.
The idea is to sell the shares of non-privatized enterprises at a price
corresponding to people’s purchasing power (Jędrzejczyk, 1990) or on
credit taking into account a rise in people’s incomes in the future
(Woźniak, 1990). At the same time, non-equivalent privatization can be
associated with employee or public shareholdings. The concept of non-
equivalent privatization involving employee or public shareholding is less
egalitarian and less attractive from the political point of view. Therefore,
the leading political powers in Poland did not demonstrate any interest in
this concept. Instead, they were more interested in direct non-equivalent
privatization.
2.4.4. Privatization of management
The answer to the question of how to overcome the barrier of low
national savings, thereby guaranteeing the mass participation of citizens
in the ownership of large state-owned companies raised the issue of how
to organize the proposal of such companies. Theoretically, there are a
number of solutions here. It could have been thorough selection planned
by the state privatization body (i.e. top-down forced privatization) or a
spontaneous process as a result of decisions made by company employees
and management.
Top-down «case by case» privatization is extremely slow and merely
drags out the process of restructuring. The unclear status of large
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companies slated for privatization would have threatened a further decrease
in the efficiency of already inefficient self-management structures. The
source of inefficient management at self-governing enterprises is the
bureaucratization of managerial decisions. Its essence depends on many
decisions, primarily, the competence of the company’s supervisory board
and trade unions. Control over decisions of the strategic directorate through
the representation of the employees leads to a situation when the
maximization of their revenues becomes the main criterion of choice. The
interests of the collective formulated in this way contradict a company’s
long-term development strategy. That is why in order to avoid inefficient
management at self-governing companies they proposed the privatization
of its management, meaning its commercialization17.
The commercialization concept implies the transformation of state-
owned companies into state treasury unions, normalizing the principles of
their operations in line with the decisions of the commercial code and
delegating full decision-making authority to their directors with non-
bureaucratic control on the part of the state. Commercialization
understood in this way is merely a form of management privatization.
Privatization of property is carried out only in the second stage through
gradual granting of access to shares available in the state treasury to
domestic and foreign private buyers. The combination of
commercialization and distribution of shares in property could also have
been feasible. The operations of commercialized companies would have
been placed under the supervision of investors acting as intermediaries
chosen precisely for this purpose, which would have amalgamated public
and private capital, as well as national and foreign capital (i.e. mutual
investment funds, holding companies, banks and social security funds).
The key task of these trust institutions would have been the optimal
placement of entrusted capital and supervisory boards would have been
made responsible for monitoring the activities of investors-intermediaries.
However, such commercialization raises many concerns, namely
whether these institutions will act in the interests of citizens-owners, as
the latter have absolutely no control over the former. More likely, they
will remain the bearers of particular political interests of the state
administration. There is also a threat of monopolization of the economy
on a greater scale than in the former sectoral ministries. One of the main
obstacles under such conditions is the lack of potential managers in the
country of this type of institution. Besides, there are concerns as to
whether the changes in the legal form of supervision will guarantee active
structural adaptations.
                     
17 W. Kostrzewa, E. Sacks and A. Berg were the first to propose commercialization.
See: Blaszczyk, 1991, p. 104.
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2.4.5. Peculiarities of the legal base of ownership succession
and relations
At the start of the transformation process the ownership structure of the
Polish economy differed significantly from that of the rest of the socialist
countries. Poland, unlike Ukraine and other former socialist countries,
entered the process of market transition with a relatively stronger private
sector. The specific feature of real socialism was considered to be, for
example, private farming in Poland. The private sector, with the
exception of the agricultural sector, in the early 1980s provided jobs for
around 7% of the workers, but produced only 2% of the GDP. In the
following decade, employment in this sector doubled and its share of the
GDP rose to 7.4%. The leasing system became quite common in business.
There were also cooperatives of individuals and the cooperative property
was widespread in trade. According to statistics, more than half of total
services were provided by the private sector.
Small private enterprises, private family farms, private trade and
foreign companies from the diaspora in 1988 were supported by the
decision of the Council of Ministers through the so-called nomenclatural
societies. This opened the way for establishing private societies based on
the property of private enterprises through leasing or transfer of property
thereof to individuals closely related to the executive board of enterprises
and resulted in the arbitrary seizure of property by party and government
leaders of various levels (substituting power with property). However,
this privatization mechanism did not provide possibilities for the transfer
of ownership and, at the same time, opened the way to unequal access to
information, loans, government guarantees, raw materials and supplies,
which due to the deficit were not available to others. This very simple
way of enrichment was the beginning of state capitalism and the
interweaving interests of politicians and businessmen that eventually led
to widespread activity outside the law and corruption.
During the period until autumn 1990, all transformations in the
ownership of state-owned enterprises could be carried out based on the
Law on State-Owned Enterprises of 1981 through the contribution of net
assets of enterprises to the aforementioned societies.
The ambiguous legal interpretation of the «new private companies» and
the fact that the state administered the process of entry into the business
market created no possibilities for the formation of efficient market sectors.
Nonetheless, the spontaneous development of the new private sector had a
major influence on the subsequent transformation of ownership, rapid,
spontaneous, and extensive development of new private enterprises and the
economic effects of the Polish process of transition to market relations.
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It should, however, be noted that in Poland, as in other socialist
countries, the entirety of ownership, in the formal and legal sense, was
attributed to the state. However, ownership rights were ambiguously
defined, primarily as they pertained to private, state, and cooperative
property, which played a dominant role in the services sector in Poland.
The broad restrictions as to the entirety of ownership also applied to
the sectors in Poland that were not socialized in farming, workmanship
and small industry. These restrictions implied concessions in obtaining
permits to conduct small business, access of private entrepreneurs to the
market, various economic resources, an authoritative manner of regulating
these resources and the imposition of a number of administrative barriers
that restricted the choice as to how much and how to produce (e.g. by
imposing government prices).
The substantial reforms of ownership relations as they pertain to
unambiguously defined rights of the person to the means of production,
which is typical for capitalism, led to the adoption of the Law on Economic
Activity in 1989, based on which obstacles that hampered the entry of
entrepreneurs into the market were eliminated and equal rights for the
private and public sectors were introduced. The subsequent changes
towards widening the space for private sector expansion were based on the
principles and guidelines of the program on systemic transformation in
Poland proclaimed on October 12, 1989. They contained, inter alia, the
declaration of establishment of an ownership structure similar to that in
developed capitalist countries. Having adopted the declaration, almost six
months later discussions began on drafting a privatization acceleration
program. At the same time, the formation of the legal grounds for
privatization and capital markets, being inseparably connected with private
ownership, lasted for another several years. Unfortunately, attempts of
legally regulate re-privatization did not succeed. The further changes aimed
at broadening the space for private sector expansion, in addition to the
aforesaid regulation, were also secured by:
• A new Civil Code adopted in early 1990;
• Law on the Privatization of State-owned Enterprises of July 13,
1990;
• Law on Public Exchange with Securities and Trust Funds of March
22, 1991;
• Law on Disposal of Agrarian Property of the State Treasury of
October 19, 1991;
• The so-called Pact on State Entrepreneurship of February 1993;
• Law on National Investment Funds of April 30, 1993.
The previously mentioned legal grounds for privatization were not
sufficient to ensure enough protection from irregularities observed during
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the de-nationalization process. They did not prepare the relevant
institutional infrastructure in the criminal law area. It created conditions
for taking advantage of loopholes in the existing law. In connection with
this, a shadow privatization market emerged and decisions pertaining to
privatization could be taken arbitrarily, thus violating the required public
control based on the existing number of individual shares. It was
impossible to impose criminal penalties on the majority of illegal private
and group profits obtained at the expense of the state budget and non-
privatized enterprises.
Unfortunately, at that time there were no integrated standards for
managing the property of not yet privatized companies or with the
participation of the state treasury. Only in December 2002 did the newly
adopted Law on Privatization and Commercialization of Enterprises
introduce the mandatory election of boards of large state-owned
enterprises or with the participation of the state treasury on a tender
basis.
Despite all the existing legal loopholes in the transformation of
ownership relations, Poland managed to create a private structure of the
economy similar to those existing in member countries prior to joining
the EU in 2004. However, privatization was a gradual process. Its
specifics, as well as its ups and downs, can be food for thought about how
to achieve success and avoid blunders in industries in which the
transformation of ownership relations was incomplete or required further
adjustments.
2.4.6. Development of the private sector in 1990—2007
The development of the private sector in Poland was due to:
• Expansion of private entrepreneurship;
• Establishment of new private businesses, their development or the
liquidation of bankrupt entities and the possibility of other entities
acquiring them;
• Leasing of small and medium enterprises often to existing
management and part of its team;
• Top-down privatization of existing state-owned enterprises due to
the sale of large entities conducted by the state, more often than not to
foreign investors and less often to domestic investors, and only very
rarely to trade unions;
• General privatization assisted by the National Investment Funds
(NIF) program;
• Incidental re-privatization.
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The institutional condition for private business expansion is the
guarantee of the legal protection of equal right to market entry for
national and international entities. It also requires banning concessions in
economic activity. Thus, while the initiated development of private
ownership was not considered sufficient, it turned out to be necessary.
The pace of privatization due to the liberalization of ownership rights
depended on the amount of accumulated private capital, access of
investors to such capital and people’s disposition to initiatives in the
industrial, commercial, and service sectors.
The source of private capital in the inherited ownership structure
of enterprises in post-socialist countries could have been earnings of
citizens from their labor, loans they took out, and foreign capital
investments. Low labor productivity and the resulting significantly
lower real wages compared to developed capitalist countries meant
that money accumulated by citizens was insufficient to start up a
private company. Another substantial barrier was the absence of
capital markets and lack of experience in starting up a small business
within the framework of a joint stock company. The very high
national and foreign debts, high inflation and the related shortage of
financial loans, as well as the huge credit risk, made it more difficult
to surmount these hurdles.
The disposition to invest in private industrial facilities is evidenced by
the optimistic projections as to the expected business climate, all state
budget regulations, tax regulations in the sphere of commercial and
industrial policies and the interests of potential investors. Other obstacles
to private business development were due to shock deregulation and
shock from the impact of financial restrictions of the stabilization
program. The turbulent changes in economic rules resulted in the loss of
fundamentals for making efficient projections. Systemic changes in the
political sphere were accompanied by uncertainties that did not facilitate
the inflow of foreign capital, in particular, until 1994, when a
memorandum of understanding related to foreign debt restructuring was
signed between the Polish government and commercial banks. The
actions to counteract them were to be government activities aimed at
improving the attractiveness of investment in the country, tax preferences,
freedom of transfer of capital abroad, a clear view on industrial policy, a
stable framework of economic laws and economic policy, as well as
progress in the adaptation of the institutional system to the standards
required by the EU.
Private sector development after the emergence of new companies
was fundamental in fostering entrepreneurship and private ownership. An
enterprise structure characterized by the dominance of large companies
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and the underdeveloped sector of small and medium enterprises (SME)
was inherited from socialism in a deformed and neglected state.
Therefore, transformation based on negotiations without a simultaneous
dramatic increase in the number of new entities would have been under
threat of negative consequences for economic efficiency, counteraction to
unemployment and convergence towards the subjective structure inherent
to a developed market economy. In Poland, this problem was successfully
resolved in the first years of transformation due to the aforementioned
relevant legal regulation.
Regarding the various gaps in statistics dealing with the SME
sector and changes in criteria for the classification of economic
agents, there is no precise information that would allow for estimating
the role of establishing new private enterprises in the process of
economic convergence. It is only possible to point out changes in the
share of the entire private sector using certain economic indicators
(see Table 2.1).
At the same time, statistics dealing with the change in the number of
micro-enterprises and small enterprises, as well as many medium-size
companies, is a good illustration of the process of setting up private
enterprises (Table 2.2).
The available estimates demonstrate that while in 1989 there were
almost 400,000 new businesses, in 1990-1992, on the average each year
there emerged 250-300,000 newly registered civil unions (Chmiel, 1999:
15); however, in the following years the growth in the number of new
businesses started to slow down. So, starting from 1990 until joining the
EU (2004) over 3 million new private businesses were created in Poland.
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that a significant number of
registered private companies did not conduct any business activities, the
same with micro-enterprises and entities that employed less than 5
persons.
The most interesting, ingenious phenomenon of the early years of
transformation in Poland was so-called small privatization. It set off a
avalanche-like process of people buying stores and other municipal
property in the transport and construction sectors in 1990-1991, mainly
through buy-back contracts. As a rule, buy-back contracts were signed
with employees that worked in these sectors up until that time. Open
tenders or bidding competitions in which all those interested could
participate were held for only a small percentage of non-privatized assets.
In 1992-1994, there was a considerable slowdown in the
establishment of new private businesses. The acceleration of economic
development caused a repeated dynamic increase in the number of new
businesses in 1996-1999.
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The most popular form of employee shareholding in Poland was
leasing of state-owned enterprise assets. This method of privatization was
specific to Polish de-nationalization in the first years of economic
transformation. By mid-1994, in nearly 75% of cases direct privatization
was carried out through workers’ leasing. The key reasons were as
follows:
• The right of first purchase was granted to employees of non-
privatized enterprises;
• State loans were issued to the workers’ union at low interest rates;
• The enterprises transferred to the workers’ union were usually
appraised at a lower value than when they were offered for sale to foreign
investors;
• The union that claimed to intercept the state-owned enterprise via
leasing by employees could dispose of only 20% of the non-privatized
facility fund, while only 50% of the employees were forced to join the
union.
In the second half of the 1990s, the symptoms of the employee leasing
crisis began to appear. The revenues of worker’s unions increasingly
frequently turned out to be lower than those of enterprises privatized with
the participation of the domestic or foreign capital. Allowing for the acute
competition and due to the spreading repercussions of local financial
crises in the global economy, workers’ unions burdened with leasing
contributions began losing their economic and financial form, the
possibilities for modernization, the chances of development and their
competitive position. In this context, the problem of searching for
strategic investors emerged. In 2000, the secondary privatization process
was launched and the redemption of workers’ shares by the top
management of the respective unions was introduced. Due to this process,
the attempt to build «people’s capitalism» in Poland through distribution
of property among the employees via leasing failed to meet the
expectations and turned out to be just a temporary and longer route to
private ownership, which indeed would have been capable of overcoming
competition in conditions of global capitalism.
Another attempt to distribute property was made through the National
Investment Funds (NIF) program based on the notion of public
shareholding. It was implemented according to the ideas of E. Szomburg
and E. Lewandowski (who was subsequently appointed privatization
minister), which were adapted to social and political expectations. Due to
a nearly 5-year waiting period for legal regulation and introduction of this
program based on the Law on National Investment Funds and their
Privatization adopted only on April 30, 1993 it included only 512 unions,
the total value of which did not exceed one-third of the value of shares
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issued by PKO BP SA sold on the Polish stock exchange in 2004.
Usually, the NIF considered these unions and those that had not been
privatized to be of a lower status.
To implement the NIF program 15 investment funds were set up to be
managed by companies selected under the control of a State Treasury
official. Their legitimate purpose was to increase the value of the NIF
assets and find an outside investor to effectively restructure the partner
union that it had purchased.
At the same time, shares distributed for free among citizens (one in
each NIF) could be freely circulated on the stock market as well.
According to experts, the economic purposes of privatization
supported by the NIF were not realized effectively or efficiently.
Although the economic efficiency of partner unions usually did not
deteriorate, they failed to create any added value for their shareholders.
There were also no perceptible improvements in the restructuring of
partner unions.
The ownership structure of the partner unions did not coincide with
the main objectives of the NIF. Seeing as the State Treasury held 25% of
the shares, 15% were owned by employees and 27% were controlled in
equal proportions by all other NIFs, the fund in charge of restructuring
the one-tier unions only had 33% of shares, which formally made it the
minority shareholder, frequently depriving it of the possibility to make
market decisions about restructuring provided that an outside investor had
the financial wherewithal to buy out the worker’s shares, certain minority
share packages in the State Treasury and through investments on the
stock exchange.
The program of comprehensive privatization brought few results in
the distribution of property and the development of the capital market.
The citizens dumped their shares in the NIF en masse.
The Polish experience of free distribution of property among citizens
through investment funds cannot serve as an example that should be
followed. This form of privatization solutions should be avoided, as they
do not lead to a rapid increase in economic efficiency of non-privatized
enterprises and delay their restructuring.
The privatization of state-run companies was an extremely
controversial issue at the public and media levels almost from the very
outset. The most controversial issue was the sale of large state-owned
companies to foreign businessmen. Unsubstantiated rumors often
emerged that foreign investors obtained the most efficient Polish
enterprises of strategic importance for the economy for next to nothing.
Major pressure for the hasty sale of large enterprises was stipulated by the
need to eliminate the excessive budget deficit and pay large portions of
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restructured external debts. These pressures led to many mistakes. As a
result, in 2002 private banks with foreign capital had more than a 97%
share of assets and revenues of all private banks, and employment was
nearly 95.5%. However, the state owned about 25% of the assets, 24% of
the revenues and 36.9% of employees of commercial banks (Lista
1500…, 2003). The metallurgy, cement, sugar, and insurance sectors
were privatized inefficiently. The foreign investors that injected capital
into the premature acquisition of almost all industries that given the
booming economic expansion of China and India and the related
improvement of global market conditions had all the opportunities to
restructure them at their own expense.
Often private domestic entrepreneurs were accused of having better
access to purchasing state-owned enterprises than the workers’
collectives. The aforementioned loopholes in the criminal laws and
ineffective supervision of property created opportunities for the abuse of
power. However, it should be noted that errors in property appraisals,
departures from the mandatory rules and even financial efforts had no
great impact on the economic implications of privatization, the
improvement of economic efficiency and fulfillment of the assumed
investment obligations and requirements of the personnel of non-
privatized enterprises.
M. Bałtowski and M. Miszewski (2006: 243) calculated that taking
into consideration the risk of investment in Poland in the early 1990s, the
potential profits by foreign investors of 12-13 % over the set period of
return on investment in Poland should be considered correct. They
support the theory popular among privatization opponents of K. Poznański
saying foreign investors purchased the assets of non-privatized
enterprises for a mere 10% of their actual value. They assert that the
magnitude of the actual value of property sold to foreign investors with
the US $232 billion estimated by Poznański would have made sense if
with a 10-year payback period the rate of return amounted to 60%. These
estimates do not coincide with the actual figures, since the return on
invested capital should not exceed 12%, even if you assume that actual
profits were higher than estimated.
Re-privatization played a significant role in accelerating the process
of establishing a capitalist economy. The aim of re-privatization is
returning the nationalized and illegally alienated property to its former
owners. Re-privatization in Poland demanded the abolition of the Law on
Nationalization of January 3, 1946 and the possible recognition of the
former owners’ claims regarding compensation for alienated property.
There are serious obstacles of an ethical, legal, and economic
nature to the full abolition of the law on nationalization. From the
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ethical point of view, the abolition of this law would have required
cancellation of the law on agrarian reform. The re-privatization of
property distributed based on the Decree on Agrarian Reform, which
meant change of ownership after its sale, would have been illegal.
Besides, many of the nationalized enterprises or illegally confiscated
property was after several decades subject to physical deterioration or
destruction. However, the rest were modernized or expanded. In view
of the aforementioned obstacles, the practical method of compensating
damages to the former owners of nationalized assets would be payout
of compensations. The lack of funds in the budget meant that these
compensations should have been paid in the form of shares in the non-
privatized assets.
However, the parties thereto failed to reach a consensus on who was
eligible for compensation. Despite the dozen re-privatization draft laws
that followed, the legal framework for regulation of the re-privatization
claims was still lacking. In practice, the basis for re-privatization became
the Constitution of 1997, stipulating that the re-privatization claims
would not breach the rights acquired by third persons and would be
limited to cases of nationalization not related to the Law on
Nationalization of January 3, 1946, as well as the Presidential Decree on
Forced State Management of December 16, 1918, which was
implemented with gross violations.
Contrary to the fears that re-privatization in Poland would be
suspended, it is an exceptional phenomenon among the post-socialist
countries that it did not slow down the privatization processes, although
in some instances it was not possible to conduct privatization.
Eighteen years of experience in the transformation of ownership
relations in Poland proved that the convergence of ownership rights with
those existing in developed capitalist countries and achievement of a
similar subjective structure of the economy are possible. In 2005, the
participation of the private sector in most of the sectors of the economy in
Poland was only several percentage points lower than in the developed
nations of Western Europe, fluctuating around 90%. The decrease in state
ownership to 10% requires the privatization of 350-450 enterprises,
which can be accomplished over the next few years.
The share of foreign capital in revenues of and employment at 1,095
of the largest companies is over 60%. However, it was foreign capital not
national owners of these companies that ensured a slightly higher level of
labor efficiency. On the same list of the largest companies, 70% of them
are represented by new entities where the labor efficiency is a minimum
of 25% higher than that of privatized enterprises (Bałtowski, Miszewski,
2006, pg. 248-254).
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2.4.7. Conclusions
The above facts prove that economic convergence can be accelerated by
the establishment of new large private enterprises and privatization with
the participation of foreign capital. At the same time, leasing of state-
owned enterprises accelerates privatization the most, while the
distribution of property through labor and public shareholdings delays the
formation of an ownership structure with an effective strategic investor.
Regarding existing state-owned property, a major and extremely
important problem is the introduction of an improved system of
ownership supervision, which is to ensure the effective use of the
investors’ capital, adherence to business ethics, responsibility of
management boards to their shareholders and co-owners, and the
guarantee of a long-term strategy of survival on open markets.
The most significant errors in privatization include the lack of a long-
term privatization plan that would contain the list of companies and
strategic sectors in which the state should maintain a dominant position or
exclusive rights.
Another fundamental mistake in privatization is the inadequate care about
the quality of laws that would protect and foster private ownership, as well as
regulate the state’s ownership supervision of public sector entities.
Social conflicts, social resistance to privatization, and high
unemployment are inevitable side-effects of the transformation of
ownership relations. While they can not be avoided, it is possible to
mitigate them by choosing the appropriate method of privatization and
adopting quality legislation that would guarantee equal and free access to
the market and would render impossible the use of privileged positions by
various interest groups in the privatization process.
2.5. Evolution of the macroeconomic stabilization policy
2.5.1. Phases of economic growth
The process of transitioning to market relations introduced fundamentally
new mechanisms for the regulation of economic growth in Poland. That
said, even prior to the EU accession similar macroeconomic conditions
existed starting in the ‘80s18. This was evident in the significant fluctuations
of macroeconomic parameters of economic growth and the subsequent
                     
18 See M. G. Wozniak, Zmiennosc tempa wzrostu gospodarczego w socjalizmie,
«Ekonomista» 1985, nr 3, s. 437—454.
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limitation of the business cycle to a 10-year period, as well as in the
tendency to maintain a low level of economic growth.
If one were to take changes in GDP and other macroeconomic parameters,
as well as adjustments by economic players and macro-regulatory processes
accompanying the transition to market relations, to represent economic
growth in Poland in 1990-2006, five phases of economic growth can be
identified within this period (Tables 2.3 and 2.4, Figure 2.1):
1) Transformational recession arising from the transformational shock
(from early 1990 until the end of 1Q1992);
2) Turning point marked by slow economic growth (1992 — except
for 1Q1993);
3) Accelerated economic growth and an active period of changes by
businesses, characterized by impressive growth by European developmental
standards (1994—1998 until the August financial crisis in Russia);
4) Fading economic growth due to external financial shocks and the
business climate freeze policy (from 4Q1998 until the end of 2003);
5) Return to accelerated growth and effects from the EU accession
(since 2004).
Industrial output
Agricultural output
Consumption
Capital investments
GDP
Figure 2.1. Average Annual Growth Rates of Select
Macroeconomic Indicators in Poland, 1990—2006 (%)
Source: Statistics Yearbooks GUS: 1993, Table 2 (214), p. 130; 1994, Table 2 (216),
p. 139, Table 1 (403), p. 377, Table 11 (413), p. 369, Table 10 (224), p. 144; 2001, Table 3
(545), p. 542, Table 1 (403), p. 377, Table 4 (356), p. 345, Table 18 (560), p. 559; 2003,
Table 3 (567), p. 580, Table 1 (420), p. 406, Table 4 (370), p. 370, Table 18 (582), p. 598;
Abridged Statistics Yearbook GUS 2002, Table 5 (276), p. 446, Table 1(212), p. 328,
Table 2 (186), p. 290, Table 1 (266), p. 428 and 452; 2004, Table 5 (227), p. 438, Table 1
(210), p. 319, Table 2 (184); Statistics Bulletin, p. 282; GUS 8/2004, Table 1, p. 24.
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Table 2.3
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POLAND BY PHASE
in 1990—2007 (selected indicators)
Item 1990—1991
1992—
1993
1994—
1998
1998—
2003
2004—
2007
Annual average growth  (%):
GDP – 9.3 3.2 6.0 2.8 5.4
Industrial output –15.6 4.6 9.2 4.6 9.7
Agricultural output –1.9 –3.0 1.7 –3.3 2.0
Source: Own estimates based on sources, as in Figure 2.1.
Table 2.4
FLUCTUATIONS OF DEMAND IN POLAND
DURING CERTAIN PHASES in 1990—2007
Item 1990—1991
1992—
1993
1994—
1997
1998—
2003
2004—
2007
Annual average growth in
consumption (%) –8.1 2.9 7.3 2.9 4.0
Annual average growth of
investments in gross
increase of capital stock (%)
–7.5 2.6 17.6 2.6 13.1
Imports, in USD bn (annual
average) 10.7 17.4 32.6 52.6 119.6
Exports  in USD bn (annual
average) 11.9 13.7 22.6 36.3 102.8
Source: own estimates using sources, as on Figure 2.1. and Statistics Yearbooks GUS;
1992, Table 1 (224), p. 138; 1995, Table 1 (678), p. 526, Table 1 (603), p. 452, Table 2
(646), p. 497; 1997, Table 7 (624), p. 437, Table 1 (659), p. 473; 1998, Table 16 (560). p.
555; 1999, Table 4 (479), p. 442, Table 5 (518), p. 501; 2001, Table 16 (658), p. 558, Table
4 (475), p. 429, Table 1 (612).
A highly volatile GDP reading, which fluctuated from 11.6% in 1990
to -7.0% in 1995, was a common economic feature in 1990-2006. The
instability was even greater in industry, construction, and investments.
We emphasize that Poland was not an exception among other post-
socialist countries in this respect. The magnitude of Poland’s fluctuations
in GDP and industrial output was the smallest among peers, but generally
not much different from those recorded in the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
or Hungary (Bożyk, 1999: 54 and the following).
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The strong GDP growth was closely related to growth in industrial
production. This implies that during the period of relatively fast GDP
growth in Poland, there was also an increase in industry’s share of added
value in the sector structure of the created GDP (Struktura gospodarki
transformującej …, 2000: 45). An inverse relation was also seen, i.e.
when GDP growth stagnated, the share of industry shrank. This peculiar
relation between economic growth and industrial production shows that
the service and agriculture sectors in Poland were the weak points
contributing to the instability of economic growth. At the same time, this
suggests that the strong GDP growth was primarily related to still-strong
domestic demand, especially in investments. Decelerating economic
growth also depends, first and foremost, on domestic demand. In this
case, however, the major role belongs to domestic consumer demand.
Before joining the EU, export demand was not able to offset the
economic fluctuations. GDP could slow at the same time as exports grew;
it could also increase when export volumes saw no significant change.
This means that domestic demand remained the major driver of economic
growth. This trend is explained by the high share of consumer demand in
GDP (52-57%) and the insignificant progress by the Polish economy to
integrate with globalization processes. Prior to EU accession, that trend’s
effects primarily manifested themselves in foreign competitors pushing
out domestic products, and to a lesser degree in the modernization of
production, productive facilities, and management methods. Only joining
the EU could help improve the situation.
In Poland, the high economic growth rates allowed it to narrow the
gap in terms of its divergence to the average level of per-capita GDP seen
in EU countries. This would only be possible, however, when the
traditional elements of demand, i.e. household consumption, investments,
and export, become the driving forces in the development. It became
impossible to implement a strategy aimed at catching up to EU countries
in times when the situation on global markets deteriorated. An export-
oriented strategy did not lend itself well to this type of strategy. At the
same time, high rates of domestic demand growth put pressure on the
trade balance and balance of payments. Since a simultaneous increase in
investment, consumer demand, and export brings with it the risk of
overheating an economy, it would become necessary to close the gap in
several phases. It was expected that Poland’s EU accession would make
this process a continuous one.
Economic policies that prioritize high, sustainable, long-term
economic growth require a much different production structure than in
place currently since the existing structure — focused on long-term high
GDP growth rates — is much too dependent on imports. Following EU
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accession, the Maastricht criteria and recommendations arising from the
Lisbon strategy set the framework for sustainable economic growth.
Therefore, the stabilization policy should take into account a budget
deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP, a public debt-to-GDP ceiling of 60%, and
low inflation benchmarks. At the same time, in 2007-2013 the country
will need to implement policies related to social and economic
consolidation aimed at:
• Improving the attractiveness (convergence) of the regions by
ensuring the appropriate quality of services;
• Supporting innovation, entrepreneurship, and the development of a
knowledge-based economy;
• Creating improved jobs and increasing investments into human
capital.
2.5.2. Determinants of the transformational recession
The implementation of the government’s stabilization program and
system transformations resulted in a transformational recession. The
authors of the program, while adopting it back in late 1989, relied on a
concept put forth by the International Monetary Fund based on an
economic stabilization program tested on debtor nations. The program
aimed to ensure that a debtor nation would become solvent once again. In
Poland’s case, the transition to market relations should have been the
program’s focus.
The authors of the stabilization program called for a neo-liberal
approach. In doing so, they limited the program to a set of macroeconomic
tools dealing with budgetary and monetary policy, and at the same time
chose to move forward with the rapid, one-off, shock program. The
program promised to stop the inflationary spiral by reducing price growth
to 1-2% monthly already in the second half of the year.
In order to limit aggregate demand at the start of the program, real
prices were set for basic materials, foreign currencies, and loans. As a
result, the share of liberalized prices grew from 50% to 90%.
Simultaneously, the government cut subsidies to improve price relations
and nearly eliminated all food subsidies. State prices were raised sharply
depending on the type of consumer (e.g., coal prices  by 400% and 600%,
electricity by 200% and 500%, transportation tariffs by 200%).
Theoretically, a complete freeze on wages through the excess wage tax
(the so-called second nominal anchor) should have helped ensure a
decline in excessive demand. In practice, this meant that wages grew
three times slower than prices in January and five times slower from
February to April.
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With the goal of decreasing inflation, which had until then been done
via soft budget caps, the government adopted the general principles of a
balanced state budget and stopped issuing interest-free loans to cover the
budget deficit. They also planned to cut subsidies from 31% to 14% of
government expenditures, reduce centralized investments and other
unnecessary government spending, limit tax privileges, and introduce
strict control over the timely collection of tax liabilities by increasing
penalties on delayed payment.
With the economy saturated with imports and the inflationary nature
of the artificially understated official exchange rate that made it
impossible to increase revenues by speculating on the informal market, a
permanent exchange rate was adopted as the principal nominal anti-
inflation anchor during the first stage of stabilization. This exchange rate
was set as the weighted average of exporters’ rates pro-rated for the
expected inflation on a three-month horizon.
The effective exchange rate, which became mandatory in December
1989, was subsequently adjusted to account for inflation expectations to
ensure its stability. This approach was later revised significantly.
Restrictive monetary policy and the attempt to set an effective interest
rate completed these major stabilization initiatives. In practice, this meant
a departure from the practice of automatically issuing money to cover the
budget deficit, limiting currency issuance and the supply of loans to
companies, the elimination of subsidized loan rates, the positive real level
of deposits and credits, and the considerably higher effective interest rate
for zloty deposits than foreign currency ones.
In order for a program designed in this manner to succeed, the
government would need to implement the program and society would at
the same time need to survive the inevitable hardships in the form of
declining real incomes and unemployment.
The program’s authors recognized that this type of stabilization package
would give rise to recession tendencies. They expected (too optimistically, as
it later turned out) national output to drop by 3.1%, industrial production to
decline by 5.0%, consumption to shrink by 1.0 %, real wages to drop by
20%, and the ranks of the unemployed to increase to 400,000. They believed
inflation would decelerate by almost 1% each month starting from the second
half of 1990, the USD exchange rate would stay at 9,500 zloty, and that the
turnover surplus from payment area I would be about 0.5 bn rubles19, while
the deficit from payment area II would be 0.8 bn US dollars.
                     
19 At the time, Poland had certain rudimentary indicators associated with its
membership in the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), which provided for
the operation of two payment areas. Payment area I was estimated in so-called transferable
rubles. (Note by Ukrainian editors)
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The implementation of the stabilization program and system
transformation failed to meet expectations. The program caused a deep
recession not seen since the Second World War (Table 2.5). The shock
transformation manifested itself in the greatest decay of production in
Poland’s post-war history. GDP collapsed by nearly 20% and industrial
production fell by 34% from 1989. Unprecedented inflation accompanied
the recession. Significant and increasing unemployment (11.8%) and a
drop in aggregate demand came next.
Table 2.5
RESULTS OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM in 1990—1991
Annual change, % 1990 1991
1. GDP –11.6 –7.5
2. Industrial production –24.2 –11.9
3. Agricultural production –2.2 –1.6
4. Unemployment –6.3 –12.2
5. Inflation, annual average CPI* 585.8 70.3
6. Real supply of the national currency 40.0 0.2
7. Investments into long-term resources, gross –10.6 –4.4
8. Gross return, total 29.4 8.3
9. Net financial result, total … –1.3
10. State budget balance, % GDP 0.4 –3.8
11. Real wages –24.0 1.0
* CPI — Consumer Price Index.
Source: Statistics Yearbooks GUS: 1991, Table 19 (191), p. 107; 1992, Table 19
(191), p. 109; Table 13 (276), p. 168, Table 24 (247), p. 148, Table 34 (257), p. 156, Table
31 (253), p. 152, Table 1 (244), 2 (255), p. 138, Table 4 (295), p. 191.
Alongside the above transformational outcomes, the recession was
primarily caused by:
• A 15.4% decrease in investment expenditures. A considerable
portion of already implemented investment initiatives proved redundant
due to the decrease in demand, while the remaining companies (whose
debts were mounting) lacked the necessary resources. However,
recreating an imperfect structure for the depreciated productive facilities
was irrational in view of the new requirements of an economy going
through a difficult transition to the market;
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• A drop in demand caused by reduced arms spending, both in Poland
and abroad, due to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc20;
• The loss of eastern markets, including the former GDR, due to the
collapse of the CMEA, the appearance in Poland of recession-linked
processes, and systemic changes in post-communist countries;
• A decline in personal incomes (-10.4%) due to a 25%+ decline in
real wages, the establishment of real prices and consequent 400%
inflation, and the considerable absorption of this demand by the
competitive supplies of imported goods;
• A decrease in balances due to the elimination of the deficit-based
economy and the introduction of the rationalization of production costs.
Industrial production Unemployment Inflation
Figure 2.2. Monthly Changes of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
in Poland in 1990-1992 (inflation, unemployment and industrial
production trends against the same period in the previous year)
Source: Statistics Bulletins GUS: 1991, no. 4, May, Table 10, p. 28, Table 29, p. 49,
Table 39, p. 60; 1992, no. 12 January, Table 10, p. 28, Table 28, p. 46, Table 39, p. 60.
In terms of the de-capitalization of national assets started in the mid-
’70s the reduced share of accumulation in GDP distribution was the most
dangerous recession tendency.
The shock stabilization therapy also affected all consumer drivers of
economic growth (consumption by 8.1%, real wages by more than 24%,
government spending due to the elimination of the budget deficit in 1990,
                     
20 This refers to Poland’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (a military
and political organization of socialist states).
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investments by 15%, and exports caused by the disintegration of the
CMEA and the Persian Gulf conflict). However, inconsistencies between
the structure of industrial production and services supply and demand in
the open market were the main drivers of the decline in production rather
than any shortcomings in the stabilization program (as believed),
although they also played a significant role (Woźniak, 1993: 229—244).
Very generally, these mistakes came down to the following:
• An underestimation on the part of the program’s authors of the low
flexibility of national production and the low adaptability of companies to
the transformation shock, whose magnitude was clearly underestimated;
• An underestimation of the inertia of expectations on the part of
paternalistically oriented economic players and the resulting game of
«wait for the end of restrictive policies»;
• Excessively restrictive fiscal and monetary policies and wage
control mechanisms through the excess wage tax.
The stabilization program’s aforementioned mistakes due to the
requisite system changes resulted in a deep demand and supply shock. In
reality, this shock was needed to spur the large-scale restructuring of
production and productive facilities. In reality, this shock proved
extremely strong. Amid inertia and passive changes, the supply gap was
increasingly being filled with competitive imports.
The economic policy’s mistakes cannot justify the fact that the sharp
decline of production in Poland, like in other countries undergoing a
transformation, was directly related to the shock process of transitioning
to market relations. At the same time, the gradual transition to market
relations in member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States
indeed resulted in a less intense, but longer recession than in Poland.
In the most general sense, the stage of transformation shock was
characterized by a dominant wait-and-see attitude, passive changes, and
protective strategies. Market participants’ protection of their businesses
brought numerous changes, including halting production of slow-moving
goods and increasing output of fast-moving goods, improving product
quality and design, and cutting redundant personnel. These changes could
have been implemented over a short time period. A common feature of
the transformation shock and turning point stage is the clear dominance of
the protective and passive changes, which primarily gave rise to
quantitative changes and the inertia of numerous obstacles for supply
flexibility. At the same time, there were elements that differentiated these
stages, namely the more frequent attempts in 1992-1993 to abandon
protective strategies, which triggered the gradual development of small
active changes that started to eliminate supply obstacles in the economy’s
development.
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In 1990-1991, the vast majority of enterprises21 found themselves
facing obstacles that were nearly impossible to overcome. They included
high and unpredictable inflation (80-50% per month), which made it
impossible to keep accurate economic accounting of alternative costs, the
unexpected and dramatic drop in demand, the complete inability of the
companies’ management to act proactively and address challenges that
emerged due to the sudden monetary shock, the impact of foreign
competition and fluctuating demand, the deficit of own financial
resources and the increasing difficulty in obtaining them externally, as
well as growing payment arrears. All of these factors, irrespective of a
company’s area of activity, had a decisive impact on the nature of the
market and changes in production. Naturally, this does not imply that
active changes were completely impossible. Rather, they did not occur
because of excessively high credit and inflation risks or for fear that the
government would return to paternalistic practices.
The consciously chosen strategy of expecting tight monetary policy
and fiscal restrictions, or of depending on macroeconomic populism, was
the result of the prevalent belief that the stabilization policy was a failure
and that it would lead to an imminent fiasco, a view that was
unfortunately supported by many politicians and mass media outlets.
Changes in monetary policy also contributed to the belief. During the
transformation shock stage all of these factors led to a situation in which
production and turnover were mainly the result of passive changes by
companies to the demand structure. For instance, in 1Q1990 the country’s
production and structure of production were unchanged, but because of
price shocks, manufacturers were producing mainly for inventories. Plans
to change the range of products began emerging only after several months
of operating under the new conditions. Producers mostly relied on the
structure of orders or the expected amount of demand. Most companies,
despite the ongoing decline in orders, were not planning to reduce output
until their warehouses were completely overstocked; they were banking
on the government’s promises to overcome the recession by mid-1990 or
at least return to partial macroeconomic regulation by the state, which had
been in effect until 1990. Besides, during the period in question, the share
of exports in the value of sales remained unchanged.
Over time, the process of quantitative changes began to spread
systematically, though with numerous obstacles and complications.
However, the manufacturers and suppliers were still not bringing in
qualitative changes in response to consumer expectations.
                     
21 The research results dealing with changes by companies to the transition to market
relations and the government’s and NBP’s stabilization initiatives are presented in:
Wozniak, 1998.
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The government’s coordinative actions in the second half of 1990,
which envisaged an increase in price administration, a lowering of the
wage indexation coefficient, and a suspension or reduction of customs
duties, served to spur inflation higher once again. The fluctuations of still-
elevated inflation, growing prices, shrinking returns on exports, and the
loss of markets of the former CMEA countries in 1991, strengthened the
tendency for passive changes. The expectation that the stabilization
program would be amended became increasingly more pronounced.
However, the dramatic decrease of exports to Eastern European markets,
restrictive barriers for entering Western European markets, and the
domestic market’s over-saturation with imported consumer goods (not
always of the appropriate quality) forced domestic enterprises to try and
modify production ranges. At the same time, the most active companies
proved to be the ones that had some experience of competition, and they
emerged in early 1991. In the meantime, in a product class where the
manufacturer held a monopoly, product modifications were exceptional
and embarrassing.
The aggravation of the financial situation resulted in changes in
resource management. Whereas in 1990 goods were produced for
inventory, a year later the focus was on reducing the resources used in
finished products and adapting an entire production process to a
specific order. Still the warehouses were full of products that failed to
meet consumers’ new requirements, having been manufactured back
in early 1990. We note that these inventories were amassed not just
because of an inability to anticipate changes. Rather, it was often
because consumers reneged on earlier-signed contracts due to delays
in filling the orders and weaker demand on eastern markets. There
were also dramatic changes in the area of resource supply. The time
when suppliers dictated terms disappeared in 3Q1990. However,
another problem emerged in the supplies area, related to payment
difficulties.
Amid the dramatic and continued decline in demand, efforts were
made to enter new markets. Efforts were mainly limited to fighting for
a share of trades, exchanges, advertising in newspapers and radio, and
it was mainly executives themselves seeking out the orders and
organizing export trades. Sometimes, price discounts were offered for
bulk purchases. Some attempts were made to preserve export markets
that could hold future potential. Efforts included cases of periodic
compensation for exports and increased volumes. On the territory of
the former USSR, after the deterioration of trade, efforts were
undertaken to organize new economic initiatives and promote barter
opportunities.
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2.5.3. Drivers and obstacles of economic growth during the
period of the turning point in the transformational recession
The turning point stage, from April 1992 to the end of 1993, is associated
with a change of economic policy. Public protests prompted the chief
architect of economic policy to be replaced. The new government
declared a change in policy priorities towards supporting proposals to end
spiraling inflation. The introduction of interventional instruments in this
respect made it possible to initiate the process of restructuring foreign
debts with the signing of an agreement with the Paris Club. Among the
priorities of the economic policy were control over the budget deficit and
its gradual reduction, spurring supply through a more rapid increase in
money supply versus GDP growth, easier access to funds for enterprises,
implementing an exchange rate policy capable of ensuring an external
balance. Debts were also brought in to help solve the problem.
Companies that had expected a return to paternalistic government policy
now understood that the transition to a market economy and fixed
financial rules were inevitable. These circumstances became a strong
driver for the polarization of companies’ operations and the gradual
development of small, but extensive changes. However, the start of the
process of emerging from recession should be still associated with
companies adapting to the rules of the market game.
In 1992, the decline in turnover volumes slowed, and structural
changes and a differentiation of companies’ efforts to change appeared.
Enterprise leaders — mainly medium-size firms and to a lesser extent
small businesses, privatized firms, and companies making final
preparations for privatization — began to appear and were marked by
intensive activity.
These leaders were characterized by a propensity to develop new
strategies and use societal changes for their own development. They made
huge efforts to fill existing gaps on the domestic market. There were
frequent attempts to introduce (with varying degrees of success) new
types of activities generally not related to existing specializations. Putting
these new activities into action required the formation of so-called small
reserves and did not require large cash expenditures or skilled labor. The
leaders also enacted deeper active changes, based in attempts to enter
markets in other regions through the local market. They also attempted to
enter the eastern markets, but these efforts generally did not bring the
expected results or ended in failure. Efforts were also made to introduce
higher-quality production and improve packaging. Attempts to speed up
changes in the assortment structure of products became visible, and a
process of introducing new products was initiated.
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The leading companies’ competitive advantages were based on their
ability to better adapt, which was a result of the following:
• Better economic standing;
• Faster adaptive actions (pro-active positions by management and,
sometimes, workers’ councils).
The turning point brought about the above changes in businesses’
actions, and also had an effect on changes in macroeconomic policy
priorities that mainly had to do with budgetary, fiscal, and monetary
policies. In-line with the economic program, it was deemed necessary for
the state to be active in two complementary areas: the further
restructuring of the economy towards the transition to market relations
through the development of the private sector, and the introduction of
intervention tools aimed at stopping the recession through market-based
measures. In budgetary policy, the concept of a controlled budget deficit
was adopted, which allowed for the implementation of the IMF’s
requirements and for the gradual reduction of the budget-deficit-to-GDP
to a level that met the Maastricht Treaty requirements.
In order to increase supply in monetary policy, a decision was made to
introduce money into circulation at a faster pace than GDP growth
(Założenia polityki społeczno..., 1992: 17), which in practice led to easier
access to money for efficient enterprises and over the subsequent years
addressing the problem of debts under the law on financial restructuring
of enterprises and banks. The macroeconomic policy principles adopted
in connection with the gradual development of extensive business
changes imitated the country’s emergence from the recession. Thus, the
internal economic conditions for the development of active changes by
enterprises were established. Due to the above measures, the
unemployment growth rate decelerated considerably, having reached a
peak pre-2001 level (16.4%). However, alongside the aforementioned
trend of increasing production volumes, there were new and existing
obstacles to economic growth, the most important being:
• A lack of obvious progress in the restructuring of the national
economy;
• High and growing unemployment, and the related dangerous
structural tendencies;
• The appearance of symptoms of tension in the trade balance;
• Difficulties, as before, with budget deficit financing;
• An increasing polarization of society’s material well-being, with
poverty among the unemployed and large families.
At the time, most state-owned enterprises had neither the appropriate
management personnel nor the financial resources to efficiently overcome
the inherited obstacles to development. The absence of efficient decisions
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on the future of Poland’s foreign debt deprived certain firms and the
economy in general of access to foreign capital markets as a way of
reducing debt. The government’s efforts in support of the IMF
recommendations to reduce external debt and its desire to increase
foreign reserves limited the room for maneuvering in terms of
macroeconomic policy. To ensure further success the government began
implementing an exchange rate policy by establishing and maintaining an
external balance, while restrictive fiscal, monetary, and profit policies
were aimed at reducing and, eventually, weakening excessive domestic
demand to bring deflation.
2.5.4. Conditions and implications of accelerated economic growth in
1994—1998
In 1994-1998 the Polish economy entered a period of high economic
growth enabled by:
• The uncovering of the consequences of the active changes by
market elements, which gradually gained prominence over the four
preceding years;
• The resolution in 1994 of problems related to restructuring foreign
debt inherited from the centrally planned economy, paving the way for a
greater inflow of foreign capital;
• Favorable economic conditions in Poland’s main trading partners,
except for former USSR countries;
• The adoption of a 6-year comprehensive program of systemic
reforms, anti-inflationary measures, and economic development called
the «Strategy for Poland», which was based on supporting national
demand.
The four year delay in the implementation of active changes at most
companies resulted in the need to change the mentalities of managers and
staff and overcome, at least for the most part, the inertia of established
behavioral patterns in the management process that were inherited from
the centrally planned economy. These delays were also due to objective
reasons. Innovation requires the existence of a certain environment;
innovation cannot yield results under uncertain circumstances.
Pro-active moves can gradually stifle passive expectations if the
possibilities exist for the accumulation of financial resources that are
needed to develop and grow market share on local or national markets, or
to conquer new markets. In this way, companies emerged that viewed
their financial shape as good or very good. The key factors in
implementing the expansive criteria were profitability, preservation of
financial continuity, and the ability to accumulate.
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Active changes were also seen in monetary and pricing policies.
These changes were seen in a departure from the practice of passing on
increases in costs to the final price. Although most companies pointed out
the cost nature of inflation, their price response to cost incentives was
generally not automatic. Competition and room available for
maneuvering that appeared as a result of growing market profitability
were two factors that countered the delay of these reactions and even
allowed some absorption of costs impulses. However, there still was a
serious threat to companies’ ability to absorb costs that were caused by
price impulses. The main source here was a lack of resources for
modernization programs.
 However, modernization programs only began to be financed
following a takeover by a strategic investor. Accordingly, a significant
difference emerged in the depth and intensity of the active changes
between the public and private sectors. A growing number of enterprises
privatized with the participation of foreign investors began producing
new product ranges each year, while manufacturers that were sold to
domestic investors did so less frequently. Unfortunately, other companies
released far fewer new products.
Privatization significantly contributed to an increase in the
modifications of manufactured products. Although most private and state-
owned enterprises reported that they successfully met the set
requirements in terms of bringing improved goods to the market,
innovations at state-owned firms were often superficial in nature, or even
non-existent. At the same time, private companies, as a rule, guaranteed
in-depth modification.
Operations that aimed to create a brand-new product, upgrade a
product range, and identify a market niche were more intensive at private
enterprises than at state-owned firms, although they sometimes failed.
Given that private companies operated under new ownership for a
maximum of three years, and sometimes for no more than 18 months, the
positive effects of privatization were rather impressive.  It should be also
said that enterprises that were sold to a strategic investor had, as a rule, a
strong production strategy, based on the broad involvement of
investments and the possibility of technological transfers. The greater
successes in implementing a production strategy at companies with
foreign investment were directly related to the implementation of the
investment commitments assumed prior to the privatization, as well as the
appearance of new possibilities for technological and organizational
support.
The appearance of a strategic investor was also beneficial in terms of
market changes. In particular, the share of exports often increased, while
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases266
at times its own markets opened up to imports of non-competitive, low-
quality products. However, entering new markets through the foreign
investor came much quicker than managers at privatized enterprises had
expected.
Privatization also contributed to increased professionalism and a
greater scope of activities in developing and modernizing sales and
supply methods. Efforts in this area had actually been made prior to the
privatization, but the impact of a strategic investor was nevertheless
crucial. Privatization enabled the application of qualitatively better
decisions and the use of proven marketing initiatives. At enterprises with
the participation of foreign investors, marketing services performed much
better, especially those public relations services. These enterprises often
engaged in specialized services, used modern supply techniques, and
spent, on average, more on advertising than other groups of companies.
The economic policies aimed at supporting demand, which as it
turned out later caused the economy to overheat, was an extremely
important factor in accelerating economic growth in 1994-1998.
The «Strategy for Poland» recognized that in the following years there
would be a state budget deficit and that the government would need to
pay large amounts of interest on national debt. A decision was made to
finance the debt servicing from state budget proceeds. They did not
consider financing the budget deficit by cutting social spending and
increasing fiscal restrictions since that would have affected the disposable
incomes of households and firms. This approach could cause national
demand growth to slow and would not guarantee a decline in inflation. It
also was not possible to finance the state budget deficit through arbitrary
price increases for goods and services controlled by the state and/or
restrictions on salary increases since those types of initiatives would
affect general demand and could threaten the targeted level of inflation.
Instead, they decided to reduce national absorption to obtain a trade
surplus, which would ensure the sufficient inflow of foreign currency to
pay the interest due. The strategy could be achieved by controlling
interest and lending rates, exchange rates, customs duties, and import
finance facilities.
Loans that carry high interest rates deter investment demand, and
exchange rates increases and protectionist restrictions cap imports and
help increase exports. A trade surplus obtained in this manner creates the
opportunity to pay the interest due and reduce debt. The side effect of
these regulatory initiatives is a decrease in investment demand. That can
lead to an increase in the import of inputs needed to eliminate narrow
margins and improve product quality to enhance competitiveness on
global markets.
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The new economic strategy outlined in the previously mentioned
macroeconomic policy was implemented in the framework of Poland’s
restructured foreign debt, which eventually helped improve economic
conditions and spur adjustments by active companies. All that taken
together facilitated an acceleration of economic growth (Table 2.6). That is
well illustrated in Poland’s annual GDP growth, which in 1994-1998 came
in at 5.2-7%, and in industrial production of 12.1-9%. The dynamic growth
in investment and consumer demand (respectively, 66% and 23.7% in the
period in question), as well as exports, although to a much smaller extent,
were the driving forces behind the high demand. In parallel with the still-
high GDP growth rates, changes took place in the structure of GDP, which
was becoming increasingly similar to developed market economies.
Table 2.6
DYNAMICS OF CERTAIN
ECONOMIC GROWTH INDICATORS in 1994—1998
Indicators 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Annual average growth (%):
GDP 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 4.8
Consumption 4.4 7.8 9.5 7.3 4.6
Investments 9.2 18.5 20.6 21.9 16.2
Industrial production 12.1 9.7 8.3 11.5 4.6
Agriculture -9.3 10.7 0.3 0.8 0.5
Average Consumer Price Index, % 32.2 27.8 19.8 14.5 11.8
Unemployment, % of the total
workforce 16.0 14.9 13.6 10.5 10.4
Public budget deficit, % of GDP –2.7 –2.6 –2.5 –1.3 –2.7
Exports, in bn US dollars 17 22.9 24.4 27.2 30.3
Imports, in bn US dollars 17.8 24.7 32.6 35.6 42.7
Source: own estimates based on: Statistics Yearbooks GUS, 1995, Table 20 (203), p.
132; 1997, Table 1 (659), p. 473; 1998, Table 19 (164), p. 138; 1999, Table 5 (518), p. 501,
Table 18 (167), p. 144, Table 5 (518), p. 501; 2001, Table 12 (349), p. 329.
The unprecedented rapid growth compared with other countries that
went through the transition to a market economy resulted in a desire to
maintain the same rate of growth, at least double that of EU countries. As
a result, it became possible to expand the use of idle production
capacities, cut unemployment by 4.9%, and increase companies’ margins
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and the share of profitable firms. They were also accompanied by almost
a 2.5-times reduction in inflation. The dramatic economic growth was
caused by the spreading out of active changes by market economic
players and the state’s introduction of demand growth drivers, prioritized
in the following way: investments, domestic consumption, and to some
extent foreign demand. However, the major factors, as before, were
aggregate investment and consumer demand.
In 1995, however, a worrying tendency of economic overheating
appeared, resulting in a more rapid pace of aggregate demand growth
against GDP growth. According to estimates by the Market Economy
Research Institute, in early 1996 the difference between these indicators
reached 5% (Popyt krajowy rośnie..., 1997). This rate of GDP growth —
too high when compared with the growth of national demand — was
partly due to the beneficial effects of avoiding a number of implications
(addressing the problem of repaying foreign debt, NATO membership,
Russia’s difficult socio-political situation, and the low efficiency of the
transition to market relations in many other post-socialist countries, and,
because of it, a less favorable investment climate than in Poland), and
improved economic conditions, which were associated, primarily, with
the elimination of the excess wage tax. At the same time, the poorly
functioning mechanism of salary payments made it impossible to ensure a
rapid increase in wages pro rata to the GDP growth rate, introduce
investment and construction benefits, abolish the tax on imports, and
implement the government’s plans to cut corporate income tax, as well as
maintain strict budgetary discipline.
In 1995, state budget subsidies accounted for 30% of all revenues at
state-owned enterprises. Some companies and entire unprofitable
industries contributed to the formation of budgetary imbalances, as they
had excessive staff and the related wage policy, which de facto did not
depend on a company’s or industry’s (e.g., mining, iron and steel industries)
economic performance. Due to the financing of salaries at loss-making
enterprises, the average salary, paradoxically, could be higher than at
profitable companies. The largest source of demand in the economy
became the state budget, with spending accounting for roughly half of
total GDP (from 48.1% to 49.9%). It proved especially dangerously to
stimulate demand through the budget deficit, especially the part financed
by the central bank. It subsequently became clear that in the
circumstances it was necessary to limit budget expenditures and slow the
rate of wage growth, which was not related with an increase in labor
productivity.
At the time, economic policy priorities were to eliminate or
substantially limit the budget deficit, stop the further growth of the
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current turnover deficit in GDP, rapidly and consistently privatize
remaining enterprises, thus contributing to microeconomic efficiency,
introduce a well thought-out trade policy that would restrain unfair
competition and favor increasing competitiveness of domestic producers,
as well as an industrial policy that would further promote industrial and
technological innovation.
The extremely rapid economic expansion vis-à-vis the country’s
export possibilities gave rise to numerous tensions and obstacles inherent
to the strategy for stabilization and economic growth designed for the
mid-term. The most important were and still are the following:
• A rapidly growing trade deficit;
• Slow restructuring of state-owned enterprises;
• The failure to initiate a restructuring of the agricultural sector;
• High unemployment and inflationary expectations;
• Excessively high growth of real public sector wages, which are
faintly related with changes in labor productivity;
• Difficulties balancing the state budget;
• Insufficient financing of education, health care, and state security,
extremely high taxes compared with countries with high production;
• Better use of industrial production capacities.
Under these circumstances the government lost room to maneuver in
the area of budgetary policy to eliminate short-term obstacles for
development.
2.5.5. Tendencies and mechanisms of stagnation in 1998-2002
The combination of negative effects from the external financial shocks
of 1997-1998 and especially the crisis in Russia, along with the
government-announced economic cooling strategy, brought to light the
structural weaknesses of Poland’s economy and policies related to the
business environment that had been implemented in the previous phase.
As a result, it led to a decline in GDP growth and a transition to the next
phase of economic growth. Taking into account the specifics of the
sources of the GDP decline, the next phase can be described as the
phase of the impacts of external shocks and changes in economic
conditions.
The first more significant slowdown in economic growth following
Poland’s emergence following the transformational recession took place
in 4Q1998. Russia’s financial crisis, which began in August 1998 and led
to a decline in Polish exports to that market, directly caused GDP growth
to slow — the Russian crisis and the start of the decline in Polish exports
and demand coincided.
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The crisis in Russia and the financial shocks in other countries gave
rise to a barrier for foreign demand as early as 1998. This barrier was still
in place in 1999, especially during the first six months. According to
GUS, the trade deficit reached 18.5 billion US dollars in 1999, and was
just 0.3 billion US dollars lower compared with 1998. Decelerating
economic growth for the second consecutive year contributed
significantly to a deterioration of the labor market situation. Improved
labor productivity in industry was also a factor in the lower national
employment levels and the average level of employment in industrial
production.
In 2000, the pace of economic growth was close to that of 1999.
According to estimates, GDP growth in 2000 was similar to 1999 and
amounted to 4.1%. In the next quarters of 2000, however, GDP growth
consistently decelerated (I quarter — 5.9%; II quarter — 5.0%; III quarter
— 3.1%, IV quarter — 2.4%), whereas it grew on a quarterly basis in
1999. The slowdown of GDP was related to a drop in industry’s gross
added value (GAV) growth in the subsequent quarters of 2000.
Nevertheless, in 2000 the annual GAV growth in industry was higher
than in 1999 (6.8% in 2000 vs. 3.0% in 1999).
A similar trend of decelerating growth was seen in market services
and construction as well, which nevertheless grew compared with 1999.
However, their growth was somewhat lower: by 0.6% in construction and
by 1.9% in market services.
The slowdown in economic growth that affected the key sectors set
Poland back almost five years in terms of the initiatives aimed at bringing
the country’s development nearer to the standards of EU countries.
In addition to the direct external factors contributing to the decline in
key macroeconomic indicators, internal conditions represented a real
threat to the development of Poland’s economy. As seen in Table 2.7, the
primary internal sources of stagnation that started in 2003 were:
• A low disposition to savings, insufficient amid the calls for
development;
• Insufficient capacity for the absorption of foreign capital;
• Persistent obstacles to external trade, mostly structural in nature
(technological gaps, incomplete privatization, poorly functioning laws
aimed at protecting against unfair competition);
• Lack of ideas and consensus as to implementing fiscal reforms in
order to address threats to sustainable economic growth;
• A large-scale and more expensive than expected program of social
reforms (health care, welfare, self-government and administrative
changes), which makes it impossible to cut public spending or create
room to gradually cut taxes.
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During the economic debates over the causes of the economic
slowdown in Poland and necessary conditions for a return to a sustainable
5-6% GDP growth rate, it was often stated that the strategic goal of
economic policy was to increase the scale of national savings (Gomułka,
2001; Orłowski, 2002). National savings, which account for roughly 20%
of GDP, do not facilitate sharp economic growth in the range of 5-6 %
annually. The problem of low national savings will not be resolved by an
inflow of foreign savings, since they would cause an increase in the trade
deficit and current turnover. With the existing structure of production and
the low competitiveness of domestic production, the Polish economy is
unable to sufficiently absorb foreign savings in order to maintain high GDP
growth since this would lead to a stronger national currency and
subsequently a decline in export margins. However, boosting national
consumer demand would widen the trade deficit and the current turnover.
This mechanism led to a situation in which export volumes caused nearly a
12% devaluation of the zloty in 2001, in addition to high corporate debts to
foreign entities. Trade volumes nevertheless stabilized at the levels seen in
2000.
The drop in export volumes, reduced employment due to corporate
restructurings initiated by the Russian crisis, and the subsequent
deterioration of global market conditions and decline in aggregate
demand (from 3.9% in 2000 to 0.4 % in 2001) as a result of loose fiscal
policy and restrictive monetary policy, brought the investment process to
a critical point. The above factors laid the groundwork for economic
stagnation in 2001-2002 and directly led to a slowdown of GDP growth
to 1.1% in 2001 and 1.4% in 2002.
In spite of the above-described GDP deceleration, Poland’s economy
staved off recession, although many industries like food, pharmaceuticals,
and chemicals faced enormous difficulties in marketing products. The
crisis in Russia exposed the low competitiveness of most exporters and of
Poland’s entire economy. Difficulties emerged in maintaining the
achieved levels of monthly exports amid a significant increase in imports
(3.5 — 4.5 billion US dollars, each month).
The aforementioned list of conditions: low savings (insufficient
capacity for the absorption of foreign capital) and insufficient export to
satisfy the needs of the economy through the introduction of the «Strategy
for Poland» led to a balance of payments deficit threatened by the
financial crisis. At the end of Q1 2000, it amounted to 8.3% of the GDP.
The fall in its share to 4% in 2001 did not mean that the risk of the
financial crisis was overcome. This was due to the weakness of Polish
exports and the low profit margins of exported domestic goods compared
with sales on the domestic market. The low level of competitiveness of
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domestically produced exported goods in 1998, the trend of the declining
market climate in the global economy, the crises in Asia and Russia, the
recession in the US, serious economic hardships in Argentina, Brazil and
Japan, and the major role of these countries as importers and exporters of
capital and technology for the EU all together contributed to the
increasing balance of payments deficit of 7-8% of the GDP. The driving
forces were investment and consumer demand, which was highly
saturated by imported goods, and the absence of better possibilities to
limit the use of trade policy instruments due to the high budget deficit and
international obligations that Poland assumed as a condition for WTO
membership and its future accession to the EU. With the government
finances the way there were, any substantial support of export by
resources of the national budget policy was impossible.
At the same time, it should be stressed that economic stagnation ate
away at the already low level of savings of all economic subjects (limited
household savings to maintain existing levels of consumption, decreasing
commercial profit margins, exorbitant 5% budget deficit due to inefficient
government spending). The process of stagnation led to a heightened
imbalance and a return to imbalanced and low economic growth with
recession tendencies.
Threats to the current and mid-term strategy of economic
development arising from the excessive current turnover deficit were
taken into consideration in the process of drafting a policy aimed at
freezing the economic climate similar to the one of 1998. The
consequences of this policy turned out to be unsatisfactory, as it did not
factor in the problems of decreasing demand. Attempts to reform fiscal
policy could not succeed without the approval of parliament and
unsuccessful projects aimed at reforming the tax system. On the backdrop
of a large-scale social reform program (healthcare, social insurance for
self-government and administrative measures), limiting social
expenditures to make room for maneuver and the declared cut in taxes
became impossible. In turn, the absence of a sufficiently restrictive fiscal
policy stipulated that the main emphasis to stabilize the economic
situation was made on monetary policy. However, it turned out to be too
restrictive compared to the high risk of the outbreak of a financial crisis.
This disadvantageous combination of a restrictive monetary policy and an
inadequately restrictive fiscal policy was implemented amidst
deteriorating conditions in the global economy, which triggered a wave of
local financial crises in Southeast Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina.
The implementation of a stabilization policy to stimulate the further
process of the adaptation of Polish companies necessitated the
introduction of measures that would have blocked the possibility of
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further development of business. The following macroeconomic
processes were the outcome:
1) Deceleration of GDP growth to 4.1% in 2000 and a further drop to
1.1% in 2001 and 1.4% in 2002;
2) Increasing threat of a government financial crisis manifested in a
surge in the budget deficit from 3.47% of the GDP in 1999 to 5.1% in
2002 and the lack of prospects of its reduction in the foreseeable future;
3) Rise in unemployment to more than 20% in 2003 and the absence
of grounds for its reduction. As a result, there was an increase in poverty,
marginalization of a considerable part of society, regional differentiation
of the country and a decrease in national demand;
4) Weakening of internal demand to the levels of 2003 made for an
unfavorable investment climate and deprived the government of the main
driving force of sustainable economic growth amid deteriorating global
market conditions;
5) Foreign debts of Polish enterprises that had accumulated until 2003
(according to the National Bank of Poland it was US $25.7 bn in H1
2000) hindered the prospects of modernization of production capacities of
the better part of the economy and a revitalization of the former growth
dynamics, where labor efficiency was still three times lower than in the
most developed countries;
6) The dramatic plunge in the inflow of foreign direct investments
(from US $8-10 bn in 1998-2000 to almost US $4 bn in 2003) made it
impossible to replenish the extremely low level of national savings;
7) Very rapid deflation amidst stagnation spurred a decrease in
inflation from 11.6% in July 2000 to 0.8% in late 2001, and,
subsequently, in the later period inflation was even lower than the figure
specified in the budget law and the  inflation target set by the Monetary
Policy Council (1.7% in December 2003 vs. December 2002);
8) The extremely low level of competitiveness of export due to the
highly saturated domestic demand for imported goods led to a
considerable predominance of import over export (US $18.5 bn in 1999).
The registered fall in decline of the balance of trade of imported goods to
US $10.3 bn in 2002 was mainly stipulated by market conditions and the
decrease in investment demand, the low increment in other elements of
the aggregate demand and changes in the exchange rate of the Polish
currency versus the euro and the dollar;
9) The increasing deficit of the balance of payments from US $4.3 bn
in 1997 to US $11.7 bn in 1999 was a significant factor. Its amortization
was due to the increased inflow of portfolio investments due to the
economy’s inability to expand the volume of FDI, which exceeded US
$10 bn a year before Poland became a member of the EU. The improved
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balance of trade in the following years helped reduce the overall balance
of payments deficit from 8.0% of the GDP in 1999 to 3.6% in 2001;
10) The low level of provision of housing and the renewed decline in
housing investments in 2001 (by 22.2% in January-September 2001);
11) An increase in regional differentiation and low efficiency of
agricultural production.
2.5.6. From supply-side policy to the improvement in public finance
A thorough analysis of the factors that caused the recession and overall
economic growth at a level that did not foster a reduction in the gap of
development allowed the new government to reorient its policy. The new
economic policy was henceforth based on a supply-based and modern
growth economy, seeing as demand and supply shocks closely related to
globalization and the country’s accession to the EU, development of
human capital and a knowledge-based economy became increasingly
important for the development processes in Poland.
The comprehensive economic strategy «Entrepreneurship —
Development — Employment» adopted by the Council of Ministers on
January 2, 2002 was aimed at:
• A gradual return to a 5% growth of the GDP by 2004;
• Professional revitalization of society and an increase in the number
of people employed;
• Effective attraction of European funds for the country’s
development.
The intention of the developers of this strategy was to rehabilitate the
financial standing of companies and foster their growth by curbing
inflation or lowering the current turnover deficit. Four sub-programs
formed the integral part of this strategy: «Entrepreneurship Above All»,
«First Job», «Infrastructure as the Key to Development», and
«Restructuring of Certain Sectors of the Economy».
The implementation of this strategy rested on three pillars:
• The strategy of state financing as a cushion from interest groups and
latent methods of administration in fiscal policy;
• A pro-development52 strategy that envisaged the gradual lowering
of taxes, elimination of red tape for business, launch of investment
initiatives in the public sector, and changes to the public spending
structure in order to gain multiple effects;
• A strategy for European integration to efficiently use the resources
of the EU.
In order to achieve pro-development and stabilization effects
simultaneously, the principles of an annual increment in government
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spending that is 1% higher than the forecast level of inflation were
adopted. In addition, taxation of legal entities was reduced to 22% in
2004 and a transparent system of VAT compensation was introduced. At
the same time, in order to harmonize the pro-development initiatives with
a decrease in unemployment, the «First Job» program, aimed at cutting
labor costs, was launched. It included:
• Coverage of part of the 1-year insurance premium by the national
budget paid by employers of school graduates that were employed for the
first time (20.41% of the salary) or exemption of employers from
payment of part of the premium with the exception of health insurance;
• Deferring tax and insurance payments for graduates that establish
their own business;
• Introducing the subject «fundamentals and techniques for starting
up a private business and self-employment» in academic programs;
• Volunteering for NGOs and the public sector supported by welfare
and compensation of travel expenses to work;
• Regulated intermediation in employment aimed at activating job
seekers.
An audit of state expenditures allowed for making changes to their
structure in order to initiate, support and guide the developing modernization
processes. Room for maneuvers concerning these expenditures clearly
could not be attributed to social transfers (40% of total expenditures) and
foreign debt payments. That is why the limits to such activity were set at
1% per annum of the GDP with a 0.5% level of public savings. Some
savings to finance pre-development initiatives could also be derived from
a reduction of debt servicing costs pro rata to GDP growth from 50% in
2002 to 10-20% in the following years.
The support of pre-development initiatives by outside sources,
meaning foreign loans of US $1 bn a year, the same amount for pre-
expansion and EU structural funds to the tune of approximately EUR 6.5
bn, were also taken into account. However, all sources of financing
economic growth can only be viewed as a starting point. In order to speed
up its dynamics and achieve a minimum level of 5% GDP growth, foreign
capital was to be attracted by the economic center and certain regions.
The largest institutional investors on the capital market were the open
pension funds (OPF), the reserves of which could reach the level of 190-
230 billion zloty by 2010. OPF investments could also be supported by
resources from tier III insurance. To this end, the limits of the pension
funds for investment in capital markets were revised and their portfolios
were expanded.
The adopted pro-development strategy was later refined in a
package of initiatives to facilitate the professional revitalization of
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graduates, business development, infrastructure improvement, restructuring
of selected sectors of the economy, actions to improve the
competitiveness of production and services, and via the policy of
earmarked placement of foreign investments. The most important
initiatives to support entrepreneurship were:
• A decrease in unemployment, inter alia, by supporting small and
medium enterprises;
• Tax preferences and subsidies for enterprises that create new
jobs;
• Assistance provided by the state to graduates in getting their first
job;
• Active export-oriented policy.
The deteriorating situation on the labor market since 1997 in terms of
the decline in economic efficiency combined with demographic pressure
forced the government to introduce various forms of social protection and
guarantees on an increasingly broader scale. This was the reason, why
disbursements from the national budget intended for development were
replaced by public spending and the system of intermediation in the job
search process was transformed into a supplementary public segment that
contributed to the professional deactivation of the population. The
government actions envisaged by the package «Entrepreneurship Above
All» and labor market reform were intended to prevent these trends. This
document ensured:
• The removal of bureaucratic barriers in relations between businesses
and institutions of public administration through simplification of procedural
rules and new legal regulations;
• Reducing appropriations for employment and increasing the
elasticity of the labor market;
• Simplification of the tax system and social and recreational
provisions.
The reduction of red tape in relations between business and state
administration was to be executed through:
• Updating laws dealing with the code of commercial partnerships,
the National Court Registry, legislation regulating economic activities
and the Civil Procedure  Code;
• Reduction of procedures in economic cases and elimination of the
possibilities for excessive dragging out of investigations;
• Broadening of the powers of district courts in cases concerning
property laws, reduction of the cancellation period, postponing the disputed
matter and reduction of procedures in economic cases and elimination of
the possibilities for excessive dragging out of investigations;
• Reducing the maximum fee for notary services;
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• Easier conditions for obtaining licenses to manage construction
works;
• Simplification of procedures required to obtain public assistance
and frequency of reporting;
• Unification of the definition of entrepreneur and introduction of
regulations that would more efficiently protect small and medium
enterprises against unfair competition;
• Abolishing regulations that allow an administrative body to suspend
business operations, eliminating the possibility to exercise control in the
absence of an entrepreneur, and regulating the turnover of money and
investments from abroad.
Through initiatives for improving the elasticity of the labor market
and cutting labor costs, changes were proposed to the Labor Code and
related laws that dealt with:
• Factoring in the specifics of small and medium enterprises in
regulations aimed at addressing problems in labor relations;
• Eliminating the requirement for small enterprises to create a social
insurance fund when setting up a plant;
• Changing the basis for the minimum wage;
• Introducing the possibility of departing periodically, upon the
consent of the employees, from certain labor law provisions, when
the employer faces the threat of bankruptcy or liquidation of his
company;
• Regulating certain new forms of employment (working from home,
self-employment, temporary jobs, substitution and overtime);
• Limiting the number of periodical mandatory medical examinations
of employees working in difficult or harmful conditions and compulsory
introduction of work schedules and benefits procedures;
• Reducing restrictions in the use of fixed-term contracts;
• Calculation of working hours and giving employees days off for job
search;
• Establishing the Occupational Health and Safety Commission
(OHSC), a social insurance fund at plants and procedure for disbursements
from it, and calculating contributions to the State Fund for Rehabilitation
of Disabled People (SFRPD).
Simplification of the tax system was to include:
♦ Updating the corporate income tax law and the individual income
tax law to simplify settlements with financial institutions;
♦ Equaling rights and duties of taxpayers and tax administration;
♦ Broadening the use of agreed to rates and forms of taxation;
♦ Unifying the basis for business taxation;
♦ Easing the VAT burden for small enterprises;
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♦ Easing the burden of tax payments for entrepreneurs and taxation
of civil and legal activities;
♦ Easing customs procedures;
♦ Introducing the possibility of quarterly calculations of
contributions to ZUS22;
♦ Introducing insurance against work accidents and occupational
diseases.
It should be added that this program was implemented amidst harsh
criticism of a restrictive monetary policy, which contrary to the views of
its opponents, had a positive effect on mid-term supply-side policy.
Although they failed to use some provisions of this comprehensive
program for pulling out of the recession, the projected rate of economic
growth was nevertheless achieved. The sharp increase in labor
productivity and low inflation created a sound basis for continuing the
process of closing the gap in development. However, economic expansion
was still accompanied by high unemployment rates and an increasing
deficit of the balance of payments.
The sharp and one-off financial impulse at the end of 2002 and
beginning of 2003 in the debt write-offs of 60,000 enterprises,
including nearly 99% of private SME, turned out to be a powerful
anti-recession stimulus and was the reason for the rapid overcoming
of stagnation trends. Debt write-offs due to improving management
and efficient adaptation of most enterprises caused a 4% growth in
GDP in H2 2003 and unemployment began to fall. The powerful
anti-recession impulses that also gave rise to the pro-development
impulses used for the implementation of the Public Finance
Improvement Program (Kołodko, 2004), which eventually fostered
structural reforms. Along with the process of streamlining and
consolidation of public finances, which has yet to be finalized, a
dramatic cut in taxes for businesses played the most important role.
Since the 4% cut in 1998-2001 turned out to be a very weak
stimulus, the further reduction of this tax by 9% from 28% in 2002
to 19% in 2004 was received positively.
It can be said that the years 2004-2008 prolonged the trend of 6%
GDP growth, which became possible due to:
• Financial, institutional, and investment advantages associated with
EU accession;
• Improvement and pro-development processes in prior years;
• Improvement of management at enterprises;
• Support of business and stimulus to regional development by the
local bodies of self-government.
                     
22 ZUS — Social Insurance Department
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2.5.7. Deferred matters of social and economic consolidation
The phantom of the public finances crisis casting its shadow over the
economy of Poland and the pressure on liberalization coming from the
Washington Consensus pulled out of focus attention to the problem related
to the social system that ripened in the 1990s, in particular growing
inequality in terms of property and income, corruption, health care,
upbringing and education, balancing work and family life, depopulation
and a decent retirement. In the 21st century prior to EU accession the
marginalization of social policy occurred under the influence of significant
proceeds expected after EU accession. It was expected that they would go
to the national budget. Besides, the first years of membership,
overburdened by payments to the EU budget (around EUR 2 bn a year) and
20-25% domestic  contributions to projects implemented by the Structural
Funds, as well as the remote advantages from additional financing of
structural programs and social consolidation made it impossible to
undertake any actions in this sphere.
However, it did not mean that prior to accession nobody had addressed
the challenges of social and economic consolidation. By that time it had
been considered only in the context of streamlining government
expenditures. Those actions were motivated not only by concern for
reducing social problems, but also attempts to reduce the extremely high
budget deficit and the threat of a foreign debt trap. As a reminder, in 1990
Poland inherited from the centrally planned economy a foreign debt of
77.9% of the GDP (Woźniak, 1997: 84). Besides its restructuring, which
envisaged the repayment of 50% of the debts to the Paris Club (1991) and
45% to the London Club (1994), investment expansion in 1995-1998 that
exceeded the possibilities of the balance of payments and the subsequent
recession resurrected the threat of a foreign debt trap.
Actions to streamline government expenditures included:
• Replacing wage indexation in 1996 with wage-price indexation, its
reduction in 1999 to 20%, reduction of price indexation and departure
from automatic indexation of savings in 2004;
• More stringent requirements in the disability examination system
introduced in 1997, which made it impossible to obtain surplus resources
from the pension fund;
• Stricter criteria for providing welfare to the unemployed. As a
result, in 2003 barely 15% of the unemployed received cash assistance;
• Refusal to increase expenditures in real-time for education, health
care and government subsidies meant their actual reduction per
beneficiary, which was due to inflation and rapidly growing appropriations in
other spheres.
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The result of such social policy was a significant deterioration in the
quality of social development, growing destructive conflicts and social
inequality, which led to increasing poverty that transformed into civilizational
backwardness of certain layers of the population and regions.
Some experts accused the new governmental groups of not just
lacking professional competence and neglecting issues of social
consolidation, but also of abusing the borrowed liberal economic order23
in favor of the nation’s financial stability.
In fact, balancing on the verge of a foreign debt trap with the
excessive inflexibility of government spending did not leave room for
maneuvering in favor of social consolidation. The problem with such
consolidation could emerge only after taking the path of high economic
growth and EU accession. This meant for Poland the start of
implementation of one of the most important policies — a consolidation
policy aimed at promoting the harmonious development of the entire
territory of the EU-25 through activities that allow for reducing the
disproportions in the levels of regional development. These actions are
expected to strengthen the social, economic and territorial unity of
individual countries and the entire Commonwealth by reducing the gap in
development and convergence with other regions and countries.
Based on the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion relating to
economic, social and territorial unity, each member state that is a
beneficiary of EU funds must draft a National Strategic Reference
Framework (NSRF) for 2007-2013 targeting economic growth and
employment, i.e. the National Cohesion Strategy24. This document
analyzes the socio-economic situation in the country and its regions,
formulates the most important challenges to the country’s development in
the years to come, and defines targets to achieve cohesion in three
dimensions (economic, social, and territorial) and allocation of financial
resources for individual programs and implementation boundaries.
The synthetic criteria to determine the extent of the realization of the
strategic goal is the rate at which the disparities in GDP per capita are in
decline at the national and regional levels. Today, this figure is about
50% of the EU-25 average. Achieving the NSRF goals should raise it to
2/3 of the EU average. Maintaining this rate of actual convergence would
make it possible to achieve the EU average level within one generation.
The sectoral objectives of socio-economic consolidation to achieve the
main objective are presented as a comparison in Table 2.8.
                     
23 In fact, many specialists expressed these ideas (Sadowski, Kowalik, Golinowska, 2004).
24 The Ministry of Regional Development prepared this paper in May 2007 and the
European Commission adopted it by its decision that approves certain elements of the
National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF).
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At the same time, the specific distribution of the Structural Funds and
the Cohesion Fund for 2007-2013 was as follows:
• infrastructure and environment  — EUR 27.9 bn (41.9 % of total
resources);
• regional operating programs  — EUR 16.6 bn (24.9 %);
• human capital  — EUR 9.7 bn (14,6 %);
• innovation economy  — EUR 8.3 bn (12,4 %);
• Eastern Poland development  — EUR 2.3 bn (3.4 %);
• technical assistance — EUR 5 bn (0.8 %).
2.6. Restructuring the Economy
2.6.1. Introduction
Structural changes that take place in a market economy are evolutionary
processes, largely ongoing in nature and in which economic agents
provide relevant solutions. The desire of companies to maximize profits
in a competitive environment encourages them to strive for the most
effective use of available capital. By responding to signals from the
market, mainly in the form of changes in demand, they bring to life
various forms and types of employment. Besides, an integral part of the
market game is the bankruptcy of unprofitable firms and the emergence
of new entities giving rise to new changes in the structure of the
economy, which can be analyzed from various perspectives. Innovative
competition plays a special role in these structural transformations; it
relies on finding a competitive advantage and additional benefits using
technical and organizational innovations. It leads to the appearance of
new products on the market, which then become major drivers of
qualitative changes in the real structure of consumption. The
technological changes lead to changes in methods and efficient growth,
seen in the growth of national income and changes in demand, which is
the source of further structural transformations. Therefore, market
mechanisms that operate without a hitch will stimulate on-going
structural transformations in the economy, which in academia is called
the creative destruction. This type of functional mechanism contributes to
the long-term adjustment of supply and demand and becomes the basis
for substantial efficient growth and economic development.
The state is also involved in the process of structural changes in a
market economy. However, the scope of its impact can differ: it may be
limited to indirect actions aimed at increasing market density and
removing barriers to economic activity, and it may involve direct
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participation in the allocation process. Historical experience, in particular
in countries where a large-scale industrial policy was conceived (e.g.
Japan and Korea), shows that the state’s role is complementary by nature,
aimed at stimulating or correcting market mechanisms, which is in itself a
major structural factor.
In a centrally planned economy the main mechanism of structurally
significant changes departed from the abovementioned design since its
components were as different as the benefits of certain structural factors.
Allocation decisions relied on political criteria that often do not
correspond to the principles of economic rationality. In addition, the
social objective was different: the key idea was equal access to property,
implemented through the policy of complete employment (Woźniak,
1993: 206). The primacy of that political and social goal required the
replacement of market incentives with decisions by the central
government in the area of economic activities (including regarding the
range of products to be manufactured) and the means of their
implementation (determining the technologies to be used, allocating
production tasks among certain subjects). The resulting structures of
socialist economies evolved differently from the direction taken by
market economies, primarily in the excessive development of industry,
especially of heavy industry for account of the consumer sector and a
focus on developing production means instead of consumer goods.
The transformation of the economic system launched in 1989, which
created the conditions for the institutional implementation of market
mechanisms, played a leading role in the process of structural change. The
introduction to the market of an allocation mechanism of savings in the form
of «shock therapy» launched a dynamic process of bringing the economy to
market equilibrium, disclosing the exchange deformations of the economy,
and starting the process of transforming the production structure.
2.6.2. Factors of structural changes during a system transformation
Structural changes in Poland’s economy took place in a very different way
from that of developed market economies. It should be noted that a
normally functioning market and one that is efficient in its allocation role,
including the structural one, requires it to meet several conditions. In
addition to the liberalization of prices and freedom of economic activity,
private ownership and competition are of paramount importance
(Kaczmarek and others, 2005: 102). «Creative destruction» also requires
the formation of business positions in a society, which implies the need for
a fundamental shift in the way of thinking that had prevailed under the
system of order-distribution. However, the process of meeting these pre-
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conditions is a long one. Therefore, intense and rapid quantitative economic
changes appear during the initial stage of transformation, with the
prevailing negative adaptations (cleaning so-called junk products from the
market) so as in the subsequent years to take the form of evolutionary
processes, which is the integral element of capitalist economies.
Trends in structural changes in Poland’s economy after 1989 (i.e. the
impact of changes in the international environment, strengthened by the
liberalization of trade relations with foreign countries) played a
significant role in shaping trajectories. The decline in production and the
economic crisis affecting the Eastern bloc countries, which for Poland
meant the loss of traditional markets (Lipowski, 1994: 80), was the first
step that prompted changes in the structure of production and foreign
trade turnover. That was a sign of negative structural adaptations of
products, which eventually led to restrictions in many sectors. At the
same time, the liberalization of international trade relations also became a
driving factor in the push towards active structural adaptations.
Afterwards, an opportunity appeared to dramatically increase exports in
convertible currencies, which became possible due to the upgrade in the
range of products and an improvement in the quality of exported goods.
Opening the market for imported goods drove changes in the structure of
the economy; it brought greater competition from players entering the
national market. On the one hand, that was a factor that mobilized Polish
producers to improve their competitiveness, while on the other it served
to push many businesses out of the market that were unable to overcome
competition from foreign producers. The impact of international trade on
the structural changes was also seen in the free access of national entities
to imported monetary assets, which are the carriers of technological
progress. Thus, the intensification of trade relations opened an important
channel for the transfer of technology, which played a key role in
modernizing Poland’s economy.
The liberalization of cash flows, especially in opening up the
economy to the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI), was of great
importance for the structural changes that took place in Poland. Poland’s
low per-capita GDP at the time of its economic transformation, as well as
its low level of household income, which continued to decline as a result
of the transformational regress, clearly showed the economy’s weak
ability to accumulate capital. This was a significant barrier for the
restructuring and modernization processes, whose implementation
required considerable financial investment. At the same time, the access
to foreign capital would have meant greater opportunities for operations
regardless of the level and size of the investments, as well as for savings
and economic growth. Foreign direct investments also played a special
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role since they provided a favorable combination of financial resources
with the dissemination of technical knowledge and modern methods of
organization and management. Although the expectation that the presence
of foreign investors would improve the state affairs only materialized to a
certain extent, it is nevertheless hard to deny the significant role they
played in the structural changes during the transition period.
The process of EU integration was also a factor stimulating the
convergence of economic structures in Poland towards the standards of
developed countries. The integration increased openness in the Polish
economy, in terms of the shares of exports and imports in the national
income, and reinforced the above factors that stimulated structural change.
Joining the EU in 2004 and the further strengthening of cooperation in
trade and the movement of funds generated new dynamic impulses, such as
the possibility to use structural funds, open the European labor market to
Polish citizens, and accelerate the restructuring process.
In analyzing factors that led to structural changes in Poland’s economy
during the period of transformation we must mention the role of the state as
the creator of the systemic transformation, particularly in shaping the
institutional framework of the market economy and carrying out
privatizations, which essentially became the main mechanism of influencing
business structures. In addition, the state owned, although to an increasingly
lesser extent due to the privatization progress, part of the country’s means of
production, enabling it to manage certain economic processes at the
microeconomic level. The scope of the state’s direct structural policy after
1989 was small. It partly resulted from subjective reasons, because the
authors of the transformation program decided that state interventionism,
including in industrial policy, should be kept to a minimum. This was
mainly due to insufficient financial resources (especially at the start of the
transformation amid the regression and huge levels of foreign debt).
2.6.3. Evolution of the structure of economic agents in Poland
in 1989—2007
One of the most important features that showcases an economy’s level of
development is the structure of an entity that is of paramount importance
for the efficiency of an economy and its capacity for sustainable growth.
The experience of developed countries suggests that the optimal structure
of such an entity is marked by the dominant participation of the private
sector limited by the area of public sector activity (mainly aimed at
creating public property), de-concentration of business activities (the
development of small and medium business), differentiation of available
legal and organizational forms of business, as well as the availability of
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financial institutions (banks, stock exchanges, and investment funds),
which  improve the flow of processes in the real sector of the economy.
By the time of the transformations in 1989 in Poland the structure of
economic agents differed significantly from the standard in market
economies, because it did not meet any of the criteria. This was mainly
seen in the public sector’s dominant share of GDP creation, as well as the
concentration of production forces at large state-owned enterprises (7.1%
of those produced about 44% of all industrial products, providing jobs to
about half of employed individuals) (Bałtowski, 2002: 187), while the
small and medium enterprise (SME) sector remained underdeveloped.
Furthermore, activities that in developed countries usually belong to
small private companies (retail, food), in Poland belonged to highly
concentrated and inefficient cooperatives (the so-called «socialized
economy») (Bałtowski, Miszewski, 2006: 226).
Undoubtedly, the most important process, which included a set of
transformations of the subjective structure of the Polish economy, was a
radical change in the structure of ownership. The right to property disposal
coupled with the responsibility for its loss is a major factor that stimulated
economic agents to act rationally and strengthened the activity towards its
augmenting. In addition, it prompted entrepreneurs to adequately assess risks
related to economic activities, especially in the investment processes that
were crucial for the evolution of the economic structure in various areas:
technical modernization, changes in the structure of product ranges, labor
market reforms, etc. (Bałtowski, 2002; Woźniak, 1995).
The privatization of the Polish economy starting from the second half
of 1990 was gradual, although its pace varied and was characterized by a
continuously shrinking share of the public sector in national income, as
well as the decline of other macroeconomic indicators. This process,
whose flow was described in section 2.4, is still not completed. With the
public sector’s share of GDP at around 20%, Poland remains far from the
developed country average; in most Western European economies its
share does not exceed 10%, and the share is even lower in non-European
countries (Błaszczyk, 2007).
In Poland in 2006 only 913 state-owned enterprises existed. Their number
decreased by 89% compared with 1991. Besides, 601 entities were totally
state-owned ones (GUS, 2007b, p. 712). The share of state-owned enterprises
in the total number of companies operating on the market was small, but
most of these were many times larger than the average, which was
manifested by the extremely high participation of these entities in the assets,
production and employment. The continued operation of expanded state
ownership, on the one hand, generates significant funds for the economy,
while on the other reduces efficiency. Most entities under state control are
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marked by significantly lower labor productivity than private sector firms
that cannot rely on exemptions and subsidies. Instead, state enterprises
received extensive state assistance (estimated at more than 3% of GDP
annually), which was nevertheless unused for development; for example,
investments per employee in the private sector were about two times higher.
These expenditures, representing a serious weight on the state budget, limit
the possibilities to support the development of the financial sector. Therefore,
satisfaction with the status quo became a barrier to further progress in the
restructuring and modernization of the economy.
Changes in the system of ownership in the economy and the
introduction of freedom of economic activity in the first years of the
transformation resulted in a dynamic increase in the number of companies
operating on the market. The unchecked expansion of the SME sector
was the most illustrative example of the development of entrepreneurship
in the early ‘90s. Their importance for the functioning and development
of modern economies is undeniable, and even greater in the process of
transformation that occurred in Poland after 1989. The thesis about the
SME sector’s key role in structural change is based on the following
factors (Butska, 2004; Woźniak, 2006):
1. The SME sector is flexible and able to interact with external
factors. This is based on the relative ease with which changes come about
in the profile of activities and the broad rotation of enterprises within the
sector. This characteristic was particularly important at the beginning of
the transformation, when SMEs (partially) filled the gap in demand,
consumption, and product ranges.
2. The SME sector is one of the best at creating employment, which
allows to organize the workforce, from which the large restructured state-
owned enterprises refused.
3. The sector plays a significant role in the creation and spread of
innovation. However, due to financial and organizational reasons it
cannot compete with international corporations in R&D, but it accounts
for many developments in so-called grassroots technologies (a popular
practice in developed countries where a company is established based on
its creator’s innovative ideas). Therefore, SMEs in the field of technical
progress are complimentary to large firms.
Given the realities of this sector’s formation after 1989 in Poland, it
should be noted that the time was ripe to release the country’s entrepreneurial
potential, which had previously been suppressed. That led to the development
of awareness and the so-called economic culture, which is a mandatory
condition for the accurate functioning of the market system.
Unfortunately, the expansion of the SME sector in Poland did not
result in structural changes in other areas to the extent expected based on
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theoretical assumptions. The basic reasons for those developments were
the limitations for this area of business in the choice of funding sources.
Problems with attracting capital were partly explained by the very
structure of SMEs, which were dispersed — in Poland, micro-enterprises
held a larger share of SMEs than in the EU, while mid-sized firms held a
50% smaller share than in Commonwealth countries (NBP, 2004: 149).
Most entities in this group are small domestic companies that operate on
the basis of minimum cash reserves and have a low ability to accumulate
capital. In addition, about 80% of them do not use bank loans. This
weakness of the SME sector is aggravated by scarce legal and
institutional solutions, particularly in attracting foreign capital, as well as
virtual execution (small entities become the first victims of payment
congestion). This is caused by those entities’ significant predisposition to
investments, which are much lower in per-employee terms than in large
companies. In these circumstances, the fact that the expansion of SMEs
concerns only certain activities (primarily trade and services) that are not
part of advanced sectors is not of great importance. At the same time, this
sector’s participation in industrial processing is insufficient, which is one
of the reasons for differences between the assortment structure of
production and existing demand, which causes a negative current account
balance with foreign countries.
The processes of privatization and private sector expansion were
constantly accompanied by the transformation of legal and organizational
forms of economic activity. The liberalization of rules influencing the
formation and operation of enterprises allowed the practical application of
the rules of the Commercial Code of 193435, which in turn opened the
path for the formation of entities in-line with Western principles. It
implied the possibility for an entity to adjust its structure to the new types
and scopes of activities in the optimal way.
The expansion of activities in the form of financial companies
(limited liability company, joint-stock company) played a special role in
transforming Poland’s economic system. The legal regulations governing
their operations were among the main elements of the institutional system
of the market economy. The financial security of a company played an
important role in the allocation process of an economy’s accumulated
savings, thus enabling the accumulation of capital for doing business, and
thereby improving the process of transforming savings into investments.
The development of these processes in an economy undergoing a
transformation depends on progress in the formation and development of
the money market with the stock exchange at its head.
                     
35 Presently, certain legal forms of activities are regulated by the Law of September 15,
2000: Code of Trade Partnerships
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In parallel with the expansion of private sector entities operating in
the real sector of the economy, the development of the financial sector
began, which led to an increase in the number of banks, insurance
companies, leasing companies, and others. The growing interest in the
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) as a place to raise capital deserves
special mention. Only five companies were quoted during the inaugural
WSE session in April 1991, with the number growing to 351 by 2006.
Currently, the WSE is a regional leader in terms of the number of quoted
companies and market capitalization. At the same time, the distance
separating Poland from developed countries, is constantly reducing: on
the eve of EU accession (late 2003) the WSE’s capitalization-to-GDP was
17.9% (at the time, the overall capitalization of EU stock exchanges
exceeded 75% of the bloc’s aggregate GDP), while by the end of 2007 its
capitalization reached 95% of GDP (Each time higher..., 2006, the
Warsaw Stock Exchange..., 2006; www.gpw.com.pl).
The changes in the structure of the Polish economy during the
transformation resulted in dynamic growth, primarily of companies with
the participation of foreign capital. The large-scale inflow of FDI to
Poland began in 1991 after the adoption of the law on companies with
foreign ownership (06/14/1991) and the introduction of the principle of
freedom to establish companies with the participation of foreign capital36
(with certain exceptions). In 1991-2007, the number of companies with
foreign capital grew 12 times and FDI-related commitments at the end of
2007 exceeded EUR 119 billion (NBP, 2007, p. 12). While satisfying the
Polish economy’s cash needs during the transformation, it also stimulated
its economic development.
2.6.4. Transformation of the sector structure of national income and
the assortment structure of products
On the eve of the constitutional changes in 1989, the assortment and
sector structure of the Polish economy had many features typical of
socialist countries, and therefore significantly different from the standards
of advanced capitalist states. In terms of economic criteria, those
differences should be defined as deformations of the economic structure,
based primarily on:
♦ Inadequate structure of GDP formation (in 1985-1989, Polish
industry produced about 50% of GDP, the share of agriculture in total
                     
36 Proposals to open the Polish market to foreign investors appeared in Poland`s
legislation in the second half of the `70s, but they stirred up little interest given the
administrative barriers (Freitag-Mika, 2007).
CHAPTER 2. The evolution of Poland’s economic model 299
output and employment was too high, while the development of service
industries, especially of finance and business, was low;
♦ Hypertrophy of the country’s production potential, employment
structure, and prevailing production of raw materials, especially low-
grade: mining, iron and steel, and military industries;
♦ Non-compliance of the supply structure with the structure of
consumer demand as well as with the requirements of international
competition (the product surplus amounted to almost 40% of all industrial
products with a deficit of key consumption items);
♦ Technological backwardness and low labor efficiency that showed
itself in products’ high capital and energy intensity, low quality goods,
and degradation of the environment.
The replacement of the economic system, predicated upon the
introduction of the mechanisms of supply and demand and the use of cost
estimates, encouraged by the economic agents, resulted in the need to
adapt to consumer needs. Thus began the process of quantitative
transformations, which served to level out the differences between supply
from companies and the structure of demand. One of the features of this
process was the transformation of the generic structure, marked by
change in individual sectors’ shares (agriculture, industry, services) in the
formation of national income, as well as a change in some assets’ share in
industrial production. Generally, industry’s share of the structure of
annual national income began to decline, while services began to gain a
greater share. During the initial phase of the transformation (1989-1992),
structural changes took place mainly through a substantial reduction in
industrial output caused not by a temporary decrease in demand, but
through a price mechanism that rejected products not competitive by
price parameters. The above tendency of changes was preserved with the
emergence of the «transformational regression» in the second half of
1992 (although their rates varied) in both production and non-production
areas. In the reviewed period, the dynamics of production varied,
although only in certain sectors of the economy, and because of it the
process of structural transformations continued based on a steady decline
in the share of agriculture and industry in national income, as well as a
significant surge in the share of the services sector, from less than 50% in
1992 to 63% in 2007 (Figure 2.3).
Traditionally, the share of the service sector in the economy is
determined by the level of its development, so the previously
mentioned structure implies that the Polish economy was nearing the
developed market economies, although there is a contradictory
distance that separates Poland from the richest countries, a fact
illustrated in Figure 2.4. Given the specifics of the changes that had
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been taking place, one should be rather conservative in estimating the
magnitude of structural changes in Poland based on the above sector
changes. One should also bear in mind that the provision of services,
which is rather developed in post-industrial nations, proceeds from the
material sphere of the economy. Qualitative changes in industry,
mainly in technological and organizational progress, lead to growth in
productivity in industry, and they simultaneously boost national
income and changes in the structure of demand. Therefore, the
synchronous changes in supply (weakening demand for the workforce
in industry) and demand (stronger demand for services) that take place
in the economy are an expression of the general socio-economic
development. In Poland, this process took place in a different way
than the above-mentioned. Structural changes in this area were caused
by industry’s limited participation in the formation of national income
and employment as a result of transformational changes and
forwarding the products to the market’s actual needs. At the same
time, there was no process of evolutionary and innovative changes.
Agriculture Industry Services
Figure 2.3.. Dynamics and Structure of Value Added in Poland
(constant prices) in 1992-2007
Source: Statistics Yearbook RP, GUS, issues from 1993 to 2008.
Alongside the sector changes, profound transformations in industry
took place that primarily changed the structure of manufactured products.
During the first years of the transformation, the main structural factor (as
CHAPTER 2. The evolution of Poland’s economic model 301
previously mentioned) was the «purging» of unnecessary products.
Prevailing negative circumstances also existed that were related to a
decline in production in many industries and certain enterprises’ inability
to produce goods. Businesses with limited investment opportunities
mainly reacted to the crisis by shrinking operations, closing unprofitable
units, and streamlining employment. The slowdown of business activity
was significant as well, which mainly affected industries undergoing
decay. At the same time, the side effects of the crisis included reduced
output in sectors crucial for development (e.g., the electrical industry). In
such a volatile domestic and external environment, changes in the
structure of product ranges occurred in different directions, and the
positive tendencies (e.g., a reduction in iron and steel output) took place
alongside negative ones (e.g., a temporary surge in the share of mining
output in the structure of industry). In light of that, it is difficult to
identify a clear tendency of economic modernization in the structural
changes of 1989—1992.
Agriculture Industry Services
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Figure 2.4. Selected Sectors’ Shares in the Creation of Added Value in
Poland and Selected Countries in 2005
Source: own estimates based on www.unece.org/stats.
From 1992, in most branches of the manufacturing sector the cost of
goods sold started to grow again, as seen in Table 2.10. Thus, the active
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changes began to play a key role in the process of structural changes, in
particular those related to the process of privatization, the improvement of
economic entities’ finances, the macroeconomic stabilization, the
development of the financial system, and foreign investments.
From 1992 to 2005 the mining industry’s share in the total structure of
industrial output declined. The industry’s sales fell the sharpest among all
other industries, declining 70% as of 2006 compared to 1990.
Low growth in the processing industry caused the shares of the iron
and steel, coke, oil refining, and textile and clothing industries to decline.
In contrast, industries producing rubber and plastic goods, metal products,
automobiles, computers, equipment for radio and television, and office
equipment showed strong growth.
Changes in the sales structure as of 2005 compared to 1992 were
considered significant because the general trend implied that Polish
industry was modernizing, but the rates of growth were not satisfactory. If
you add the unquestionable improvement in the organization and
management of production and the positive effect of changes on the
environment (Matsiak, 2006), then one would have a largely positive
image of the restructuring efforts.
Unfortunately, the above arguments are insufficient to positively
evaluate the entire set of structural changes in Poland’s economy. It
should be emphasized that similar trends emerged in most countries of
the world as well, a direct result of permanent technological progress.
Therefore, economic modernization is like chasing a moving target, and
its effects should be assessed only through a comparison with the
achievements of others. The priority in the economic strategy of not just
developed countries, but also of those who seek effective management
and want to make up for lost time, may become the development of
high-tech industries, particularly in the area of production, which will
ensure the high competitiveness of the economy (Turowski, 2006).
Table 2.11 provides an analysis of the structure of industry in Poland in
various fields of high technology. It also contains data showing that
despite positive trends in certain areas, there is no general trend towards
the increase in production of goods highly «saturated» with knowledge.
Over the last decades this structure has changed slightly, mainly in a
decrease of the share of goods requiring a low level of technological
development, which are called medium-low technologies. When
describing the process of the restructuring of industry in Poland, it must
be said that there are some signs of technological modernization and
upgrading production facilities, but this process was limited to
improving quality and productivity, without a significant development
of new industries (Table 2.11).
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The outdated assortment structure not only results in the low
attractiveness of Polish industrial products abroad, but it also fails to
satisfy domestic demand for high-tech goods. Therefore, this group of
products will continuously be the reason for the negative balance in
current foreign commerce. For comparison: in countries with the highest
technological potential, high-tech products account for over 20% of
exports, whereas they accounted for just 16.7% in the EU in 2006 (GUS,
2007).
The economy’s excessive import-oriented growth (in 2004 the value
of imports exceeded PLN 325 billion, which accounts for almost 35% of
the internal demand) due to the low competitiveness of Polish industry
led to the partial failure of the economic transformation. Over the past
several years, there was a positive trend in its exports; however, it was
insufficient to offset imports, and the negative balance in current
settlements with foreign countries reached PLN 53.5 billion in 2004. The
economy also suffered from the increasing weight of foreign debt. This
meant that despite the significant changes that took place over the past
decade, the structure of the Polish economy continues to show its
inability to adjust to demand. It also leads to serious consequences for the
labor market.
2.6.5. Innovations and the diffusion of technology in modernizing the
economy
On the eve of social and economic changes in 1989, the Polish economy
was marked by significant technological backwardness compared with
developed countries. This fact was supported by low productivity, high
energy and material consumption of industrial products, the low quality
of goods, and environmental pollution. The obsolete structure of product
ranges created problems for Polish entities wishing to enter western
markets. However, after the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance and the USSR, the decline of exports to eastern markets
exacerbated this problem. Moreover, Polish companies were more
frequently losing the battle against foreign competitors on the domestic
market, which, as a result of the liberalization of trade relations, was
saturated with imported goods.
Under those conditions, it became clear that modernizing the
production process to improve labor productivity, update product ranges,
and thus to increase industry’s competitive potential should be one of the
major objectives of the economic restructuring. The task was not easy
because the economy was simply trying to survive, while the possibilities
of the national research and development system were extremely limited.
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The R&D sector’s weakness was caused not only by under-funding, but
also by inadequate institutional decisions in the existing competitive
environment and subjective constraints (it was necessary to make the
personnel of the research units economically feasible and commercialize
the research deliverables). The above difficulties were aggravated by the
low investment ability of businesses and the state’s limited capacity to
maintain investment processes since it was weighed down by foreign
debt.
In those circumstances, the few opportunities to overcome the
technological backwardness could have been found in the international
transfer of technology. This reasoning is based in theory, as it relies on
the experience of many countries. The assumptions about the possibility
to compensate the difference in technical levels between countries by
transferring the technology stem from the fact that the cost of acquiring a
technology are lower than the innovation cost, which are based on own
research and development (Truskolaski, 2004). The price requested by
entities that own a technology decreases with time. Thus, one can assume
that imported technical knowledge probably became obsolete faster than
the catch-up process; the rate of convergence will be inversely
proportional to the extent of technological education. In addition, using
someone else’s solutions allows one to avoid risks related to conducting
the research on one’s own, since only proven technologies are usually
transferred. This has an impact not just on the financial resources, but
also on the pace of the implementation of progress, which is of great
importance in times when it is necessary to close the developmental gap.
Less developed countries using the technology transfer method in
catching up with nations from the first echelon face numerous
restrictions. For example, expenses related to the adaptation of the
imported solutions are elements of the costs of the technology transfer,
which include compensation to the owner. The low ability to absorb, and
therefore, the considerable funding required to implement the technology
transferred, can significantly slow the process of technological «pursuit.»
However, contrary to the above, in most technologically backward
countries the scope of the technology transfer is small. This transfer
produces the best effects in medium-developed countries that can try to
adapt the knowledge received (Gomułka, 1998, p. 170). Therefore, the
technology transfer should be not seen as an instrument that guarantees
the automatic start of the technological convergence. It simply holds a
powerful potential whose implementation depends on compliance with a
number of conditions.
It should be noted that in Poland in the early ‘90s the conditions for
the efficient import of technical knowledge were favorable. On the one
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hand, the relative technological backwardness meant that the reserve of
technologies, available from foreign entities for relatively easy
implementation, was quite large. On the other hand, although poorly
developed, the research sector and the human capital resources did exist,
and they determined the economy’s absorption potential. The consistent
liberalization of international trade and cash flows opened the channels
for the transfer of technologies, of which the most significant in Polish
terms were the import of funds and foreign direct investments.
Econometric research undertaken in Poland that covered 1992-2003
clearly showed that the exchange channels of technical knowledge play a
key role in the modernization of the economy, which is measured by the
overall efficiency of production factors. It can be asserted that Poland’s
technological progress almost entirely relied on the implementation of
imported technological solutions, since the effect of public R&D
spending on productivity growth in many models had insignificant
statistical results (Michałek and others, 2003).
Despite the accumulated positive influence of the technological
transfer on the economy, prerequisites existed that disallowed the use of
all potential opportunities in this process. This stemmed primarily from
the fact that the diffusion of knowledge contained in the imported
investment product had a dominant importance. It was the easiest form of
transfer to implement. Its weak point, however, was the considerable
limitation by the import of second-generation technologies. This means
that in a country where the technological level is advancing (i.e. in an
import economy), technological education against the so-called
technological milestone not only remains unchanged, but may even
develop further.
Expectations about FDI as a source of technological innovation failed
as well. Theoretically, this method of disseminating knowledge is one of
the most effective (Bolonek, Firszt, 2007). In the case of the Polish
economy, the advantages of FDI as a channel for the transfer of
technologies were not enjoyed in full and were offset by negative events.
The main problem was still that FDI was coming into traditional sectors;
therefore, their influence on technological progress was limited and
similar to the impact of imports. At the same time, the common practice
was to split companies’ production activities and transfer processes that
were less technologically intensive and mostly assembly-based to Poland
(as well as to other post-socialist countries). Attracting investors to the
sector of production that still operates on the Polish market also meant the
partial defeat of national producers, who had problems with foreign
competition. In addition, there was no convergence between
manufacturers with foreign capital and national entities, which, on the
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one hand, showed that FDI failed to «penetrate» the sphere of knowledge,
and on the other showed the low ability of Polish companies to attract and
creatively use the technical knowledge obtained.
This type of development of the technological dissemination process
resulted in the progressive economic modernization raising the
technological level of traditional sectors, but not influencing the growth
of productivity and improving product quality, as well as failing to
seriously and positively change the economic structure towards the
expansion of high-tech sectors. That situation resulted in the economy’s
permanently low competitiveness and a negative impact on the labor
market, including the elimination of jobs in traditional industries (due to
increasing productivity), with a low number of jobs in new sectors, which
drove growth in unemployment.
The above problems emerged because the transfer process was
passive by nature, and the efforts made by domestic entities to intensify
knowledge and its use were insignificant. In order to change the situation,
efforts were made to develop research and launch initiatives aimed at
increasing the economy’s adaptive ability in implementing the latest
technologies and their creative use. Meanwhile, subsequent government
policy marginalized the R&D sector by  consistently reducing state
budget expenditures for such projects. No appropriate actions were taken
to reorganize the R&D sphere, reinforce its connection with industry, and
increase the private sector’s participation in financing research.
Hopes to improve the situation should be associated with Poland’s EU
accession. However, there currently are insufficient data to support the
thesis about the integration’s positive impact on technological changes in
the Polish economy37. However, the effects of Poland’s EU accession can
already be seen now, especially in increasing trade turnover, growth in
FDI inflows, the establishment of cooperative relations between domestic
and foreign entities, and finally in the increased mobility of its workforce.
All this proves that the channel for the transfer of knowledge is constantly
expanding, which therefore improves the opportunities to use the positive
external effects of this process. Signs that foreign investors in Poland are
changing their approach have also appeared: more frequently they set up
high-technology production in the country and transfer research centers to
Poland. This trend and the expansion of modern sectors cannot take place
without further improvements by Poland of its own research and
development activities, as well as without new efforts aimed at enhancing
the quality of human potential.
                     
37 This is due to delays in the publication of statistical data, primarily because these
types of consequences are disclosed with at least several years of delay.
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2.6.6. Spatial differentiation problems
in the development of the Polish economy
During the evaluation of social and economic development of nations in
the second half of the 20th century, the emphasis is increasingly placed on
the analysis of spatial differentiation of economic activity. It is seen in the
growing importance of regional policy that aims to stimulate the efficient
development of certain territories of a given country. Regional policy
aims to level out38 differences in living standards in various regions by
using their potential, like demographic and cultural factors, natural
resources, geographical location, etc. Finally, its most important element
is to prevent environmental pollution provoked by the excessive
concentration of industrial production.
While analyzing the spatial structure of the Polish economy we should
point at a number of errors. The most important of them include the
excessive differentiation of economic activity and infrastructure, which
also entails the different income levels in various regions. This can be
seen from the well-known distribution into «Poland A» (the better-
developed central and western parts, especially the territories within the
Trójmiasto-southern state border triangle) and «Poland B» (regions that
are poorly developed, especially the eastern part of the country)
(Marciniak, 2003: 19). The above regional problems have a deep
historical context and it is difficult to trace the changes that arose from
decisions made during modern planning. Investments made between the
wars were insufficient to economically rehabilitate the weaker regions in
terms of agricultural development. The economic policy carried out at the
time of the People’s Republic of Poland, when investment decisions were
dictated by political considerations and often led to errors in the
economy, did not contribute to efficient regional development. The
consequences of this policy, which became clear after 1989, led to a drop
in activities of all the regions (for example, the decline in the textile
industry in the Lodz region). At the same time, the industrialization
process in 1945-1989 resulted in numerous environmentally contaminated
areas. Economic changes that occurred during the subsequent
transformation increased the regional polarization even further.
The administrative reform carried out in 1999 was important in
improving the spatial structure of the Polish economy. The reform was
                     
38 «To level out» is not quite an appropriate term. In the ex-USSR this term describes
arresting the growth of large cities, primarily regional capitals, and moving productive
forces to the western parts of the country. Although, often enough their efforts were futile.
In the modern EU, creative cities are not restrained, but they actively support the outsiders
(Notes of the Ukrainian editors)
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tasked with territorial division, which, unlike the previous administrative
divisions, was largely dictated by economic factors. In total, 16
voivodships, 308 powiats, 65 cities with powiat authority, and 2,489
gminas were created (the division by gminas remained unchanged).
Owing to the short period since the implementation of the reforms, the
reorganization of administrative divisions and the related delegation of
some powers to public authorities did not contribute to any significant
changes in the regional economic structure. It can be assumed that
streamlining the division of the regions will lead to the deeper
specialization of regional economies, as well as improved functioning.
The EU accession and the resulting access to structural funding is an
additional factor that undoubtedly drove the leveling of the asymmetric
development of certain parts of the country.
The participation of the five poorest eastern voivodships (Podkarpackie,
Lubelskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, etc.) in the «Eastern Poland
Development» operating program is an important example of the positive
effects of the EU integration. The European Regional Development Fund
allocated EUR 2.27 billion for this program for 2007-2013. It is a vivid
expression of the responsibility of European policy to the Community’s
poorest regions, as well as the macroeconomic expression of the
territorial cohesion, which is an innovative solution in the Polish
economy.
2.6.7. Labor market problems as a result of the structural changes
High unemployment in Poland was one of the main problems in both
economic and social terms. Starting in 1991 and through the next 10 years
the unemployment rate remained above 10%, not even retreating below
that threshold during the strongest economic growth in 1995-1997 and
reaching a record-breaking 20% in 2003. The rate only came down
significantly in 2006-2007 due to improved market conditions and the
liberalization of labor markets within the EU.
Analyzing the Polish labor market tendencies in chronological order,
we highlight two main reasons for unemployment in the first years of the
transformation. The first is related to changes in market conditions,
leading to limited demand due to the «shock therapy», the drop in
production, and the reduction in jobs. The second was brought about by
the release of unemployment hidden in the corporate sector. Prior to
1989, complete employment was among the state’s priority tasks,
implemented for political reasons. The level of employment at state-own
enterprises did not meet the principles of a sound business plan and did
not correspond to a cost-benefit analysis. As a result, the economy faced
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hypertrophic employment, estimated at 10-30% (Sztanderska, 2001). The
transition to a market economy exposed the scale of this problem,
resulting in a massive surge in unemployment in 1990-1991
One of the main causes of unemployment after 1992 were structural
changes, in which the integral element became the change in demand for
labor due to the parallel processes of the elimination and formation of
jobs. Following the changes in the shares of the main economic sectors in
the formation of national income, significant changes also took place in
the proportion of individuals employed there. The nature of these
structural changes was traditional, however, the decline of agriculture’s
and industry’s shares in added-value creation came alongside a
decreasing share of these sectors’ employment compared with overall
employment in the economy. The services sector tended towards
proportional changes in both the share of added-value and the creation of
jobs. The total number of jobs in the first two sectors exceeded 3.1
million individuals and the services sector provided slightly more than 1
million jobs, therefore in 1992-2005 more than 2.1 million total jobs were
lost.
In order to understand the reasons for this catastrophic drop in
employment in industry, we analyzed the processes of creating and
eliminating jobs in selected industries. Those industries were marked by a
distinct asymmetry between the number of industries where jobs were
created and those where their number reduced. In most industries in the
reviewed period, the number of employees declined, while new jobs were
only created in some of them. A total 1.0501 million jobs were
eliminated, while only 183,900 jobs were created.
For the reasons outlined, we can state that restructuring the Polish
economy would have had to follow a path of de-industrialization rather
than re-industrialization. The share of decaying industries in both
production and employment was falling, while there was no simultaneous
expansion of new industries. The shortcomings of the processing
industry’s modernization led to the lack of correspondence between the
structure of aggregate demand and the range of manufactured products.
At the same time, the low competitiveness of the Polish economy on
international markets restricted export opportunities. Furthermore, the
growing trade deficit and its negative consequences had a powerful
impact on both the labor market («imported unemployment») and the
economy as a whole.
Negative changes in the level of employment amid the overall
positive trend towards production growth (in terms of both industrial
product sales and the growth of added value) clearly indicate that
Poland’s economy was on the rise during the reviewed period. In modern
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economies, this phenomenon is usually explained by technological
progress. Cases of significant GDP growth with a slight increase in
employment rates or even no growth are particularly noticeable in
transitional economies, since the relative technological backwardness
offers no chance to progress. Labor efficiency grows at an accelerated
pace because of the transfer of technology, especially through FDI
(Kwiatkowski, Roszkovska, Tokarski, 2004).
Apparently, spontaneous transfers of technology are taking place in
the Polish economy, leading to an efficient increase in the output of
traditional products, and therefore, shrinking job opportunities. The
expansion of high-tech industry does not always facilitate the
development of human resources and their involvement in the production
of new products and new job creation. In Poland, the share of employed
individuals in technologically advanced industries and in those producing
goods or providing services differs from the EU average. Meanwhile, in
developed knowledge-based economies starting from the second half of
the ‘90s, technologically advanced industries accounted for most newly
created new jobs. This is a beneficial phenomenon not just in terms of
providing employment, but also in improving its structure, since most
jobs in «new» sectors are intended for highly qualified scientific and
technical personnel (Zakrzewski, 2002). That shows how important it is
to develop knowledge-based economies, since they create new jobs for
post-secondary graduates, which then significantly improves the structure
of employment.
CHAPTER 3
EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL IN
UKRAINE
3.1. Background and Specific Features of Market Transformation
3.1.1. Introduction
Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europe by population, area,
industrial development, natural resources, and workforce. However, despite
the generally favorable starting position1, during the transformation period
Ukraine faced a series of problems that it was unable to solve for both
objective and subjective reasons. Both Ukrainian (O. Belyaev, 2006);
A. Halchynskyj, 2001; S. Mochernyj, 1999; V. Pynzenyk, 1998; V. Heyets,
V. Semynozhenko, B. Kvasnyuk, 2007; V. Heyets, 1999; I. Akimova,
2001) and foreign economists (E. Wilson, 2004; O. Hawrylyshyn, 2005;
Stefan von Kramona-Taubadel, A. Siedenberg, L. Hoffmann, 1998;
L. Hoffmann, F. Moellers, 2001) conducted theoretic and practical research
of transformation processes in Ukraine2.
Today we can claim that the Ukrainian economy has gone through the
major stages of market transformation: 1) destruction of the old command
economy and formation of new market mechanisms, accompanied by
inflation and a rapid decrease in production; 2) financial stabilization that,
depending on the political will of the country’s top officials, is
accompanied by a number of social and economic crises; 3) development,
i.e. when the real and financial sectors are sanitized as a result of
qualitative transformations in the economic institutions of society that can
define and implement the policy of economic growth (A. Halchynsky,
V. Heyets, A. Kinakh, V. Semynozhenko, 2002, p. 27).
                     
1 In the early 1990s, economists defined the starting position of Ukraine as the most
favorable for market economy reforms among other countries of the FSU (Former Soviet
Union). Deutsche Bank placed Ukraine at No. 1 in 1990 (83 points, while the Baltic States
scored 77 points and Russia got 72). This is mainly attributable to the high industrialization
level, agriculture, export potential, mineral resources, and infrastructure.
2 American economist Oleh Hawrylyshyn made an analytical study of how economic trans-
formations in Ukraine are reflected in foreign economic literature (O. Hawrylyshyn, 2005). The
author makes certain optimistic conclusions: firstly, both reknown and young experts study
Ukraine, using the most advanced techniques of modern economic thought; there are in-depth
studies of the issue in the English-language literature, which indicates that there is global interest
in the issue; secondly, many experts studying the subject are not Ukrainian and are not even part
of the Ukrainian diaspora. The author also forecasts that oligarch structures and land privatiza-
tion are to be of major interest; these forecasts have already come true. When studying market
transformations of the Ukrainian economy it is important to compare different schools of
thought, the expert opinions of which are often contradictory to each other.
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When characterizing the background and the preliminary transformation
phase, we need to point out that compared to other countries that started
reforming their national economies in the late 20th century (Central and
South European states, the Baltics, and the CIS), Ukraine has the longest
periods of decline and one of the worst cumulative decline rates. (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1
CUMULATIVE DECLINE IN NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND
THE REAL GDP INDEX IN SELECTED ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION
Country
Production
decline period,
years
Cumulative
production
decline
Real GDP index
in 1999
(1990 = 100)
Central and South
Eastern Europe and the
Baltic States
3.8 22.6 103.1
Albania 3 33 102
Bulgaria 4 16 78
Estonia 5 35 80
Latvia 6 51 58
Lithuania 5 44 66
Poland 2 6 141
Romania 3 21 80
Slovakia 4 23 104
Slovenia 3 14 113
Hungary 4 15 105
Croatia 4 36 84
Czechoslovakia 3 12 97
CIS 6.5 50.5 57.7
Azerbaijan 6 60 53
Belarus 6 35 82
Armenia 4 63 50
Georgia 5 78 29
Kazakhstan 6 41 60
Kyrgyzstan 6 50 62
Moldova 7 63 34
Russia 7 40 59
Tajikistan 7 50 56
Turkmenistan 8 48 63
Uzbekistan 6 18 93
Ukraine 10 59 41
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3.1.2. Background for the Transformation
of the Economic Model of Ukraine
There are certain objective factors that brought about transformation in
Ukraine. Among these factors are micro- an macroeconomic imbalances
of the planned economy inherited from the USSR. The economic crisis of
the 1990s in Ukraine was the immediate continuation of the structural
crisis that the USSR had been experiencing prior to its dissolution.
I. Burakowsky and V. Novytsky claim that Ukraine has a very distinct
Soviet legacy that is not limited to mentality, management style and
market infrastructure. It is the legacy that is organizational as well as
technical and economic in nature; among these are the high level of
energy and resource inefficiency, irrational production links, highly
depreciated fixed assets, scientific and technical innovations were not in
demand by production (Political and Economic…, 2003: 74-75).
Obviously, the structure of the Ukrainian national economy was in
crisis starting from early stages of its independent development, because
for decades it had been formed as an inseperabale part of the Soviet
structure aimed mainly at the development of heavy industry, the military
complex and self-sufficiency. The need for restructuring forced
production decline, at the same time this process was reinforced by the
destruction of the established cooperative ties, the loss of traditional
markets, and the loss of savings by the population. All this led to the
dramatic decline in the production of goods and services, which, in turn,
led to the further deterioration of structural imbalances.
One can also claim today that the relatively high economic potential
prevented Ukraine from realizing the so-called advantages of
backwardness. The more developed a planned economy was in the past, the
harder it turned out to implement its market reforms, because the structural
imbalances are more deeply rooted in the fixed assets. In other words, it
turned out that smaller and poorer countries had shown better national
economy macrodynamics during the period of transformation. The capital
intensity of the Ukrainian economy in basic industries worsened chances
for its reformation by creating new capacities (like China did), which added
unprecendented scale to structural reformation.
3.1.3. Economic Policy of the Transformation Period in Ukraine
The key subjective factor affecting the process of market transformations in
Ukraine, especially in the first years of the transformation period, was the
ineffective economic strategy. This fact is acknowledged not only by
domestic and foreign economists but also by high-ranking officials and
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economic consultants. It is further proved by the annual correction of
government reform programs.
When analyzing different versions of transformation (shock therapy,
gradualism, and institutionalism), we need to conclude that having no
strategy of reforms and theoretical ideologists, like Poland (L. Balcerowicz,
A. Gelb) or Hungary did (J. Kornai), Ukraine imported the outdated
concept of the Washington Consensus3.
As a result of the use of the concept, Ukraine faud structural imbalances,
especially between the real and financial sector of the economy, technological
degradation and the de-industrialization of the national economy in the form
of a growing share of outdated and inefficient material- and energy-intensive
types of production, no conditions for long-term and sustainable development
for production types with long pay-back period and capital turnover cycle; loss
of traditional international relations at all levels of the reproductive cycle
«fundamental science — applied research — new technology — industrial
production» which weakens the scientific and technological potential; further
deterioration of the labor force in various industries, especially in the high-tech
ones, i.e. outflow of qualified professionals abroad and deteriorating
qualifications of those who stay in Ukraine; general deterioration of social
standards of living as well as general attitude to environment’ that in current
conditions became antagonistic in nature.
A major drawback of the Ukrainian market transformation model was
its focus on the idea of the survival of those who are most adaptive to
change, which led to indifference to the problems of common Ukrainians.
As a result, people developed a negative attitute towards reforms and the
level of mistrust towards the state overall became stronger. It is no
surprise that in the late 1990s the Ukrainian economy was stagnating, but
paradoxically, it is surprising that it was somehow functioning, because
the borrowed liberal model was being implemented without such major
components as antitrust regulation and social protection. Economic
growth was planned with no innovation in integrated production,
structural reforms were not supported by the national financial capital that
was for the time being separated from the real economy.
The critique of the Washington Consensus from both its ideologists
and recipients led to the development of its corrected version, which was,
however, unproductive in correcting the drawbacks. In other words, the
Post-Washington Consensus did not work for Ukraine either.
                     
3 The main drawbacks of the concept are known to be the focus on industrialized and
even pre-industrialization countries of Latin America, insufficient role of the state during
the transformation period, insufficient attention to globalization and neglect of institutional
reforms. The concept also disregarded the fact that in the post-Soviet states, economic
transformations were accompanied by the state-building processes.
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At the same time, positive economic developments in terms of market
prospects also took place. These are the formation of an efficient and competitive
private sector of the economy and a layer of entrepreneurs; formation of national
markets for goods, labor and capital with mainly market-driven price formation
— these markets can meet effective demand; the introduction of a stable national
currency, the hryvnia, establishment of national financial and banking systems,
diversification and liberalization of foreign economic relations, establishment of
new channels for trade and investment cooperation.
The obvious achievements that Ukrainians made over the transformation
period are an accumulation of entrepreneural energy in productive fields
and fields with significant potential; formation of such characteristics as
business intiative, business focus, active life position, understanding of
the importance of individual interest and striving to realize its priority
over market relations; understanding that work is the sole way to welfare;
internal need for joint participation in the restructuring of social, economic,
and polical relations; pride in the international image of the country.
When estimating market transformation internationally, experts talk
of adequate and false versions. Adequate versions that were used in
Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia focused on a
decisive and consistent movement towards a liberal economy that was not
insured against economic shocks and social protests but provided a rapid
revival of the national economy, increase in domestic and foreign
investment, etc. False versions focused on transformational moderation
and the characteristic peculiarities of their implementation were a lack of
system and completion of the reforms, which invariably led to rent-
seeking behavior and corruption among businesses and the shadow
economy as well as continuous stagnation in society as a whole.
The key components of reforms in Ukraine cannot be classified as false
but it is clear that they were not adequate either — on the one hand, state
monopoly was removed, which also removed the inefficient distribution of
limited resources; on the other hand, because the state overly limited its
influence on macroeconomic regulations, new forms of ownership and power
monopolization emerged. Ukraine is basically forming a national capitalist
corporate economy (Andrew Wilson, 2004: 427), several regional oligarch
groups accumulated all business, mass media and political power. Current
political confrontations change their format and participants, but its essence
remains unchanged, which is both pragmatic and destructive as retards the
real national interests of economic develoment4.
                     
4The data of reputable publications on the personal wealth of Ukrainian oligarchs are
indicative — according to Korrespondent magazine in 2008 the total wealth of the 50 rich-
est Ukrainians was more than USD 112 b., which is more than twice the budget of Ukraine.
The richest man in the CIS and Europe became Rinat Akhmetov (USD 31.2 b.).
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Overall, Ukrainian and foreign experts characterize both the reform
components, mainly privatization, and the transformation process as a whole,
as unsatisfactory. We deem the main reasons for failures in the domestic and
foreign economic policy in Ukraine to be the temptation to use global system
changes ignoring the specific features of the transformation process and
attempts to fit into the world business system with an inadequate institutional
base. Therefore, one needs to critically assess not only the theory and practice
of market reforms5, but also the real opportunities of effective development
in the global competitive environment.
3.1.4. Transformation of the Economic Model of Ukraine in Light of
International Rankings
Ukraine currently ranks low on competitiveness rankings6 by most
criteria (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2
UKRAINE’S POSITION IN WORLD RANKINGS, 2007
Criterion
Number
of __
countries
Ukraine’s
position
World Economic Forum global competitiveness index 131 73
World Economic Forum business competitiveness
index 127 81
The Heritage Foundation & The Wall Street Journal
economic freedom index 161 125
UN human development index 177 77
A.T. Kearney&Foreign Policy globalization index 72 43
Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research (KOF)
globalization index 122 50
Doing Business report by the World Bank 178 138
International Institute for Management Development
ranking (Lausanne, Switzerland) 55 46
Corruption perception index by Transparency
International 179 118
                     
5 Transformation was a major topic for Ukrainian researchers in the late 1990s-early
2000s, but then their focus shifted to the problems of innovative development and com-
petitiveness.
6 In the recent past, these rankings were one-off, had limited coverage, and only took
into account certain aspects of development and competitiveness. Higher rankings charac-
terized the level of industrialization, export potential, mineral resources, infrustructure, and
education. Modern country rankings are more systematic and serve as a sort of indicator of
the national potential in the globalized world.
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In 2007-2008, Ukraine ranked 73rd in the World Economic
Forum global competitiveness ranking, which is worse than
Lithuania (38), Latvia (45), Hungary (47), Poland (51), Croatia (57),
Russia (58), Kazakhstan (61), Uzbekistan (62), Azerbaijan (66),
Vietnam (68), and Brazil (72). In the Global Economic Forum
business competitiveness index (detailed research of microeconomic
aspects of competiteveness by M. Porter) among 127 countries,
Ukraine ranked 82 (the quality of business climate) and 83 (company
operations and strategies).
In the competitiveness ranking by the International Institute for
Management Development (Lausanne, Switzerland), that has been
compiled annually since 1989, Ukraine ranked 46th out of 55 countries in
2007, which is behind Chile (26), India (27), Lithiania (31), Bulgaria
(41), Russia (43), Romania (44), and the Philipines (45). However,
Ukraine was ahead of Mexico, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina,
Poland, Croatia, Indonesia, and Venezuela. Estonia (22) and Lithua-
nia (31) enjoyed the highest rankings among the post-Soviet states;
Russia has placed 43. According to certain criteria, such as technological
infrastructure, Ukraine ranked among the top 10, but got worse results for
structural reforms, property rights protection, political stability, business
regulation or state macroeconomic policy.
The economic freedom index that characterizes how well the
national economy relates to liberal principles (by the Heritage
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal) placed Ukraine No.124 among
161 countries in 1998 and No.8 among the countries of the CIS and the
Baltics; in 2001 Ukraine ranked 133 among 155 countries. In 2007 the
average global index was at 60.6 points, average European index was at
67.5, Ukraine got 53.3 points and was characterized as mostly unfree.
Ukraine ranked No.125, while Latvia ranked No.41, Bulgaria ranked
No.62, Romania ranked No.67, Moldova ranked No.81, Poland ranked
No.87, and Russia ranked No.120.
In the UN human development index (comparison of welfare, literacy,
and average life expectancy), in 2001 Ukraine ranked No.74 out of 162
countries, in 2006 — No.77 out of 177, which is worse than Russia (65),
Belarus (67) and Thailand (74).
The globalization index (compiled annually by A.T.Kearny and
Foreign Policy magazine based on 14 criteria of economic, political,
technological and social integration) ranked Ukraine among 72
countries by such criteria as participation in global political processes
(53), personal international contacts (49), and economic integration
(17). In the globalization index (KOF), compiled by the Swiss
Institute for Business Cycle Research (Zurich, Switzerland) in 2007,
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Ukraine was awarded 61.83 points out of a maximum of 100 points
(No.50 out of 122).
In the 2006 Doing Business report, Ukraine ranked 128 out of 175
countries, in 2008 Ukraine was No.139 out of 178, which is below
Kazakhstan (71), Moldova (92), Kyrgyzstan (71), Ethiopia (102), Russia
(106), Belarus (110), Uganda (118), Mozambique (134), Iran (135), and
Uzbekistan (138).
Effective public management (political stability, rule of law and
responsibility of the government, freedom of personal and business choice)
is particularly important for Ukraine. This aspect was closely monitored by
the World Bank in 1996-2006; as a result, The Quality of Public
Administration 2007 report: Global Indicators of Public Management 1996-
2006 was published. Out of a 100 point maximum, Ukraine got 40 points
for the responsibility of the state to the voters (Poland and Estonia got 84
each, Lithuania and Latvia got 73 each, Romania — 57, Mongolia — 56,
Mozambique — 44), 32 points for political stability (Poland got 54, Estonia
-t 67, Lithuania — 77, Latvia — 74, Romania — 46, Belarus — 45,
Turkmenistan — 34 points), 40 points for the effectiveness of the
government (Egypt got 43, Mongolia — 44, Estonia — 83, Lithuania —
76, Latvia — 73, Romania — 57), 47 points for effective regulatory policy
(Armenia got 57, Romania — 58, Poland — 69, Latvia — 79), 35 points
for the rule of law (Armenia got 42, Romania 57, Poland 60, and Latvia —
61 points), 34 points for curruption control (Georgia got 38, Mongolia —
39, Estonia — 80, Latvia — 66). In the same year Ukraine ranked 50 out of
55 countries in the IMD WCY assessment.
In the corruption perception index (compiled annually by Transparency
International, Berlin, Germany, since 1995 and based upon representative
analytical materials of respective research agencies) Ukraine ranked 83
out of 91 countries in 1998. In 2006, it ranked 99 out of 163 countries,
and in 2007 — 118 out of 179 countries, which was below Moldova,
Mozambique, Zambia, Rwanda, and Uganda. In 2007 Ukraine ranked
53rd out of 55 countries according to the IMD World Competitiveness
Yearbook.
This means that Ukraine has to choose between living without post-
industrial and informational claims and structural as well as
technological modernization of the national economy. If we go for the
first option, we need to effectively use the present natural resources
with the use of industrial technology, introduce relevant models,
provide for the renewal of a labor force that is capable of copying
technology and thus adapt to global living standards. The question is
whether this version is sufficient for Ukraine, which has the potential
for competitiveness on the international arena.
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If we go for the second option, we need to mobilize intellectual
resources, will and based on pragmatic public policy, make an economic
breakthrough. Modern Technology of Economic Breakthrough (TEB) as
a mechanism of the realization of long-term development for Ukraine
as a globally competitive country was publicly introduced by
Ukrainian economist, Head of Competitiveness Council of Ukraine
Y. Poluneev. The techology was used as a basis for the work of the
Ukrainian government in 20077. The theory stresses that evolution
(organic growth based on current trends, factors and competitive
advantages) will not give new quality to the economy and country as a
whole within 10-20 years. We need more ambitious rates of economic
growth, which can be achieved through the implementation of a
relevant economic policy.
3.1.5. Conclusions
We feel, that based on Ukrainian and international reform experience, it
can be said that in order to achieve sustainable economic growth in
Ukraine, we need a nation-wide policy rather than that of separate parties
or oligarch groups8. Economic growth cannot be achieved unless
economic policy is based on the national economic consensus that is, in
turn, based on the following factors: taking into account current and
perspective, individual and social economic interests, equality in the
access to the results of social progress, democratic development, i.e.
citizen participation in the decision-making process. This consensus has
to be socially constituted rather than conjunctural. We thus need the
constructive, transparent and clear cooperation of all institutions of the
state and the market. The permanent absence of an economic consensus
in Ukraine can soon lead not only to the next political crisis but also to
the loss of the critical level of the national consolidation that has already
been achieved. When guarding the national interests and security of
Ukraine, we need to rely solely on the internal potential of economic
thought, whereas foreign participation needs to be consultative in nature.
It is particularly important to prevent or neutralize the political and
                     
7 TEB vectors are based on more that 320 indicators and expert opinions that are used
in the internationally acknowledged ranking methodology for country and region competi-
tiveness at the Institute of Management Development (IMD-Lausanne), World Bank, UN,
OECD, Dow Jones, AccountAbility.
8 In democratic countries politics can be and as a rule are party-based, because the
state and national priorities are key for all parties. In Ukraine the programs of certain and
fairly influential political forces in effect question its sovereignty, while Ukrainian oli-
garchs, with very few exceptions, ignore not just the interests of the population but also
those of the nation.
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financial influence of other countries and international organizations on
the selection of key directions of the economic development of Ukraine.
In modern conditions, this requires active measures of political and
commercial diplomacy.
The key qualitative feature of the new economic policy of Ukraine
needs to be the innovative focus while taking into account global
trends of intellectual, informational and democratic processes in the
economy. Ukraine has fairly good achievements of economic thought
(A. Halchynsky, V. Heyets, A. Kinakh, V. Semynozhenko, 2002;
V. Heyets, V. Semynozhenko, B. Kvasnyuk, 2007; O. Vlasnyuk, 2006;
D. Tabachnyk, 2004) that unfortunately have not been implemented
so far.
In the strategic sense, only an open competitive national economy
can guarantee success. Given global imbalances (D. Lukianenko,
O. Mozhoviy, 2006), developed countries are the ones that benefit the
most from the high level of openness of national economies. The
Ukrainian economy has experienced this — the outflow of productive
resources strips it of major sources of development, the spread of
transnational corporations breaks national renewable patterns, initiates
the processes of structural simplification, as well as the
peripheralization and intensification of the secondary nature of certain
industries. Economic globalization brings innovative technology,
business and management experience, and real capital that can improve
the employment level. However, these trends are not dominant and the
challenges of globalization are intensifying.
In light of these facts, a traditional approach to the aims and
conditions of the formation of a national model of an open economy is to
be revised. On the macrolevel, we need to take into account the
correlation between domestic and foreign macroeconomic policy
(structural reforms influence the competitiveness of locally produced
goods, increased export is a favorable factor thereof; the real sector
defines the long-term trends of the monetary realm, which in turn creates
favorable conditions for the sale of produced goods both on domestic and
foreign markets, etc.).
At the microlevel, it is important to allow all sorts of businesses to
enter foreign markets of goods, services, and capital, make foreign trade
an organic component of their business activity. The processes of
entering foreign markets require a new legislative base. The main
obstacles to making Ukrainian businesses internationally competitive,
are high depreciation and worn out fixed assets, excessive material and
energy intensity of production, underdeveloped production and market
commercial infrastructure, limited domestic and foreign investment
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sources as well as imperfect management style of domestic and foreign
economic activity.
Effective economic policy is to minimize the chance of repeating past
mistakes and miscalculations, take into account the experience gained and
be focused on innovative ideas and approaches that have been proved
effective domestically and are implemented according to the modern
development paradigm.
3.2. The Model of Compensatory Economic Growth
3.2.1. Introduction
The problems of economic growth are important for many countries, but
for the states that went through substantial social and economic changes
in the 1990s they are extremely urgent, because during these years they
fell far behind. The relatively high pace of economic development that
started in the 21st century is often attributed to certain political leaders;
however, this growth is highly controversial, because it is compensatory
in its nature. Ukraine is no exception — its economic deterioration during
the transformation period is attributable to a number of objective and
subjective factors that hindered transformation towards a market
economy. The major factors are as follows:
• market unreadiness of society in terms of understanding the essence
of economic reform, its principles and institutions;
• absence of a clear and consistent reform strategy that follows any
model, be it the shock therapy model by L. Balcerowicz or the
gradualist model by Y. Kornayi. As a result, a certain mix emerged,
which is often ealled a post-soviet development model, but it is
impossible to single out common features, social relationships and
transition to the next implementation level, because integration
processes are not comparable;
• rapid growth of the shadow economy, increased criminalization of
the economy, numerous wars between certain economic groupings trying
to divide the turf in the early 1990s;
• rapid increase in state debt levels, incomplete nature of measures
taken to rehabilitate the economy, inconsistency and lack of transparency
of reforms;
• significant energy dependence on export, outdated technology in
metal production, chemical and sugar industries, which are the largest
energy consumers;
• capital outflow to numerous offshore zones.
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These and other factors brought about the rapid recession of the
Ukrainian economy in the 1990s; the annual rate of 10-20% of GDP
decline caused systemic shock, which can be seen as a prolonged (up to
10 years) version of its Polish counterpart. Therefore, transition towards
the model of gradualism was impossible during the period. Thus the
problems of the transformation of the national economy turned out to be
more complex than those in the countries of the CEE.
3.2.2. Specific Features of Compensatory Economic Growth in Ukraine
In modern economic theory there is a number of factors used to assess the
quality of economic growth; their combination can bring about a
synergetic effect in gradual development or hold it back. This trend is
especially noticeable with regard to the global economy, where
conjunctural changes are major and cause a big wave of fundamental
changes in all sectors of the economy. Energy price increases for
residents of rural areas in several European countries forced them to stop
growing wheat and other food crops and grow other crops that can be
used as biofuel. These changes will soon lead to food price increases, the
production of equipment for the food industry and other related sectors,
as well as the deformation of the market. All this can influence structural
changes in the global system of economic relations. Because the public
structure is not diversified enough, the periods of growth and recession
are becoming more noticeable. Ukraine is no exception — its
development in many respects depends on oil and natural gas prices,
because its main export products are ferrous metals and products thereof.
This sort of production is very energy intensive — in the early 21st
century metals enjoyed favorable market conditions and energy price
increases coincided with metal price increases, but there is no guarantee
that the situation will remain the same. Decreasing metal intensity of
machine building that is about to take place in the near future will lead to
new changes in the global economy. Therefore, the recent relative success
of the national economy looks fairly unconvincing, since the market
infrastructure for ferrous metal products that accounts for 40% of total
Ukrainian exports could deteriorate.
Thus, the illusion of rapid (in 2000-2006) economic growth went
away pretty fast and the growth can be characterized as compensatory,
i.e. based on the extensive growth factors. These factors are:
• relatively low energy prices (particularly gas);
• favorable global ferrous metal market conditions;
• remittances from abroad;
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• privatization (including through raider attacks) of certain state-
owned enterprises;
• foreign investment inflow into certain selected sectors of the
national economy.
It is natural that favorable conditions cannot become permanent;
therefore, soon each of the above factors will have the opposite effect
(energy prices will keep growing, foreign remittances will go down,
immigrant parents will instead take their children to Italy, Spain and the
USA; the privatization process will end, but we do not know whether all
the raided plants and factories will operate and whether conditions will be
created for foreign business in Ukraine). The problem of innovation
complex development is no less important — it has been discussed in
Ukraine for a while, but real tools and mechanisms have not been
developed yet. Most researchers, however, see real opportunities for the
increased competitiveness of national producers on the global economic
arena in the formation of the new economy.
Many European researchers, including R. Strätling (2003), think that the
problem of the weak diversification of the energy sector in the EU is difficult
and will not be solved soon. Danish researcher G. Svendsen (2003, р. 23) is
convinced that economic growth depends on a number of production factors,
among which social capital is equally important as the physical capital.
Therefore, the strategy of increasing the competitiveness of the national
economy should simulate the European model of economic growth that is
based on decreasing energy intensity, an innovation-investment growth
system and focus on the new quality of human potential.
The model presented below (Figure 3.1) reflects the evolution of the
conceptual approaches to the quality of economic growth. Despite the
inclination for market methods of management, Ukrainian officials
often use «manual» management techniques. At the level of post-
socialist shock that lasted for 10 years, such methods were justifiable,
but under londitions of transition to market economy and the start of the
compensatory growth, such management became very Rarmful for the
quality of growth. We forecast that the constant interference of highly-
placed officials into all aspects of life can destroy the mechanism of
effective management of the economy. On the other hand, numerous
cases of abuse of power, both in the regions and in the capital, require
an immediate response from the president or prime-minister, which
makes us think that Ukraine has a dualistic growth model. The
implementation of European mechanisms and instruments of regulation
of social and economic development in 2008-2013 would enhance
favorable factors and reduce the impact of adverse factors and,
therefore, transfer to the technology-based stade of growrh.
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Post-socialist shock
introduction of market prices for raw materials and
energy
disruption of established links
poverty of the population
price shock
no definite strategy
unfavorable market conditions for traditional export
products
growing shadow economy
ruin caused by Ponzi schemes
Manual economic
regulation
strengthened presidential vertical of power
non-market regulation of aggregate supply and
demand
«monlight» privatization
growing conflicts between oligarch clans
strict monetary regulation
political uncertainty (East or West? What are we
building?)
feudalization in the regions
Dualistic Model of the
Compensatory Economic Growth
of Ukraine
Relatively favorable factors (some) Relatively unfavorable factors(some)
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of technology can make certain products
uncompetitive
Figure 3.1. Model of Compensatory Economic Growth in Ukraine
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3.2.3. Determinants of compensatory growth
The growth of macroeconomic indicators in Ukraine started in the second
half of 1999 after a long production and social crisis that stripped Ukraine
of 59.3% of its GDP. During the period of economic growth until mid-
2008, the Ukrainian economy only recovered 31.9% and reached 72.6%
of the GDP level from 1990 (Figure 3.2). This makes such economic
growth compensatory, i.e. growth that utilizes productive resources that
had been freed during the crisis.
The implemented policy of active production growth at any cost
results in long-term economic recovery. If the average annual growth
of real GDP stays constant (7.5 %), the gap with the 1990 level
(27.4%) can only be bridged in 2012, i.e. 13 years after the start of
economic growth. Only then provided that new strong material and
technical resources emerge, which is the only long-term development
factor, can the economy of Ukraine enter the stage of an economic
upturn.
Research of the specific features of the economic development of
Ukraine and other countries, conducted by the Ministry of Economy of
Ukraine, Ministry of Finance, and the National Bank of Ukraine,
entitled «The Potential of Ukraine and its Fulfillment» (2008, p.12)
proved that in 2000—2005 Ukraine ranked No.7 out of 46 analyzed
countries according to average GDP growth rate. An important trend of
global economic development was that countries of the CIS
(Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus) dominated
the top 10 fastest growing economies. Some of them have already
reached the pre-reform level of GDP value — in Uzbekistan it was
achieved in 2001, in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia — in 2003, in
Azerbaijan — in 2005, while in Russia — only in 2007. The economic
growth of most of these countries was compensatory in nature —
increased global demand for raw materials loaded production capacities
in export-oriented low-tech industries. For example, Armenian export is
mainly made up of copper ore and scrap metals, Azerbaijan exports oil
products, steel and cotton, Kazakstan exports oil, gas, and cotton.
Belarus is the only exception — its GDP grew due to the active
development of export-oriented industrial production of processed
products.
At the same time, the world financial crisis of 2008 nullified the
forecasts of positive economic dynamics in Ukraine, which proved the
unsustainability and unreliability of the compensatory model of economic
growth. As we can see in Figure 3.2., in just one year real GDP fell from
72.6% down to 67.4% of the value recorded in 1990.
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In Ukraine a high GDP growth rate resulted from the high levels of
production capacity use due to favorable market conditions and the
appreciation of the main components of Ukrainian export (mostly low
value added raw materials — metals). This allowed for a rapid increase in
output without additional investment. But there is little possibility of
further increase in GDP via the intensive use of existing production
capacities, which is seen in the analysis of the GDP composition
according to end use (Figure 3.3.). In 1990—1993 gross savings as a % of
total GDP were growing9 (at 8.7 p.p.) and end consumption was falling
(at 9.6 p.p.); in 1994—1999 there was a reverse trend — the share of
gross savings fell by 17.9 p.p., while end consumption rose by 9.2 p.p.
The period of economic growth (2000—2008) is characterized by the
simultaneous uneven increase in gross savings (5.1 p.p.) and end
consumption (2.8 p.p.); net export played an important role in GDP
dynamics until 2005 — its share was cyclically changing from 5.0% in
2000 to 0.8% in 2005. At the same time, 2006 saw the start of a steady
trend of a negative trade balance (–8% in 2008).
These changes in the structure of the GDP in recent years, in effect
meet the requirements of economic revival. During this period, in order to
accelerate economic revival, the share of savings needs to increase
compared to the share of consumption, which creates better conditions for
the mobilization of the financial resources of the country. Instead, there is
an unsteady trend of simultaneous increase of both consumption and
savings, which indicates a gradual decline in the resources for economic
revival, which is particularly visible in a significant decline in the share of
net export.
Potential opportunities for improving the quality of economic
growth are in the first place defined by the volume of capital in the
country, which indicates production capacity and the level of fixed asset
utilization. Fixed assets are formed through incoming investment and
reduced by depreciation. In Ukraine the trend of investment into fixed
assets in comparison to prices, became positive with the start of
economic growth; investment increase is greater than the real GDP
increase (Figure 3.4.). Investment peaked in 2003-2004 when gross
investment grew by 27% and 29% respectively against the previous
year, which also brought about a 9-12% increase in real GDP. The
resilience of the economy to commodity price shocks that Ukraine
showed in 2006 proved to foreign investors that it is an attractive target
for investment. In 2007 Ukraine experienced a new investment boom
(+23.7%), which led to a 7.7% increase in real GDP.
                     
9 Gross savings include capital increase, working capital increase, and net asset pur-
chases.
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Real investment into fixed assets in 2007 reached the pre-reform level and
constituted 103.4% of the 1990 value. This investment level could be
characterized as an achievement of the national economy, but the crisis of 2008
revealad certain problems in the investment activity of Ukraine; they are
situational, speculative and focus on rapid returns. In 2009 investment into fixed
assets decreased by 44.2% against 2008, when this indicator also showed
negative dynamics. Such dynamics makes the modernization of national
production impossible while competition on domestic and international markets
is growing, M&A activity is becoming more active and gas prices are increasing.
In addition to the investment problems analyzed above, the dynamics
of the share of accumulated depreciation in the GDP highlights that fixed
assets are not being replaced at the necessary rate, which has been the
case since the period of social and economic crisis. In 1990 the rate of
capital consumpion was at 16.8%, in 1993 it was 20.0%, but until 2008 it
declined and reached 9.3% (Figure 3.4).
Ukraine is behind developed countries in terms of the gross accumulation
of fixed assets, i.e. the level of investment inflow. In 2002-2005 «The Potential
of Ukraine and its Fulfillment» research paper, determined that the average rate
for 46 countries was at USD 2,580 per capita, while Ukraine only showed USD
179. Despite the fact that in 2000—2005 fixed assets in Ukraine were growing
with a compound annual growth rate (7.6%) that exceeded the rate in other
countries (6.4%), the Ukrainian value is still lower than that in the 10 countries
leading in terms of GDP growth (14.4%) (Potential of Ukraine, 2008: 12).
Overall, the real increase in fixed assets in Ukraine in 2006 was at 73% of the
1990 level, while the absolute value was at 60% (p.61).
Investment inflow in recent years is insufficient to improve the quality of
economic growth, because inflow does not compensate the depreciation of
fixed assets that is currently at 50% across all sectors of the economy.
The industry structure of investments is not favorable for dealing with the
compensatory nature of economic growth in Ukraine. As of year-end 2009,
only 38% of capital investments went to industrial production that requires the
replacement of production resources. Whereas the retail and financial sector
received 28.4% of all investments. As of the first half of 2010, industrial
production received a major share of investments (39.9%). Against the first half
of 2009, investment into industrial production decreased by 11.4%, including
by 11.1% for the processing industry, 8.6% for the mining (extracting)
industry, and 18.4% for the production of electricity, water and gas. Major
investments go to real estate, leasing, engineering (23.3% of the total volume),
transportation and communications (14.6%), trade, automotive, household
appliances and consumer product repairs (6.5%); 3.3% of investment goes into
construction. Investment in Ukraine, therefore, goes into low-tech industries,
which doesn’t support the innovation-investment course of development.
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Similar trends are observed in foreign direct investment (FDI) —
most investments go to production using second, third and fourth-
technology modes. In 2006 USD 239.0 m was invested in the production
of non-metal mineral goods, USD 144.0 m went into metal production
and processing, USD 73.6 m went to food processing and agriculture,
USD 55.4 m was invested in extraction. The cumulative share of these
industries was 72.8% of the increase of FDI into industrial production. At
the same time, the share of the mechanical engineering industry was a
mere 7.3% (USD 51.0 m), chemical and petrochemical industries received
7.5% (USD 52.4 m) (The State of Economic Security…, 207: 22).
In the first half of 2008 the trend of the reallocation of foreign investment
in favor of intermediate industries continued: the growth of the share of
FDI that went into intermediate industries (financial services, real estate,
utilities and individual services, hotels and restaurants) was at 19.7 p.p.
(from 48.4% to 68.1%) while the share of FDI in industrial production
fell by 16.8 p.p. (32.6% to 15.8%) (The State of Economic Security in
Ukraine in the 1st Half of 2008, 2008: 15).
An important factor for the conservation of the low-tech
production structure in Ukraine is external demand, because positive
macroeconomic dynamics is maintained by the extraction and export
of non-renewable mineral resources (Table 3.3). In 1995-2006 the
share of metals in the export structure increased (from 32.7% to
42.2%), while the share of food products went down (from 20.4% to
12.1%). At the same time, the financial crisis influenced the industry
structure of foreign trade, which proved that the factors of
compensatory economic growth are unstable. The share of food
products in the export structure went from 12.1% in 2006 to 23.6% in
2009; the share of ferrous and non-ferrous metals fell sharply from
42.2% to 31.7%. At the same time, the share of cars and machinery in
the import structure went down from 31.0% to 20.3%, while the share
of mineral products went up from 26.3% to 33.1%.
The low share of machinery and equipment in the export structure
(17.1% in 2009) has a particularly adverse effect, because it makes it
impossible to achieve long-term steady growth rates by increasing the
output of high-tech products and makes the economy of Ukraine
dependent on the rest of the world. This takes place at a time when the
most developed countries achieve 85-90% of GDP growth through the
production and export of high-tech products, creating a new economy,
the effectiveness of which is no longer defined by material factors like
goods, raw materials, labor force, and equipment but is rather
influenced by intellectual factors like expertise, information, and
technology.
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Overall factors determining the long period of compensatory revival of the
economy of Ukraine and its low competitiveness on the global market are
divided into two groups, production factors and demand factors. Among
production factors, the main restriction in terms of labor effectiveness is the
critically high level of depreciation of fixed assets, the unsatisfactory condition
of the production infrastructure, the high level of resource intensity of the
economy, and the innovational passivity of most companies. The factors that
determine ineffective consumer demand are the low general level of income
and excessive inequality of its distirbution among different social layers.
The high depreciation level of fixed assets in Ukraine is caused in the
first place by the inadequate financial resources of companies and low
investment in fixed asset renewal, while assets are used more intensively.
Table 3.4 shows that the growth of output by 21.6% in 2001—2009
caused an increase in the accumulated depreciation of fixed assets from
54.6% to 61.8%. This proves that businesses focus on fast payback and
have no development funds to be used to replace the depreciated fixed
assets of the company. The replacement of fixed assets at industrial
production companies is inadequate (replacement rate in 2005 was at a
mere 4.4%) (The State of Economic Security…, 2007: 8).
When analyzing the relation of the dynamics of the fixed assets
depreciation level to the output volume by industry, we need to pay
attention to certain negative moments that point to the increased intensity
of fixed asset use. Firstly, the unfavorable trend of growing depreciation
of fixed assets is characteristic of most industrial production types except
the low-tech sectors (timber processing, consumer products
manufacturing, coke and oil production, non-metal mineral products).
Secondly, high-tech industries (automotive, chemical) that provide above
average growth rates, unfortunately, cannot replace their fixed assets, the
depreciation level level of which, as of 2006 was more than critical, i.e.
63.2% and 69.6%, respectively. Thirdly, the development of basic
industries of the Ukrainian economy (extraction of resources, in particular
energy; production and distribution of electricity, gas, and water) is
particularly ineffective — they showed slow growth rates (11-15% over a
5-year period) and rapid increase in the depreciation level.
The infrastructural sector of Ukraine, i.e. railroads, highways,
electricity, gas and water production and distribution, also has a high level
of depreciation of fixed assets. The depreciation level of electricity, gas and
water production and distribution was at 62.2% in 2009: 33.8% of water
supply pipes and 42.9% of street water pipes were in need of urgent
replacement (I. Burkovsky, V. Movchan, N. Sysenko, I. Yuzefovych,
2008). This leads to long-standing problems with water supply, numerous
electricity, railroad, and gas outages, emergencies on the roads.
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Table 3.4
OUTPUT INCREASE AND THE LEVEL OF FIXED ASSET
DEPRECIATION BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY
Production volume growth Fixed asset depreciation ratio, %
Industry 2006 vs.
2001, %
2009 vs.
2001, % 2002 2006 2009
Production total 52.6 21.6 54.6 58.6 61.8
Extraction of
energy resources 11.5 2.7 36.4 44.9
Extraction of other
resources 46.3 19.6 62.8 63.2
46.1
Food, beverage
and tobacco
production
82.9 80.9 40.1 48.3
Consumer goods
production 16.7 –24.6 50.7 45.9
Timber processing,
except furniture
manufacturing
160.5 115.5 38.4 28.9
Paper production,
publishing 113.3 93.7 41.4 44.9
Production of coke
and oil refining 7.4 -8.3 52.3 48.9
Chemical and
petrochemical
production
61.3 23.0 63.0 69.6
Production of
other non-metal
mineral products
91.0 27.7 55.1 54.2
Metal producion 42.7 –1.9 60.0 67.7
Automobile
manufacturing 131.7 52.3 58.2 63.2
64.9
Production and
distribution of
energy, gas, and
water
14.9 2.7 58.9 61.1 62.2
Source: State Statistics Committee.
This state of the infrastructural sector leads to the low quality of
infrastructure services and threatens the stability of the economy as a whole,
because it leads to additional non-productive expenses that in effect hold
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back real GDP growth. Despite the constant lack of financial resources, the
share of people employed in the infrastructural sector is growing: in the year
2000, the transportation and communications sector as well as gas, water, and
electricity production and distribution sector, employed 11.7% of all workers,
while in 2005 it was at a level of 13%. This increases the ineffectiveness of
the use of resources allocated for the development of these sectors and leads
to a decline in labor productivity. At the same time, every year the
contribution of the infrastructural sector to GDP growth is declining. In 2000
electricity, gas and water production and distribution was at 6.8% of the
GDP; however, in 2005, it went down to 3.9% and in 2009, it went further
down to 3.5%. The transportation and communications sector contributed
13% of the GDP in 2000, 14.6% in 2004, and 11.3% in 2009.
The specialization of the economy of Ukraine in the extraction and
initial processing of raw materials as well as its low technological level,
make it very energy intensive, which creates the threat of the country
becoming technologically dependent and an economically underdeveloped
market for industrially developed countries.
A significant increase in gas prices made the problem of high energy
intensity more acute; in 2008 the economy used 0.35 kg of fuel for the
production of every UAH 1 of the GDP, in 2005 it was 0.521, in 2000 —
0.668 (Energy Intensity as a Resource of Innovational Development,
2009: 13).
In spite of a certain fall in energy intensity of the GDP, it remains too
high and exceeds that in developed countries by 2.1-3.7 times, which makes
it necessary to keep labor costs, working capital, and long-term capital
investment low in order to keep the economy competitive. It is important to
note that old equipment in the Ukrainian energy sector and lack of resource-
saving technology can lead to the state being unable to provide the necessary
energy levels for the population even if there is enough fuel. Unconventional
and renewable energy resources are utilized inadequately — their share in the
energy balance of the country is at mere 0.7%.
According to international statistics, the energy dependence of Ukraine
in 2004-2005 was 62% (the share of import in total expenses on energy
resources). This level is fairly close to that of developed countries: the
average for EU-25 is 50%, in Germany it is 62%, in Austria — 64%, USA
— 65%, Japan — 92%, France — 50%, Finland — 56% and Hungary-
58% (The State of Economic Security…, 2007: 26), but the situation is
further aggravated by the lack of geographic diversification of energy
supply. The level of Ukrainian oil dependence on the Russian Federation is
roughly 80% and gas dependence is more than 70%. Some imported gas
comes from Central Asia, but its prices and supply are almost completely
dependent on Russian companies. Moreover, Russian oil companies control
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more than 85% of oil processing facilities in Ukraine, roughly 80% of the
domestic market of fuel and lubricants, the total volume, supply and
utilization of nuclear fuel as well as a major part of the equipment for the
construction and repair of nuclear power stations.
In order to reduce the energy intensity of the GDP it is necessary to
restructure the national economy, while stimulating development of the
sectors that are close to the end consumer (first and foremost, services,
trade, and communications) as well as high-tech industries. According to
the Energy Strategy of Ukraine that was adopted in 2006, Ukraine has to
halve its energy intensity by 2030 (down to 0.24 kg of fuel/ UAH 1)
against 0.47 kg of fuel/UAH 1 in 2006. But this objective is criticized by
experts, because it isn’t supported by modern trends of investment
dynamics in the national energy sector (V. Heyets, 2006).
A key role in the prolongation of the compensatory stage of economic
development in Ukraine is played by the development trends in
innovation activity, that in light of the positive dynamics of real GDP in
2000-2006, show a decline in the high technology used in domestic
production (Table 3.5).
According to the estimates of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine,
GDP growth based on the implementation of new technology is just 0.7%,
which is critically low (The State of Economic Security…, 2007: 21).
Resource-intensive industries are prominent in Ukraine, while high-tech
industries (aviation and space, pharmaceuticals, IT equipment, medical,
precise and optical instruments, TV, radio and communications equipment)
contribute a mere 3-5% of the GDP. The most progressive high-tech
industries of the sixth technological level (nanotechnology, optoelectronics,
biotechnology, genomics, photonics) are almost non-existent in Ukraine —
their share in the GDP is less than 0.1% (the state of economic security: 28).
Innovations, unfortunately, didn’t become the basis for the formation
of a new innovation- and investment-based model of national economic
development. The share of scientific research in the GDP fell from 1.38%
in 1996 down to 1.14% in 2000 and 0.95% in 2009; funding of research
work fell respectively. At the same time, developed countries spend 2.5-
4% of their GDP on scientific work, while funding of 1% of the GDP and
lower leads to the loss of economic significance of scientific work and the
country becomes totally dependent on foreign technology.
The falling share of high-tech industries in the GDP led to the falling
prestige of scientific work and, as a result, a decline in the number of
scientists. In 1990 Ukraine had 313,000 scientific workers, but during the
years of independence, their number decreased more than threefold to
92,400 in 2009. Even during the years of economic growth the negative
trend persisted despite the growth of salaries.
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Moreover, the share of companies focusing on innovations is decreasing
in Ukraine. The share of companies working with innovations went down
from 18% in 2000 to 12.8% in 2009, while the share of companies that
implement innovations went down from 14.8% in 2000 to 10.7% in 2009. In
the countries of the European Union, according to the data of the Directorate
on Entrepreneurship of the Commission of the European Union (European
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), 2009: 57), on average, 30% of small and
medium-sized enterprises work with innovations, while for big companies,
innovations are a major part of business activity.
The constant decline in the technological level of production became the
consequence of this innovation passivity in Ukraine. In 2000—2009 the
number of innovative products fell 5.6 times, indicating the decline in
innovation activity. In general, these trends resulted in a low share of
innovative products in total industrial output (4.8% in 2009, i.e. 3-4 times
lower than that in the countries of the EU). The share will keep defining the
raw material specialization of the Ukrainian economy, price-based
competitiveness and will keep it among the outsiders of global development.
Apart from the analyzed production factors that determine the low quality
of economic development in Ukraine, supply factors were also important.
Based on the Keynesian concept of the regulation of the economy, the main
leverage of economic stability was consumer demand, the volume and
effectiveness of which is defined by the level and nature of income
distribution. Presently, Ukraine has a positive dynamics of disposable
income, the nominal value of which grew 3.9 times in 2001-2009, while the
the average salary rose from UAH 311 to UAH 1,906, i.e. 6.1 times (Table
3.6). The share of disposable income in the GDP grew during these years
from 58% to 73.5% and the salary intensity of the GDP grew from 32.4% to
41.1%, which is considerably lower than that in developed coutries, where
the value is at 60%. The lengthy social and economic crises of the mid-
1990s, have caused a low level of real income among the population and a
high level of their differentiation against standards of the developed world.
In Ukraine, the growth in the income of the population, driven by
progressive reforms in taxation, social insurance and pension administration
grew twice as fast as the economy. The real income of the population grew
10-20% annually, while real GDP grew by 5-10% annually. In 2001—2009
real disposable income grew 2.4 times, real salary increased 2.6 times, while
real GDP grew 1.3 times.
The faster dynamics of income than that of output volumes has been
observed since the period of the transformation crisis. In 1991—1999 real
GDP shrank by 55.3%, while gross disposable income shrank by 67.1%
and average salary shrank by 71.2%. In the years of economic growth the
lost potential wasn’t regained. As the growth of the disposable income, and
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the one of the transfer payments particularly, was faster than the dynamics
of industrial output, the level of disposable income came close to the pre-
crisis level. In 2007 the real GDP lag behind the level of 1991 was at
20.7%, real salary lag was at 23%, while real disposable income lag was
8.4%. On the one hand, this creates a positive influence on the growth of
productive demand in the country, increases internal investment potential
and, thus, fosters the growth of production; on the other hand, given the
unstable price situation in the country, it causes further inflation. High
inflation rates characterized by the annual growth of consumer prices of
10% and more (Table 3.6), restrict the purchasing power of the population
and had a negative influence on consumer demand.
Table 3.6
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE INCOME OF THE POPULATION OF UKRAINE
Indicator 2001 2004 2007 2009
2009 vs.
2001,
growin
index
2009 vs.
1991,
growin
index
Disposable income, %
of previous year 122.8 130.4 127.3 104.1 3.9 223,883.5
Real disposable income,
% of previous year 109.6 119.7 112.8 89.8 2.4 0.90
Real salary, % of
previous year 107.4 113.9 115.0 87.5 2.4 0.78
Average monthly
salary, UAH 311.1 590.0 1351.0 1,906.0 6.1 381,200.0
Real average monthly
salary, % of last year 120.7 117.1 115.1 91.1 2.6 1.07
Share of disposable
income in the GDP, % 58.3 61.4 65.9 73.5 1.3 1.05
Salary intensity of the
GDP, % 32.4 33.1 36.0 41.1 1.3 0.90
Supplementary data:
Real GDP, % of last
year 109.2 112.1 107.7 84.9 1.3 0.67
Consumer price index,
% of last year 112.0 109.0 112.8 115.9 2.3 354,716.4
Source: calculated based on the data provided by the State Statistics Committee
The problem of unproductive consumer demand in Ukraine is getting
worse due to the uneven distribution of income among different social
layers. In the years of social and economic reforms under conditions of
spreading corruption, the «moonlight» economy and privileges to certain
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citizens were getting worse, the share of poor people was increasing, a
limited pool of people were accummulating wealth and the middle class was
shrinking. The growth of income in recent years doesn’t improve the
problem of uneven income distribution, because people that have access to
resources and their distibution benefit most from economic growth. The
cumulative expenses of the 10% wealthiest people exceed the cumulative
expenses of 10% poorest people by 5 times, which is by the refleated
dynamic of the fund coefficient (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF UKRAINE
ACCORDING TO GROSS INCOME LEVEL
Indicator 2000 2003 2006 2009
Decile coefficient of differentiation, times 4.2 4.1 3.8 3.4
Decile fund coefficient, times 8.1 7.9 7.1 5.3
Concentration index (Gini index), times 0.318 0.320 0.302 0.257
People living below the poverty line, m 39.2 35.2 23.1 9.5
Share of population living below the
poverty line, % 80.2 76.2 50.9 21.4
Supplementary data:
Minimal monthly cost of living, UAH per
capita 270.1 342.0 472.0 701.0
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine collected via a sample inspection of
living conditions. In 2007 the data is for quarter 1.
Based on the decile differentiation coefficient, the minimum level of
expenses among the 10% of wealthiest people is 3.4 times higher than the
maximum level of expenses among the 10% of poorest people. In general,
the distribution of the population of Ukraine according to the level of
average per capita and aggregate expenses deviate more than 0.25 % from
the mean, as seen in the Gini index dynamics. In advanced Western
countries it is at a level of 0.15-0.17; according to the methodology of the
OECD, index values of more than 0.33-0.35 characterize a high level of
social inequality. In Ukraine the index level grew from 0.36 in 1993 to 0.41
in 1996 (Y. Lebanova: 21), while in 2000-2009 the value went down from
0.318 to 0.257. The current value still points to the high level of inequality
both inside the country and compared to advanced Western countries.
A positive consequence of the state policy on income and social
protection regulation that was implemented in Ukraine, is the falling share
of people living below the poverty line — in 2000 it was 39.2 m, while in
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2006 it went down to 23.1 m. The share of people that cannot provide for
their own basic needs decreased in 2000-2009 from 80.2% to 21.4%.
However, the value still remains high and continues to determine low
unproductive consumer demand.
Due to the high level of fixed asset depreciation, the low level of
innovation in the economy and unproductive consumer demand in Ukraine,
the level of labor productivity is very low. Each employee produced UAH
4,200 of the GDP in 1991, based on 1995 prices; while in 1997 it was
already UAH 2,000. In 2007 labor productivity went up to UAH 4,000 due
to an economic upturn.
«The Potential of Ukraine and its Fulfillment» research paper, placed
Ukraine in 9th place out of a total of 46 countries, according to the growth of
labor productivity, after a lengthy transformation crisis (The Potential of
Ukraine and…, 2008: 17-18). Other countries that made it to the top 10 are
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, China, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. Despite the growth of labor productivity in Ukraine during the
period of economic growth, its absolute value still remains one of the lowest
in the world. The level of social labor productivity defined as GDP
(purchasing power parity basis) per employee on average for the 50 countries
studied by the International Institute of Management and Development in
Lausanne (IMD) (Economy Statistics…) was at USD 40,900 in 2007, while
in Ukraine it was at just USD 15,40010. The highest labor productivity was
recorded in such countries as Luxemburg (USD 89,700, which is almost 6
times higher than that in Ukraine), USA and Ireland (over USD 74,000,
which is 5 times that in Ukraine), Italy (USD 65,700), France, Denmark and
Austria (USD 57,800-USD 59,400, which is almost 4 times that of Ukraine),
Canada, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain
and Japan (USD 50,600- USD 57,000, i.e. 3.5 times that in Ukraine).
Countries that a have lower value than Ukraine are Indonesia, India, the
Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela, and Romania, where it was between
USD 6,800 and USD 13,600 per employee.
The negative influence of the generally low labor productivity on
economic growth in Ukraine was aggravated by the fact that during the
years of independence the proportion of labor productivity growth rate and
nominal and real salary was distorted. In developed countries nominal salary
growth is always ahead of labor productivity growth, while real salary lags
behind. During 15 years (1980—1995), labor productivity in these countries
grew by 40-45 p.p. annually, nominal salary increased by 60-65 p.p., while
real salary increased by 30 p.p. (A. Nikiforova, 2001: 106).
                     
10 Calculated based on the GDP data (PPP basis) defined by the Central Intelligence
Agency (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.
html) and the data provided by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
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In 1991-2007 labor productivity in Ukraine shrank by 5%, while
nominal salary grew 188,000 times, which was caused by high inflation
rates, real salary shrank by 23% (Figure 3.5).
However, the positive dynamics of labor productivity was caused not so
much by growth in the technical level of production but by loading the
production capacity that had not been used during the crisis. The dismissal of
employees lagged behind the decline in real production during the years of
reforms. The highest rates of productivity decline were observed during the
first three years of the transition period; the following five years brought
stagnation — its level was at roughly 50% of that during the pre-reform
period. Labor productivity growth started after the rapid decline in the number
of employees in 1999 by 3.7 million, compared to 1997 (i.e. by 16%).
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OECD research (The Potential of Ukraine and…, 2008: 18) shows
that until 2003, the shrinking labor force caused by the active
restructuring of Ukrainian companies had a favorable influence on labor
productivity and the level of production capacity utilization. However,
labor productivity growth driven by these factors is limited and over the
long run, Ukraine will first and foremost, need to stimulate investment
and innovation, improve the institutional and legislative components of
the business environment and create conditions for the development of
free competition.
3.2.4. Ukraine’s Economic Development Goals
It is universally recognized that the government is responsible for
justifying and achieving the goals of economic development. Therefore,
we need to take into account the specific features of its activity these
days, when on average, the composition of the government and the prime-
minister change annually. Therefore, we cannot talk about long-term
goals. Firstly, in the years of independence Ukrainian governments have
been trying to «solve today the problems of today» (sometimes the
problems of yesterday). Secondly, goal-setting in Ukraine is really non-
transparent, concealed, has many understatements and considerable lack
of clarity. Opinions on the goals of economic development vary greatly in
state bodies — they range from the re-nationalization of all assets to their
sale to foreign investors. Therefore, on the one hand, the government is
trying not to declare its economic goals, keeping them to a minimum; on
the other hand, it is trying to artificially boost its reporting.
This raises the question of the possibility of accurately defining the
goals of economic development. We deem this possible if we build a
matrix (bi-dimensional) model of goal-setting that is widely used for
management decisions in companies. This means using two dimensions
to justify the goals, e.g. time and structure (industry). The first dimension
allows the definition of current, medium-term and long-term goals. The
second dimension defines the goals on different levels: the economy as a
whole, industry, region, etc.
The concept of this model is not new. However, it is not used
adequately, due to a lack of coordination between the branches of power,
separate agencies, divisions, or sometimes due to the fact that employees
do not follow the directions of state agencies. In Table 3.8, we present the
matrix model schematically while accounting for the classification of
goals based on the level of management and time.
The model is theoretical and needs further details for practical use
with vertical and horizontal components. For example, the industry-based
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level of management needs to be broken down into industrial production,
agriculture, construction, etc. For each industry, there will be more
specific goals. For instance, steel production needs to be less material and
energy intensive. The mechanical engineering industry needs greater
focus on technology. Agriculture is to focus on the rational use of natural
resources in the long-term.
When defining the goals of economic development, it is reasonable to
use such a tool for making goals more specific, as SMART (R.L. Daft,
2000: 218-221). SMART means capturing all the basic characteristics of
goals by meeting the following requirements:
— specific, both qualitatively and quantitatively;
— measurable, i.e. defining the goal based on certain criteria of
economic development;
— achievable based on available resources;
— relevant, i.e. those that can be used as criteria of economic
development;
— timed, i.e. having certain deadlines.
Table 3.8
MATRIX MODEL OF GOALS
FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE
Goal nature
Management
level Immediate
(1—3 years)
Medium-term
(5—10 years)
Long-term
(over 10 years)
Foreign ExportImport Regional focus
International
competitiveness
Nation-wide Key indicators ofsocial welfare
Strategic
priorities
International
competitiveness
Functional
Indicators of the
functioning of
separate areas
(monetary, fiscal, etc.)
Strategic trends
Forecasts of
indicators based on
intergation
processes
Sectoral
Indicators of the
work of separate
industries (sub-
sectors)
Change in the
sectoral
structure
Position on global
markets
Regional Key developmentindicators of regions
Change in the
economic
structure of
regions
Equal development
of different regions
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At the level of separate companies, requirements to management
goals are easier to meet than at the state level. Company goals are mostly
in revenue generation, which is measurable. Company management also
has certain resources at hand — human, finacial, material, etc. However,
the SMART approach is also reasonable at the state level for setting
economic goals.
In the first place we need to define a timeframe for the goals. Based
on a well-known classification, economic policy, and therefore goals, are
developed and implemented in three main periods: short-term (1-3 years),
medium-term (5-10 years), and long-term (over 10 years). O. Rosenfeld
classifies goals in the following way — he links goals to economic
growth rates: medium-term goals are linked to the economic security of
the state, long-term goals are linked to the accession of Ukraine to the
countries of the golden billion. Let’s examine these approaches more
closely.
We have already talked about short-term economic development goals
in relation to the GDP. Other types of short-term goals (export, import,
WTO accession, structural changes, etc.) are reviewed in other chapters
of the book.
For medium-term macroeconomic goals, O. Rosenfeld suggests using
a meaningful and consistent shift away from the dangerous levels of
certain criteria. These are:
1. Critical level of consumption of imported food products. The safe
level is 30%, while in Ukraine it is 30-40%. Therefore, Ukraine is
strategically dependent on importers.
2. Critical level of export of manufacturing that is at least at 40% of
the total export structure in developed countries. In Ukraine this indicator
is at 20%. Exporters sell too many commodities to foreign markets and
lose their value added potential.
3. The share of investment into the GDP must exceed the level of
simple reproduction and foreign investment into the GDP. This indicator
is very low in Ukraine.
4. The share of allocations to scientific research and the share of new
products in the total output is also several times lower than the floor level.
5. The poverty threshold in Ukraine is 40%, while its critical level is
10%.
As we can see above, the indicators of mid-term macroeconomic
goals are mainly related to international trade (three out of five), scientific
work and public welfare. For the most part, they meet SMART
requirements and, therefore, can be a subject of discussion in scientific
and political circles. However, we feel that in terms of relevance, the list
can be made longer by adding the requirement of lowering the energy
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intensity of the GDP, improving production infrastructure, transformation
of the economic structure for the growth of its technological level and
value added, etc.
As for the long-term goals, we deem the idea of Ukraine’s accession
to the countries of the golden billion to be somewhat romanticized and do
not meet the requirements of the SMART concept. The increasing
international competitiveness of Ukraine looks more constructive. We
think that Ukraine should look closely at Kazakhstan’s aspirations to
become one of 50 most developed countries. If Ukraine gains social
stability, we can set even more ambitious goals. Social contract,
justification and ways of achieving of all these goals need to be
researched further.
3.2.5. Conclusions
The problem of the compensatory nature of economic growth and
improving its quality can be solved through (1) changing the structure of
production factors, while striving to improve the level of scientific and
technical progress, investment into fixed assets, human capital, and
innovations; (2) changing the stucture of industrial production, while
focusing on high-tech industries with high value added; (3) changing the
social structure of the economy in order to fight uneven income
distribution and setting the fair distribution of the national income.
In order to shift away from a raw-material orientation towards
competitiveness and industrial development based on a progressive
restructurization towards high-tech production. However, based on the
experience of Ukraine and other countries of the CIS (K. Khubiev, 2005),
the economic policy and legislative base cannot provide the financial
differentiation in favor of high-tech industries; on the contrary, it
accelerates structural shifts towards the raw-material specialization of the
economy, which increases its dependence on commodity prices on global
markets.
3.3. Trends and Prospects for Quality Economic Growth in Ukraine
3.3.1. Theoretic background of quality economic growth research
This chapter looks at the theoretical background of quality economic
growth. We analyze the role of innovations in providing high living
standards and improving international competitiveness of most innovative
countries. We look at innovation trends that have formed in Ukraine in
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recent years. We also provide grounds for the necessity of transition to
innovation-based economic growth.
Global economy development is cyclical, which can be seen in the
time disproportions of economic growth and the uneven distribution of
wealth among countries. Therefore, priority tasks in the economic policy
of most countries are the creation and implementation of an effective
innovation policy in order to achieve steady and quality economic
growth, the endogenous stability of market conditions, the minimization
of the impact of cyclicality and the improvement of international
competitiveness.
Due to globalization, priorities of human development and high
standards of living are the key indicators of development. No country
has managed to achieve high competitiveness without radically
improving living standards and effective investment in human capital.
The main condition for improving the quality of economic growth is
innovation development. Modern economic thought is based on the
premise that the key factor of global transformation is technological
production. The acceleration of innovation diffusion processes, transfer
of new technology, innovation and technological cycles create good
opportunities for the achievement of optimal relation between
production, accumulation, and consumption as well as balance in the
market conditions in the long-term.
Authors headed by American researcher G. Saks base their thoughts
on the fact that in the global competitive environment only innovation can
help achieve an international competitive edge. Therefore, it is
particularly important to look at the Global Competitiveness Index
compiled by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The methodology of
WEF is based on the premise that only due to high technology and its
implementation to create new products, can we achieve steady economic
growth and improve public welfare. Therefore, countries with a high
competitive position are at the highest innovative level of global
competitiveness.
Research shows that one of the most important and common
indicators of quality economic growth in developed countries, is the
increase of the GDP per capita (Kuznets Simon, 1966: 1; Lucas Robert E.,
1988: 3; World Economic…, 1996: 19). Therefore, the quality indicator
of a global economic downturn (e.g. in 1982, 1991, 2001, 2008-2009),
according to IMF methodology, is the negative growth of GDP per capita.
Its dynamics in the short run is fairly close to classical business cycles,
but over the long run it reflects the change of the quality indicators of life
of the population, caused by such factors as innovations, effectiveness,
and rational use of natural resources and fixed assets, as well as
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conditions for the formation and renewal of human capital. However, in
developing countries and countries in transition, GDP growth per capita,
given the low base level against countries with a high competitive status,
cannot be used as an indicator of quality economic changes. Growing
living standards can be assessed based on the shrinking gap in these
indicators (or reduction of macroeconomic disparities) compared to
developed countries.
We feel that quality economic growth cannot be reflected in one
indicator. It needs to be reflected in a system of indicators, because
improved living standards are not only accompanied by an increase in the
GDP per capita, but also human development indicators (i.e. labor
productivity, education level, life expectancy, etc). Other links between
GDP growth and the parameters of human development were reflected in
the research by W. Esterly in «Life during Growth» (1999). The scientist
proved that out of 81 indicators of human development that were
analyzed, less than a tenth improve as a result of economic growth. The
same portion gets worse, while the rest are not correlated with the GDP
per capita dynamics (William Easterly, 1999). These results are another
argument in favor of using more parameters for the assessment of quality
economic growth.
Such researchers as W. Thomas, M. Dailami, A. Dareshwar, D. Kaufman,
N. Kishore, R. Lopez, Y. Van suggest assessing the quality of economic
growth in the context of human development indicators, i.e. based on
such criteria as falling child mortality, literacy among adults, and growing
life expectancy (The Quality of Economic Growth…, 2002: 258). An
alternative approach was created as part of the UN Development
Program. This methodology includes the calculation of the Human
Development Potential Index (HDPI) based on three components: Gross
National Income per capita (assessment of the standard of living),
education (integral assessment of average and expected duration of
studies), life expectancy (assessment of health and duration of life). In
order to calculate the index of human development, we use the simple
arithmetic of the components. Since 2010, UN experts also calculate a
new version of the HDPI by including the criterion of how uneven the
distribution of income in the country is — it is also called Human
Development Potential Index corrected for Inequality (HDPII) that shows
the level of HDPI that would be achieved by each member of society on
condition of even wealth distribution (Report on Human Development 2010.
Real Wealth of Nations: Ways of Human Development, 2010).
A new methodology is suggested by UNDP for the assessment of the
spread of poverty based on the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
that characterizes the share of the population that suffers from
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deprivation, based on 3-10 weighted indicators of multidimensional
poverty (deprivation is the inability of a person to realize their needs due
to the fact that they have no access to material wealth and social
resources, i.e. healthcare, education, housing, etc.). The Multidimensional
Poverty Index reflects multiple deprivations in one household with regard
to education, healthcare, and standard of living; it is calculated by a
statistical review of a relevant sample of households. Ten poverty
indicators are taken into account — they are nutrition, child mortality,
duration of studies, education spread, fuel for cooking, water, electricity
and other components of the poverty scale in the poverty index. Their
sum makes up the Multidimenstional Poverty Index.
In general, we can conclude that quality economic growth and
international competitiveness are complementary, because they both
relfect the goals of higher living standards and innovation-based
economic growth. On the other hand, the cyclicality of production
resources development is accompanied by the pro-cyclical changes in
national income and, as a result, causes the cyclicality of their economic
growth and international competitiveness.
The importance of the innovation process was first summarized by
Y. Schumpeter, who thought that the reason for economic development
was the desire to get super-revenues generated by a temporary
monopoly that is formed through innovation. Y. Schumpeter as one of
the founders of the evolution theory thought that disproportionate
weights are one of the main conditions of development. The researcher
thought of innovations as a departure from routine and claimed that they
lead to imbalance.
The close link between the innovation dynamics and the change in
indicators of quality economic growth is proved in existing theoretical
models of economic growth. The basic neoclassical model of economic
growth that was developed by Nobel Prize winner in economics R. Solow
(1987) claims that technological change is the key criterion of quality
economic transformations. He claimed that the latter can be seen as the
shift of the real demand curve in time that is not related to change in
capital and labor use. According to the methodology of the statistical
assessment of the contribution that these factors make to growth
accounting, there is always a so-called Solow residual that reflects
relative technological changes and shows average factor productivity
(AFP). R. Solow calculates that extensive growth of labor productivity
based on the criterion of increase in production output per man-hour
accounts for only 12% of investment increase, while intensive growth, i.e.
the basis in technological changes, accounts for roughly 87.5% (The Gold
Book…, 2002: 3-4).
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The technological process, new technological basis and staff potential
determine approximately 28% of national income growth. Thus, there is a
close link between economic cycles and quality economic growth. On the
one hand, higher AFP indicators characterize increase in the potential of
national economies to develop based on innovations; on the other hand,
their growth is wave-like and has significant fluctuations, that in their
turn, cause cyclicality.
Research, based on the three-factor neoclassical models of economic
growth using significant statistical data, provided inconsistent
conclusions, but invariably provided proof that innovation changes
make a significant contribution (based on AFP) to economic growth.
Leading economists, such as M. Abramovitz, R. Solow, J. Kendrick,
and E. Denison assessed the contribution of AFP to the GDP growth of
the USA at 48%, 49%, 40%, and 46% respectively (Abramovitz M.,
1956, р.8; Solow Robert M., 1957, р. 315—316; Kendrick John W.,
1961, р. 84—85; Denison Edward F., 1985: 87—113). However, the
main drawback of the neoclassical theories is the assumption that
innovation development depends on time and is not linked to processes
outside the economy that is being modelled. These suggestions
correspond to the research of the neoclassical and Keynesian economic
theories that prove that average factor productivity can differ from the
real contribution of technological changes. Researchers attribute the
difference in economic growth indicators to the influence of human
capital.
During the last decade a number of new theoretical models that aim to
justify the endogenous nature of technological changes, that induce
innovation-driven economic growth, have been published. According to
these theories, technological changes are the result of research and
development conducted by economic agents that aim to maximize their
revenue over a long period of time. These models are different from
neoclassical ones, in that their production function in one form or another,
has a new component, human capital that characterizes scientific
knowledge and hands-on experience accumulated in the process of
studying and production. In his work «The Mechanism of Economic
Development» (1988), Nobel Prize winner R. Lucas claims that human
capital is a separate factor of economic growth, its accumulation and
efficient use are the necessary conditions for improvement in living
standards. Thus, investment in human capital is an important factor of
radical innovation changes in the world economy. Such economists as
R. Nelson, E. Phelps, P. Romer, P. Aghion, and P. Howitt also prove in
their works that human capital is the decisive factor of radical innovation
changes and technological innovations (Nelson R., Phelps E.; Romer P.;
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Aghion P., Howitt P., 1998). An econometric analysis of the models of
economic dynamics with regard to the equillibrium trajectory of
economic growth, whereby the consumption level, new expertise,
production output and capital expenses grow exponentially at a constant
rate, allowed American researcher P. Romer to mathematically prove the
hypothesis that economic growth rates depend on investment in human
capital.
World Bank and other international organizations research major
features of the economy of knowledge and the factors that accelerate its
development. The World Bank report, «Knowledge for Development»,
focuses on the following components of the economy of knowledge:
information infrastructure, institutions, innovations and education, and
concludes that countries can accelerate economic growth rates by
improving the education level, transparency in international trade, and
telecommunications infrastructure. A high level of education, openness of
the economy, and developed information infrastructure bring GDP per
capita growth of roughly 4% annually. However, it is obvious that
education without responsiveness to innovation and knowledge
accumulation does not bring economic growth. It is clear that the post-
industrial society is a society of knowledge where public welfare is
achieved through knowledge gained through uninterrupted access to
information and ability to work with it. Therefore, the system of training
for qualified staff becomes strategically important and a tool for
achieving high international competitiveness.
It is also worth noting the results of the scientific research of the role
of international trade, conducted by G. Grosman (Princeton University)
and E. Helpman (University of Tel-Aviv). Their model takes into account
the possibility of capital overflow for the funding of research and
development (R&D) and stipulateshat if certain conditions are met, the
formation of transnational corporations and the country’s economy
drawing closer to the equilibrium trajectory of growth. In general, the
theoretical conclusions of researchers with regard to endogenous
technological development are proven in practice, through large-scale
programs of international scientific cooperation and the spread of new
organizational forms of technological cooperation.
Success stories of the key innovators among countries prove that a
larger share of research is done in the private sector, first and foremost,
by large corporations that organize and fund research, both fundamental
and applied, development of large-scale high-tech projects,
commercialization of new ideas through the organization of scientific
centers in the countries of the world. At the same time, a relative
reduction in the share of state R&D expenses is not evidence of the
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decreasing role of the state in innovations. Increasing state regulation
accompanied by reduction in its direct participation in R&D is a logical
process, a general trend that is characteristic of economies of all
developed countries of the world. It is caused first and foremost, by the
improvement in financial mechanisms, systems of organization and
management of the innovation process, the creation of effective national
innovation systems as a «structural and functional profile of the nation
that serves as the basis for interconnection between technological
innovation and economic activity» (as defined by A. Lundval, K.
Freeman, and Y. Park) (Yong-Tae Park. A, 1999: 52). Moreover,
development of national innovation systems and their integration into
the global innovation system, create the stock of the technological
might of the country that embodies an innovative competitive edge,
fosters quality economic development and eliminates the impact of
cyclicality.
Most economists studying scientific progress, think that growth in
the funding of research is a positive factor of economic growth.
American researcher F. Sherer defined the «natural law of technological
progress» in such a way that R&D expenses in every country are to
grow at a higher rate than does production of the GNP. Optimal funding
of research is 3% of the GNP. Otherwise, it is impossible to compete in
innovation and provide high standards of living by fulfilling national
scientific potential.
3.3.2. Modernization Directions of the Economy of Ukraine
In order to further analyze long-term changes in quality economic
growth, we have researched the dynamics of human development
indicators in developed countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Great Britain, and the USA) and in Ukraine since 1870. We took
into account such indicators as GDP per capita (PPP basis), the level of
education (percent of adult population that has a university degree and
level of education among the population) and average life expectancy
(Figure 3.6).
In order to assess long-term trends of quality economic growth, we
calculated the main parameters of human development indicator
dynamics, i.e. their levels relative to a chosen comparison base
(indicator values in 1870) and chain growth rates. As a method of
eliminating the short-term fluctuation of component indicators, mainly
GDP per capita, statistical data was organized in such a way that their
change reflected just the long-term growth trend and neutralized short-
term declines.
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Figure 3.6. The Dynamics of Human Development Indicators
in Developed Countries (average values), 1870-2005
The accumulation of quality economic growth in developed countries
starting from 1870 is first and foremost related to the industrial revolution
that along with the radical innovation-based changes in the economy,
caused an overall increase in the living standards (proven by the increase
in life expectancy and education level). An analysis of the dynamics of
relevant indicators in these countries since 1870 allows us to make the
conclusion that major growth in human development indicators was
recorded n 1870-1950. When analyzing GDP per capita in the USA in
more detail, we can single out two complete cycles in its long-term
dynamics (1870-1938 and 1939-2009), the lowest points of which are the
consequences of the Great Depression of 1929-1933 and the modern
financial crisis. As of 1870, GDP per capita in the USA was at USD
2,500; in 2009, it was USD 45,900. Thus the intensive growth of GDP per
capita, education level, and life expectancy in the researched period,
despite temporary economic downturns, reflects a significant increase in
living standards in the countries with the highest competitive status and
an increase in their international competitiveness.
We need to underline that human development in Ukraine declined
significantly in the first half of the 1990s. In 1990 the HDPI, which
indicates human development in Ukraine during the Soviet era was at
0.690; over the next two decades Ukraine significantly lost by moving
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from 45 down to 69, i.e. consistently losing its position until 2005.
Despite certain statistical discrepancies in such comparisons due to
different numbers of studied countries or change in HDPI methodology,
Ukraine is very much behind most countries according to the standard of
living, although Ukraine holds leading positions in the education level
and education spread as well as significant research potential. National
standards of living have been deteriorating so fast during the period of
independence, that they pose a significant threat to the social and
economic security of the country.
According to the latest data, in 2010 the Human Development Potential
Index is at a level of 0.710, which places Ukraine 69th out of 169
researched countries. When comparing the index values in 1990 and 2010,
we see that its growth is 0.02 points or 2.9%. At the same time, Hungary
saw a 16.3% increase (36th in the ranking), Poland saw 16.4% growth (41),
and Russia experienced 3.9% growth (65). Ukraine’s ranking according to
this indicator in 2005-2010 went down by three positions. At the same
time, the Human Development Potential Index corrected for Inequality
(HDPII) is at the lowest point, 0.652, which is 8.1% lower than the basic
level. Thus, the uneven income distribution in Ukraine lowers the standards
of living in our country, although its relative value is not significant.
Despite the positive economic dynamics in Ukraine over the last 10
years, the productivity of the Ukrainian economy remains very low,
which is proved by the Gross National Income per capita: as of 2008, it
was at USD 6,535, while in the Czech Republic it was at USD 22,678, in
Slovakia — USD 21,658, in Hungary — USD 17,472, in Poland — USD
17,803, in Russia — USD 15,258, in Belarus — USD 12,926, in Romania
— USD 12,844 and in Bulgaria — USD 11,139. In fact, according to
GNI per capita, Ukraine is a regional outsider in the CEE. Moreover,
Ukraine is lagging behind such developing countries as Botswana (USD
13,204), Gabon (USD 12,747), El Salvador (USD 6,498) and others.
According to GNI per capita, Ukraine is also lagging behind the key
innovators the GDP per capita of which is 4-5 times that of Ukraine.
These countries have totally different standards of living and
opportunities of social and economic growth. Moreover, when analyzing
the long-term dynamics of the national GDP, we need to clarify that its
total volume and share per capita are still not at the pre-crisis level of
1990. Obviously, low income among the population of Ukraine, fist and
foremost, as compared to developed countries and countries with a
medium level of income, affects other components of human
development, health and poverty in particular.
According to life expectancy our country is lagging behind 23
countries, where it is at a level of more than 80 years, Ukraine ranks 113
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in the global ranking and the average life expectancy at birth is 68.6
years. Let’s compare Ukraine to other countries: an average Japanese
lives for 83.2 years, average Swiss — 82.2 years, Frenchman — 81.6,
Czech — 76.9, Pole — 76. The permanent deterioration of the health of
Ukrainians, high mortality of the employable population, falling life
expectancy, and uneven access to healthcare are primarily caused by the
significant pitfalls in the national healthcare system.
Traditionally, Ukraine has high literacy rates and spread of education.
In general, our country ranks 21 according to education level. Ukraine has
a high share of the population with university and associate degrees. At
the same time, the Ukrainian education system needs to be closer linked
to practical work and better state funding as well as a more effective
development strategy for world-class universities.
The poverty level has significant effect on the quality economic
growth in Ukraine and the formation of adequate social standards. Based
on the results of research conducted by the UNDP on multi-dimensional
poverty, Ukraine scored 0.008. This relatively low level means that on
average, Ukrainians feel deprivation at 0.8%. In other words, less than
1% of physiological and social needs of Ukrainians are not met
(according to the methodology of the assessment of weighted indicators
of multidimensional poverty by the UNDP). Let’s compare, Ukrainian
results to Latvia (0.001), Hungary (0.003), Russia (0.005), Croatia
(0.007), Ethiopia (0.582), and Nigeria (0.642); the methodology hasn’t
been applied to developed countries.
In terms of components of the multidimensional poverty index, the
Ukrainian poverty index is at 2.2% (that is the share of Ukrainians that
live below the poverty line) and the poverty scale is at 35.7% (that is the
share of the weighted component indicators by which Ukrainians feel
deprived). According to another absolute indicator of poverty spread (the
share of people living on less than USD 2), the share of poor people is
less than 2%. Thus, in the system of human development potential
indicators by UNDP, among the research countries, Ukraine has a
moderate level of poverty that doesn’t exceed critical levels.
At the same time, if we take the income of the population (actual
expenses) against guaranteed social standards (poverty line, minimal
wage) and the share of expenses spent on groceries as the criteria of
poverty, the poverty situation in Ukraine looks much less optimistic than
the assessment of the UNDP. Research conducted by the Institute of
Demographics and Social Research of the National Academy of Sciences
of Ukraine that was done based on the data released by the State Statistics
Committee shows that poverty level in our country was 26% in 2009.
Roughly 11.7 m citizens (4 m households) live in poverty. The national
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poverty line in 2009 was UAH 869, which is very low; this proves the
absolute inability of the majority of Ukrainians to have a high standard of
living. This is proven by the fact that the biggest share of expenses goes
to groceries — in 2009 their share was 52%. The critical indicator of the
share of such expenses internationally is 60%. It is clear that when the
national floor poverty level is kept too low, its real level is underrated.
This conclusion is also proven by our calculation of the relationship
between the average salary in the country and the poverty line in 2000-
2009. The relationship of the average monthly salary to the poverty line,
according to the data released by the State Statistics Committee, in 2009
was 2.19 (1906/869), in 2004 — 1.53 (590/386.73), in 2002 — 1.03
(376/365), in 2000 — 0.80 (230/287.63). This means that as the income
of Ukrainians is growing, there is no adequate correction of the minimum
wage. Therefore, the current level of the relationship is too low, while the
positive economic change (GDP growth rates) in our country over the last
decade was not adequately reflected in the indicators of the basic social
standard (living wage) and minimum wage.
In recent years GDP growth in Ukraine was achieved through the
increase in output levels in the traditional sectors of the economy, mainly
manufacturing. Traditional indicators of economic growth are based
primarily on resource mobilization, savings accumulated over the a
lengthy period of economic downturn in the past almost dried out and no
adequate structural changes of the economic system that could stimulate
the investment- and innovation-based recovery of the economy took
place. This situation is threatening for the economic security of the
country and significantly increases the risks of permanent economic
stagnation or, taking into account inflation processes, stagflation. Another
proof of our conclusions is the ineffective anti-crisis system of measures
taken during the current financial crisis.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) made similar conclusions in their report, «Ukraine. Economic
Assessment» (2007). OECD analysts prove that the recent fast economic
growth of the national economy was based on transient indicators —
these are improved trade conditions, relatively low energy prices and idle
production capacities. In order to support such economic dynamics over
the medium and long-term, Ukraine will need to achieve independent
economic growth driven by investment and innovation. Therefore, one of
the main challenges that our country faces is the improvement of business
mechanisms, i.e. improved business conditions, commodity market
reforms in terms of entrance and exit and increased competition
(Economic research by OECD…, 2007). Apart from capital accumulation
and effective resource distribution, we will also need to maintain high
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levels of growth in the cumulative productivity of production factors
through intensified innovation activity and the simultaneous effective use
of traditional factors. Therefore, it is strategically important for the
national economy to conduct effective economic reforms aimed at system
modernization and increased international competitiveness.
We thus need to say that Ukraine ranks 181 out of 183 countries that
have been studied in terms of taxation system simplicity in the Paying
Taxes 2010 ranking (prepared by the World Bank and audit company
PriceWaterhouseCoopers). Only Venezuela and Belarus ranked lower. In
Ukraine, there are 147 tax payments made annually (in Poland, there are
40, in Russia — 11, Great Britain — 8); 736 hours per year are spent
paying taxes (Uzbekistan — 356, Lithuania — 166, the United Arab
Emirates — 12). The full tax rate in Ukraine (% of income) is 57.2% (the
USA — 46.3%, Great Britain — 35.9%, Poland — 42.5%) (based on
Doing Business 2010. Paying Taxes). Auditors from Price Waterhouse
Coopers think that doing honest business in Ukraine is too burdensome.
Only well thought-through reforms can save Ukrainian business,
according to the authors of the report. They also note that tax procedure
simplification is a global trend — in recent years, more than seventy
countries have conducted such reforms.
Polish economist H. Kolodka says that the rate of reduction of state
expenses in the GDP of the country is an important indicator of the
effectiveness of reforms in post-socialist countries. The falling share of state
expenses in the social product is deemed to be a sign of ineffective reforms.
According to the data released by the State Statistics Committee, in 1994-
2002, the share of state expenses (consolidated budget of Ukraine) in the
GDP was declining (1994 — 52.4%, 1995 — 44.6%, 2002 — 26.7%). In
2003 the share stabilized at 28.4% and has been growing ever since, although
at modest rates. As of 2005, the coefficient of state expenses to the GDP was
at 25.59% (state budget) and 32.16% (consolidated budget), in 2009 —
26.5% and 33.92% respectively (Table 3.9).
There are no significant changes in the structure of the GDP apart
from the significant growth of the absolute volume and the share of state
expenses. R&D expenses remain extremely low and have a tendency
towards further decline (in 1996 they were at 1.38% of the GDP, in 2008
— at 0.34%). Education expenses remain stable (1991 — 6.2% of the
consolidated budget, 2000-2007 — 5.3%; 2005– 2.25% of the state
budget, 2009 — 2.62%), so do healthcare expenses (2000-2007 — 4.0%
of the consolidated budget; 2005 — 0.79% of the state budget, 2009 —
0.82%). Thus, despite the gradual revival of the pre-crisis level of state
expenses, there is no change in their structure in Ukraine. Even though
relative shares of R&D expenses, education and healthcare remained
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stable, their absolute volume at current exchange rates (i.e. purchasing
power parity basis) is dozen of times less than that in the countries that
are leading innovators.
Table 3.9
EXECUTION OF THE STATE AND CONSOLIDATED BUDGETS
OF UKRAINE, ACCORDING TO EXPENSES
2002 2005 2009
Expense categories of
the state budget UAH m % ofGDP UAH m
% of
GDP UAH m
% of
GDP
General state
functions 6,872 3.04 11,981 2.71 24,868 2.72
Defense 3,536 1.57 6,041 1.37 9,655 1.06
Civil order, security
and courts 4,677 2.07 10,142 2.30 24,164 2.64
Economic activity 5,581 2.47 14,041 3.18 33,234 3.63
Environmental
protection 528 0.23 981 0.22 1,824 0.20
Utilities 51 0.02 110 0.02 248 0.03
Healthcare 1,582 0.70 3,508 0.79 7,531 0.82
Spiritual and physical
development 425 0.19 1,274 0.29 3,216 0.35
Education 4,989 2.21 9,933 2.25 23,925 2.62
Social security 7,273 3.22 31,604 7.16 51,512 5.63
Funds going to lower-
level budgets 8,818 3.91 23,361 5.29 62,180 6.80
TOTAL expenses in
the state budget 44,348 19.64 112,976 25.59 242,357 26.50
TOTAL expenses in
the consolidated
budget
60,319 26.71 141,990 32.16 310,223 33.92
Compiled by the authors based in the official data of the State Statistics Committee of
Ukraine, Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, National Bank of Ukraine and the Accounting
Chamber of Ukraine.
It is important to stress that the planned expenses for education and
practical studies in the consolidated budget of the European Union as of
2010 are at EUR 1.1 bln, i.e. 4.4% higher than that in the previous period.
Education expenses in the EU account for 0.8% of the total volume of the
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forecast budget expenses. The highest expenses (Article 15.02 of the
General Budget of the European Union) in the 2010 budget of the EU
among education and practical studies expenses are used for life-long
education programs (EUR 982.313m, or 85.24% of all expenses). Top
priority is given to the funding of secondary and university education
(Erasmus Mundus) and specialized education projects carried out by
relevant European institutions. The expected growth in education expenses
in the European Union in the current period proves that investment in
human capital is given priority despite the negative impact of the global
financial crisis on the budget indicators of many European economies.
The national budgets of Western European countries also include
significant education expenditures. Germany holds investment in
education and research as their key priority. According to the data
released by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany,
in 2010 the government of the country allocated EUR 10.9 b to these
sectors, i.e. 6.5% more that in 2009. University education is expected to
receive EUR 509m in funding, which is 33% more than in the previous
period and these funds will be used to create new student places at
universities. Funding of life-long education programs will increase by
44% and reach EUR 201m. The funding of projects aimed at
modernization and the improvement of professional practical studies will
increase by at least 71% and reach an unprecedented level of EUR 193 m.
Thus, according to the social and economic indicators of living standards
that are the necessary prerequisite for an improvement in international
competitiveness, Ukraine is significantly behind developed countries.
It is universally known that innovation-driven growth requires
spending at least 2% of the GDP on research. Countries that have
achieved good economic growth rates through innovation meet this
requirement. During the global financial crisis they didn’t cut investment
in innovation — they increased it instead. This is shown in the strategies
of the key innovators for 2008-2009 as well as in the strategic
development plan of the EU Europe 2020.
Unsatisfactory conditions for business activity are currently the main
obstacle to the growth of the level and effectiveness of investment and
innovation activity. Businesses face a very high level of legal, regulatory
and political uncertainty, which makes long-term projects very risky.
Uncertainty and unpredictability are caused in many cases by pervasive
corruption among state officials, which makes property rights in the
country unenforceable. The improvement of public administration and rule
of law are the absolutely critical priorities of the economic mechanism for
the modernization of Ukraine. A consistent and broad policy of
deregulation could do much to solve these problems, because excessive and
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often inconsistent regulation often creates opportunities for bureaucratic
chaos. At the same time, OECD analysts say that in many sectors, Ukraine
needs better regulation rather than less regulation. This means eliminating
the numerous blanks and controversies in legislation and norms.
The 21st century is seeing a rapid change of technological production.
The business structure, economic growth, the system of values and
motivation as well as criteria of social progress are changing their
qualitative characteristics. For the immediate and long run, the
maximization of the innovation factor is becoming a key condition for the
steady development of modern economic systems. Therefore, government
economic policy is based on the prospects and opportunities of innovation
potential growth, its ability to achieve and keep a good competitive position
on the global market; stable market conditions and growing qualitative
indicators of life do not receive that much attention.
During the Soviet era, Ukrainian scientific and research organizations
were important in labor distribution. The main macro-proportions of this
complex were mainly maintained by the size of the Ukrainian industrial
potential and its contribution to the social product of the Soviet Union. At
the same time, in terms of some indicators (e.g. saturation of the economy
with university graduates) Ukraine was different from USSR averages
(I. Yegorov, 1993). Most scientific and research organizations of Ukraine,
including leading institutes of the Academy of Sciences, were highly
technology-focused. If we look at data on patents received abroad, in their
research S. Radosevich and D. Kutlaca found that the Y.O. Paton Institute
for Electric Welding, ranked 7 among organizations from the socialist
countries that had the greatest number of patents in the USA (54 patents
in 1969-1994). Another Soviet scientific organization that made it to the
list is the Russian Institute for Mining of the Siberian Department of the
Academy of Sciences of the USSR (No. 17, 29 patents) (Radosevic S.,
Kutlaca D., 1998: 47). Since the 1990s, the technological potential of
Ukraine has gone significantly downhill.
Researchers of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine found
that businesses of the third technological mode produce 58% of total
production output, while their share in investment is 75%. At the same
time, businesses of the fourth technological mode produce 38% of the
output and account for 20% of the investment (V. M. Heyets, 2003: 16).
The investment structure of the economy of Ukraine doesn’t favor
progressive changes but rather hinders them. The development of
businesses of the fourth technological mode would help the situation.
Ever since independence, Ukraine has been trying to introduce new
mechanisms to stimulate innovation-driven growth, i.e. the introduction of
a special tax aimed at filling the state innovation fund that would be used to
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finance innovation programs, many state programs of support and
development, activities of the Ukrainian State Innovation Company,
economic stimuli (privileges) in the form of special economic zones,
territories of priority development, techno-parks, etc. However, all these
measures did not bring any results, either in terms of innovation volume
increase, or in terms of its improved quality. Overall, the lack of success in
the state innovation policy as well as in most areas of public management,
is largely attributable to the institutional inability of the state to consistently
and effectively develop and implement public policy. This is proved by the
low absolute and relative indicators of innovation activity and the
international competitiveness of Ukraine in global rankings.
When analyzing the current condition of Ukraine’s international
competitiveness, including innovation, we need to look at the indicators
analyzed by the World Economic Forum. This methodology deserves
attention, because it takes into account the ranking assessment of the
innovation factor that allows the determination of the factors that
stimulate innovation-driven growth in the country, i.e. innovation
potential, number of scientific and research organizations, R&D
expenses, cooperation of universities and research institutes, state support
of high-tech developments, number of scientists and researchers, number
of registered patents, and intellectual property right protection. In the
Global Competitiveness Index 2010—2011, Ukraine ranked 89th out of
139 countries and lost 7 positions compared to the previous year (or five
positions if we look at countries analyzed the year before) and, thus, came
after Poland (39), Russia (69), and Kazakhstan (72). Unfortunately, the
competitive status of the country is in decline.
Ukraine’s worst result — 134 — is in the quality of institutions
category. The following aspects pose problems for our country: business
ethics (130), property right protection (135), including protection of the
rights of minority shareholders (138), transparency of state decision
making (131), effectiveness of auditing and accounting standards (128),
independence of the court system (111), effectiveness of state budget use
(131), intellectual property protection (113), trust towards politicians
(122), state regulation burden (104), lobbying of state decisions (127),
and organized crime (116).
In terms of the innovation factor, Ukraine ranks 63 (3.1 points). Such
a low result is caused by the low assessment of component innovation
sub-factors, including state support in purchases of high-tech products
(112), the number of scientists and engineers (53), R&D expenses (69),
research cooperation between universities and businesses (72), number of
research institutions (60) and the number of registered socially beneficial
patents (64). Given the low ranking position, these sub-factors have been
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classified as competitive disadvantages by WEF analysts. The high
innovation potential of Ukraine is seen as a competitive advantage (37).
Thus, according to innovation activity, high-tech production, science and
research funding, and infrastructure of innovation business, Ukraine is
lagging behind leading countries. There is a significant discrepancy
between the scientific potential of the country and the total productivity
of the national economy, which is caused by the low effectiveness of the
national innovation system. According to the criteria of the Lisbon
Strategy, i.e. innovation potential, WEF experts gave Ukraine the
advantage over the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Growth in the competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy will
depend on how actively regions will implement innovation policy and
stimulate innovation activity. Despite significant theoretical achievements
in innovative research in the regions, there are still many problems to be
solved. Various draft legislation documents have repeatedly declared
the improved competitiveness of Ukrainian regions, but this indicator is
not reflected in the national statistics, which makes the assessment of
the effectiveness of state measures highly problematic. Moreover,
indicators of innovation capacity do not meet the world methodology
and new indicators of innovation productivity according to the
competitiveness determinants of the region, i.e. human resources,
knowledge generation, its transfer and use, as well as innovations.
According to indicators of the competitiveness of Ukrainian regions
according to EU methodology, regions of high competitive status have
been selected. These are the city of Kyiv, the Donetsk, Odesa, and
Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts (regions) as well as the city of Sevastopol.
However, the labor productivity levels in these regions are about one
third of labor productivity in the countries seen as outsiders in Europe.
3.3.3. Conclusions
This analysis proves that innovation-based growth is the only alternative for
Ukraine, since there is no other way to achieve the growth of international
competitiveness and quality economic growth. This requires the accelerated
development of the national innovation system, based on long-term
technological forecasts, the greater role of the state in the commercialization
of basic innovations, the stimulation of innovation activity in order to build
up the micro- and macroeconomic competitiveness of the country.
It is necessary to create and pass a long-term strategy of Ukraine up to
2020 as soon as possible, which would create conditions for an
accelerated transition to innovation-driven economic development. The
national innovation system should also be closely linked to the regional
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innovation policy and work at both regional and industry-specific levels
within a single management system for the commercialization of
intellectual activity result processes.
According to the latest estimates of Ukrainian experts, the main
priorities for the innovation-driven development of Ukrainian industry
and, therefore, the buildup of the economic potential of the industrial
sector are the most effective use of existing intellectual potential for the
generation of scientific ideas and their implementation, increased output
levels of high-tech products with high value added, that is competitive on
the global market, the revival of the industrial potential based in
innovations, progressive structural changes in the economy, effective
transformation in order to increase independence, productivity,
competitiveness and social focus and the increased motivational factor of
taxes for the development of national production while reforming the tax
system of Ukraine (Activation of the Innovation…, 2007: 71-72).
In order to follow these directions of innovation development, we need to
implement changes of the business mechanism as a whole, including the
modernization of the resource base, development of human capital,
improvement of the business management system, creation of a strong
system for funding innovation activity using all sources of funding. These
can be private and public venture funds, funds of business entities and
individuals and foreign investment; we feel that the emission resource of the
central bank is the most promising source. The prerequisite for innovation
growth is increased funding of research of no less than 3-4% of the GDP.
The following directions of innovation activity in Ukraine should take
priority over others: information technology, nanotechnology, and
biotechnology (especially in the agricultural sector). Moreover, it is
necessary to force executive branches at all levels to create conditions that
are most favorable for work aimed at the realization of work in priority
fields and their focus on financial, economic and intellectual resources.
Ukraine already has some of the necessary prerequisites, such as renowned
Ukrainian scientific schools and unique technologies that through adequate
stimulation can develop high-tech production of the highest standard. It is
only through the full-scale development of the national innovation system
in Ukraine that we can create real prerequisites for the radical renewal of
the technological level of production, increased labor productivity and, as a
result, the international competitiveness of the country. At the same time,
the continued rejection of an effective innovation policy can lead to the
conservation of accumulated characteristics of structural degradation, since
the stabilization growth of recent years is not sufficient evidence of the
positive long-term prospects of the Ukrainian economy in the international
economic arena.
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3.4. Modern Trade Policy of Ukraine
3.4.1. Introduction
There are four main stages in the formation of the current trade regime of
Ukraine: autonomous creation of trade policy (1991—1994), initial
liberalization (1994—1999), active liberalization based on WTO principles
(1999—2008), the trade policy of a full WTO member (since May 2008).
At the first stage, the foreign trade regime mostly reflected the decline
of the planned economy and was characterized by the full use of
restricting measures (quotas, licensing, and state trade). Moreover, the
domestic market was dominated by price control limitations and foreign
exchange operations.
The world economy saw dynamic growth of trade and production in
the 1990s, but Ukraine experienced significant troubles building up the
state and dealing with the national economic crisis. The situation was
further aggravated by the fact that old leverages of economic regulation
of the command economy proved ineffective but there was no experience
in using other leverages. In the first place, this was true for foreign trade
and the protection of national economic interests, because there was a
monopoly on foreign trade in the Soviet Union, starting from 1973 other
forms of foreign economic activity were also monopolized. Therefore, the
regulation system for foreign economic activity, and foreign trade in
particular, was created based on the models of countries with different
levels of economic development, economic structure and national
economic priorities; it was implemented through trial and error.
In the early 90s, the tariff policy had a negative impact on the formation
of the domestic market as well as further social and economic development.
A single customs duty was introduced in January 1993, with a rate of 0-10%,
depending on the type of product. Very few product types had 15-30% duty,
while alcohol and tobacco had a 50% duty. Average weighted duty was
much lower than that in most developed countries. At the same time, there
was very tight control over products that could be exported by business
entities. Almost 70% of exports from Ukraine at year-end 1993 was limited
by legislation. Miscalculations in foreign trade policy led to the loss of
traditional markets in the countries of Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa.
Experts claim that the decline in output in 1991—1994 of more than 35%,
was caused by mistakes in foreign trade policy.
The start of the next stage of development of the trade policy was
marked by a package of reforms in 1994; these reforms included a set of
important measures for macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and
privatization. The implementation of this reform complex, trade policy
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measures in particular, was inconsistent — it had significant fluctuations
from administrative regulation to the intense liberalization of the domestic
market. Having applied to the WTO in 1993, Ukraine started negotiations
on accession to the system of multilateral agreements. However, this
process was not harmonized with the necessary changes in the legislative
base, and trade policy remained autonomous and mostly protectionist.
During the third period the government of Ukraine started important
actions on the liberalization of foreign trade and the broadening of
opportunities for integration into the world economic system. Strategic
priorities defining the direction of improving the trade policy of Ukraine
were WTO accession and EU integration.
Starting in 1999, Ukraine activated the negotiation process on
accession to the World Trade Organization. This stage saw the active
liberalization of foreign trade according to the rules of GATT, GATS, and
TRIPS; a legislative base was also adapted to the requirements. This
allowed Ukraine to start operating, based on WTO principles 2-3 years
before accession, but Ukraine didn’t yet have the equivalent access to
other markets and equal status during anti-dumping investigations.
According to Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement on WTO
establishment, WTO accession took place on conditions agreed upon by the
government of Ukraine and the WTO. There were 17 official and many
unofficial meetings of the Working Group on Ukraine’s accession to the WTO.
At the last meeting on 25 January, 20 members of the Working Group
approved the accession package for Ukraine: Working Group Report,
Schedule of Obligations on Access to the Market of Goods and Services
and the draft decision of the Council General and Accession Record. On 5
February 2008, the accession package was reviewed and approved by the
WTO Council General. The President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko and
Director General of the World Trade Organization Pascal Lamy signed
the Protocol of Accession to the WTO.
The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) approved Law No. 250-VI «On
Ratification of the Protocol on Ukraine’s Accession to the World Trade
Organization» on 10 April 2008. On 16 April 2008, the President of
Ukraine signed this law and on the same day, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs provided notification thereof to the WTO. This day was the start
of the 30-day countdown, the official term that has to pass from
notification to membership; on 16 May 2008 Ukraine was the 152nd
country to become an official member of the World Trade Organization.
Thus, stage four began in May 2008, i.e the implementation of
Ukraine’s trade policy as a full member of the WTO. The current trade
regime of Ukraine is fairly liberal, which is largely the result of the
completion of a long and complicated process of WTO accession.
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3.4.2. Adaptation of the Trade Policy
of Ukraine to WTO Requirements
Ukraine was signing agreements on trade relations that stipulate most
favored treatment with many countries starting from 1992. These
countries are Algiers, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Vietnam, Canada,
China, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, Macedonia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Korea,
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Montenegro, Moldova, Mongolia, Norway,
Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United
States of America.
Ukraine also signed agreements on partnership and cooperation
with European Communities and their members (effective as of
01.03.1998) that stipulate most favored treatment for the members of
the agreement except advantages in free trade areas and advantages
of neighbor countries aimed at the simplification of cross-border
traffic.
Before WTO accession, almost 45% of imports came from countries
that had the most favorable duty rates (in Ukrainian legislation such rates
are called privileged; 82 countries enjoyed such rates).
Free trade agreements were signed with the Republic of Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, as
well as the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. Free trade
agreements with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were ceased due to their
accession to the EU in 2004. Import from free trade zones (12 countries
listed above) is not subject to duties apart from the exceptions from the
free trade regime. About one third of free trade zones have certain
exceptions to the regime — these are Belarus, the Russian Federation,
Moldova, and Kazakhstan. Russia, for example, has exceptions for sugar,
confectionery and other products.
Full duties before WTO accession were levied on 3% of imports
(Economic Research…, 2005). After WTO accession this share
decreased, because Ukraine uses privilege rates of import duties as part of
the most favored treatment for all goods coming from WTO member
states (153 countries).
In the process of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO, there was a significant
decrease of weighted average and average duty rates (Table 3.10).
A comparison of WTO average rates of import duties with effective
rates in leading countries demonstrates the high level of Ukraine’s
obligations (Figure 3.7). Only the USA has an average duty tariff that is
lower than that in Ukraine after WTO accession.
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Table 3.10
EFFECTIVE IMPORT DUTIES OF UKRAINE
AND THOSE OF THE WTO
Duty rate As of 01.09.2005, % WTO level, %
Weighted average rate for all products 7.02 5.09
Agricultural products 18.19 10.07
Industrial products 6.11 4.77
Average rate for all products 6.61 6.28
Agricultural products 13.84 11.16
Industrial products 4.40 4.85
Source: Materials of Parliamentary…, 2006.
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Figure 3.7. Average Rates of Import Duties
in Ukraine and Several WTO Members11
During negotiations on WTO accession, Ukraine undertook to join 16
sectoral agreements and initiatives and almost all of them (with the
exception of the chemical and textile industry) stipulate the introduction
of a 0% import duty (Table 3.11). Most agreements and initiatives
became effective before Ukraine’s accession to the WTO (except civil
aviation and distilled spirits).
                     
11 Created by the authors based on : Annual Report…, 2003, p. 14; Informational and
Analytical …, 2006, p. 22.
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Table 3.11
OBLIGATIONS OF UKAINE IN TERMS
OF JOINING SECTORAL AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES
Name Year Year (%)
 1. Chemical harmonization 2004 5.5—6.5
 2. Steel 2004 0
 3. Toys 2004 0
 4. Timber 2004 0
 5. Textile and Clothing 2004 0—17.5
 6. Non-Ferrous Metals 2004 0
 7. Pharmaceuticals 2004 0
 8. Paper 2005 0
 9. Agricultural Equipment 2005 0
10. Furniture 2005 0
11. Information Technology 2004 0
12. Scientific Equipment 2006 0
13. Construction Equipment 2006 0
14. Medical Equipment 2006 0
15. Civil Aviation 2010 0
16. Distilled Spirits Within 3 years ofWTO accession 0
Source: Current State…, 2008.
Table 3.12
IMPORT DUTY (PRIVILEGE RATES) LEVIED
ON GOODS IMPORTED INTO UKRAINE
Effective import duty
Import duty
rate, % 0 0—5 5—10
10—
15
15—
20
20—
25
More
than 25
Specifi
c rate Total
Number of
products 3,495 3,418 2,213 890 393 44 122 672 11,247
Share of all
products, % 31.07 30.39 19.68 7.91 3.49 0.39 1.08 5.97 100
Maximum rate of import duty
Groups 1—24: 50 % (4.86 % are more than 25 %)
Groups 25—97: 25 % (only 0.48 % of products)
Average rate of import duty (%) 6.51
Average rate of effective import duty (%) 5.10
Source: Working Group Report…, 2008, p. 38.
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3.4.3. Protection of the National Producer
According to the estimates of the World Bank, import duty in Ukraine has
three main drawbacks: the excessive protection of agriculture, the high
escalation of the duty rate, the excessive complexity of the tariff scale
which leads to the incorrect classification of products and creates
opportunities for corruption (Economic Research…, 2005).
However, it should be noted, that duty rate escalation is present in most
countries of the world. In developed countries the highest protection goes to
textile and clothing (weighted average import duty rate is at a level of 8.4%),
leather, rubber products and shoes (5.5%), agricultural products (5.2%), fish
(4.2%), transportation equipment (4.2%). The lowest import duty is applied
to timber, paper, and furniture (0.5%), oil (0.7%), fossil minerals, gems and
ores (0.7%), metals and metal products (0.9%), non-electric equipment
(1.1%), chemical products (2.2%). Access to agricultural product, textiles and
clothing markets is extremely complicated. This is understandable, because
this is how developed countries protect sensitive industries (agriculture,
textile and clothing industry) on the one hand, and favor the import of the
necessary raw materials on the other.
Metal production and the chemical industry enjoy protection in
developed countries through anti-dumping, compensational and special
protective duties, therefore, regular import duties for these products are
fairly low (Figure 3.8).
We need to point out that duties in developed countries are also built
on the principle of duty rate escalation and contain specific duty rates that
in effect hide rate peaks. If these were taken into account, average
effective duties would be 5-7% higher. When recalculated using ad
valorem values, some duties in the EU reach 210%, in Canada they reach
314%, in the USA — 253% and in Japan — 1,739%12.
In Ukraine, just like in most countries, the most protected are the
markets of agricultural products (first and foremost, sugar and sugar
products; the flour and grain industry, meat and offal, milk and dairy
products, alcohol and non-alcoholic beverages) as well as cars, clothing
and shoes (Table 3.13).
We need to note that Ukraine has export duties levied on certain oil
seeds, cattle, leather materials, ferrous metal waste and scrap. They were
caused by the necessity to fight the crises in the relevant sectors of the
economy.
Export duty levied on sunflower seeds at 21% of the customs value
was introduced in October 1999 when seed production was developing
extensively. Almost 50% of sunflower seeds was exported, processing
                     
12 Based on the data of the WTO Secretariat.
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capacities were utilized at 30%, some of them ceased operations. A
deficit of sunflower oil led to a situation whereby domestic companies
processing sunflower seeds, producing oils, margarine, special fats and
mayonnaise were on the verge of bankruptcy.
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Figure. 3.8. Average Weighted Rates of Effective Duties
by Product Category after the Uruguay Round
Source: Development, Trade and…, 2002.
Table 3.13
PRODUCT CATEGORIES MOST PROTECTED
BY REGULAR IMPORT DUTIES IN UKRAINE
№ Category Description Average Weightedaverage
1 Group 17 Sugar and sugar products 27.81 46.82
2 Group 11 Flour and grains, malt, starch, insulin,and gluten 23.43 28.85
3 Group 24 Tobacco and industrial substitutesthereof 25.16 25.09
4 Group 02 Meat and offal 21.52 23.31
5 Group 04
Milk and dairy products, eggs, honey,
other meat products not mentioned in
other categories
24.88 23.07
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continued Table 3.13
№ Category Description Average Weightedaverage
6 Group 22 Alcohol and non-alcoholic beverages,vinegar 23.97 22.83
7 Group 07 Vegetables, plants, roots and tubers 19.46 19.64
8 Group 87
Vehicles, trucks (rigs), bicycles and
other road transportation means, spare
parts and accessories
10.61 16.1
9 Group 42
Leather products, saddles and
harnesses, luggage, handbags and
similar products, products made out of
animal guts (except catgut)
12.94 16.03
10 Group 16
Foodstuffs made from meat, fish or
crustacean, molluscs and other
invertebrates
17.34 13.7
11 Group 10 Grains 8.77 12.28
12 Group 19 Grains, flour, starch or milk products;confectionery 12.79 11.39
13 Group 61 Clothing and accessories, knitwear 11.44 11.35
14 Group 20 Processed vegetables, fruits and otherparts of plants 12.97 10.57
15 Group 62 Clothing and accessories, textiles withthe exception of knitwear 11.55 10.49
16 Group 91 Watches and their spare parts 9.22 10.49
17 Group 65 Hats and parts thereof 10.47 10.1
18 Group 64 Shoes, leggings and similar products;parts thereof 10 10
19 Group 66
Umbrellas, parasols, walking sticks,
portable walking stick chairs, whips
and parts thereof
10 10
20 Group 67
Processed feather and down as well as
products made thereof; artificial
flowers, products of human hair.
10 10
Source: Materials of Parliamentary Hearings…, 2006.
The introduction of export duty for some oil seeds made oil and fat
production into an industry that is attractive for investment, led to the
better use of production facilities and increased output of oil, margarine,
special fats and mayonnaise.
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In the same way the Law of Ukraine «On the Export Duty for Cattle
and Raw Leather Materials», No. 180 from 7 May 1996, improved the
situation in the leather and shoe industry. In 1995 (before the introduction
of the duty), the export value of raw leather was USD 85.5 m, of
unfinished and finished leather products — at just USD 19.1 m; in 2001,
these values were USD 26.8 m and USD 82.0 m, respectively.
When Ukraine was negotiating with the WTO, member countries
demanded the cancellation of export duties. As a result, a middle ground
was reached — duties are to be gradually lowered. Export duties levied
on certain oil seeds are decreasing by 1% annually until they reach the
10% level (in 6 years after accession). Cattle duty was set at 50% and is
to be decreased by 5% annually to reach 10%; leather materials duty was
set at 30% and is to decrease by 1% annually to reach 20%. Effective
duties levied on ferrous metal waste and scrap are also a middle ground
— the gradual lowering of the export duty from EUR 30 to EUR 10 per
ton; non-ferrous metal scrap duties are decrease from 30% (no less that
EUR 0.4/kg) to 15% (no less than EUR 0.2/kg).
The system of volume restriction on imports to Ukraine in general
meets WTO requirements. In terms of export restrictions, Ukraine
undertook to cancel the ban on the export of non-ferrous metal scrap and
restrictions on the export of grains, precious metals and gems (except
gold, silver and diamonds).
The list of products whose export and import requires licensing and
quotas are set annually in the relevant decree of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine; volume restrictions are mostly set, based on the results of
anti-dumping, compensational and special investigations conducted by
the Interagency Commission on Foreign Trade in Ukraine (it follows the
rules and norms of the WTO). The following materials and products are
also subject to licensing: those ruining the ozone layer (for reasons of
environmental protection), plant protecting substances (for reasons of the
protection of human health, animals and plants), poly-carbonates used for
the production of optical devices for information storage, stamps, stamp
paper, securities and laser disks (for reasons of the protection of
intellectual property).
State subsidies are an important instrument of trade policy and
national export stimulation for all countries. When joining the WTO,
Ukraine undertook not to subsidize export. Certain programs were also
changed to meet the requirements of the WTO; these are programs of
domestic industrial protection as part of special economic zones, priority
development territories, technological parks as well as specific programs
for the fish industry, ship, automotive and plane manufacturing, air and
space, coal-mining and publishing.
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In the course of negotiations, Ukraine kept its right to implement
measures for the domestic protection of agriculture in the amount of
UAH 3.043 b, i.e. planned measures can be used. If we compare
agricultural support to that in the countries of the OECD, we can
conclude that in 2004, New Zealand implemented measures of 2% of
total production, Australia — 4%, USA — 18%, Japan — 56%,
Norway and Switzerland — 68%. (World Trade…, 2006, p. 151). In
Ukraine, it was at a level of 3.5%13, but it will increase as the
situation improves.
In 1991-2008 there were roughly 150 investigations, mostly anti-
dumping (roughly 100), started against products from Ukraine. As of
May 2008, there were 37 restricting measures (33 — antidumping and 4
— special protective) against Ukrainian products, first and foremost,
rolled metal, seamless and welded pipes, steel ropes, ammonium nitrate,
urea, etc.
An important step on the way to equality in trade relations with the
countries of the EU in terms of anti-dumping investigations, was when on
30 December 2005, Ruling No. 2117/2005 came into effect, transferring
Ukraine from the list of countries in transition to market economy in the
context of anti-dumping EU legislation. Prior to this, the nominal value of
products was determined through theoretic calculations or looking at
similar countries. This methodology often led to the incorrect calculation
of the nominal value and, therefore, high anti-dumping duty. The United
States of America also recognized Ukraine as a market economy (early
2006).
In order to protect the interests of national producers on foreign
markets in terms of anti-dumping, special protective and compensational
investigations that were initiated against Ukrainian products, on 7 June
2006, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine passed Decision No. 801 «On
the Procedure for Protecting the Interests of Ukrainian Producers when
Foreign Countries, Economic or Customs Unions Conduct Anti-
Dumping, Special Protective or Compensatory Investigations against
Ukrainian Products». The purpose of the Decision is to ensure a more
effective coordination of work between the executive branch agencies
responsible for the implementation of state industrial policy and
Ukrainian producers, as well as at the protection of the interests of
Ukrainian producers on foreign markets as part of anti-dumping, special
                     
13 Calculated by the author based on data released by the State Statistics Committee of
Ukraine — http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ (tab: Statistical Data) and O. Nivyevsky Expendi-
tures on Agriculture and WTO/ Institute of Economic Research and Consulting/
http://www.ier.kiev.ua/Ukraine/RT/rt28092005_present/rt_28092005_ukr_nivyevskiy.pdf
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protective and compensatory investigations initiated against Ukrainian
products.
At the same time, Ukraine only started carrying out investigations in
1998 when the Anti-dumping Code was passed — the code includes three
laws; «On the Protection of National Producers from Dumping Imports»,
«On the Protection of National Producers from Subsidized Imports», and
«On Using Special Measures with Regard to Imports into Ukraine».
According to the code, investigations are carried out by legislative bodies,
i.e. The Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, State Customs Service of
Ukraine, and the Inter-Agency Commission on International Trade. The
Commission organizes and controls investigations, chooses to initiate
them, decides on whether there is dumping or harm and makes the final
decision on the use of adequate measures.
Since 1998, Ukraine has carried out 40 investigations. Products the
import of which was investigated and protective measures were used are
iron ore concentrate, rubber tires for passenger vehicles, ball bearings,
steel ropes and cables, knitted fabrics, sodium carboxymethyl cellulose
(glue), electric heating lamps, asbestos cement sheets (asbestos board),
wood-fibra boards, etc. As of October 2010, there are 25 protective
actions — 22 final anti-dumping measures and 3 special protective
measures. In other words, Ukraine actively uses protective measure in its
foreign trade activities; these are largely used against products from CIS
countries (first and foremost, the Russian Federation) and China (6
actions).
3.4.4. Protection of Intellectual Property and Standardization
In terms of the regulation of trade aspects of intellectual property rights,
Ukraine has a separate legislative basis; there is also a mechanism for the
implementation of intellectual property norms at the level of developed
countries.
In order to achieve it, a set of laws and rulings on intellectual property
was passed, work was done to implement existing laws and norms,
measures were taken to prevent the production and sale of fake audio-
and video-products and software on the territory of Ukraine. In the
system of law enforcement and intellectual property protection, a separate
division was created on software legalization, national register of
producers and distributors of software and information and a search
system for the distribution and use of licensed software are being created.
In order to conduct state control of the compliance of businesses to
legislation on intellectual property, a division of state inspectors on
intellectual property was created as part of the State Department on
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Intellectual Property of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine.
Specialized departments at the Ministry of Interior, State Tax
Administration and Customs Service work on preventing the violation of
intellectual property rights.
In decentralized economies, institutes of intellectual property rights are
focused on strengthening the stimuli of investment into high-tech
industries. However, increased protection of intellectual property rights is
not a valid reason for such investment. In the first place they depend on an
effective system of investment stimulation, research and engineering works
in the industrial sector, capital markets, financial system, etc. The task of
building a new regulatory apparatus is to be accompanied by reforms in
other fields, e.g. reforms of the legislation on shareholder rights, collateral,
bankruptcy and financial services, for the purpose of stimulating
investment into creative work and new technology in Ukraine.
Technical standards and procedures are particularly important for the
production of technologically complex products, the creation of a new
certification system that is recognized by other countries and improves
the competitiveness of Ukrainian products on global markets.
Ukraine took a series of measures for the implementation of the
Agreement on Technological Barriers to Trade. The Laws «On
Standardization», «On the Assessment of Adequacy», and «On the
Accreditation of Certification Agencies» were adopted. During the
negotiation process with the WTO, Ukraine passed 6,113 legistive acts on
standardization, 2,516 of which were harmonized with international and
European standards. At the same time, the current standardization system
in Ukraine doesn’t meet international requirements, which is caused by a
number of problems:
• the use of many legistive acts that remained from the USSR;
• the failure of standardization bodies to meet the requirements of the
national standard ISO/IEC Guide 59:2000 the Code of Standardization
Rules and national standard 1.13:2001 National Standardization. The
Rules of Giving Notice to Trade Partners of Ukraine;
• insufficient activity of business entities in funding the creation of
national standards and the inadequate coordination of the work of
technical committees for standardization, which leads to an inadequate
preparation level of draft legislation;
• significant lag in completing tasks defined by the Program of
Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union on harmonizing national
standards with international and European standards;
• limited participation in the work of international and regional
organizations on standardization (the Ruling of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine…, 2006).
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International organizations for standardization passed almost 20,000
standards that are used when international trade is conducted, pursuant to
the requirements of the WTO; there are 16,000 documents of European
organizations for standardization that are used by members of the
European Union and their trade partners.
Ukraine needs to introduce more than 8,500 standards. The State
Program for Standardization in 2006-2010 is supposed to help with this; its
aim is to ensure the development of the national standardization system and
its adequacy to the requirements of the Agreement on Technical Barriers in
Trade and its harmonization with the standardization system of the
European Union. Moreover, we need to create a court system that can
quickly, fairly and transparently solve issues regarding the responsibilities
of the producer. As we can see from the experience of WTO member
countries, it is very costly to conduct the implementation of legislation,
provision of information to the public, provide equipment for the
metrological base and research laboratories, as well as support the
information center for inquiries from WTO members.
Ukraine is also planning to modernize its system of sanitary and
phyto-sanitary measures. Just like in the case of technical regulation and
the protection of intellectual property rights, the effective use of the WTO
Agreement on sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures depends on large-
scale investment in order to implement world class systems for public
healthcare and protection of the flora and fauna. The harmonization of
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures with the relevant WTO agreement
in Ukraine is not enough to provide the effective export of agricultural
products. Therefore, it will be necessary to solve more fundamental
problems, such as the legislative regulation of land ownership,
availability of credit, etc.
3.4.5. Conclusions
Accession to the WTO creates a number of opportunities for Ukraine.
However, at the modern level of economic development, Ukraine has two
negative features. Firstly, it is dependent on the situation on foreign
markets. Of the 100 top companies according to gross revenue, 45 belong
to the top 100 exporters from Ukraine (Ranking of 100 Top…, 2004). 23
of these exported raw materials or metals. This means that financial
stability in the country, just like in the mid-90s, depends on metal
production, which accounts for 30% of foreign exchange proceeds.
Secondly, national production is dominated by products with low
value added. The basis of big business in Ukraine is, like before, metal
production and chemicals. In the top 100 best big companies in Ukraine
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there are no high-tech companies; moreover, metal production has been
growing as part of the GDP and is currently at a level of more than 25%.
In these conditions, the opportunity to increase the export volumes of
Ukrainian products and services to foreign markets is limited, due to the
incompatibility of the product structure of Ukrainian exports with the
structure of global trade. According to the data provided by the
International Trade Center, a series of product categories in Ukrainian
export is in degrading sectors or sectors, the growth of which is not
promising, based on the deteriorating conditions of trade in these products
on world markets (Trade Performance Index…)
Thus, in order to use the advantages of WTO membership, we need a
structural adaptation to the priorities of the world economy as well as the
formation of an adequate innovation and investment strategy. Moreover,
the advantages of free access to the markets that is gained through WTO
membership is most visible for the markets with primarily price-based
competition, i.e. commodity markets. Therefore, it is necessary to use a
broader selection of measures for economic policy, i.e. a trade policy that
would influence innovation acceleration in the sectors of potential
competitive advantages in the Ukrainian economy.
In many sectors, Ukraine has worked according to WTO rules since
2005; therefore, there is valid reason to say that there will be no
deterioration due to WTO accession. Moreover, the sectors that will
experience the negative impact can have temporary justified special
protective mechanisms for modernization, restructuring and competitiveness,
as stipulated in WTO agreements.
3.5. Ukraine’s Positioning in the European Economy
3.5.1 Introduction
In this special period of world history, the period of globalization and
global crises as well as the growing inequality of economic development
of countries, Ukraine faces the question of looking for new ways of
development, which requires understanding future goals and scenarios as
well as a clear impression of what such transformations will lead to, what
the achievements will be, what we will need to sacrifice, and why the
country needs to go through transformation difficulties. Answers,
although initial, to these questions outline approaches for the formation of
a new ideology of Ukrainian society’s integration into the world
community. These questions demonstrate the problem of higher aims and
values that make all social processes look extremely important. For
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Ukraine they are still important, because Ukraine is still developing
without any scenario.
Ukrainian politicians with the unanimous support of society once
declared very ambitious goals of forming the basis of the economic and
political positioning of the country in the world by following the
European example, i.e. high competitiveness of the national economy and
its domination that is linked to the establishment of high standards of
living in the country. The transformation of the institutional structure of
society and the formation of a market economy for Ukraine was never the
ultimate goal — market economy was seen as a more effective form of
management that naturally stimulates economic development and is able
to provide these standards. Social welfare is seen as the pre-requisite of
stability and might of the country and, therefore, as the goal of
transformation.
At the same time, the issue was not simply about economic success
but also saving the values that have already become a significant
component of the Ukrainian mentality, i.e. communitarism and social
justice. The origins of this mentality lie in the past of the country, but
they were also proved by modern examples, i.e. the success of Western
European models that combine market values with high standards of
living.
These intentions found their reflection in the notion of the necessity of
building an effective social and market economy and were declared by
the Ukrainian government in the first half of the 1990s, during the period
when the economic downturn was at a critical level. Despite all attempts
of the world community to introduce a unique model of market
development and a harsh method of shock therapy in Ukraine, these
intentions caused the special national parameters of transformation.
There were also certain economic reasons, because a country’s
position in the global and regional realm is first and foremost defined by
its economic and integration potential, the maturity of the infrastructure,
level of social stability, and the quality of human and research capital.
Ukraine’s claim to a good position in the world, starting from the point
when Ukraine gained independence, was mostly based on its starting
economic potential, developed scientific potential, strong industry, strong
resource base, good geographic location — the country is located on the
intersection of trade routes and has a strong fleet, automobile and railway
transportation, developed transportation communications and
infrastructure and a fairly high level of integration in the global economy.
Ukraine was way ahead of other former republics of the USSR according
to all indicators and had a valuable background at the start of the
transformation, giving hope that it would determine its foreign economic
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development as well as forms of international cooperation and this would
allow it to hold a position, if not of domination, then also not of being on
the periphery of the world economy and would also integrate into the
European economic spau on its own terms.
These expectations reflect the mentality of Ukrainian politicians and
the population that formed during its communist past; irrationality and
infantilism have been also characteristic of this mentality. Governments
of the independent Ukraine did not realize that integration has applied,
rather than political, significance and serves as one of the instruments of
the state fulfillment of national interests on the international arena —
the sense of process boils down to the rational redistribution of strategic
world resources and their use for consistent economic growth. It was
not taken into account that in these processes, the reverse may also
apply — redistribution takes place in accordance with the laws of the
nature, which objectively outline the position of the weaker country as a
source of resources and its economy as an auxilliary or serving
economy for the dominant countries. It was not taken into account
either that the course of integration into the modern world is determined
by economic benefits, while its effectiveness is measured by the success
of the national economy or that leading positions are won in a
competitive war.
Another important moment is that countries integrate in order to deal
with development difficulties but at the same time, they try to keep their
sovereignty. This sovereignty is not just about the protection of language
or ritual symbols of the nation, it is about forming a sustainable and stable
core of the national economy that will help prevent the consequences of
external aggression and destructive external impact and thus requires the
formation of this structure controlled by the state, i.e. subordination to
social interest and its exclusion from the context of private interests of
national groupings.
When determining integration vectors, it was necessary to solve the
question of the adequacy of its results to the main parameters that will
determine the status of the country: what form does the structure of the
national economy ultimately need to have in order to provide a certain
level of sovereignty, what economic conditions will Ukraine have when
the country joins the global space (as an auxiliary element or an equal
partner); whether the standard of living will reach a qualitatively new
level. At the same time, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the other side of
this process is the interest of the world community in the integrative
acquisition of a separate, in this case, Ukrainian national economy, i.e.
how attractive its potential is and whether it has the required
advantages.
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3.5.2. Implications of the Inherited Structure
of a Materialistic Economy
The general criterion for entering the world economic system on a par, is
the level of the relevant development — the one on which the countries
find themselves, i.e. the post-industrial one. Otherwise, e.g. based on the
resource potential, the country will not choose its place but will be
assigned a place in the global economy by stronger world players.
Integration aspirations of Ukraine in the first years of independence
faced a series of problems. Firstly, it turned out that demand for its
integration potential boils down to demand for raw materials and low
value added industrial products — everything that was deemed
competitive in Ukraine, e.g. scientific achievements, high technology,
was not demanded (did not correspond to the set world economic
structure or economic needs), all niches were already taken, or was the
joint property of Ukraine and Russia and could not be used without the
latter’s permission. Secondly, without market transformation, the
unification of the grounds for development, the Ukrainian economy was
not compatible with the European market space.
Understanding the fact that the economy of the country is not
inherently attractive, just because it complements the structure of the
world economy, forced the governments of Ukraine to choose the option
that has a series of advantages, infrastructural and territorial in nature.
Ukraine’s declared goal of EU accession is very much defined by the
understanding that any other integration vector will lead to a certain loss
of sovereignty, becoming peripheral and the subordination of its economy
to global needs. In this context, the EU is the best integration model,
because, unlike other integration formations, except pragmatic, purely
economic goals that boil down to the need of the realization of natural
competitive interests and meeting the need for resources, also has other
goals, such as consistent economic growth and the convergence of
country development levels, reaching a high level of collective economic
security and only requires partial concessions in terms of national
sovereignty. In effect EU accession for Ukraine is the attempt to solve
problems that it cannot solve on its own due to harsh competition.
At the same time, Ukraine can only join the EU on the terms of the is
integration block rather than on its own terms, i.e. with the partial loss of
economic, institutional and political sovereignty. These terms, formulated
by the Union, focus on good final results and at the same time, on
extreme activity, because apart from its geographic location in Europe,
linked transportation and a common infrastructure that are a given, all
other indicators required hard work to transform Ukraine into a democratic
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country. It was necessary to develop an effective market economy that
can compete on global markets, be able to adapt the aquis communautaire
of the EU, and ready to carry out the obligations of EU member. In terms
of economics, the key requirement is an economy that can compete on
global markets due to certain national economic advantages. The essence
of the question is what advantages the integration grouping will favor
most. Clearly, the desire of the community to accept a new member
together with its problems, is determined by its ability to take it in and
adapt it to its own standards while doing no harm to the economy of this
regional grouping, i.e. the main reason for the high standards set for
Ukraine is first and foremost, the fact that the structure of its national
economy is to complement rather than substitute or ushape the existing
structure of the EU economy.
3.5.3. Implications of the Structural Changes in the National Economy
Ukraine’s weakness is in the low competitiveness of its economy that is
measured not only by the level of labor productivity, it is in the country’s
lagging behind global development trends, despite sufficient natural
resources and acquired potential. This inadequacy of development levels
is the main obstacle to convergence with leading countries.
The increased competitiveness of the national economy of Ukraine,
right from the start of the reformation process, was linked to its
restructuring, especially during the first years of independence, when its
parameters could be formed on their own.
Clearly, it needed general and institutional restructuring, based on
effectiveness and rationality and driven by private economic interest that
is based exclusively on private property, as well as restructuring that
would help create the core of high-tech industries that would guarantee
that it becomes competitive and economically secure.
At stage one, in early 90s, it was believed that the formation of the
basis for development and the exclusion of the state from the economy
would automatically provide economic growth and integration into the
world economy as a whole and the European economy on equal terms.
Instead, at that point, the economy of the country was in deep economic
crisis. In 1990-1999 GDP fell by 60.8% or 2.5 times (more than UAH 2
trillion). In addition, this period saw the start of capital flight (more than
USD 100 b was taken out of the country). The economy of Ukraine was
in effect taken back decades in its development. Even though 2000
greeted the start of an economic revival, which showed high economic
growth rates for an extended period (in 2000-2007 Ukraine grew by
66.4% or 7.2% annually, which is much higher than average world
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indicators), its volatility remained fairly high (ranging from 2.5% in 2005
to 12.4% in 2004; the fluctuation of the coefficient for 2000-2006 was
42.5%) 14, and Ukraine still hasn’t reached the 1990 level of GDP (Figure
3.9). In 2007 GDP was at 69% of the production levels of the former
Ukrainian Republic as part of the USSR. This indicates that the country
hasn’t yet transitioned to the next development stage, the compensatory
stage, and is losing the potential that can provide qualitative changes,
economic breakthrough and further development dynamics that would
help it become part of the economic community on its own terms.
Ukraine
* Forecast
** World Bank data
Global economy Developed countries Developing countries
Figure 3.9. GDP Growth in Ukraine and the World
(% change to previous year)
The irrationality of the economic structure is caused by over-reliance
on the leverages of market regulation. The elimination of the state from
the processes of the reformation of the national economy was
strengthened by deep transformations of the economic system that
required the formation of the institute of private property. Hopes for the
formation of a rational production structure were mistakenly linked to
market transformation, instead, the total individualization of economic
interests led to devastating consequences: production of competitive
products was privatized (their competitiveness was largely caused by the
high demand level for products of first-tier processing and, thus, low
value added). We need to take into account the fact that current changes
in trade terms (import and export prices) are most significant for products
                     
14 Unless otherwise stated, based on the data of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.
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with a low processing level, which made the effect stronger (Figure 3.9),
therefore, growing export of such goods under conditions of changing
global market conditions undermined the financial and economic basis of
the restructuring. These products have been the basis of Ukrainian export.
In 2006 the share of metals in export was at a level of 42%, chemicals —
12%, grains — 3.5%. The share of mechanical engineering products,
which still remains low-tech is at 14.3%. Let’s compare it to 1995 during
the crisis (when mechanical engineering production was ceased due to a
deficit of components) when trade in low value-added products and
demand for such products were particularly strong, the share of
mechanical engineering products in the export structure of Ukraine was at
19%, while the share of metals was at 36%. Even compared to neighbors
from Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine looks weak — firstly, the
export of raw materials and low value-added products from Ukraine is
4-10 times higher than that from the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland; secondly, the export of mechanical engineering products from
Ukraine is 5-7 times lower than that from the countries of Central
Europe. In addition, the dependence of the process of a new economic
structure formation on the individual interests of major exporters, makes
this structure not just archaic but also unstable. One of the indicators of
this instability is the fact that presently, economic activity in Ukraine
continues to be mainly defined by external market conditions — there is
a very close link between changes in foreign market conditions and the
GDP.
The almost direct link between the dynamics of domestic production
and global metal prices is also significant. Deteriorating trade terms in
2000 caused a GDP decline and a reduction in several types of
production; improvement on foreign markets starting from the second
quarter of 2006 turned metal extraction and production as well as the
mechanical engineering industry into the driving force of the industry and
the economy as a whole. It should be noted, that Ukrainian business was
able to take advantage of favorable global market conditions and started
showing high dynamics of development, particularly in terms of
technological re-equipment. However, such positive changes do not allow
us to characterize the structure of social production in Ukraine as capable
of bringing about an economic breakthrough in the country. The first
reason for this is that qualitatively different poles of development (i.e.
innovative production rather than post-industrial) do not meet the current
requirements of an economic breakthrough, let alone domination. The
second reason is that growing revenues from raw materials and low value
added production in market conditions, favors the conservation of the
production that is the source of these revenues. This is evidenced by the
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trend of growing new value added that significantly and increasingly lags
behind the growth of production output over the years of economic
growth. If we take 1999 as a base (the last year of economic decline when
value added was at 40% of the 1990 level), by the present time, value
added grew by 40% and gross output grew by 60%. This was caused by
the almost two-fold increase in industrial consumption (raw materials and
processed products) — it has been fairly high over recent years (over
60%), while even in 1991its share in the output structure was 50%, i.e. it
was 10% lower; in developed countries this share was 45-50%. The
economy of Ukraine remains costly and material intensive.
We also need to note that currently the gap between volumes of added
value and production output has increased due to social and fiscal policy
as well as gas price increases in 2005-2006. For example, net tax grew
significantly: by 29% in 2005 and by 17% in 2006. In 2007, the growth of
net taxes accounted for one third of increase in domestic production and
the trend persisted in 2008. At the same time, the salary level remains
low, which brings about price competitiveness.
The formation of the rational structure of the national economy, the
structure that national economic security is based on, is the domain of
the state. It is especially true for countries with a transition economy: in
such economies the state is responsible for initiating poles of
development. However, the state can only influence these processes
when it has market leverages, i.e. strategically and effectively
functioning public enterprises and (which is closely related) significant
financial resources, sufficient to initiate and correct the cumulative
processes in structure-forming and currently (as demanded by modern
conditions) innovative industries. The state of Ukraine, the share of
which is roughly 21%, lost the ability to correct these processes by
market mechanisms, and by protecting the national interests of the
population, uses mechanisms of non-market influence, by contradicting
the interests of the rest of private businesses.
It is worth paying special attention to the structure of this property and
the ways of transforming the basis of national economic development, its
market unification and adaptation to globalization requirements. In Ukraine
they boiled down to privatization that was not well thought through and
sometimes harmful. As we have already noted, despite the logic of building
a stable and strong national economy, privatization in the country was
subordinated to the private interests of groups in power; therefore, they
privatized profitable and strategic enterprises that could have allowed the
state to influence the process of the formation of a national economic
structure and improve the international position of the country in the global
economic arena. Moreover, the share of the state in revenues is declining.
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases388
At the same time high-tech production requires significant capital injections
that will not pay off soon; therefore, it is not in demand and remained in
public property, at which the state is unable to fund its development. This is
how the structure of the economy deteriorated.
All along, privatization in Ukraine has been seen as a populist move
aimed at convincing everyone that market transformations are inevitable
and as a fast way to generate revenues that will be used to patch the holes
in the budget. The most illustrative example when privatization was used
as a political and populist, rather than social and economic, tool is the re-
privatization of Kryvorizhstal. If we distance ourselves from the still
acute problem of the social value and general purpose of its privatization
that caused the state to lose significant revenues to the benefit of private
owners while modernization never happened, the value of its re-
privatization is still questionable. The funds (USD 4 b) obtained during
the course of the resale were to become the investment for the
modernization of the structure of the national economy. Instead, these
funds were lost on the supposed increase in social standards. Meanwhile,
in 2006-2007, 15,000 employees were made redundant; a further 12,000
employees where scheduled for redundanct in 2008. This didn’t just
aggravate the problem of unemployment in the region and become an
additional burden on the regional budget (unemployment expenditures
went up), it also cut budget incomes, because the lion’s share of the
budget of Kryviy Rih is largely formed by income tax, i.e. deductions
from the payroll expense. In 2007 roughly UAH 6m went to the city
treasury, but as a result of the redundancies, these incomes decreased by
more than 50%. Payroll expense taxes and pension fund payments that
are made by the factory will also decrease, which will cause a
deterioration in public welfare.
Other negative aspects of re-privatization were the reduced investment
rating of Ukraine, which cannot guarantee the owner his property rights,
reduced budget revenues (in 2007 alone, new and, more importantly,
foreign owners received more than USD 800 m in net income), over 2.5
years of work the share of the domestic Ukrainian market in the sales
structure of products necessary for the national economy grew by just 6%
(from 15% to 21%), while the Ukrainian economy lost one third of its
foreign market that went away with the factory to the new owner;
although the investment obligations stipulated that he had to increase the
supply of metal to the domestic market, he actually increased export
volumes, thus squeezing out Ukrainian producers from the global market.
In order to minimize costs, new managers started to gradually move away
from Ukrainian raw materials in favor of the cheaper Russian and Kazakh
materials, which also affected country revenues.
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3.5.4. Implications of the Trans-Border Capital Movement
In terms of investment, the problem of attracting investment into the
national economy has been important throughout the years of independence.
All governments pointed to their insufficiency and stressed that
investments are the main condition for economic restructuring. Although
over the last decade, current investment into the economy grew almost
two-fold, in 2006-2007 they were at just 35% of the 1990 level. And their
quality is now very different from what it was during the Soviet era.
It was thought that the structural reform of the economy of Ukraine
required much greater investment than the country had domestically;
focus on domestic reserves will prolong the period of dealing with
structural deformations caused by the ruining of technological links and
the lack of stimuli for the development of high-tech industries; if our
country doesn’t attract foreign capital, it risks the de-industrialization of
the economy and will have a hard time transferring to the post-industrial
stage of development. However, the attraction of new investment that
structural changes in the economy were linked to, didn’t prove successful
either — ruled by market laws, this process was distanced from the state
and also led to the de-industrialization of the formerly strong economy.
At the same time, as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ukraine was
growing, although the growth was modest compared to other countries
(Figure 3.10), the structure of their use favored the development of the
general trend for the further destruction of the formerly sustainable
structure of the national economy. In the first 10 years of independence,
Ukraine received USD 4.2 b, or USD 85 per capita. Of these, 75% were
in wholesale trade and brokerage, therefore, they cannot be seen as real
investment. Based on the recent data released by the State Statistics
Committee15, the total volume of FDI was almost USD 29.5b, and debt
capital was at USD 33.5b. This means that USD 636.5 was attracted per
capita, which is a significant increase in comparison to 2001. In 2007
alone, the net increase in FDI compared to 2006 was 67.1%; of this
amount, just USD 6.9 went into processing industries and USD 1.1b went
into extraction industries. Foreign capital was not injected into the high-
tech industries of Ukraine, either. Neither was the technical re-equipment
of budget-forming industries done, although the utilized technology was
very outdated. For example, 95% of steel was smelted in open-hearth
furnaces and converters and, specialists claim, some USD 40 b will be
necessary to transfer the industry to the use of energy efficient
technology, i.e. electric furnaces. So far metal production has received
USD 1.7 b in FDI, while the mechanical engineering industry received
                     
15 As of 1 January 2008
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USD 1.b. While one of the signs of an industrial state is large-scale
machine production for all industries, Ukraine currently produces
hundreds and thousands times smaller volumes of equipment and
machinery than it did in 1999. At the same time, the harmful industry of
tobacco and alcohol production produced USD 1.6b. This is, of course,
due to the faster payback of these industries. It is payback in the market
conditions that is the sole regulator that determines the structure of social
production in less developed countries.
Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine
Figure. 3.10. Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine (USD m)
The greatest volumes of FDI streamed into trade and services. The
development of trade infrastructure, i.e. growth in the number of modern
supermarkets is definitely a positive development, but it is not caused by
the improved investment climate in the country, it is rather an indicator of
its instability and the fact that the structure of the national economy is still
being deformed and Ukraine is turning into a market for foreign products.
Official data proves that roughly 7 million Ukrainians work outside the
country. In 2007 they transferred about USD 22 b (roughly USD 3,150
each) in remittances, which is half the annual budget of Ukraine and, at
the same time, the opportunity to increase effective domestic demand or
savings. This value is many times higher than the FDI received by the
economy. The annual inflow of half of the state budget was supposed to
cause incredible economic growth and unprecedented GDP growth rates.
However, in reality these funds are used mostly on current consumption,
which is, especially after 2005, closely connected to imports.
Naturally, the negative image of Ukraine played its part and became
the main obstacle to FDI inflow. The investment climate, determined by a
series of factors, was really unfavorable for investment inflow despite the
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formation of a developed market infrastructure and improved legislation.
The reasons were: first, lack of economic development strategy, which
prevented investors from determining the industries of long-term and
promising capital investment, second, the fact that the state was distanced
from the processes of cumulative investment that is always part of such
strategy; third, instability in all areas of social life, particularly business
legislation and regulation of domestic and foreign policy — it is
necessary to point out that Ukraine has no inheritance of power that
would guarantee maintaining its previous course; fourth, corrupt power
that made investment very risky. All this prevented serious investors,
aiming at long-term prospects, from conducting forecasts and assessing
the investment. The economy of Ukraine thus lost the opportunity for
restructuring, based on late industrial and post-industrial principles and
therefore, focus on its own view of its international positioning.
3.5.5. Implications of Asymmetric Foreign Relations
Internal instability during the transition period stimulated capital
outflow. Moreover, the investment base was getting smaller due to a
low savings rate caused by the high level of current consumption that
was in turn caused by low income levels and economic instability which
also stimulated immediate consumption. Today the trend is reinforced
by the outflow of income caused by the imbalance of export and import
policies. This reduces domestic social demand and at the same time
undermines demand for domestic investment (the sector of its use is
getting smaller and in recent years only residential construction saw an
increase in domestic investment). 2001—2004 were exceptional years
when the Ukrainian economy demonstrated a steady growth trend;
positive changes in the business climate and the revival of the national
economy were the consequences of domestic political and
macroeconomic stabilization; businesses realized the importance of the
trend and this led to the activation of investment activity. Although at
first economic growth was solely attributable to national currency
devaluation, at later stages it was caused by the growth of world metal
and chemicals prices; later still, it became clear that it was caused by
the development of domestic investment and consumer demand that was
growing based on political and macroeconomic stability.
The real sector of the economy of Ukraine as a whole became
profitable, which led to budget surplus in 2001—2004 and a significant
strengthening of budgetary discipline. Other indicators were also gradually
changing, but starting from 2005 due to political destabilization,
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macroeconomic stability was again shattered, which was immediately
reflected in the growth of the lag between the index of real salaries,
consumer prices and industrial producers. The economy could have
collapsed were it not for the changes in the institutional structure of the
economy that took place during the market transformation — they became
the stabilizing factor. The openness of the economy to a certain degree
helped Ukraine take part in the redistribution of the world banking and
financial resources, establish mechanisms of domestic and foreign lending.
Corporate lending stabilized the situation with investment into the real
sector. More specifically, growth of foreign borrowing reflects the growing
trust of foreign investors in the Ukrainian economy as a whole, stimulates
investment activity, and is a sign of the integration of the national economy
into the global economy. As seen below (Figures 3.11 and 3.12), incomes
of Ukrainians and the economy as a whole, starting from 1999, are closely
correlated with the development of lending.
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Figure 3.11. Correlation Between
the Borrowings of Corporate Sector and its Income
Particularly important is the growth of corporate lending that stimulates
income growth through increased economic activity — corporate lending in
2007 led to significant income growth. The trend (Figure 3.11) proves that
for every UAH 1 increase in corporate lending there is a UAH 1.7 increase
in income.
The national banking system started integrating into the global
economic system; apart from the fact that Ukrainian banks are getting
experience of work with foreign borrowers, important for the economy of
Ukraine is its participation in the redistribution of world financial resources
and integration into world financial markets.
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Figure 3.12. Income as a Function
of Lending in the Economy of Ukraine
The inflow of significant amounts of relatively cheap foreign loans
helps to accelerate social and economic growth via increase in lending.
This also means significant increase in income as the basis for demand.
However, the main problem is in the structure of consumer investment
demand, i.e. ways and directions of income use, which limits Ukraine’s
chances to transfer to the post-industrial, or at least late industrial,
development stage, because after unreasonable changes in the import
policy initiated in 2005, demand was significantly re-focused, which led
to the outflow of financial resources abroad, intensified these processes
and undermined the savings base, the basis of domestic investment,
narrowed domestic sources and increased the potential of foreign
competitor producers; investment demand started to increase but it re-
focused on industries with a short payback period that could meet the
need for revenues.
Over the last three years, imports into Ukraine have exceeded exports.
The last time that Ukraine had a surplus trade balance was in 2004
(approximately USD 3.7b.), in 2005, the trade deficit was at USD 1.8b.
Only in 2007 did the foreign trade deficit grow by 71% and was at USD
11.5b (product export grew by 28.4% and reached USD 49.2b, but import
was growing at faster rates, at 34.7%, and reached USD 60.7b). In 2008,
the foreign trade deficit was at a record level of USD 18.5b.
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Experts from the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine also note a
significant increase in the expenses of Ukrainian businesses on imported
goods, that was linked to the growth in business activity: factories started
paying more attention to the modernization of production and the
expansion of capacity, so the import of equipment and its components
grew significantly. However, 81% of these factories focused on export
and specialized in low value added production; therefore, their activity
contributed to the conservation of the outdated and de-industrialized
national economy. On the other hand, both consumer and investment
demand in Ukraine was, in effect, lending to foreign economies the
markets of which were closed to Ukrainian producers. Fast inflation
growth also proved resource outflow abroad and the real monetary base
was becoming narrower. The inadequacy of monetary bases and their
content led to price growth, national currency devaluation and inflation16.
Naturally, we can attribute inflation, the new wave of which occurred in
2007-2008 and to external influences. Ukraine has an open economy and
cannot be left outside global processes. The main reason for high import
inflation was price growth on world commodity markets and the general
market conditions of the world economy. However, internal reasons for
inflation growth in Ukraine were also serious and proved, first and
foremost, that the production structure had not undergone innovative
changes that could have guaranteed stability and the gradual development
of the economy.
One of the external threats was the narrowing of the monetary base of
social production that largely affects weak national economies (with a
weak structure at the core). The level of monetization of the Ukrainian
economy that had been growing and had been cumulatively increased by
lending volumes (Figure 3.1317), started to decline significantly in early
2008. The reason was the sharp reduction in investment lending and growth
of consumer lending (in 2007 consumer lending grew by UAH 77 bln),
which also stimulated consumer demand and caused monetary
outflow.
Destructive changes in the structure of the economy that gradually
turned it into a peripheral economy, were accompanied by the ruining of
the state management system. The unprofessional actions of the previous
governments were further aggravated by the never-ending political crisis.
As a result of the 2007 crisis, economic growth rates fell 1.5 times. At the
same time, the state, in order to increase the income of the population,
didn’t utilize the mechanisms that could have absorbed internal demand,
so their mechanisms turned into unproductive demand that stimulated not
                     
16 NBU data.
17 NBU data.
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only price hikes, but also import growth (the domestic economy could not
meet the growing demand of the population due to low labor productivity
and the inadequacy of its structure). The government’s attempts to fight
inflation in these conditions boiled down to the artificial binding of the
monetary base, while it was necessary to fight the growing state budget
deficit that was growing due to ungrounded social liabilities and expenses
arising from them.
Supply of money growth (M3)
Monetary base growth
Inflation
Figure 3.13. Growth Rates of Consumer Prices
and Monetary Instruments in Ukraine in 2007
In general the course of development of the Ukrainian economy
became further proof of the fact that its nature over the last decade
transformed, unified and adapted to the part of the global market system
that is based on basic market principles — it is one of the most liberal
systems of the world, because it self-regulates and develops without state
interference that is limited by a small number of classical macroeconomic
leverages of influences, which is even smaller than that in other
peripheral countries of the world, let alone developed countries. The
share of public property in the structure of the national economy is at its
minimum. The rapid and uncontrollable growth of capital through the
redistribution of social resources in favor of a small entrepreneurial part
of the society is also characteristic of wild capitalism. The consequences
of such growth are the creation of more distinct social layers, an
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unprecedented gap between incomes and standards of living of the rich
and the poor in Ukraine (Annual Report.., 2007): in 1990, the ratio of the
highest to the lowest level of income (due to social payments and social
benefits) was on average 1:2; in 2000 the correlation of indicators (10%
poorest and 10% richest) was at 1:30, in 2007 — 1:40, while in the
countries of the EU this correlation varies from 1:5 to 1:7, in Japan it is
1:4 — 1:5, in Russia it is 1:25. In Ukraine the rich and very rich account
for roughly 10% of the population, the middle class accounts for another
10%, while the poor and very poor make up the balance, i.e. 80% or the main
bulk of the population. GDP in 2007 was at UAH 663 b (USD 131.2 bln), or
USD 2,834 per capita, of which 80% of the value belongs to 10% of the
rich and very rich who manage the social and economic life of society,
public opinion and mass media and, thus, determine the course of further
country development. While an important component of the process of
social and economic transformation is not private interests but national
support of reforms — the unity of the aim, public faith in its results and
that the chosen way is right — all this assists transformations in
Ukrainian society, and creates social and mental catastrophe, the
consequence of which, is lack of faith among the public in the prospects
of country development, which at the same time feeds corruption. The
deepening of social disappointment is proved by the results of the
research conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy
of Sciences of Ukraine: 7% of the population believe in liberal values and
the effectiveness of market self-regulation, while in 1990 it was 69%.
72% of the population are ready to use corruption schemes in different
aspects of social life, because they don’t believe in the possibility of
change and the ability to confront the will of corrupt top officials. The
share of those who link the future of the country to the European choice
has also gone down: in 2004, the share was 69%, in 2007 it decreased to
31%. All these indicators started to decline, particularly after the Orange
Revolution.
Obviously, due to such an attitude and the general status of the
development of the national economy we shouldn’t hope that the external
world will react positively to the intention of Ukraine to integrate into the
global space, especially on our own terms. Instead, WTO accession
removed obstacles to access to the markets and therefore, any need to
agree with the state before such agreements are made with businesses that
have unlimited access to commodity markets and unlimited influence on
domestic markets. This means that the country is losing its last chance to
form the structure of its national economy on its own; at the same time,
its positions on the global and European economic space are becoming
weaker.
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Under such conditions the European integration intentions of
Ukraine are the only panacea to external threats. First of all, the EU will
insist on certain strict requirements, the fulfillment of which will help
improve the business climate in the country and define the rules of the
game and achievements of market transformations; secondly, under
certain conditions, integration links with the union and their
intensification will help to take the national economy to the late
industrial level of development; thirdly, intensified integration links
with the EU is the only way of protecting the national economy within
the WTO from the aggressive expansion of countries that are still using
price and low-tech competitive advantages, because the EU can also
suffer from it; EU patronage for Ukraine can open new opportunities for
the construction of a new social format, that prior to this, due to
objections of supra-national organizations could not be transformed at
its own will, by turning them into a rational mechanism for stimulating
social processes, economic and social regulation as well as means of
macroeconomic balance. Using the experience and borrowing the best
of social formats from the EU is linked to the hope of building a new
mentality based on what for Ukraine are traditional values that are
based on solidarity.
However, because the economic growth that has recently started is
unstable and sensitive to domestic and external factors, Ukraine cannot
count on European help in forming the structure-forming and stable core
of the national economy — now Europe views Ukraine as a problem
country that wants to be a leader but instead can only be a source of
commodities and a market for consumer goods.
Such simplified motivations cannot provide full reciprocal
diversification of economies and only contributes to the further
peripheralization of the weaker. Even if we assume that the European
Union is interested in a stable and booming partner, such partnership will
start with the assessment of benefits. As for saturating the consumer
market, we need to take into account the fact that high-tech products are
determined by incomes as well as whether the country belongs to the
high-tech developments stage. There is no doubt that such significant and
constant political and macroeconomic risks narrow the possibility of EU-
Ukraine cooperation. These risks determine both the structure of
investment and the structure of product turnover.
Direct investment into the economy of Ukraine from the countries of
the EU is still insignificant and their distribution among sectors follows a
general trend — the biggest share goes to trade and services, while
investors come from just several countries (Figures 3.14 and 3.15). Less
than 12% of investment is used to develop production capacities.
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Into Ukraine from the EUInto Ukraine, total
Figure 3.14. Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine
(total and that from the EU, USD m)
Great BritainGermany Cyprus Austria
Figure 3.15. Foreign Direct Investment
from Individual EU Countries (USD m)
The trade structure with the EU does not favor production restructuring
either: a large share of imports is in FMCG and some of these are
products that Ukraine has traditionally been strong in. The example of
Finland is very characteristic — it mostly exports telephones, radios, and
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TVs to Ukraine (31% and 27%) rather than equipment (especially
electrical equipment that the country is famous for); the share of
telephones, radios, and TVs compared to 2004 grew by 80%, while the
share of equipment and machinery decreased by 8%18. These trends
clearly point to destructive imbalances in the foreign trade structure. They
are also supported by the product structure of Ukrainian export to the
countries of the EU, where in 2006 an important share was in ferrous
metals (24.4%), energy sources, oil and oil products (13.4%), ores, slag
and ashes (5.4%), textiles (4.8%), electrical machinery and equipment
(4.4%), fats and oils (4.3%), ferrous metals products (3.9%).
Table 3.14
TEN MOST IMPORTANT PRODUCT CATEGORIES EXPORTED
FROM FINLAND TO UKRAINE IN 2006
No. Product category EUR m Share, %
Growth
rate,
(% of 2004)
1 Telephones, radio, TVs, etc 97.4 31 80
2 Paper, carton and their products 82.5 27 15
3 Other electric equipment and
machinery
22.7 7 9
4 Specialized machines and equipment
for different industries
18.4 6 –8
5 Paints and tanning materials 14.2 5 2
6 Plastic and unprocessed components 13.0 4 68
7 Industrial machinery and widely-used
equipment
8.1 3 –33
8 Products made of base metals 6.3 2 27
9 Mineral oils and products 4.7 2 –14
10 Chemicals 4.2 1 19
Total for 10 largest categories 271.4 87 27
Export, total 310.8 100 21
On the one hand, such a structure that is characteristic of secondary
economies is not promising for the future; on the other, it doesn’t
stimulate foreign investors and businesses to have long-term and deep
economic relations with Ukraine.
                     
18 Based on the data released by the Customs Department of Finland (the data is ob-
tained from the Department of Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine).
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And although foreign trade between Ukraine and countries of the EU
became more active (both exports of products from Ukraine and imports
have increased), as of 2005, EU countries started to rapidly increase
exports (compared to 2005, export grew by 18%, while imports grew by
31.5%), which increased the rade deficit to USD 4.744.6 b compared to a
deficit of USD 2.6697 b. In 2005, the coefficient of export/ import
coverage was 0.7, and in 2006, it was at 0.8. All this created new threats
to the macroeconomic situation in the country. At the same time, there
was growth in the volumes of services in foreign trade (major partners
accounted for 65%), which improved the trade balance: foreign trade
surplus for services was at USD 351 m (although in 2005 it was at USD
441.9 m). The share of services export to the EU in total volume was
29.6%, the share of import was 49% (in 2005, it was 28.1% and 43.8%,
respectively). The largest share in the total volume of Ukrainian export in
services to the EU was in transportation services (64.3%).
Here we need to note that most Ukrainian roads and highways do not meet
European standards according to many criteria, such as speed of movement,
load per axle, modern road signs, technical and medical assistance points,
service stations, telephone connection, etc. There are almost no category one
roads with high-speed multi-lane traffic. Road construction has been halted
during the crisis in Ukraine; prior to this they were built at very low rates due to
insufficient funds (Table 3.15). However, European investors are reluctant to
invest into road renovation and construction in Ukraine, which makes
integration between the EU and Ukraine less promising.
The situation is very similar with other means of transportation and the
pipeline infrastructure (oil and gas): despite a certain dependence of
European countries on the length and capacity of Ukrainian pipelines, these
countries prefer to work with Russia and other countries.
Table 3.15
ASPHALT ROADS OF GENERAL USE WITH A HARD SURFACE, km
year
Indicator
1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Road length 163,255 163,827 164,245 164,633 164,772 164,957 165,155
Negative aspects of foreign trade development and economic
cooperation of Ukraine are caused by the low quality of economic
transformation that affects Ukraine’s participation in labor distribution.
The most obvious and important factor that gained new importance and
influences the integration parameters of the national economy into the
European are constant government crises as well as the lack of a
development strategy as well as a consistent economic policy.
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3.5.6. Conclusions on the Improvement
of the Economic Strategy of Ukraine
Despite domestic economic difficulties, Ukraine still has the internal
potential for the creation of a competitive economy and improvement of
its positions on foreign markets. Under certain conditions, it can be used
for economic restructuring based on innovations.
Experts from the Ministry of Economy point out that even natural
advantages can be turned into a source of innovative changes that are
becoming ever more necessary (Ukraine is one of the leaders on the
continent by the level of deposits and production of mineral resources).
Along with industries of late industrialization (mechanical engineering,
energy production, etc), low-tech industries (metal production and
extraction industries) are also threatened by foreign competitors — their
price competitiveness is getting weaker. Therefore, in 2006-early 2007,
Ukraine started innovative modernization, when the government set the
target of the innovation-driven growth of the national economy and
budgeted funds for the support of innovative initiatives. According to the
data of the Ministry of Economy, in 2007 investment into new technology
was roughly UAH 7 b, which is 80% higher than that in 2006. Innovations
were introduced by 840 (8.3%) of 10,107 enterprises. Metal production
spent most on innovation — they spent 40.2% of total investment; coke and
oil producers spent 27.1%, mechanical engineering production accounted
for 16.4%; in the past, the mechanical engineering industry was the leader.
These industries contribute most of the income of the country and can
form the resource that will help them turn into development poles as the
centers of demand formation for high technology. It is not just about
modernization, it is about modernization based on high (post-industrial)
technology, which hasn’t been done in traditional industries yet. For
Ukraine the penetration of post-industrialial trends into industrialism in
such industries, is about survival and, at the same time, development of
demand for high technology, which due to the multi-functionality of high
technology and its ability to diversify (unlike low technology) and cause
cumulative effect, will contribute to their adaptation to high-tech
segments of the global economy.
However, we are not just talking of the innovation-driven
modernization of production — it is a fundamentally new use of resource
potential. For instance, Ukraine has significant scandium deposits, one of
the rare-earth metals that are most promising for industrial
implementation. According to the data of the National Academy of
Sciences of Ukraine, the country has the largest deposits of scandium in
Europe, and is placed among the top 5 world leaders.
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Scandium alloys can become a unique competitive advantage of our
country in both high-tech industries (air and space construction, military
laser production) and in consumer goods production. These strong alloys
can also be used in cryogen technology, scandium is used in dentistry and
halogen lights. Scandium alloys can compete with titanium alloys — they
are cheaper, lighter and not so fragile. Their use in the automobile
industry helps make engines lighter, stronger and more reliable.
Therefore, scandium gives the country a unique opportunity to attract
foreign partners to innovative projects.
The innovative attractiveness of this resource is strengthened by
innovations in extraction technology and alloy production that Ukrainian
researchers have, but no other country has.
The situation in extraction and use of scandium is also characteristic
of other common rare-earth metals. Ukraine can be seen as the geological
center of Europe — it has almost all the geological structures of the
continent. In addition to scandium, Ukraine has deposits of other
precious, rare-earth and non-ferrous metals. The market value of this
mineral base is estimated at USD 7.5 trillion (USD 150,000 per capita)
(Institute of Geological…, 2007: 12). If these resources are processed
with the use of high technology into high-tech products, their value
increases significantly. Having such a base, Ukraine can create and
develop an industry that can produce modern competitive products based
on high technology and, at the same time, have a cumulative structure-
forming role.
Ukraine is one of the five producers of strategic ilmenite ore (20% of
world deposits) and extractors of this ore. Moreover, only Ukraine, China
and the USA have a full cycle and innovative technology for the
production of rolled titanium. In view of this, the country could become a
leader in the production of this metal and products thereof.
Researchers of the Institute of Geological Sciences of Ukraine should
also pay attention to the production of zirconium, because the world is
experiencing a deficit in this product and its price is expected to increase
by 10% per annum. Having established zirconium production, Ukraine
could capture a good niche on global ceramics, glass and nuclear energy
production markets. For now, Ukraine has just 3.5% of the market share.
The most rare metal in Ukraine is silicon, while in the past Ukraine
supplied it to the USSR as well as developed countries, including
countries of the EU, Japan and the USA. Having basically inexhaustible
silicon deposits and a full high-tech production cycle, Ukraine is currently
importing it, while its price has grown 2-3 fold over the past years (the
current price is EUR 60-80 per kg, while production in Ukraine costs
EUR 26-29). It could bring significant income to Ukraine, because
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demand for silicon, according to analyst forecasts19 will increase
significantly. Today its consumption is growing due to the producers of
cellular phones, computers, and TVs that Ukraine imports from Europe,
but in the future, it is also supposed to be used in alternative energy
production. Due to the growth of the world production of solar batteries,
the world need for poly-crystal silicon in 2010 could exceed 30,000 tons,
while production levels are forecast at 8,000 tons.
In this field, Ukraine has a number of competitive advantages that are
characteristic of the latter stage of industrial development, but it cannot
fully utilize its natural advantages, favorable market conditions and
innovative production capacities. Domestic extraction and processing
industries work inconsistently due to no vertical integration and integration
cooperation with consumer countries. The innovative use of these
resources and the products of innovation technologies, can become the
basis for scientific and economic interaction with the countries of the EU.
Clearly, it is not just the prospect of increasing its presence on the
global market that is attractive, but also the prospect of mastering
alternative sources of energy production and eliminating dependence on
traditional energy sources that continue to increase in price.
At the same time, Ukrainian resources remain attractive to other
countries, which under certain circumstances creates the risk of the
country transforming into a raw material appendage of the global
economy. Therefore, the development of these strategic directions must
be controlled by the state that owns the innovative technology.
Of course, we also need to take into account the fact that Ukraine has
more than 25% of the most fertile soil in the world and has a favorable
climate. The completion of the property reform and the technical re-
equipment of the agro-industrial complex due to the global deficit and
increase in food prices, will change Ukraine’s position on agricultural
markets. Moreover, large modernized food production enterprises
produce goods that meet world quality standards and are in demand in
Europe. This industry requires a strong state strategy and mechanisms:
Ukraine’s WTO accession rid it of a number of advantages that could
help modernize this field. Moreover, the threat to the development of the
agricultural complex is the increase in global demand for bio-fuel and raw
material production, which narrows the opportunities for the production
of food crops.
Ukraine is the largest natural gas transit country in the world and has a
gas transportation system with a very high capacity: 290 b m3 of input
and almost 170 b m3 of output (per annum). The development of these
                     
19 Nova Era (official representative of producers from the CIS in Ukraine; the largest
supplier of machinery and spare parts in agriculture and automobile industries).
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pipelines, that are interesting to the EU because there is no other
alternative, can be done in cooperation with these countries, but on
condition of domestic political stability.
Ukraine has significant potential in high-tech industries. Until recently
it had a solid position among such countries as the USA, Russia, France,
and China in air and space, it participated in a number of big international
projects (Sea Launch, the creation of an international space station, joint
project with Russia on the modernization of the CC-18 intercontinental
ballistic missile, joint project with Brazil and Italy on the modernized
Cyclone-4 launch vehicle). Ukraine is among the nine countries that
manufacture military aircrafts and is part of the group of leading
exporters of weapons and military and technical services. However,
positive factors and potential do not guarantee export growth or quality
changes in the structure of the national economy. Key conditions for
success are the development and implementation of state strategy for the
accelerated development of high-tech production and deep internal
economic and political reforms.
CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL ECONOMY CONVERGENCE
MECHANISMS AND INSTRUMENTS
FOR POLAND AND UKRAINE
4.1. Poland — Ukraine: Opportunities for Cooperation
in the Light of Real Processes
4.1.1. Introduction
There are a number of ways to analyse cooperation between neighbouring
states. The simplest would be to demonstrate cooperation existing at the
current stage. There may be another approach: to study neighbouring
states — Poland and Ukraine — not only through their current economic
and institutional status, but also through their long-term goals.
The second method seems more attractive both in theory and practice,
at least in the long-term perspective. We shall focus on this approach.
However, this analysis will not be entirely theoretical, as it is based upon
the description of a real situation. Neither will it relate to a long-term
prognosis, since it is merely an attempt at defining the goals to be
pursued. To the extent possible, the analysis will depend primarily on
political causalities, as well as, or first and foremost, on cultural, rather
than economic factors. It will depend on that defined by Braudel as
«collective mentalities».
4.1.2. Background
The reference point for the analysis is to accept two foundations, which
are sufficiently valid not only for Poland, but also for Ukraine. However,
it is to be first emphasised that the attitudes to the above mentioned states
vary globally. At least in the sense that in Poland the foundation is not
only more developed, but also irreversible, which so far is not valid for
Ukraine.
Firstly, this is so, because the economic foundation is created by the
market economy. Therefore, the developed foundation does not speak
about the economic system, the economic model, the role of the state or,
even more so, about the degree of economic freedom (Kowalik, 2005).
Secondly, this is so, because the political system, or institutional and
legal order, is based upon a certain form of democracy (Shapiro, 2006).
Since the democratic system, as well as the market economy, may take
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various forms, similar both from a formal perspective and a real
perspective, democracy theorists constantly stress the need to distinguish
between these two approaches.
The specific nature of post-socialist states lies in an essential
distinction from mature market capitalist economies. The distinction is in
the simultaneous formation of a market capitalist economy and a
democratic system (Kleer, 2005). Without analysing the reasons
underlying such interweaving circumstances, one should take due notice
of a number of relevant benefits and challenges.
In the introduction, we would like to graphically demonstrate both the
nature of benefits and the nature of challenges, which are in action
simultaneously (Chart 4.1).
 
Country undergoing changes
(systematic transformation) 
Transition reduction
External 
support 
Imitation 
possibility 
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Chart 4.1: A Quadrangle of Benefits for the Simultaneous Establishment
of a Democratic System and a Market Capitalist Economy
Source: Developed by the author.
Without scrutinising such dependences, one should pay due attention
to four key distinctions between Poland and Ukraine.
In the author’s opinion, the first distinction is paramount. Poland,
which belonged to the socialist system, was a moderately independent
state, while Ukraine was integrated into the Soviet Union.
The second distinction is that Poland’s economy and social-political
space had been actively eroding from the second half of the 1950s,
intensifying in the 1980s. Meanwhile, Ukraine was characterised by a
great institutional and legal accord with the traditional socialist system.
The degree of erosion was minimal (Bąk, 2006).
The third distinction lies in the external and internal support of the
transformation process, which was significantly stronger in Poland than
in Ukraine.
CHAPTER 4. National economy convergence mechanisms… 407
The forth distinction lies in the speed of transformational changes,
which was considerably greater in Poland than in Ukraine. The reasons
underlying this were not only external, but also internal. Poland was
substantially more ethnically homogenous and the degree of openness
was significantly greater than in Ukraine.
In this context, the statement related to the simultaneous creation of a
market economy and a democratic system needs supplementing. Indeed,
the economic and political processes were simultaneous, however one
should not forget that, first and foremost, the pace differed and, secondly,
public acceptance of such processes differed as well, which is attributed
to another evolutionary nature of the process of creating the institutional
foundation for a new economic and political system (Wilkin, 2007).
In addition to numerous benefits, the simultaneous and rapid pace of
creating a market economy and a democratic system has a number of
inadequacies (Chart 4.2).
Dualism of the rules of the game in various
spheres of activity
Resistance of the old elite and, first and
foremost, the loser groups
The spheres of
continuality and
systematic rupture
Shortage of modern
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managers
Privatisation of the
public sector and a
possibility for its partial
depredation
Unreasonable hopes
related to the transition
to a new system
Particularly rapid public
structuring
Rapid growth of the off-
the-books economy
Chart 4.2 Inadequacies of the Simultaneous Transition to
a Democratic System and a Market Economy
Source: Developed by the author.
The above mentioned phenomena are typical of any transformation,
however on a different scale. It depends primarily on four processes:
• The proliferation of the new rules of the game, above all in the
economy;
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• The extent of the adaptation of individual public groups to the
fundamentals of the new system;
• The economic and ideological orientation represented by the
political actors in power;
• The speed and extent of society differentiation (Kleer, 2007).
An in-depth analysis of the above mentioned inadequacies as relevant
to Poland and Ukraine is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, we
will only refer to a number of examples, which vividly illustrate the
factors exacerbating potential inadequacies.
The initial point for the analysis is GDP per capita in 1989.
Distinctions between the two countries were not great at that time: USD
5,150 and USD 5,680 for Poland and Ukraine respectively.
Transformational processes started vigorously increasing the gap between
the two figures. Indeed, the transition to a new system always generates a
so-called transformational crisis; however, the transition was different in
the two countries both in terms of depth and duration.
In Poland the crisis, if measured in terms of duration, ended in 1992,
with sustained GDP growth. In Ukraine, instead, the decline continued
until 1999. The decline there was significantly worse than in Poland. The
GNI (gross national income) in 2005 amounted to USD 7,110 and
USD 1,529 in Poland and Ukraine respectively (Atlas of Global
Development, 2007). Thus, with an almost identical initial level in 1989,
15 years later the gap increased almost 5 times to the benefit of Poland.
The real gap must be somewhat smaller, since Ukraine has consumption
in kind (extra-market) and the sphere of off-the-books transactions
(shadow), the share of which is greater than that of Poland.
In addition, one should note that, as immediately related to the above,
as early as in 1996, Poland managed to reach the level of 1989, which
does not hold true for Ukraine.
The next question to be considered in this context relates to the degree
of income differentiation measured by the Gini index. Indeed, both in
Poland and Ukraine it has a tendency to grow; however, there are
essential distinctions between the two. The data referred to below relates
to 2001; however, it can be assumed that the values have not fallen. The
Gini indices for Poland and Ukraine were 34.1 and 45.2 respectively.
Among all European post-communist states and post-Soviet states, only
the Gini index for Russia was higher than that of Ukraine (Bąk, 2006).
An important conclusion originates from the above mentioned
differentiation.With such a great income differentiation, it is hard to
believe that the transformation was sufficiently supported by the public.
According to the data of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 40 %
of households were satisfied with the transformation. Also in Poland,
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according to Kornai (2005), with a significantly lower profit differentiation,
a positive assessment of socialism was comparatively high. Such a great
distinction means that there emerged a considerable social group in
Ukraine that rapidly accumulated wealth in the process of chaotic
privatization. The above may be confirmed by the thesis that the rapid
process of a spontaneous and chaotic transformation stiffened resistance
to the rules of the market economy; the old administration contributed as
well. However, it is also true that the old establishment also rapidly
joined in the acquisition of property benefits.
It is also important to look at the start of the transformation in terms of
the private sector share in the GDP produced. At the beginning of the
transformation (1989), the relevant share in Poland exceeded 45 % of GDP,
while in Ukraine it stayed within the limits of 15—20 %. However, as early
as in the middle of the 1990s, the indicator grew to 60 % and is now
slightly behind that of Poland. This meant that the chaotic transition to
market relations in Ukraine occurred at an extremely rapid pace, which
contributed to the failure to abide by market rules and legal procedures.
However, the problem was relevant not only to Ukraine, but also to Poland.
4.1.3. Transformation Effects
Transformation effects may be analysed from various perspectives,
specifically in terms of social, political or economic consequences.
The selection depends to a greater extent on the purpose or objectives
of the analysis. Since the entire monograph text is intended to give
answers to questions pertaining to the economic cooperation of Poland
and Ukraine, it seems reasonable to analyse the transformation effects in
terms of the economic and political rules of the game. Firstly, whether
they guarantee stability; secondly, whether the rules are transparent;
finally, to what extent they are compatible with the modern market
economy and the democratic system.
At the beginning, we should tackle a number of questions related to
the role of the state.
Modern theoretic trends in economics apply different approaches to
the role of the state in the economy. Without analysing such approaches,
but guided by the experience of the current global economy, it is possible
to arrive at the conclusion that there is no rigid rule for determining
optimal proportions between the state and the market. As Professor Jerzy
Wilkin (2007, page 42) writes, «We may observe rapid economic
development and high quality of life in countries with various proportions
of the state and market and thus, there is no rigid rule that would
guarantee economic progress in the long-term».
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If we look at the recent experience of Poland and Ukraine from that
perspective, we will see that though being different and often opposite,
with a certain great simplification, it can be reduced to a common
denominator. Such common denominator lies firstly, in the lack of
explicit delimitations between that which should belong to the state’s
competence (possibly, public sector) and that which should belong to the
market sphere; secondly, the rules of the game imposed by the state (state
institutions) are very volatile; thirdly, there is a strong bond between the
political and economic spheres.
One definitely should try to derive a common denominator for both
states; however, this does not imply that the situation in the two countries
is identical. The distinctions are not only numerous, but also qualitative.
If we divide transformation into several stages, the first stage will
include the development of a foundation for the market economy and
democratic system. Poland passed that stage long ago, and the basis of its
market economy and its democratic system has become irreversible,
while the transformation, at least in the principal sphere, has been
completed, by virtue of Poland’s accession to the European Union. The
current phase is characterised by the creation of institutional frameworks
ensuring the complete integration of Poland into the EU.
From this perspective, Ukraine is still at the initial stage, which
includes the development of a foundation for the market economy and
democratic state.
The major problem of the state is the lack of explicit delimitations
between that which lies within the state’s competence and that which
should belong to the market sphere. Such peculiar interweaving, with the
state constantly playing a dominant role not only with regard to resources,
is unacceptable in a developed society.
Proceeding to somewhat selective quantitative illustrations, we would
like to divide them into two groups. The first, more generic group relates
to the standing of Poland and Ukraine in the global economy, i.e. it
demonstrates how free and business-friendly the market economy
presently is; the second group demonstrates the ranking of the states in
the process of transformation and democratization among 29 states in
transition to a market economy (European post-socialist states and post-
Soviet states). The paramount or, to be more precise, the most ponderous
and widely used indicator in the first group is the index of economic
freedom annually published by the World Bank. It covers a great number
of states and includes 150-180 states of the total number into the
calculations depending on the year.
It includes all post-socialist states; however, for the purposes of the analysis
given below, we will limit ourselves to Poland and Ukraine (Table 4.1).
CHAPTER 4. National economy convergence mechanisms… 411
Table 4.1
POLAND AND UKRAINE RANKING
FROM THE INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM
State 2005* 2006 2007
Poland 54 74 75
Ukraine 124 132 128
* The 2005 Ranking relates to only 155 states. Doing Business 2006, 2007, page 110.
Source: Doing Business 2006, 2007, page 8.
If we recognise the index as an important illustration pertaining to the
development opportunities for a market economy, we may formulate
certain conclusions. Distinctions between Poland and Ukraine in the
sphere of economic freedom are gigantic; however, this does not imply
that, with Poland’s preponderance, this sphere is satisfactory in Poland.
Quite the opposite, the data referred to above is not sufficient for a more
profound analysis; however, it still demonstrates that the ranking
achieved may both improve and deteriorate.
In this context, one should pay attention to a more general issue: there
is no simple relation between economic maturity measured, for instance,
by GDP per capita and the degree of economic freedom. For example,
Lithuania and Estonia rank higher than Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands, or Austria. However, for a state with the legacy of a social
system the issue of acquiring a broad sphere of economic freedom is
primarily related to the degree of business development, business
creativeness and foreign ties, both economic/technical and ideological.
This can be illustrated by one indicator that is extremely important for
entrepreneurs — the taxation system. The Paying Taxes, 2008, report has
been drafted for 178 states; Poland and Ukraine rank 125 and 177
respectively. Poland ranks 26 among EU countries.
The above mentioned information is a certain illustration of this
sphere of the market economy, which interests entrepreneurs. It is
important for the solidification of the foundation for the market economy
and business development, while its imperfection contributes to the
transition of large and medium-sized businessmen to the shadow sphere.
We would like to review the indices of systemic transformation and
democracy for 1989—2006 (Kondratowicz, Postępska, 2007). However,
first, one should be warned about two things. As in any index analysis,
the range of data is not only limited, but also, which is extremely
important, selective. At the same time, it is suitable for general
description, which is important for comprehending what is going on in
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one state as compared to other states and how such state perceives this.
This does not imply that every state must develop by the same trajectory,
since two important and isolated factors determine its specific nature. The
first factor is the size of the state; the second factor is the state’s historic
traditions and cultural system.
It is a universally recognised fact that a large state should have a
development strategy different from that of a small one for two reasons:
the economy of a small state, as it arises from its nature, has or should
have a more open nature of the economy as compared to that of a large
state. The former is generally forced to ensure something defined as
«cost-efficient minimal economic independence». However, on the other
hand, a large state is characterized by a significantly greater regional
differentiation than a small one. Therefore, it should also adopt a certain
strategy for its regional policy to reduce distinctions, which will lead to a
greater influence of the state, or let the market tackle the issues.
However, the state’s historic traditions and its cultural system are
important as well. To a certain extent, the past shapes not only the present,
but also the future. The cultural system, which constitutes a particular
conglomerate of homogeneity or ethnic differentiation and the level of
tolerance, also essentially impacts domestic policy. The latter has the strong
support of the democratic system and market economy, particularly with
regard to its openness. However, the inhibition of the pace of changes by the
former elite and administration may be great or restricted (Sztompka, 2005).
We would like to go back to the previously mentioned ranking related
to transformation and democracy. The annexes following Section 4.1
present extended components of the ranking.
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index is one of a number of
rankings and is distinctive from the others in the allotted values.
However, all the assessments demonstrate a similar conclusion:
distinctions between Poland and Ukraine, both in the democracy status
and market economy, are rather critical (Table 4.2). If we apply a
quantitative assessment, we will see that relevant values for Poland are
twice as high as those for Ukraine. If we analysed relevant data over a
longer time span, we would see that Ukraine has made a better relative
progress than Poland. This is the first conclusion.
One may also arrive at the following conclusion, which does not
result from a more general review. Two states, which differ in terms of
the maturity of their democratic and market institutions, may cooperate
economically. Economic cooperation between states with mature market
and democratic institutions is more stable and transparent, as well as, to a
lesser degree, dependent on the volatile political climate; however, this
does not mean that economy-wise it will always be more effective.
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Table 4.2
BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX (BTI). VALUES
FOR THE MANAGEMENT INDICES AND TRANSFORMATION STATUS,
INCLUDING COMPONENTS (2005*)
Ranking Countries Status of Democracy Status of Market Economy Status Index
7 Poland 9.26 8.61 7
13 Ukraine 6.96 6.82 13
* 28 post-socialist states, all European post-socialist states, post-Soviet states and
Mongolia have been analyzed.
Source: Kondratowicz, Postępska, 2007, page 86.
4.1.4. The Economy and Economic Structure
There are two ways to present the economic ties between Poland and
Ukraine. The first one demonstrates the sphere of relations which
primarily goes through the channels of foreign trade and other forms of
relations that are not always statistically covered. The nature of such
connections may be analysed through the lens of potential opportunities,
which are deeply solidified in these economies.
In any case, the reference point would be an attempt at elaborating on
the economic and human potential of interaction between states and,
furthermore, on the place in the global system of relations.
Paramount indicators from this perspective are presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
ECONOMIC-DEMOGRAPHIC POTENTIAL OF POLAND AND UKRAINE (2005)
Ref
No. Indicator Poland Ukraine
1 Territory, square kilometres 312,685 603,628
2 Population, thousands 38,161 47,075
3 GDP, billion USD (2004) 252.7 65
4 GDP per capita, USD (at current prices), 2004 6,618 1,384
5 GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, 2004 13,089 6,571
6
Share in world trade, %:
Import
Export
1.0
0.9
0.4
0.4
7 Import per capita, USDExport per capita, USD
2,660.8
2,342.1
767.6
727.1
Source: International Statistical Yearbook 2006, GUS, Warsaw 2007.
The presented values give a statistical picture reproducing the state of
affairs over a period of one year, however, not disclosing the past and
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thus, not permitting anticipation of the future. Still, the picture is
important for more general contemplations.
From the theoretical perspective, one may assume that middle-sized
neighbouring countries have or should have extensive and deep economic
ties. In fact, such states never have entirely open economies, since they
have to develop sufficiently extensive contacts to specialise in the most
effective spheres under existing conditions; and, furthermore, to sweeten
the offer for their own producers and, finally, consumers, in order to
interact in current innovative and possibly, future undertakings.
Theoretical opportunities are not always related to practical decisions.
We may explicitly see this if we review the Polish-Ukrainian experience.
The countries have a common border: for Poland this is the second
longest border (after the border with the Czech Republic), while for
Ukraine it is the fifth longest border after the ones with Russia, Moldova,
Belarus and Romania. The border has no effect on the intensity of
economic ties, at least official ones.
Ukraine’s share of imports and exports in Polish foreign trade amounts to
1% and 3.6 % respectively (data for 2006); while in 2005, imports from Poland
and exports to Poland amounted to 3.2 % and 2.8 % respectively. Thus,
analysing the values, one can reach the conclusion that the values are small and
very unsatisfactory. In the past ten years, the values changed by a fraction of a
percent. However, if we had additional data about small-scale cross-border
trade and about shadow transactions, the above share would possibly have been
slightly larger. One should also take into account several hundred thousand
citizens of Ukraine working legally, semi-legally or illegally in Poland.
However, even that will not essentially affect official statistics.
In view of the above, it is natural to enquire: what are the reasons for
such a weak interaction of the Polish and Ukrainian economies? The
answer to this question is of paramount importance not only for the
present, but also and, first and foremost, for the future.
After considering the issue from a broader perspective, we can
ascertain that the answer is associated with three major circumstances.
The first pertains to the past and is related to the system of ties
developed under socialism.
The second pertains to the transformation process, forms and, first and
foremost, consequences in the social and economic sphere; the third is an
effect of the economic development level and the lines of the re-
orientation of economic ties under the new conditions.
Under socialist economy conditions, Ukraine was not a sovereign
state, but rather functioned as an integral part of the Soviet Union. This
affected both the nature of its ties and the legacy of its economic
structure. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation did not
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bring any changes to the key lines of its ties. This was different for
Poland, which, while initiating the transformation, made resolute steps
towards a major reorientation of its foreign ties (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4
KEY PARTNERS IN THE FOREIGN TRADE OF POLAND AND UKRAINE
Country Year First Partner Imports Exports
1985 USSR 34.4 28.4
1990 Germany 20.1 25.1
1995 Germany 26.6 38.3
Poland
2005 Germany 24.7 28.2
1995 Russia 53.3 43.4
Ukraine
2005 Russia 37.1 17.6
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade, 2007, p. 35; International Statistics
Yearbook, 2006, 2007, page 48.
With the start of the transformation, export-import relations between
Poland and Ukraine changed completely, since Poland reduced its
commercial ties with post-Soviet states to a minimum. In 2005, the share
of imports from the states of the former USSR amounted to 12.4 %, while
exports amounted to 7.3 %. There may be a number of interpretations as
to the sudden restriction of commercial ties. From Poland’s standpoint,
the old international division of labour was entirely destroyed. While for
Ukraine, just like in the past, such ties have been maintained, even though
in past years they were indeed subjected to some essential modifications.
In this context, it is possible to formulate the following conclusion: the
nature of foreign relations always influences domestic decisions. If foreign
relations are of a fully market nature, they influence or can influence the
nature of market transformations in the domestic economy. Therefore, the
reorientation of economic relations plays a crucial role in transformation.
We previously partially covered the forms of transformation in Poland
and Ukraine; however, we still need to emphasise that, firstly, the
institutional and legal order corresponding to the needs of the market
economy was established in Poland long ago, which, unfortunately, is not
the case for Ukraine. Secondly, in both cases the state has a considerable
impact on the economy; however, there are qualitative distinctions
between Poland and Ukraine from this perspective.
The answer to the third question is the most challenging. The answer is
made up of two different components. The first component is more of a
theoretical nature; the second component is more related to the real sphere.
The first component relates to the cooperation between the economies
differing in their development levels. If as a criterion we take an economic
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indicator measured, for instance, by GDP per capita, i.e. the most reasonable
indicator measured by purchasing power parity, we will see that the difference
between Poland and Ukraine is twofold. In fact, such type of distinction does
not indicate that no cooperation, first and foremost a profitable one, is possible.
The practice of many states demonstrates that such cooperation may become
and often becomes a factor stimulating economic development. However, this
would require that at least two conditions have to be met.
The first relates to the type of economy, i.e. how imitative and
innovative the economy is. Generally, a more developed economy is the
most innovative, while a less developed economy may not take advantage
of its innovativeness. Unfortunately, from this perspective both our
economies are of an imitative nature. If we accept research and
development related costs as one of the critical measurements, we will
see that in the past ten years such costs never exceeded 1 % of the GDP;
thus, modernization was primarily a product of external factors.
The second condition relates to the structure of exchange between the
countries. If we look at the structure of imports and exports between
Poland and Ukraine from this perspective, we will see that it is to the least
degree pro-developmental (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5
STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE
TO POLAND AND EXPORTS TO UKRAINE (2006)
Indicator Imports, USDthousands %
Exports, USD
thousands %
Total 1,319,438 100 3,967,792 100
Food and live animals 64,921 4.9 193,840 4.9
Beverages and tobacco 1,695 0.1 7,994 0.2
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 258,558 19.6 33,910 0.8
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related
materials 121,684 9.2 147,221 3.7
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and
waxes 36,010 2.7 2,057 0.05
Chemicals and related products 171,094 12.9 495,446 12.5
Manufactured goods classified
chiefly by material 588,693 44.6 1,202,896 30.3
Machinery and transport equipment 54,207 4.1 1,449,140 36.5
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 21,681 1.6 435,071 10.9
Source: Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics 2007, page 129.
The commodity pattern of imports and exports demonstrates that this
exchange, irrespective of low values, does not seem to have been, at least
for Poland, a significant stimulus for economic development.
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4.1.5. What Awaits in the Future?
It is not easy to give a specific answer to a question formulated in such a
manner, since anticipating the future includes not only extrapolation
based upon existing tendencies, but also changes that may occur.
Outlining mutual economic and political relations between Poland and
Ukraine is complicated, since the conditionality of such cooperation has
not been explicitly outlined yet. The preceding years do not permit an
outline of explicit directions for changes, particularly those pertaining to
the opportunity for enhanced cooperation. The previous restricted
economic relations and more or less incidental political cooperation do
not create an adequate basis for extrapolating future tendencies.
Under certain conditions, close economic cooperation may obviously
be intensified. The identification of both threats and opportunities for the
two states is important.
The starting point is the identification of threats or, more specifically,
obstacles limiting opportunities for cooperation.
The nature of the major obstacles is institutional and legal, as well as,
to a lesser extent, economic. In fact, Poland’s and Ukraine’s economic
structures are only complementary in nature; nonetheless, the
opportunities for creating conditions for such cooperation are always a
by-product of political will. One can distinguish between four groups of
conditions that create potential opportunities for developing economic
cooperation.
We shall name the groups according to the hierarchy of their
significance. The first group is related to the institutional and legal order.
Such order should be distinctive in the following: stability of legal
decisions, transparency of the rules of the game and, first and foremost, a
great degree of economic freedom, including for foreign capital.
The second group pertains to the climate for economic cooperation
developed by the government. This is of essential significance, since,
depending on whether such climate is negative or positive, it will either
attract or repel potential contractors.
The third condition relates to the attractiveness of co-initiatives.
Fundamentally speaking, with the potentials that Poland and Ukraine
represent or, to be more specific, may represent, there is a rather great
prospect for the development of interrelations between the countries.
The fourth one, in our opinion, is the most challenging one, as it is
associated with the need for a rather essential re-orientation of foreign
trade. Such re-orientation is not possible at this stage for two reasons:
Poland is a member of the European Union and another re-orientation is
impossible and, furthermore, impractical. The question as to the extent of
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Poland’s unutilized export capacities remains open. There is no
comprehensive information on this matter. However, there is another,
even more important reason. Poland, as previously, does not have
technological potential that would allow it to essentially modernise
Ukraine’s economy.
Thus, one should think that the economic cooperation will develop
gradually, with more and more previously unengaged industries involved.
Annex І
POLAND
Ref. No. Indicator Measurement units Scale
1 GDP, constant prices National currency Billion
2 GDP, constant prices Annual growth —
3 GDP at official exchange rate National currency Billion
4 GDP at official exchange rate USD Billion
5 GDP, deflator Index —
6 GDP per capita, constant prices National currency —
7 GDP per capita, constant prices National currency —
8 GDP per capita, constant prices USD —
9 GDP (PPP) USD Billion
10 GDP (PPP) per capita USD —
11 GDP (PPP) per capita, % ofglobal Percent —
12 Exchange rate (PPP)
National currency
exchange rate against the
USD
—
13 Inflation, annual consumerprices Index, 2000 = 100 —
14 Inflation, annual consumerprices Annual changes, % —
15 Inflation, end-of-periodconsumer prices Index, 2000 = 100 —
16 Inflation, end-of-periodconsumer prices Annual changes, % —
17 Population Persons Million
18 Current account balance USD Billion
19 Current account balance % GDP —
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Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1 554.36 514.51 478.56 488.29 509.22
2 3.80 –7.20 –7.00 2.00 4.30
3 9.63 58.98 85.14 120.93 163.97
4 66.90 62.08 80.45 88.71 90.37
5 1.74 11.46 17.79 24.77 32.20
6 14,651.00 13,471.45 12,495.00 12,715.80 13,221.31
7 254.41 1,543.96 2,223.02 3,149.08 4,257.26
8 1,767.95 1,625.24 2,100.56 2,310.23 2,346.24
9 234.75 226.33 217.84 227.38 242.60
10 6,204.06 5,924.82 5,687.59 5,921.23 6,298.80
11 0.93 0.84 0.77 0.77 0.79
12 0.04 0.26 0.39 0.53 0.68
13 1.44 9.87 16.80 24.03 32.51
14 251.10 585.80 70.30 43.00 35.30
15 6.14 11.46 18.38 26.54 36.55
16 27.70 86.50 60.30 44.40 37.70
17 37.84 38.20 38.30 38.40 38.52
18 –1.23 1.19 –0.29 0.86 –1.16
19 –1,80 1.90 –0.40 1.00 –1.30
Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 535.90 571.95 607.64 650.70 683.11
2 5.20 6.70 6.20 7.10 5.00
3 235.64 337.22 422.44 515.35 600.90
4 103.68 139.10 156.66 157.08 172.00
5 43.97 58.96 69.52 79.20 87.97
6 13,885.09 14,819.36 15,731.99 16,835.80 17,668.17
7 6,105.40 8,737.45 10,937.03 13,333.97 15,541.84
8 2,686.41 3,603.96 4,056.01 4,064.24 4,448.53
9 260.74 283.97 307.41 334.67 355.24
10 6,755.63 7,357.70 7,958.90 8,659.06 9,187.94
11 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.89
12 0.90 1.19 1.37 1.54 1.69
13 42.98 54.96 65.90 75.71 84.65
14 32.20 27.90 19.90 14.90 11.80
15 47.38 57.62 68.28 77.29 83.94
16 29.70 21.60 18.50 13.20 8.60
17 38.60 38.60 38.62 38.65 38.66
18 5.48 0.85 –3.26 –5.74 –6.90
19 5.30 0.60 –2.10 –3.70 –4.00
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Continuation of Annex І
Indicator 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 714.02 744.38 753.35 764.22 793.77
2 4.50 4.30 1.20 1.40 3.90
3 665.60 744.40 779.50 808.60 843.10
4 167.76 171.27 190.41 198.21 216.80
5 93.22 100.00 103.47 105.81 106.21
6 18,489.05 19,357.72 19,696.30 19,989.91 20,776.89
7 17,216.63 19,358.30 20,380.10 21,150.74 22,068.05
8 4,339.42 4,453.87 4,978.16 5,184.64 5,674.63
9 376.68 401.26 415.83 429.20 455.28
10 9,743.41 10,434.74 10,871.96 11,226.67 11,916.91
11 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.87
12 1.77 1.86 1.88 1.88 1.85
13 90.83 100.00 105.50 107.51 108.37
14 7.30 10.10 5.50 1.90 0.80
15 92.17 100.00 103.60 104.43 106.20
16 9.80 8.50 3.60 0.80 1.70
17 38.66 38.45 38.25 38.23 38.21
18 –12.49 –9.98 –5.38 –5.01 –4.60
19 –7.40 –5.80 –2.80 –2.50 –2.10
Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 836.19 866.44 919.55 980.24 1,032.10
2 5.30 3.60 6.10 6.60 5.30
3 924.54 983.30 1,057.86 1,158.87 1,251.26
4 253.02 303.98 340.97 413.31 444.24
5 110.57 113.49 115.04 118.22 121.24
6 21,900.06 22,702.15 24,109.06 25,751.68 27,168.37
7 24,213.84 25,764.20 27,735.16 30,444.50 32,937.50
8 6,626.67 7,964.70 8,939.62 10,858.06 11,693.94
9 493.40 527.77 577.80 631.83 676.60
10 12,922.23 13,828.36 15,148.96 16,596.77 17,815.82
11 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85
12 1.87 1.86 1.83 1.83 1.85
13 112.15 114.53 115.71 118.21 121.42
14 3.50 2.10 1.00 2.20 2.70
15 110.88 111.65 113.22 116.22 119.84
16 4.40 0.70 1.40 2.70 3.10
17 38.18 38.17 38.14 38.07 37.99
18 –10.68 –5.11 –7.97 –15.14 –22.73
19 –4.20 –1.70 –2.30 –3.70 –5.10
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Annex II
UKRAINE
Ref. No. Indicator Measurement unit Scale
1 GDP, constant prices National currency Billion
2 GDP, constant prices Annual growth —
3 GDP at official exchange rate National currency Billion
4 GDP at official exchange rate USD Billion
5 GDP, deflator Index —
6 GDP per capita, constant prices National currency —
7 GDP per capita, constant prices National currency —
8 GDP per capita, constant prices USD —
9 GDP (PPP) USD Billion
10 GDP (PPP) per capita USD —
11 GDP (PPP) per capita, % ofglobal Percent —
12 Exchange rate (PPP) National currency exchangerate against USD —
13 Inflation, end-of-periodconsumer prices Index, 2000 = 100 —
14 Inflation, end-of-periodconsumer prices Annual changes, % —
15 Inflation, end-of-periodconsumer prices Index, 2000 = 100 —
16 Inflation, end-of-periodconsumer prices Annual changes, % —
17 Population Persons Million
18 Current account balance USD Billion
19 Current account balance % GDP —
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1 N/A* N/A N/A 206.49 177.12 136.48
2 N/A N/A N/A N/A –14.20 –22.90
3 N/A N/A N/A 0.05 1.48 12.04
4 N/A N/A N/A 20.78 29.66 36.48
5 N/A N/A N/A 0.02 0.84 8.82
6 N/A N/A N/A 3,966.76 3,390.20 2,629.72
7 N/A N/A N/A 0.97 28.38 231.94
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Continuation of Annex ІІ
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
8 N/A N/A N/A 399.27 567.62 702.85
9 N/A N/A N/A 332.65 291.91 229.72
10 N/A N/A N/A 6,390.15 5,587.47 4,426.22
11 N/A N/A N/A 1.13 0.95 0.71
12 N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.01 0.05
13 N/A N/A N/A 0.01 0.58 5.78
14 N/A N/A N/A N/A* 4,734.9 891.20
15 N/A N/A N/A 0.03 2.56 12.83
16 N/A N/A N/A N/A 10,155.00 401.10
17 N/A N/A N/A 52.06 52.24 51.90
18 N/A N/A N/A –0.82 –0.85 –1.16
19 N/A N/A N/A –3.00 –2.90 –3.20
Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 119.90 107.86 104.63 102.59 102.36 108.35 118.27
2 –12.20 –10.00 –3.00 –1.90 –0.20 5.90 9.20
3 54.52 81.52 93.37 102.59 130.44 170.07 204.19
4 37.02 44.60 50.15 41.89 31.57 31.26 38.01
5 45.47 75.58 89.23 100.00 127.43 156.96 172.65
6 2,328.11 2,110.67 2,067.83 2,043.69 2,051.36 2,214.72 2,440.68
7 1,058.57 1,595.28 1,845.16 2,043.69 2,614.07 3,476.27 4,213.83
8 718.89 872.74 991.09 834.5 632.64 639.00 784.38
9 205.94 188.76 186.17 184.57 186.82 202.05 225.84
10 3,998.74 3,693.99 3,679.25 3,676.61 3,743.82 4,130.03 4,660.58
11 0.60 0.52 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.48
12 0.27 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.70 0.84 0.90
13 27.53 49.62 57.50 63.58 78.00 100.00 111.96
14 376.40 80.20 15.90 10.60 22.70 28.20 12.00
15 36.11 50.46 55.56 66.67 79.48 100.00 108.12
16 181.40 39.70 10.10 20.00 19.20 25.80 6.10
17 51.50 51.10 50.60 50.20 49.90 48.92 48.46
18 –1.15 –1.18 –1.34 –1.30 1.66 1.48 1.40
19 –3.10 –2.70 –2.70 –3.10 5.30 4.70 3.70
* N/A — no data is available.
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Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1 124.43 136.33 152.80 156.92 168.06 179.32 189.10
2 5.20 9.60 12.10 2.70 7.10 6.70 5.40
3 225.81 267.34 345.11 441.45 537.67 662.54 767.39
4 42.39 50.13 64.88 86.14 106.47 131.20 151.96
5 181.48 196.10 225.86 281.32 319.92 369.47 405.82
6 2,592.03 2,862.72 3,231.71 3,343.78 3,602.95 3,867.72 4,103.27
7 4,704.03 5,613.82 7,299.22 9,406.71 11,526.54 14,289.99 16,651.88
8 883.12 1,052.72 1,372.29 1,835.46 2,282.48 2,829.70 3,297.40
9 241.75 270.51 311.90 330.67 365.33 399.87 428.97
10 5,036.00 5,680.26 6,596.76 7,046.08 7,831.91 8,624.46 9,308.48
11 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52
12 0.93 0.99 1.11 1.34 1.47 1.66 1.79
13 112.81 118.68 129.41 146.90 160.16 178.50 197.77
14 0.80 5.20 9.00 13.50 9.00 11.50 10.80
15 105.52 114.22 128.16 141.48 157.92 175.29 193.86
16 –0.60 8.20 12.20 10.40 11.60 11.50 10.60
17 48.00 47.62 47.28 46.93 46.65 46.36 46.08
18 3.17 2.89 6.91 2.53 –1.62 –4.53 –9.40
19 7.50 5.80 10.60 2.90 –1.50 –3.50 –6.20
Annex III
BERTELSMANN TRANSFORMATION INDEX (BTI), MANAGEMENT INDEX
AND STATUS INDEX, INCLUDING COMPONENTS, 2005
Ref.
No. Country Region S SІ Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
1 Slovenia 1 9.45 9.55 9.8 10.0 9.5 9.5 9.0
2 Estonia 1 9.29 9.40 9.3 9.8 9.5 10.0 8.5
3 CzechRepublic 1 9.23 9.45 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.5 8.8
4 Hungary 1 9.16 9.40 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.5 8.5
5 Slovakia 1 9.06 9.20 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.5 7.5
6 Lithuania 1 9.02 9.25 10.0 10.0 9.3 9.5 7.5
7 Poland 1 8.90 9.20 9.80 9.8 9.3 9.5 7.8
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Ref.
No. Country Region S SІ Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
8 Croatia 1 8.71 9.10 9.5 10.0 8.3 9.5 8.3
9 Latvia 1 8.20 8.30 8.8 9.5 8.5 8.5 6.3
10 Bulgaria 1 7.98 8.45 9.3 9.3 7.8 9.0 7.0
11 Romania 1 7.89 8.20 9.3 9.0 7.3 8.5 7.0
12 Macedonia 1 7.08 7.55 8.0 9.0 7.0 8.0 5.8
13 Ukraine 6 6.96 7.10 8.0 7.8 7.0 6.5 6.3
14 Serbia 1 6.95 7.40 8.8 8.5 6.8 7.0 6.0
15 Bosnia andHerzegovina 1 6.61 6.80 7.0 8.5 6.5 7.0 5.0
16 Albania 1 6.61 7.25 8.0 8.0 5.5 7.5 7.3
17 Mongolia 6 6.29 7.05 8.5 6.8 6.3 7.5 6.3
18 Armenia 6 6.26 6.10 8.8 6.0 4.3 6.0 5.5
19 Russia 6 6.14 5.70 7.5 6.0 4.8 5.5 4.8
20 Georgia 6 5.73 6.10 5.3 7.5 6.5 7.0 4.3
21 Kazakhstan 6 5.48 4.18 8.5 2.8 4.0 2.0 3.7
22 Moldova 6 5.06 5.40 6.5 6.8 4.8 4.5 4.5
23 Kyrgyzstan 6 4.76 4.08 7.3 3.8 3.8 2.0 3.7
24 Azerbaijan 6 4.51 3.80 6.8 3.0 4.3 2.0 3.0
25 Belarus 6 4.47 3.97 8.3 3.0 3.3 2.0 3.3
26 Tajikistan 6 3.50 3.60 5.8 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.0
27 Uzbekistan 6 3.46 3.13 6.8 1.8 2.5 2.0 2.7
28 Turkmenistan 6 3.20 2.58 7.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.7
Note: Region 1 — East-Central and Southeast Europe
Region 6 — Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia
S — status index
SІ — democratic development status
Q1 — statehood
Q2 — political participation
Q3 — rule of law
Q4 — stability of democratic institutions
Q5 — political and social integration
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№
з/п Country SII Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
1 Slovenia 9.36 10.0 9.0 10.0 9.5 9.5 8.0 9.5
2 Estonia 9.18 8.0 9.8 10.0 10.0 8.5 9.0 9.0
3 CzechRepublic 9.00 9.0 10.0 9.5 9.5 9.0 8.0 8.0
4 Hungary 8.93 9.0 10.0 8.5 10.0 8.5 8.0 8.5
5 Slovakia 8.93 9.0 9.0 9.5 10.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
6 Lithuania 8.79 8.0 9.5 10.0 10.0 7.5 9.0 7.5
7 Poland 8.61 8.0 9.8 9.5 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
8 Croatia 8.32 8.0 8.8 9.5 8.5 8.0 8.0 7.5
9 Latvia 8.11 7.0 9.3 9.0 9.5 7.5 8.0 6.5
10 Bulgaria 7.50 6.0 8.5 9.0 8.5 7.5 7.0 6.0
11 Romania 7.57 6.0 8.0 9.0 8.5 7.5 8.0 6.0
12 Macedonia 6.61 6.0 6.8 9.0 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.0
13 Ukraine 6.82 6.0 6.8 8.5 6.5 6.5 8.0 5.5
14 Serbia 6.50 6.0 6.0 8.5 6.0 7.0 7.0 5.0
15 Bosnia andHerzegovina 6.43 6.0 7.0 8.5 6.0 5.5 7.0 5.0
16 Albania 5.96 5.0 6.3 8.0 6.0 5.5 7.0 4.0
17 Mongolia 5.54 3.0 6.3 8.5 6.5 4.5 6.0 4.0
18 Armenia 6.43 4.0 6.5 9.0 7.0 5.5 8.0 5.0
19 Russia 6.57 6.0 6.0 9.5 5.5 5.5 9.0 4.5
20 Georgia 5.36 4.0 4.5 9.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 5.0
21 Kazakhstan 6.79 6.0 6.5 9.0 7.0 5.0 9.0 5.0
22 Moldova 4.71 3.0 5.0 6.5 5.5 4.0 5.0 4.0
23 Kyrgyzstan 5.43  4.0 5.0 8.5 6.5 5.0 5.0 4.0
24 Azerbaijan 5.21 5.0 5.0 7.0 5.0 4.5 6.0 4.0
25 Belarus 4.96 7.0 4.8 3.5 2.5 7.0 5.0 5.0
26 Tajikistan 3.39 2.0 3.8 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 2.5
27 Uzbekistan 3.79  4.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 3.0
28 Turkmenistan 3.82  4.0 1.8 3.5 2.5 4.0 8.0 3.0
Note: SII — market economic development status
Q6 — level of socioeconomic development
Q7 — organization of the market
Q8 — currency and price stability
Q9 — private property
Q10 — welfare regime
Q11 — economic performance
Q12 — sustainability
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Management Index М
Ref No. Country
Value Ranking
1 Slovenia 7.41 1
2 Estonia 7.29 3
3 Czech Republic 6.95 5
4 Hungary 6.81 7
5 Slovakia 7.32 2
6 Lithuania 7.00 4
7 Poland 6.36 10
8 Croatia 6.88 6
9 Latvia 6.78 8
10 Bulgaria 6.51 9
11 Romania 6.33 11
12 Macedonia 5.54 14
13 Ukraine 4.69 19
14 Serbia 5.31 16
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.69 18
16 Albania 5.32 15
17 Mongolia 6.31 12
18 Armenia 5.08 17
19 Russia 3.84 23
20 Georgia 5.91 13
21 Kazakhstan 4.13 22
22 Moldova 3.50 24
23 Kyrgyzstan 4.17 21
24 Azerbaijan 3.50 25
25 Belarus 2.74 26
26 Tajikistan 4.48 20
27 Uzbekistan 2.17 27
28 Turkmenistan 1.83 28
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005.
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4.2. The Strategic Partnership and Bi-Lateral Economic Relations of
Ukraine and Poland
4.2.1. Introduction
The dynamic processes of intensifying globalisation and internalization
of the economic life objectively actualise issues related to the
development of a scientifically justified foreign economic strategy and
policy of Ukraine, as well as an effective mechanism for the gradual
and well-balanced inclusion of the national economy into the global
economic system. The system of measures, aimed at achieving this
strategic goal, includes both domestic market transformations intended
for Ukraine to master the scientific-technological model of economic
development and to enforce high social standards and to realise the
potential of foreign economic ties by enhancing and diversifying
cooperation with regional unions and countries — strategic partners in
the West and East. Poland, cooperation with which serves as a catalyst
for Ukraine’s implantation into the European economic area, is special
among these states.
4.2.2. The Asymmetry of Trade Cooperation
and Tools for its Elimination
The current level and, even more so, potential possibilities for economic
cooperation between Ukraine and Poland are sufficiently large-scale and
multi-faceted, enabling the pursuit of national economic interests of both
states in the international arena.
It is a well-known fact that the position of any country in the system
of international and regional labor division, to a great extent is
conditional upon the scope and pattern of its foreign trade exchange,
since foreign trade specifically mediates practically all types of
international labor division and enhances interaction between entities of
the global economy. Furthermore, foreign trade becomes even more
important to Ukraine, since its lop-sided, narrow-field, raw material
export specialisation, causing the dependence of foreign trade upon the
effect of external factors (primarily price fluctuations in the global
markets), renders any normal process of the reproduction of social
product in the country impossible. Furthermore, the prevalence of energy-
and material-intensive products in exports not only enhances the
dependence of Ukrainian export production on the supply of imported
energy carriers (primarily from the Russian Federation), but also
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considerably reduces the significance of exports as a source of currency
proceedings due to the flow of currency beyond state borders through
external debt service channels. Finally, conditional upon the creation of a
powerful export potential, foreign trade is a significant lever for the
restoration of Ukraine’s national economy and a key source of currency
proceedings for the purchase of critical import goods.
The destructive consequences of Ukraine’s primarily unilateral
dependence upon foreign trade constitute a significant argument in favor
of geography and commodity diversification of export-import
transactions, as well as the intensification of its regional trade. Among
neighbouring countries, a special place belongs to Poland, which has been
an important trading partner of Ukraine among the new member-states of
the EU. Inquiring into the role of Ukrainian-Polish trade relations in the
geography of Ukraine’s export-import transactions, we can arrive at a
conclusion about the traditional orientation of Ukraine’s foreign trade and
the legacy of being part of the USSR’s national economy. As the data in
Table 4.6 illustrates, unbalanced foreign trade is typical of Ukraine. For
instance, even though the share of the CIS states in foreign trade turnover,
exports and imports in 1996—2010 had a tendency to decline from
59.0 %, 56.8 % and 61.3 % to 40.2 %, 38.6 % and 41.8 % respectively, it
still remains unjustifiably large and demonstrates a considerable
asymmetry of the geographical pattern of Ukraine’s trade relations, with
the explicit predominance of Russia, which in 2010 accounted for over
32 % of Ukraine’s foreign trade turnover, 29.4 % of exports and 34.7 %
of imports (the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine). Also, there
remains a chronic deficit in Ukraine’s foreign trade with CIS states: in
1996—2010, the negative balance «increased» from USD 638.8 million
to USD 3.287 b. At the same time, the weakness of Ukraine’s positions
on CIS markets is partially offset by its positive balance in the trade with
the countries of Asia and Africa, which in 2010 amounted to USD 3.5413
b and USD 2.2523 b respectively.
With regard to Ukraine’s foreign trade with EU states, the trade is
characterised by a consistent tendency to grow: from 21.4 % to nearly
30 % in Ukraine’s foreign trade turnover for the period of 1996—2010
(the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine). One should emphasise that
Ukraine prioritizes cooperation with the European Union and its
individual member-states considering that this integrated block will be
determining the key vectors of economic, technological and innovative
progress, as well as political stability in the European region for the long-
term. Under this scenario, the development of cooperation between
Ukraine and Poland may become a catalyst for the process associated
with the European integration of Ukraine.
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The objective necessity to enhance the role of Poland as Ukraine’s
foreign trading partner may be attributed to the following factors:
• First, an urgent need for Ukraine to diversify the geographical
pattern of its export-import transactions for the purpose of reducing its
dependence upon the markets of CIS counties;
• Second, prospects to develop an ample domestic market in Ukraine
and Poland in view of the geographical proximity of foreign trading
partners of the two states, which would significantly enhance the potential
for regional trade, to the extent that the mechanism of inter-state foreign
trade exchange is improved;
• Third, opportunities for Ukraine to significantly expand the segment
of domestic products on the markets of Western Europe states via Poland,
as well as to seek support of the neighbouring state in the pursuance of its
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Poland, on the other hand, is also interested in intensifying trading
cooperation with Ukraine. Even though Poland prioritizes economic ties
with the countries of the European Union in terms of trade relations, the
provision of technological assistance, financial resources of the EU
foundations and the utilisation of foreign managerial experience, the
promotion of Poland’s national economic interests is essentially conditional
upon the effectiveness of developing stable, reciprocal and long-term
economic relations with East-European countries. Ukraine is special among
the latter; a number of factors contribute to such interest in Ukraine. First,
Polish trade is characterised by an extremely high and constantly growing
share of EU countries, which presently account for about 80 % of Poland’s
exports and 70 % of imports (the Central Statistical Office of Poland). On
one hand, the current geographical pattern of Poland’s foreign trade is
entirely natural, since regional integration in the European Union is
characterized not only by the elimination of internal barriers to the
development of foreign economic relations between its member-states and
coordination of various lines of economic policy, but also by the
coordinated development of the principal spheres of interstate cooperation.
On the other hand, Poland did not demonstrate such mono-dependence
upon one regional block even in the times of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance. Therefore, presently, Poland’s economy has the
exigent task of diversifying the country’s foreign trade turnover to the
benefit of the states which are not member-states of the European Union.
Furthermore, the virtual destruction of high-technology production
facilities in Poland during the transformation period essentially restricts
Poland’s opportunities to compete in the global markets. Under such
conditions, the great capacity of the Ukrainian market, along with its
potentially high solvency, and good awareness of Polish manufacturers
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases432
about the needs of Ukrainian consumers create attractive prospects for an
increase in the volume of Polish products on the Ukrainian market.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s current role in Poland’s foreign trade and
the realization of Poland’s export potential is quite modest. This is
demonstrated by the extremely small share of Ukraine in Poland’s total
foreign trade turnover, which in 1992 - 2010 did not exceed 2 %,
including 3.5 % in Poland’s exports and 1.5 % in Poland’s imports (the
Central Statistical Office of Poland). Studying the dynamics and pattern
of the export-import transactions between Ukraine and Poland permits
one to arrive at a number of generalising conclusions.
First, there are considerable discrepancies in the statistical data related
to the foreign trade dynamics between the two states and provided by the
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine and the Central Statistical Office of
Poland (Table 4.7). This may be attributed to both different
methodological approaches to the calculation of the volumes of export-
import transactions between Poland and Ukraine and the partial
presentation of the volumes of cross-border trade or «suitcase-trade»
exchange in the Polish statistics, while relevant data remains practically
uncovered by the Ukrainian statistics. Furthermore, one should not
neglect the considerable abuse of power by employees of the Ukrainian
customs office, who fail to register the large-scale volumes of illegal and
sometimes contraband trans-border movement of consumer goods and
industrial commodities in violation of customs rules and regulations.
Second, in 1992 — 2010, the trade between Ukraine and Poland
developed unevenly. While in 1992 — 1997, the volumes of inter-state
trade gradually increased from USD 285.4 million to USD 1.6223 billion
respectively, or 5.7 times, in 1998 — 1999 the dynamic growth of the trade
turnover of the two countries was interrupted due to the financial crisis of
1998 in Russia. Consequently, the volumes of Ukrainian-Polish trade
during the period dropped from USD 1.6223 billion in 1997 to USD 1.0406
billion (or by 36 %) in 1999, including the volumes of Ukrainian exports
and Polish imports which shrank from USD 415.5 million to USD 338.4
million (or by 19 %) and from USD 1.206.8 billion to USD 702.2 million
(or by 42 %) respectively. An impetuous, as compared to that of the
exports, reduction of imports from Poland to the Ukrainian market led to a
reduction of the negative balance in the trade of goods between Poland and
Ukraine, which in 1998 amounted to USD 709.2 million and in 1999 and
2000 to USD 363.8 million and USD 328.8 million respectively. It was
only in 2000 that the trade between Poland and Ukraine stabilised and
began to gradually increase volumes: during 2000—2010 the volume of
export-import deliveries grew over 6.5 times from USD 730.4 million to
USD 4.8101 billion respectively.
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Table 4.7
INDICATOR DYNAMICS FOR FOREIGN TRADE IN GOODS BETWEEN
UKRAINE AND POLAND IN 1992-2010 (USD MILLIONS)
Turnover of
foreign trade
Exports from
Ukraine
Imports to
Ukraine
Foreign trade
balance
Year
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1992 285.4 ... 123.8 … 161.6 ... –37.8 ...
1993 388.6 199.3 201.1 122.5 187.5 76.8 13.6 45.7
1994 485.3 386.7 204.9 197.6 280.4 189.1 –75.5 8.5
1995 1,033.4 714.6 290.8 256.8 742.6 457.8 –451.8 –201.0
1996 1,396.3 873.5 418.5 362.8 977.8 510.7 –559.3 –147.9
1997 1,622.3 930.2 415.5 380.3 1,206.8 549.9 –791.3 –169.6
1998 1,463.6 796.1 377.2 317.9 1,086.4 478.2 -709.2 –160.3
1999 1,040.6 559.9 338.4 301.4 702.2 258.5 -363.8 42.9
2000 1,282.2 730.4 476.7 417.9 805.5 312.5 –328.8 105.4
2001 1,354.1 936.2 503.4 489.2 850.7 447.0 –347.3 42.0
2002 1,672.1 1,043.1 491.6 505.9 1,180.5 537.2 –688.9 –31.3
2003 2,305.8 1,565.4 744.6 763.0 1,561.2 802.4 –816.6 –39.4
2004 3,063.3 1,948.6 1,039.7 979.9 2,023.6 968.7 –983.9 11.2
2005 3,609.2 2,417.6 1,021.0 1,010.9 2,588.2 1,406.7 –1,562.2 –395.8
2006 5,299.0 3,453.6 1,371.1 1,344.5 3,927.9 2,109.1 –2,556.8 –764.6
2007 7,132.8 4,557.4 1,619.5 1,636.9 5,513.3 2,920.5 –3,893.8 –1,283.6
2008 8,709.2 6,618.6 2,266.8 2,338.3 6,442.4 4,280.3 –4,175.6 –1,942.0
2009 4,641.1 3,378.3 1,166.3 1,208.0 3,474.8 2,170.3 –2,308.5 –962.3
2010 … 4,576.0 … 1,787.2 … 2,788.8 … –1,001.6
Source: Calculated and drawn up on the basis of the data of the State Statistics
Committee of Ukraine and the Central Statistical Office of Poland.
Third, throughout the period of Ukraine’s independence, the balance
of trade between Poland and Ukraine has been developing to the
advantage of Poland. This is demonstrated, in particular, by the fact that
the volumes of total turnover of goods between the two countries
increased primarily owing to the positive dynamics of Poland’s exports to
Ukraine. For instance, as per Ukraine’s statistics, while in 1993—2010
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the exports of Ukrainian goods to Poland increased 14.6 times, Poland’s
imports to Ukraine increased over 36 times. This became an agent for a
non-parity inter-state exchange of goods and caused a chronic trade
deficit between Poland and Ukraine, which in 2010 was equal to USD
1.0016 billion.
The effectiveness of the foreign trade relations of any country and the
level of their impact on economic development, to a great extent, depend
on the commodity pattern of exports and imports. Trade between Poland
and Ukraine is characterised by an extremely narrow assortment of goods.
For instance, in the past ten years the following prevailed in the total
volumes of Ukraine’s exports to Poland: mineral commodities (on
average 49 % of the annual export volumes); ferrous and non-ferrous
industry products (22 % respectively); chemical products (13.1 %
respectively); agricultural and food-processing industry products (6 %
respectively); as well as timber and timber products (4.2 % respectively).
In the aggregate, the above mentioned groups, representing low-
technological industrial sectors of Ukraine with a low level of value
added production, account for nearly 90 % of the total volume of
Ukraine’s exports to Poland. At the same time, the share of high-
technological goods and services in Ukraine’s exports to Poland is quite
humble; in particular, the total share of products of the machine-building
industry in 1999—2010 amounted to only 2.9—3.3 % of Ukraine’s
exports to the neighbouring state. The available advantages in the
development of high-technological competitiveness were extremely
underutilised by Ukraine’s economy, since its international
competitiveness in foreign trade relations with Poland is primarily based
on the comparative advantages of the export of cheap labour and natural
resources. Under such conditions, Ukraine’s domestic exporters actively
utilize price competition in the sphere of semi-finished goods, low-value-
added and low-technological products.
With regard to the commodity pattern of Poland’s imports to Ukraine,
its active diversification in the past decades has shaped a number of lines
with the prevalence of such groups as the products of the chemical
industry and related industries, including polymeric materials and pure
rubber (on average, 20.3 % of the annual volumes of Poland’s imports in
1999—2010); agricultural and food-processing industry products (13.3 %
respectively); consumer goods industry (11.2 % respectively); furniture
and lighting equipment (6.8 % respectively). Products of the machine-
building industry, as well as their spare parts and accessories, hold the
strongest positions in Poland’s imports to Ukraine: in the above
mentioned period the share of such goods grew from 12.1 % to 26.3 % of
the total imports of commodities from Poland to Ukraine.
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This status quo, first, fundamentally impedes the inclusion of Ukraine
into the European Economic Area; second, does not correspond to the
consumer demand for imports both in Poland and in Ukraine; and, finally,
solidifies the asymmetry of the structural development of Ukraine’s
economy, hinders the development of high-technology industries and the
intellectualization process of national production as the basis of Ukraine’s
export potential.
At the same time, the non-proportionally large share of raw materials
and energy-intensive and material-intensive products in Ukraine’s exports
to Poland amid Ukraine’s dependence upon the import of energy carriers
and fickle price competition in the relevant market segments does not
permit Ukraine to enhance its trading potential without fundamentally re-
structuring its export strategy.
The factors that have recently been adversely affecting the
development of bilateral trading and economic cooperation between
Ukraine and Poland may be split into three groups. The first group
incorporates endogenous (internal) factors, which should include a
reduction in the production of key export commodities in Ukraine due to
high tax and bank loan rates; difficulties associated with value added tax
(VAT) refund to commodity exporters; weak mechanisms of the
government support of export; low competitiveness of domestic products;
imperfection of credit facilities and financial support schemes for foreign
trade transactions of Ukrainian business entities; instability of Ukraine’s
legislative framework; constant changes to tax rates and tariff rates;
imperfection of the practice of copyright protection; an organisational and
structural weakness of Ukrainian manufacturers of export-oriented
products; low marketing activity of Ukrainian enterprises (participation in
fairs and trade shows); an extremely low level of representation of
Ukrainian companies in Poland, etc.
The second group encompasses exogenous (external) factors, which
include the non-harmonization of European and Ukrainian standards,
existing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade with EU member-states, etc.
Since from the perspective of its trading relations with third countries,
Poland’s accession into the European Union implies the transfer of
competences pertaining to its trade and customs policy to the
commonwealth level, one should not neglect the fact that the problem of
the harmonization of Ukraine’s certification standards and procedures
with those of the EU remains unresolved. This factor may be the major
obstacle to the establishment of effective cooperation between the
industrial enterprises of Ukraine and European states, particularly Poland,
and thus, to a breakthrough in the status quo of the trading relations
between the two states.
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Furthermore, the problem associated with the application of quotas on
the import of ferrous industry products from Ukraine to the new member-
states of the EU remains unregulated, which may become a factor,
contributing to the loss of an essential segment of the European rolled
steel market by Ukraine, with annual losses for the Ukrainian economy
reaching USD 50 million.
The utilization of Ukraine’s foreign trade potential in its economic
cooperation with Poland requires providing systematic support for the
development of its national export potential, which would include a
system of measures implemented by Ukraine to provide technical
assistance to its exporters abroad in order to promote national economic
interests on the Polish market. This requires the application of
regulatory (normative-legal), financial and economic, as well as
organisational tools.
With regard to the regulatory methods, improving normative-legal
provisions on the support of commodities produced by Ukrainian
manufactures and marketed in Poland is presently becoming particularly
important. The ones that require immediate action include: inventorying
Ukraine’s and Poland’s normative-legal framework with regard to the
status quo in the implementation of bilateral agreements on trade and
economic cooperation; harmonizing the legislation of Ukraine pertaining
to tariff and non-tariff regulation with that of the EU, as well as
certification and currency regulation systems; gradually harmonizing the
state standards of Ukraine with international and European standards; and
activating the process of entering into an agreement on the creation of a
free trade area with the EU, etc.
The package of financial and economic measures intended to promote
the interests of Ukrainian manufacturers on the Polish market includes the
following most effective measures: the provision of financial assistance
by the state to domestic exporters through export crediting facilities; the
insurance of export crediting facilities against commercial and political
risks; the provision of government guarantees to extend credit facilities to
export-oriented production and to introduce an effective crediting system
for their current assets; the provision of government support to the
exporters of industrial commodities, first and foremost in the sectors with
competitive advantages on the global market, etc.
With the further development of financial assistance, it seems
reasonable for domestic exporters to enhance investment cooperation
between Ukrainian and Polish business entities within the framework of
specific projects designed to develop competitiveness in foreign markets
of relevant commodities; to accumulate financial resources for both
utilizing new technologies and implementing large-scale diversification
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of the production of knowledge-intensive goods; and to apply tax, duty
and tariff tools for the purpose of stimulating exporters.
Realising Ukraine’s export potential on the Polish market also
requires improving organisational support for foreign trade activities.
Relevant top-priority tasks encompass the following: providing
information and analytical support for foreign trade activities, which must
include, in particular, developing effective information networks for
foreign trade and diversifying the activities of information and
consultation services of regional and foreign missions; monitoring
Poland’s goods markets and drafting recommendations for the
enhancement of Ukraine’s export of goods; organizing an effective
system for the exchange of business information between Ukrainian and
Polish economic entities; implementing advertising, image and promotion
campaigns to gain publicity for the development of economic relations
with Ukraine; developing an effective infrastructure for the sale of goods
and services on the Polish market; facilitating the implementation of a
prospective plan pertaining to the participation of Ukrainian business
entities in trade shows and related events held in Poland, etc.
In view of the fact that presently the key channel for the promotion
of Ukrainian goods in foreign markets goes through Ukraine’s trade
and economic missions, which have the capacity to collect and process
huge bulks of initial data about demand and supply in individual
segments of foreign markets, there is a possibility of Ukraine making
a breakthrough in the Polish and European markets, provided that the
presence of Ukrainian enterprises in such markets will be pivotally
enhanced. This process includes the following critical measures:
promoting the participation of Ukrainian enterprises and firms in trade
shows and related events held in Poland; creating a ramified network
of trade representative offices of Ukraine’s large companies in Poland;
improving the performance of Ukrainian trade and economic missions,
etc.
Furthermore, there is a need to initiate an active publishing activity, to
finance the publication of materials, catalogues, newsletter and factsheets
for the creation and operation of a public information system, which
would provide exigent, available, interactive information about the
enterprises of Ukraine and their export capacities.
The above mentioned measures intended to promote the interests of
Ukrainian manufacturers on the Polish market permit not only the
enhancement of the effectiveness of trading cooperation between Ukraine
and Poland, as a key component of bilateral economic interaction at the
state level, but also to achieve a strategic goal — the integration of
Ukraine into the European Economic Area.
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4.2.3. Diversification of Investment
and Production Cooperation
The cooperation in investment and production is a critical component of
the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Poland in the economic
sphere. It plays an important, pivotal role in the promotion of their
national economic interests in the international arena by developing an
optimal model for the interaction and complementarity of the national
economic systems of the two countries and for the implantation of their
reproductive systems in the international division of labor and the global
economy, as well as by ensuring the effective utilization of international
capital flow channels by the countries.
With regard to Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in investment, first, it
may be viewed as a mechanism that, by embodying itself in specific
forms of interstate industrial cooperation, enhances cooperation of
Ukrainian and Polish enterprises in the production sphere and forms
international reproduction relations pertaining to the production of a
social product.
Second, with limited internal resources for economic development,
the engagement of foreign investment plays a critical role in dealing with
the investment slump and may be viewed as an instrument for bringing in
advanced technologies and innovations, modern management, marketing
and production organisation methods, thus it is a powerful tool for
Ukrainian production and diversification of its exports pattern, which
may bring Ukrainian-Polish economic relations to a new advanced level
of strategic partnership.
Finally, taking into account Poland’s inclusion into the
reproductive process of the EU member-states, Ukrainian-Polish
cooperation in investment and production facilitates the development
of reproductive relations between the EU, Poland and Ukraine through
participation of not only Ukrainian and Polish, but also European
entrepreneurs in the production and technological cycle. The context
opens wide prospects for Ukraine to become engaged in the
reproductive process of European Union countries through the
development of an effective model of cooperation in investment and
production with Poland.
Furthermore, motivational advantages of effective cooperation in
investment and production between Ukraine and Poland may also include
prospects of expanding Ukraine’s export of finished commodities not
only to the Polish, but also to the West European markets (first and
foremost machinery and equipment markets) by virtue of a comparatively
insignificant growth of the purchase volumes of component parts,
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elements and units. Since strengthening its positions on the global
markets through traditional trade channels is considerably complicated
for Ukraine in this present context due to escalating competition and
increasing protectionism, cooperation with Polish and Western companies
through deliveries of primarily individual component parts and elements
is more effective than the sale of finished commodities with the
utilization of trade channels.
Research in the engagement of Polish investment capital into
Ukraine permits us to conclude that the origin of the process virtually
goes back to the collapse of the USSR. However, business entities of
both states only became engaged in the Ukrainian-Polish investment
cooperation in 1994. As the data in Figure 4.3 illustrates, the
accumulative volumes of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ukraine’s
economy kept constantly growing from the very beginning and on 1
April 2011 amounted to USD 45.6023 billion, thus surpassing the
relevant indicator for 1995 nearly 95 times.
The largest inflow of FDI in Ukraine’s economy was in 2005,
when foreign investors invested nearly USD 8 billion, which ensured
USD 350 of foreign investment per capita. The greatest growth was in
the capital of non-residents from Germany —by nearly USD 5 billion
(due to the purchase of Kryvorizhstal by Mittal Steel Germany Gmbh
registered in Germany) and Austria — by USD 1.1 billion (due to the
purchase of Aval Bank by Raiffeisen International from Austria in the
amount of EUR 850 million) (Investment in the Economy …,
2006 : 23).
With regard to the geographical pattern of foreign capital
investment in Ukraine’s economy, a total of 113 countries invested in
Ukraine and as of 1 April 2011 the greatest volumes of FDI came
from non-residents from Cyprus (USD 10.665 billion or 23.4 %),
Germany (USD 7.1534 billion or 15.7 %), Great Britain (USD 2.3189
billion or 5.1 %), the Netherlands (USD 4.7468 billion or 10.4 %), the
United States (USD 1.1008 billion or 2.4 %) and Russia (USD 3.3833
billion or 7.4 %), while investments from Poland were relatively
insignificant (USD 893.2 million or 2.0 %) (the State Statistics
Committee of Ukraine).
The analysis of the dynamics of Poland’s investments in Ukraine’s
economy (Figure 4.8) permits us to make a number of general
conclusions. First, Poland’s total investment in Ukraine’s economy in
1995—2011 grew 70 times, which demonstrates that Poland’s
economy has enhanced its investment potential and that the
neighbouring state is interested in enhancing investment cooperation
with Ukraine.   
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Table 4.8
DYNAMICS OF UKRAINIAN-POLISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 1995—2011
(at the beginning of period)
Foreign direct
investment in
Ukraine’s economy,
USD millions
Foreign direct
investment of
Ukraine,
USD millionsYear
Total FromPoland
Poland’s
share in
foreign
investment
in Ukraine,
% Total To Poland
Poland’s
share in
Ukraine’s
foreign
investment,
%
1995 483.5 13.1 2.7 20.3 0.4 1.9
1996 896.9 20.5 2.3 84.1 0.3 0.4
1997 1,438.2 25.4 1.8 97.4 0.3 0.3
1998 2,063.6 37.1 1.8 127.5 0.3 0.2
1999 2,810.7 45.7 1.6 97.5 0.3 0.3
2000 3,281.8 54.5 1.7 98.5 0.3 0.3
2001 3,865.5 62.1 1.6 170.3 0.3 0.2
2002 4,555.3 69.3 1.6 155.7 0.4 0.3
2003 5,471.8 98.5 1.8 143.9 0.4 0.3
2004 6,794.4 156.3 2.3 163.5 0.4 0.2
2005 9,047.0 152.7 1.7 175.9 0.3 0.2
2006 16,375.2 225.0 1.4 218.2 20.3 9.3
2007 21,186.0 366.0 1.7 221.5 24.2 10.9
2008 29,489.4 702.6 2.1 6,196.1 30.1 0.5
2009 35,723.4 694.7 1.9 6,198.6 46.9 0.8
2010 40,026.8 864.9 2.2 6,223.3 49.4 0.8
2011* 45,602.3 893.2 2.0 6,920.6 50.7 0.7
*  — as of 1 April 2011
Source: Calculated and drafted by the authors on the basis of the data of the State
Statistics Committee of Ukraine // www.ukrstat.gov.ua
However, while there is an absolute increase in Poland’s investment,
the share of Poland as a donor of FDI in Ukraine is shrinking (from 2.7 %
in 1995 to 2.0 % in 2011). In relation to the above-mentioned, Poland’s
investment in Ukraine did not considerably assist in dealing with the
deficit of investment resources in the state or contribute to its innovative
and technological development, did not trigger the creation of effective
jobs or the elimination of regional disproportions of social and economic
development, while in terms of significance for Ukraine’s economy,
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Poland’s investment is essentially behind the capital investments of such
states as Germany, the United States, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Great
Britain or the Russian Federation.
Second, even though the absolute volumes of Ukraine’s foreign
investment in Poland are relatively insignificant, its dynamics is
characterized by high indicators: in 1995 — 2011 absolute volumes grew
from USD 0.4 million to USD 50.7 million or 127 times. At the same
time, in 1995—2004 the dynamics of Ukraine’s FDI in Poland were
characterized by stagnation, as the share of Poland as a recipient of
Ukraine’s foreign investment shrank from 1.9 % to 0.2 %.
The year 2005 became a turning point for the cooperation in investment
between Ukraine and Poland, as Ukrainian financial and industrial groups
began investing in Poland. The activation of their relations was associated
with the privatization of large industrial facilities in the neighbouring state.
For instance, the largest Ukrainian investors in Poland’s economy are
presently ISD Corporation and the UkrAVTO Corporation. More
specifically, ISD Corporation invested EUR 307 million in the
metallurgical plant Huta Częstochowa, purchased 50% of the shares in a
plant producing refractory materials, located in the city of Chrzanów from
Ropczyce S. A., a Polish company, and signed an agreement with Zlomrex
S. A. for the creation of the joint Ukrainian-Polish venture Industrial
Metallurgical Company. In its turn, UkrAVTO Corporation became known
on the Polish financial market for investing in Fabryka Samochodów
Osobowych (literally, the Warsaw Automobile Plant).
With regard to the sector composition of Poland’s investment in
Ukraine’s economy, the largest-scale investments of Poland are presently
in the industrial sector — 55.9 %, particularly in the chemical industry
(18.9 %) and woodworking industry (9.9 %). Polish investors were also
significantly interested in the sectors of Ukraine’s economy that
guarantee fast circulation of capital, specifically domestic trade (11.2 %),
as well as finances, insurance and crediting (27.4 %). For instance,
presently, the opening of parent enterprises of Polish companies in
Ukraine may be called the most successful projects implemented by
Polish investors in Ukraine: a TZMO S.A. factory for bandaging materials
in the town of Berezan located in the proximity to the town of Boryspil,
Inter Groclin in Uzhhorod, Can-Pack S.A. opening a factory for beverage
can production in Vyshhorod. Furthermore, three Polish furniture
factories operate in the East of Ukraine: Forte, Wiko and Nowy Styl.
In the financial sphere, the Polish Credit Bank made the largest
investments in Ukraine by establishing Credit Bank Ukraine, which is
currently one of the largest banks in Ukraine, with a vast network of
regional divisions. Furthermore, another bank with Polish capital operates
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in Ukraine — Pekao Ukraine, which has two branches — one in Lutsk
and one in Kyiv. The activities of the banks are aimed at simplifying the
settlement of payments in Ukrainian-Polish trade.
At the same time, financial contributions in the machine building and
metal-working manufacturing, food processing, consumer goods industry
and pharmaceutical industry presently do not exceed 4.3 %, 3.7 %, 3.2 %
and 2.1 % of the total Polish investment in Ukraine respectively. Thus,
one may ascertain that Poland’s investment in Ukraine has a limited
impact on the economic development of the country. The investment’s
concentration in individual high-profit sectors guaranteeing quick returns,
weak connection with infrastructure projects, and low regional
diversification do not permit the full satisfaction of Ukraine’s resources
needs required for its accelerated development or to effectively utilise the
available investment potential of the country.
The strategy of Polish investors for penetrating and consolidating
domestic capital in Ukraine’s economy gives significant consideration to
the establishment of joint ventures with Ukrainian partners. According to
statistics, joint Polish-Ukrainian ventures presently represent a prevailing
form of Poland’s direct investment in Ukraine.
With regard to the benefits and weaknesses of Ukrainian-Polish
investment cooperation in the form of joint ventures for economic entities
of Ukraine, the following should be included in the benefits: opportunities
for raising material and financial resources which are part of the
enterprise’s fixes assets and do not require payment; consolidation of
interests of the Ukrainian and Polish partners, which implies
motivation/commitment to the improvement of production and market
penetration; as well as opportunities for the free promotion of goods
produced at such enterprises in third countries’ markets (first and
foremost, post-Soviet states and the European Union).
The intensification of inter-state investment cooperation between
Ukraine and Poland is possible only through the transition of Ukrainian-
Polish business entities from mere trade activities to investment and
production activities. Such form of cooperation must include:
enhancement of the manufacturing presence of Polish partners on the
Ukrainian market; broader participation of Polish enterprises in
privatization processes in Ukraine; Poland’s investments in top-priority
sectors of Ukraine’s economy (the energy complex, coal-mining,
chemical and oil-refining industries, and food processing).
A pragmatic approach to the strategy of Ukrainian-Polish economic
cooperation permits the determination of priorities in co-production that
involves Ukraine and Poland. For instance, inter-state cooperation in
agriculture has broad prospects for development. Such cooperation could be
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enhanced by the following: creating joint ventures for cultivating agricultural
crops (sugar beets and sunflower) with the application of Polish technologies
and Ukraine’s supply of raw materials and subsequently entering third
countries’ markets; food processing; constructing storage facilities; arranging
co-production of machinery and equipment in Ukraine for the mechanization
of technological processes in vegetable farming, gardening and livestock
farming; organizing the agricultural market; delivering low-capacity
slaughterhouses, bakeries and grinding mills by Polish partners; staff training,
creating and ensuring the operation of new organizations for the state
regulation of the agrarian market, privatization of state agricultural
enterprises, modernization and re-structuring of agriculture, etc.
At the same time, the development of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in
production in the pharmaceutical industry also offers prospects. For
instance, investment may be used for the implementation of joint projects
in the production of vitamins and multi-vitamins on the basis of
concentrated juice, fruits and vegetables, microelements and sorbents;
bacterial preparation and vaccines; cardio-vascular and anaesthetic
agents; non-fusion solutions; and generic drugs.
The production and sale of construction materials is another sphere of
investment and production cooperation between Ukrainian and Polish
economic entities. The high prospects of such cooperation emerge from,
on the one hand, the dynamic development of construction and home
renovation in Ukraine and, on the other hand, a wide assortment, high
quality and reasonable prices of construction materials produced in
Poland (A. Skovronska-Luchynska, 2003 : 431).
In the context of the promotion of Ukraine’s and Poland’s national
economic interests, enhancing cooperation and implementing investment
projects in the energy sector becomes particularly relevant. Achieving
this strategic objective is facilitated by a project associated with the
development of the Euro-Asian Oil Transportation Corridor (EAOTC)
(through the Odesa—Brody—Gdansk pipeline), which has created a clash
of national economic interests of many actors on the European energy
market, including the United States and the Russian Federation. With
regard to Ukraine and Poland, their national economic interests pertaining
to the Caspian Oil and the Gas Basin are a product of a number of
significant factors, including the following key ones.
First, this creates opportunities for both countries to assume key
positions in the sphere of hydrocarbon transit and to diversify the
channels of hydrocarbon supply to Europe. Second, Ukraine and Poland
are critically dependent on the import of energy carriers. For instance,
annual consumption of oil and natural gas by Ukraine’s economy recently
amounted to about 1 million tons and 80—85 billion cubic meters.
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Second, there is a similar picture in Poland, which has strong energy
dependence on the Russian Federation. This is, specifically, illustrated by
the share of imported natural gas in total gas consumption, which
amounts to about 70 % (with annual natural gas consumption by Poland’s
economy being at a level of 12 billion cubic meters, only 4 billion cubic
meters are produced domestically, 1 billion cubic meters is imported from
Western Europe and 7 billion cubic meters are imported from Russia).
Third, the participation of Ukraine and Poland in Caspian oil
transportation creates additional opportunities for the development of the
reciprocal cooperation of the two states with Asian countries producing
and transiting oil to their territory, which will facilitate the enhanced
cooperation of the countries with leading global companies dealing with
the extraction and transportation of energy resources. On this basis, the
EAOTC Project may become an additional stimulus for Ukraine and
Poland to establish special relations and strategic partnership.
The following key lines of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in the energy
sphere should be noted:
• Reconstruction of the Komarno Compressor Plant - Drozdovychi
by the Ukrainian party to increase flow capacity of the gas pipeline in
the section delivering gas to Poland for the purpose of counter-
balancing the peak load of Poland’s gas transportation system during
the winter season;
• Activation of the use of Ukrainian underground gas storage
facilities and the construction of the Ustyluh— Hrubieszów gas pipeline
with an annual capacity of about 10—20 million cubic meters by the
Polish party for the development of a gas supply network in the Eastern
regions of Poland;
• Joint construction (in the long term) of a new gas pipeline in Poland
from the Ukrainian-Polish border to the Ukrainian-Czech border to
improve the supply of gas to the Northern regions;
• The participation of National Joint-Stock Company Naftogaz of
Ukraine in Polish gas distribution enterprises;
• Co-participation of Ukrainian and Polish companies in the privatization
processes in the national fuel and energy sector. Specifically, the
participation of National Joint-Stock Company Naftogaz of Ukraine in the
bidding proceedings for the sale of 30—35 % of shares of PGNіG, a Polish
concern and a monopolist in the production and sale of oil (460—470
thousand tons annually) and gas (about 4 billion cubic meters annually) in
Poland, speaks about the high prospects of relevant cooperation;
• Co-development and co-utilization of the gas and oil fields of
Ukraine, Poland and third countries, as well as the enhancement of the
flow capacity of the Polish gas transportation system, etc.
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In view of the limited financial resources required for the
implementation of the above mentioned projects, it seems reasonable to
raise funds from foreign investors interested in the operation of the
facilities, for instance, oil refineries located in Central and Eastern
Europe. Poland will benefit from the transit of energy carriers through the
territory of Ukraine, while Ukraine will enhance its potential for the
provision of services associated with the transit of energy carriers.
The implementation of investment projects associated with co-
construction and the modernization of the transportation corridors of the
two countries also corresponds to the gradual development of Ukrainian-
Polish investment and production cooperation, particularly in the context of
preparation for Euro-2012, which would permit not only the expansion of
the exchange of goods with the countries of Western, Central and Eastern
Europe, to improve the quality and to optimize transportation routes, but
also to resolve a number of regional problems of Ukraine’s and Poland’s
border territories, specifically to reduce social tension through the creation
of a network of consumer services and maintenance for road users.
The considerable length of the Ukrainian-Polish border and non-
conformance of its infrastructure to modern demands (small number of
border checkpoints, obsolete equipment, etc.) require putting in more
effort to improve its technical infrastructure and creating new
checkpoints. For instance, there are short-term plans to reconstruct the
Yahodyn—Dorohusk checkpoint and to construct a bypass highway in
the area of the Ustyluh—Zosin checkpoint. Ukraine has also initiated
negotiations with Poland about the creation of the Adamchuky —
Zbereze border checkpoint on the territory of the Volyn Oblast.
The enhancement of international labor division in research and in the
industrial utilization of research results, contributes to an objective
increasing need for the cooperation of Ukraine’s and Poland’s capitals
and the further international exchange of research and development
findings. Since the participation of the two countries in the international
exchange of technologies is characterised by rather limited opportunities,
the following may become an effective form of bilateral cooperation in
investment and production: connecting our enterprises to the
technological network operating within the framework of West-European
transnational corporations; opening their branches and subsidiaries on the
territory of Ukraine and Poland, which, according to the corporations’
innovation strategy, latest technologies will be passed on to said entities;
and gaining the membership in international production and research
associations (including, those involving representatives of the European
Union). In the future, similar production and research associations could
be united in technoparks, which would form an institutional and
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organizational environment and would facilitate the intensification and
enhancement of the bilateral cooperation in investment and production
between Ukraine and Poland.
Furthermore, for the purpose of raising additional financial resources for
research and development, one needs to establish a special foundation for the
support of science and technology and to seek share contributions from
Polish and Ukrainian partners and financial funds from Western investors
and representatives of domestic business and financial communities.
The activities of industrial and financial groups will contribute to the
implementation of the Ukrainian-Polish model of investment and
production cooperation. Within its framework, by consolidating
Ukrainian and Polish capitals, management experience, research and
technology developments, it will be possible to achieve considerably
better results from the implementation of investment co-projects, which
will significantly improve the positions of Ukrainian and Polish business
entities that have consolidated their capital in the domestic and
international markets. Industrial and financial groups (IFGs) are
characterized by various forms of origin and existence and differ in their
formation centres. IFGs may be established around a powerful industrial
enterprise or a group of enterprises; banking IFGs are established around
potent banks; furthermore, there also exist research IFGs and trade IFGs
(involving a trade company and a bank or another financial institution),
which permits IFGs to utilize government support (state guarantees for
raising investments, easing of reserve requirements for banks — IFG
members, financial government support of IFGs are involved in national
or international projects, exemption from customs duties and taxes, etc.).
The introduction of an effective syndicated lending mechanism through
the association of Ukrainian and Polish financial institutions (primarily
banks) into syndicates will also facilitate progressive development of the
Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in investment and production through the
implementation of large-scale projects. With the introduction of the
legislative regulation of Polish and Ukrainian banks’ participation in the
capital, unlike ordinary interbank cooperation, such cooperation through
association in syndicates, will be based on the mutual agreement of the
participants, may have various terms, will involve less risk and permit a
considerable expansion in the scale of crediting. Even though presently
syndicated lending has become significantly less popular in developed
countries due to the spread of the securitization practice, for Ukrainian and
Polish banks, in view of limited access to the global capital market, the
formation of bank capital may contribute to the implementation of large-
scale projects based on the investment and production cooperation of the
business entities of the two countries.
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4.3. Sector-Specific Priorities of Social and Economic Convergence
4.3.1. Introduction
Real needs and the specific features of the social and economic
development of the modern global economy comprise an objective
foundation for the convergence of Ukraine’s and Poland’s national
economies. In this context, if the economic interests of relevant partners
are similar or identical, the consolidation of efforts of governments,
regions, individual companies, sectors, and industries can secure a
powerful synergy effect for each participating state separately and for
both, if all components of such effects are taken into consideration.
Nonetheless, real sector-based convergence of national economies or, even
more so, a lasting synergy effect of such convergence may only be possible on
condition of the following: similarity of the strategic goals of social and
economic development; a developed institutional environment for a market
economy ensuring operational uniformity of market mechanisms, individual
sectors of the economy and the economy as a whole; real economic freedom
of business entities; political will of the government; economic needs and
interests the satisfaction and promotion of which will facilitate the growth of
economic capacities and the well-being of every partner.
4.3.2. Background for the Development of Bilateral Cooperation
Both Poland and Ukraine have developed fundamental formal, primarily legal
institutional norms ensuring the operation of a market economy. There is also
the political will and legal framework for cooperation and the closing in of
national economies defined in a number of legislative acts, which also
determine the top priorities of social and economic convergence. Specifically,
the Agreement on Economic Cooperation between the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Poland signed on 4 March
2005 and ratified by Law No. 3535 — IV (3535 — 15) dated 15 March 2006,
has become an institutional instrument for the formation of close cooperation in
the economic, political and social spheres of Ukraine and Poland.
We feel that this Agreement lays down the legal institutional
foundation for the sector-based convergence of the countries, as it
explicitly sets forth the priorities of such convergence (Articles 1 and 2),
specifically the following:
1) The intensification of bilateral economic relations in the sphere of
investment, innovations and financing of economic projects,
2) The development of a transportation infrastructure and an energy
supply system; cooperation in project implementation in the oil, gas and
electric power sectors,
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3) The development of interregional economic cooperation,
4) Cooperation in the sphere of certification and standardization,
5) The development of consulting, legal, banking and technical
services, including for the purpose of supporting investment projects on
the territories of the states — signatories to the Agreement,
6) The development of tourism cooperation (inter alia, this high-
priority line of cooperation between the states is entrenched in an individual
intergovernmental agreement approved by Resolution No. 870 (870 —
2006-п) of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated 24 June 2006).
However, one of the deeply-rooted problems associated with the
convergence of any national economies emerges from distinctions in
domestic priorities of economic development and the specific nature of
strategic tasks related to the combination of political, social, economic
and cultural factors, which a foreign economy strategy and tactics must
undoubtedly take into consideration. Notably, such specific nature in
Poland is primarily shaped by two political documents: Strategies for
Poland (September 1993, June 1994) and Package 2000 (March 1996),
which determined macroeconomic strategic benchmarks of domestic
economic and social development (also approved by the Parliament and
the public), as well as economic policy priorities, which would ensure the
international competitiveness of Poland’s economy as a whole and its
individual sectors specifically. The principal task of the economic policy
was defined as «the creation of a modern economy, distinctive in a
considerable share of exports in the GDP, as well as vantage ground in
international trade; the creation of conditions for raising foreign capital
and effectively utilizing such capital in the process of development; the
enhancement of the absorptive capacity of Poland’s economy with regard
to foreign financial tools» (Kołodko, 2000 : 94). In accordance with the
goals, the documents determined strategic implementation tools,
specifically the following: pro-exports transformations in industry,
agriculture and other sectors of the economy; a further increase in the
number of agreements concluded for the geographical expansion of target
markets for Polish business entities; the elaboration of a concept for the
development of trade and cooperation with the countries of Eastern
Europe, specifically a system of settlements ensuring an effective use of
warranties and export insurance; the stimulation of changes in the
commodity pattern of imports intended to increase the share of capital
and to reduce the share of consumer goods, particularly those that can be
produced in the country (Kołodko, 2000 : 95—96).
Pursuant to the elaborated strategy of economic development, the
sectors of non-financial and financial corporations in Poland’s economy
are oriented towards outward expansion, primarily in two directions: to
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the West, which has turned into a domestic market for the country, and to
the East — from Ukraine, Russia and to China. Therefore, one can
ascertain that the first obstacle to the satisfaction of an objective need for
the convergence of the economies of the two states, is the equally
objective law of competition associated with the promotion of the so-
called first-range interests, i.e. support of the national producer in
international markets, primarily by prioritizing the national producer in
the real sector of the economy within the country.
The problem becomes particularly relevant, as we acknowledge that
the economic policy and economic development priorities determined in
Poland are similar to the priorities of Ukraine’s strategic goals.
When asked about another obstacle to convergence, political science
scholars mention political competition, i.e. the aspirations of both states
(primarily Poland) to play the role of the sole leader among the states of
the former socialist camp (S. Pavlenko : 113, 2002 : 101). Therefore, we
may ascertain that convergence, as the adjustment of competing national
organisms to similar conditions of existence, requires the determination
of genuinely common strategic goals of social and economic development
and real reciprocal implementation tools.
4.3.3. Analysis of the Factors and the Structure
of Sector Cooperation between Ukraine and Poland
The analysis of the quality and structural factors of economic growth in
Poland and Ukraine, as separate integral economic systems in the
globalized economic environment of the modern world, permits us to
make a number of not quite optimistic conclusions about the existing
tendencies of economic convergence.
Firstly, the total turnover of commodities between Ukraine and
Poland is too insignificant for countries — strategic partners.
Secondly, Poland dominates in economic cooperation, even in the sale
of such products, traditional for Ukraine, as agricultural products,
chemicals, machine-building and metal-working products, timber, etc.
Thirdly, if we analyse the products traded between Ukraine and
Poland on the basis of the dual-sector model given by Sir Author Lewis
(1954), we can see the almost 100 % appurtenance of such products to the
second, traditional sector characterized by the mentioned author as a
sector with obsolete machines and equipment and weak connection with
the market unlike the first sector, which the scholar defined as modern,
with relatively advanced machines and equipment and a well-operating
market mechanism. Furthermore, one probably should agree with experts
from the National Institute for Strategic Research who believe that «the
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analysis of the pattern of the bilateral turnover of goods permits to
conclude that Poland still regards Ukraine as a source of raw materials»
(Ukraine: strategic priorities). Scholars believe that this is illustrated by a
considerable increase in the number of trade transactions associated with
the supply of basically-processed metal produced in Ukraine to Poland
where it is used for the production of goods (zinc coating of plate metal,
metal structures, etc.) to be later exported to Ukraine.
The industries most closely associated with traditional technologies
and an intense use of raw materials and energy resources remain the
major ones in the real sector of Ukraine’s and, to a considerable extent,
Poland’s economy. However, the case is not about the development of
industries contributing to a breakthrough in innovations and competitiveness
in high technology markets, as well as the transformation into the system
of post-industrial relations (see Table 4.9).
Table 4.9
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT SALES STRUCTURE
FOR UKRAINE AND POLAND, 20091
Ukraine Poland
Industry 100 100
Extraction 8.3 5.0
Processing 69.4 82.7
Including:
Production of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco products 19.8 18.7
Consumer goods production 0.9 4.2
Cellulose and paper production; publishing business 2.7 3.2
Production of coke and refined products 6.7 5.6
Chemical and petrochemical industry 6 10.6
Production of other non-metal mineral goods 3 4.0
Metallurgy production and production of finished metal wares 17.6 8.8
Machine-building 10.6 22.5
Electric power, gas and water production and distribution 22.3 12.4
1 The data has been grouped by homogeneous products which, according to the Classification
of the Types of Economic Activities, pertain to a relevant type of economic activity.
2 The data has been modified to reflect the change in the primary line of economic
activities by the enterprises.
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 1998-2010 //
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2007/pr/orp_rik/orp_06_r.htm;
GŁÓWNY URZĄD STATYSTYCZNY, Departament Produkcji //
http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/prod_bud_inw_PLK_HTML.htm
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases452
Such a state of affairs speaks about significant unutilized opportunities
for cooperation, the lack of an active search for cooperation principles,
methods and motives, as well as huge prospects of real convergence,
subject to the determination of real priorities that will be able to guarantee
the competitiveness of our countries in global markets in the future.
What allows us to make such optimistic statements? Where do we see
considerable reserves or rather the beginning of convergence? As has
been previously mentioned, the statements are based upon an objective
need to consolidate the efforts of the two countries in order to ensure
market advantages in third countries and specifically, developed states.
The ratified Agreement on Economic Cooperation (March 2006)
between the governments of our countries creates a legal institutional
background for real convergence in «the sphere of investment,
innovation, and financing of economic projects» (Article 1; 2.2.). First,
since the innovation economy, which is a high-priority strategic line of
transformation of national economies practically in all subjective world
countries, is at the inception stage both in Poland and in Ukraine. Second,
since due to the above-mentioned circumstances, it may not presently be
competitive in its relations with the mentioned countries or in relations
with any other developed state.
4.3.4. Research and Technology Factors
of Sector Cooperation Development
In the 20th century, the scientific and technological revolution not only
altered the notions of the abilities of productive forces to satisfy public
and individual material needs, but also resulted in a fundamental re-
structuring of the national economy, aggregate work-force, principles, the
nature and forms of the economy’s operation, interaction with other
business entities, as well as forms of the realization of property relations.
One of the distinctive properties and requirements of a post-industrial
society, which develops under the influence of the scientific and
technological revolution, is a transition to specifically an innovation
economy, the key feature of which is the creation of ideas. Bringing ideas
into life requires creative approaches not only from the authors’ of such
ideas, but also from those who deal with their practical introduction,
which increases the field of intellectual labour (R. Nureev, 100,
2000 : 138—187). For instance, at the end of the 20th century, intellectual
companies of the United States, i.e. the companies whose share of
intellectual workers amounted to or exceeded 40%, accounted for 28 % of
the total employment in the country; however, in the last five years of the
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research, these companies accounted for 43 % of newly-created jobs
(T. Stewart, 157, 1999 : 281).
Such needs and changes become possible due to significant structural
developments in investment processes and projects. Specifically,
education and production of new knowledge remain top-priorities of
investment in the economy of developed countries in recent decades, both
at the macro and micro levels. Furthermore, all business entities make
systematic investments in these innovation sectors of the economy:
private and corporate business, the state, households, and individuals,
realizing that human social status increasingly depends on the level of
education. For instance, government and private expenditure on education
in the United States in 1980—1990 increased by 66 % and amounted to
7 % of the GDP. Furthermore, under various evaluations, the costs
associated with adult education, which in the mid-1990s engaged 76.3
million citizens or 40% of the adult population of the country in various
training programs (as compared to only 13.3 % in the mid-1980s),
amounted to nearly USD 150 billion.80 % of all educational institutions
are funded by the state and federal governments in the United States.
Consequently, at the end of the 20th century, about 60 % of the American
work-force had a higher or uncompleted higher education, which is one
of the best indicators in the world (V. Supyan, 158, 2001, p. 91, 92).
Such high regard of the United States government for the development of
the knowledge economy1 has turned this country into a technological and
economic super-state: 45 % of the GDP in the United States is created in
research, education, health care and software production; the country
accounts for 36 % of global academic staff, 44 % of research costs and 72 %
of the global information services market. The exports of patents and
technologies from the Unites States is almost eight times higher than relevant
imports. About two thirds of new jobs are created in the «new economy» and
education costs exceed military expenses nearly twofold. Consequently, in
the 1990s, inflation in the country dropped from 6.2 % to 2.9—3.0 % per
annum; the annual average growth rate amounted to 4—5 %; the
unemployment rate fell to the minimal value in the past thirty years and was
equal to 3.9 % of the population able to work; and personal income grew
steadily (V. Inozemtsev, 59, 2003 : 353).
In general, the 1980s, 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century
demonstrate that the role of developed countries in ensuring the growth of
GDP research intensity (the ratio of national costs on research and
development to GDP) has been increasing considerably. According to
statistics, in this process, the state covers half or more of the costs, thus
                     
1 The term knowledge economy was first introduced in 1962 by Fritz Machlup, an
Austrian-American scholar.
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immediately affecting the formation of an integral intellectual
infrastructure and, therefore, the development of intellectual property,
intellectual capital and, consequently, an innovation vector of public
production development (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10
DOMESTIC EXPENDITURE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (R&D AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, %)
USA Japan Germany France Great Britain Italy Canada
1985 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.3 1.1 1.4
1990 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.3 1.5
1995 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.3 1.5
2000 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.3 1.7 1.6
2005 2.6 3.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.1 2
2007 2.7 3.4 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.3 1.5
Source: MOST, Main Science & Technology Indicators 2007/1 (OECD), RICYT,
UNESCO.
Along with a constant increase in the expenditures of developed
countries at the expense of budget revenues, there is a simultaneous
policy of preferences and privileges for enterprises and companies
regularly engaged in certain research and development of new
technologies and goods, promotion of such goods for production and for
sale on the market. The elaboration and increasing flexibility of the
organisational structure ensuring the institutionalization of research and
development and the introduction of developments resulting from the
technological revolution in mass production in the United States,
demonstrate that there is an understanding by the government of the role
that this sector plays in ensuring the high competitiveness of the national
capital on global markets, and are also indicative of the extent to which
the state effectively performs new functions associated with the
strengthening of the economy in the context of information society and
globalisation challenges. Consequently, about 70 % of global intellectual
property rights are concentrated in the United States, while its revenues
from the export of knowledge-intensive products reach USD 740 billion
annually. The turnover of technology exports of the United States exceeds
that of, for example, the Russian Federation (as well as that of Ukraine,
with a similar correlation), Germany and Italy by over 200 times, 100
times and 14 times respectively. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, as research
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suggests, less than 10 % of leading companies operate within the
framework of the fifth technological mode (1996 — 2 %; 2003 — 9 %),
centered on microelectronics, software, computer facilities and
information processing technologies, production and utilization of
automation means, space and fibre-optic communication. However,
presently, a reproductive system of the sixth technological mode, centered
on biotechnologies and artificial intellect systems, global information
networks and integrated high-speed transportation systems, is developing.
The prevalence of low- and middle-technological production (i.e.
production that belongs to the third and forth technological modes, typical of
an industrial economy at the stage of development) in Ukraine’s economy,
even in leading companies, vividly demonstrates low quality and thus, low
effectiveness of the motivation system; government negligence; inadequate
de facto consideration for the role of technological progress in research and
development, technical, structural, taxation, budget and social policies; and
low competitiveness of the national capital in the market of high technologies
and high-quality high-technology products. The governments’ disregard for,
as well as refusal to prioritize, the training and effective utilization of human
resources, specialising in research and technology (in combination with other
internal and external factors), has caused the emergence and development of
negative tendencies in the provision of material resources to various sectors
of the national economy, that are required for large-scale capital stock
modernization, based upon progress in research and development and the
scientific and technological revolution. In the 1990s, the tendencies revealed
themselves in the reduction of the total number of new types of machinery
created and adopted for industrial production and the slowdown of the
dynamics of the upgrading of machine-building products as well as the
introduction of progressive technological processes, etc. (Table 4.11)
Table 4.11
DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND INTRODUCTION
OF NEW TYPES OF MACHINERY AND TECHNOLOGIES IN UKRAINE
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
New machinery models
developed (total number of
items)
593 498 437 335 268 266 335
Including:
Machines, equipment, devices 481 435 353 304 253 242 300
Electronics 20 15 6 5 4 3 6
Automation appliances and
equipment 112 63 54 31 15 24 35
Computing hardware 9 5 7 3 3 6 6
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Final Table 4.11
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
New types of product in
machine-building adopted
for industrial production
(total number of items)
— 641 543 468 393 341 469
Including:
Machines, equipment, devices — 582 497 426 379 318 444
Electronics — 18 15 6 2 1 11
Automation appliances and
equipment — 59 46 42 14 23 25
New progressive
technological processes
introduced (total number of
items)
7303 2936 2138 1905 1348 1203 1403
Including:
Low-waste, resource-saving
and non-waste 1825 1044 688 600 467 423 430
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine for 2002. State Statistics Committee of
Ukraine — Kyiv: Machinery, 2001 : 460—462.
The state of affairs at the beginning of the 21st century does not seem
to have improved much (see Table 4.12)
Table 4.12
IMPLEMENTATION OF INNOVATIONS AT INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES
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2000 14.8 1,403 430 15,323 631  
2001 14.3 1,421 469 19,484 610 6.8
2002 14.6 1,142 430 22,847 520 7.0
2003 11.5 1,482 606 7,416 710 5.6
2004 10.0 1,727 645 3,978 769 5.8
2005 8.2 1,808 690 3,152 657 6.5
2006 10.0 1,145 424 2,408 786 6.7
2007 11.5 1,419 634 2,526 881 6.7
2008 10.8 1,647 680 2,446 758 5.9
Source: Science and Innovations in Ukraine. Statistics — K., 2003 - 2009.
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There is only one solution under the circumstances. First, the
government must create conditions and motivation for the maximal
comprehensive utilization of national skilled labour, which constitutes the
basis of human capital — an institute recognised and evolving in any
country with a developed market economy. Second, it should consolidate
efforts in this endeavour with other interested countries, including Poland
as our strategic partner.
At the same time, the existence of conditions for ensuring individual
development through education at all stages of the human life cycle means
the ability of the state to regulate the processes associated with human and
social capital formation, which, after all, is an effective factor of the growth
of the national economy’s productivity and competitiveness. Therefore, the
model of advancing innovative development must be based upon the
following properties of an education system: structuring level, availability
and quality sufficient to satisfy the needs of the national economy, society
and science; effectiveness of the mechanisms regulating the processes of
organising education by the state from the legal and financial standpoint;
availability of a well-developed market space and social environment that
would encourage individuals to attain and continue education, i.e.
correspondence of the economic and extra-economic training motivation in
the labour life cycle to the needs of the national economy and the state;
availability of national and global cultural heritage, as well as an incentive
system for proper acceptance and adoption of such by the citizens.
Thus, the problem of developing an innovation economy and creating
conditions for the domination of sectors integrated by the economic
operational principles in the national economies of the two states may
become the foundation for an economic policy of the governments and
business entities that will target the consolidation and convergence of
individual industries in the non-financial and financial sectors of the
economy.
4.3.5. Investment Determinants of Bilateral Cooperation
The formation of an innovation economy and relevant cooperation
requires the consolidation of efforts, primarily in education, science,
research and development, elaboration and implementation of innovation
and investment co-projects at the regional and international levels,
cooperation of the state and private, corporate capital, which will also
ensure and support changes in the organizational forms of doing business
(the establishment of Ukrainian-Polish and Polish-Ukrainian financial and
industrial groups, including through mergers and acquisitions, as a form
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of capital concentration and the consolidation of the competitive efforts
of the partners, co-budgeting associated with the implementation of high-
risk scientific and commercial co-projects, etc.).
One should note that certain fundamentals of such convergence
already exist in the economic relations of Ukrainian and Polish
businesses. To begin with, a certain institutional framework of the overall
public administration sector has developed, exercising control over
cooperation and interaction processes in the real sector of the economy.
The framework includes, in addition to the above-mentioned agreements,
such institutions as: the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine
and Poland, the Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, the
Ukrainian-Polish Conference for European Integration, the
Intergovernmental Coordination Council for Regional Cooperation, the
Annual Ukrainian-Polish Economic Forum of Businessmen, the Civil
Ukrainian-Polish Forum, the Parliamentary Assembly of Ukraine and
Poland, the Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Poland’s
Sejm and Senate and Lithuania’s Sejm, etc.
Investment cooperation tendencies are improving (as per absolute
indicators). Specifically, Poland’s direct investment in Ukraine’s economy
in 1995, 2005 and as of 1 October 2006 constituted USD 13.1 million,
USD 214.9 million and USD 330.5 million respectively (though, this is
only 1.7 % of the total investment in the country’s economy). Poland’s
capital is distinctive in that it primarily goes into production, banking and
finance and, to a significantly lesser extent, in commerce and services —
more than 58 %, more than 23 % and about 11 % respectively.
Poland is favorably distinctive in such focus of investments, as
compared to investors from other countries who are much more interested
in commerce, real estate and financial transactions. This permits us to
assume that Polish business is psychologically ready to invest in
innovative projects in the economy’s real sector, provided that the
perpetual problem of high-risks associated with the implementation of
such projects has been regulated and that the government guarantees an
increased reward for taking such risks.
Specifically, the following powerful Polish companies are planning to
significantly enhance their presence in Ukraine’s economy: Inter Groclin
Auto, Empik Media & Fashion, PKM Duda and PZU. Grupa Kety SA, a
leading aluminium pipe producer, is planning to open a plant in Ukraine,
by investing PLN 80 million; Duda is planning to invest up to PLN 100
million in livestock breeding, by increasing pig stock at its farms in
Ukraine nearly tenfold — from 25,000 to 250,000 in order to become a
leader in the production of meat foods in the country; Infоvide and
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Matrix.рl, Polish companies specialising in information technologies,
have opened a joint subsidiary enterprise in Ukraine, etc. Significant
positive changes are also expected in the financial sector. For instance,
Pekao SA, the second largest bank in Poland which belongs to one of the
largest banks of Italy — UniCredit SpA, plans to merge with such a
Polish investor as Credit Bank Ukraine (the second largest bank with
foreign investment in Ukraine). It intends to invest USD 100 million in a
number of branch offices in Ukraine. In December 2006, Getin Holding
SA signed an agreement to purchase the assets of Prykarpatya Bank,
which has 30 branches around Ukraine.
We can proceed with a list of specific Polish projects associated with
the penetration into Ukraine’s economy. However, firstly, there is
obviously a positive trend in the increase of Poland’s investment in
Ukraine. Secondly, the course that such increase will take is obvious as
well. We should note that the expansion of Polish capital in the Ukrainian
economy is primarily driven by the desire to survive competition by
penetrating markets with lower operational costs (cheaper raw materials,
lower labor costs, etc.). It should be mentioned that the capital primarily
penetrates traditional industries, in which under certain conditions
Ukraine could successfully compete in global markets. Thus, in our
opinion, such tendencies of an increase in Polish capital are not indicative
of the emergence of certain features of the convergence of the mentioned
sectors of the national economies of our countries.
The movement of Ukrainian capital in Poland may be more
interesting in terms of the formation of the signs of the convergence of
individual sectors of the economy. Its total turnover is not estimated at a
large amount — USD 300-400 million. However, this capital, first, goes
into production, and, second, in the sectors of Poland’s national economy
which allow for (and require) certain innovative projects; third, it actually
does not compete with Polish national capital, but rather ensures a certain
support of production sectors whose competitiveness did not prove to be
high. For instance, in November 2006, General Motors (the United
States) and Ukrainian Automobile Corporation, JSC (UkrAVTO) signed a
number of agreements about the production of Chevrolet Aveo
automobiles to commence in October 2007 at Fabryka Samochodów
Osobowych (FSO, Poland), which is managed by UkrAVTO. The vehicles
will be supplied to the European market (to EU countries); production
localization for the automobiles will amount to or exceed 60 %. After
launching the production of the automobiles in Poland, UkrAVTO plans to
produce automobiles in Zaporizhia at the Zaporizhia Automobile Building
Plant, CJSC. In 2005, AvtoZAZ, JSC purchased FSO, a Polish plant, from
the government, thus receiving a foothold in the EU. In 2005, the plant
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produced 40,000 automobiles, which constitutes approximately one third
of the enterprise’s capacity.
In 2006, disputes related to the rights to Huta Częstochowa, a
metallurgical plant, were settled in favour of ISD Corporation, a
Ukrainian financial-industrial group, thus creating an opportunity for
consolidating the efforts of Ukrainian and Polish capital in competition
on the markets of the European Union.
4.3.6. The Role of the Energy Complex in the System of Bilateral
Economic Cooperation
Considerable opportunities for convergence exist in the energy
production (generation of electricity, oil refining) and energy supply
sectors. Cooperation in the above-mentioned sectors can take various
forms, including, primarily, the transportation of energy vectors as an
instrument of making profits, maintaining national and European energy
security, and developing common political and economic interests
between Western and Eastern partners.
On the face of it, such form of cooperation seems to be the simplest,
the most accessible and obvious in the process of sector convergence
development. The accord of economic and other interests of Poland and
Ukraine is irrefutable. However, there are no simple solutions in complex
systems, with the globalised economy being one nowadays. On the one
hand, key partners, such as Ukraine, Poland and the European Union, are
inclined to cooperate, which can be demonstrated by real measures taken
by all interested parties. However, there are a number of countries,
specifically the United States and Russia (as well as Azerbaijan, Turkey,
etc.), whose interests are not entirely incompatible, but do not always
concur with those of Ukraine and Poland.
Irrespective of the above, the energy sector in the economies of our
countries can become fertile ground for convergence, though this also
involves certain challenges associated, first and foremost, with different
levels of adaptation of the sector’s components to market conditions.
Specifically, we are referring to oil refining and electricity production by
various methods, with the application of various energy sources. One
should mention that presently, Ukraine is inferior to Poland in the
technological, organisational and, thus, market dimensions in the oil
refining sector. This is primarily attributed to different approaches to
maintaining a fuel and energy balance in our countries: while in Ukraine
it is dominated by natural gas (approximately 50 %), coal (over 28 %)
and the nuclear power industry (over 13 %), in Poland coal
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(approximately 65 %) and oil (approximately 23 %) prevail.
Respectively, in Poland, in times of real independence, cutting-edge
technologies for crude oil refining permitted the enhancement of
industrial capacity utilisation at all seven oil refineries to a level of
87.4 % (2002), while in Ukraine it amounted to only 38 % in 2002
(H. Burlaka, 14 : 28). Similar distinctions exist in the geography of oil
supply sources: while in Poland up to 50 % of oil is supplied from the
Middle East and Norway, in Ukraine about 87 % of oil is supplied from
Russia. Furthermore, outdated technologies at Ukrainian oil refineries do
not permit the significant enhancement of the share of high-octane petrol
and eco-friendly fuels, which could be exported to European Union
countries. At the same time, the modernized Plock Oil Refinery is in the
top ten modern European oil refineries. Thus, in our opinion, convergence
in this sector is possible only subject to the establishment of financial and
industrial co-groups through mergers and acquisitions, i.e. through the
consolidation of interests, capitals, and efforts in the aspiration for
expansion in foreign markets. Convergence in the energy sector,
connected with energy production development, can prove to be more
fertile ground, including at nuclear power plants. The transportation,
production, and sales interests of Ukraine and Poland, as well as the
interests of their joint economic security, interweave and certain co-
projects exist and are de facto implemented in this sector.
4.3.7. Conclusions
Summarising the findings of our research in the problems of sector
convergence of the economies of the two friendly states, it should be noted
that, first of all, such convergence has the nature of an incipient tendency. It
is objectively based on the effect of market, social and political laws that
determine the needs for the development of similar, related features and
properties of our economic, social and political systems, our societies and,
thus, our strategic interests. Secondly, the key directions and forms of such
convergence may originate in, first and foremost, those sectors and
branches of the economy where our interests interweave, however do not
conflict, and where the promotion of such interests is beneficial to both
societies. We are referring to the following sectors: education, research and
development, innovative projects of mutual interest, transit services, as well
as the system of extra-economic (political, legal, social) institutions. The
failure to develop and effectively utilize the above-mentioned in the
process of outlining and consolidating economic interests, renders the
implementation of sector-based economic convergence impossible.
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4.4. Poland’s Trade Policy Instruments in the Context of Polish-
Ukrainian Cooperation
4.4.1. Introduction
Openness of the economy to international competition was one of the main
elements of the economic reform implemented in Poland in the 1990s. The
process was supposed to enhance the foreign economic competitiveness of
Poland’s economy, stabilize prices for goods and raw materials and provide
Polish enterprises and consumers with goods which were not produced or
produced in insufficient quantities in Poland itself. The trade liberalization
process was dramatically impacted by the commitments undertaken by
Poland during the Uruguay Round (GATT), as well as commitments under
agreements on free trade areas (FTAs) concluded with the European Union,
EFTA2, CEFTA3 and a number of other states4. The Europe Agreement
played a key role in the process, since it envisaged limited liberalization of
the trade of agricultural goods and the elimination of all barriers to the trade
of industrial goods within the next ten years (creation of a free trade area).
Along with the dichotomy in goods exchange principles, there was an
asymmetry of the liberalization schedule — Poland, as a weaker partner,
opened its market at a slower pace; however, the process of opening the
market was not conflict-free. Not only national producers, but also foreign
investors sought protection from international competition.
4.4.2. Trade Policy Instruments Utilized by Poland5
Because of multilateral commitments, including those arising from FTAs,
Poland lost the opportunity to autonomously influence the level of
customs protection. First of all, within the framework of the Uruguay
Round of GATT, Poland bound its duty rates for the import of the
majority of industrial goods (92.2 % of tariff proposals) and all
agricultural goods, preserving the right to influence the customs policy
(without binding duty rates) only with regard to some merchandise
                     
2 European Frеe Trade Association (EFTA)
3 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
4 The Europe Agreement provisions on trade and trade-related matters came into force
on 1 March 1992; the EFTA — Poland Free Trade Agreement took effect on 15 November
1993; the CEFTA — Poland Free Trade Agreement came into force on 1 March 1993.
Poland also concluded bilateral agreements on the creation of a free trade area with the
Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (1996—1998), Israel (1997), the Faroe
Islands (1998) and Turkey (1999).
5 The following references have been used in this sub-section: Annual Report…,
1994—2004; Polska w WTO, 2002; Umowy o wolnym…, 1995.
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(specifically: automobiles and spare parts, petroleum lubricants, wool and
linens). During the negotiations, establishing the binding level for duties,
the Polish side took EU rates into consideration. A general principle was
adopted that Polish conventional rates would not be lower than those of
the EU (Por. W. Mroczek, 2002). Furthermore, Poland’s accession to the
WTO and the signing of FTAs resulted in the liberalization of Polish
trade, which manifested itself in a consistent reduction of duty rates and
the introduction of tariff quotas on a significant number of commodities.
There was a third factor affecting the level of duty rates established in
the Polish tariff: the provision of unilateral preferences to developing
states by the country. Imports from the least developed countries (49
countries included in the list of the United Nations) was subject to zero
duty rates, while imports from the countries which GDP per capita that
did not exceed that of Poland was subject to rates that were reduced by
20 % as compared to conventional rates. These rates (LDC and DEV) are
called preferential in customs tariffs. However, the goods that are
sensitive for Poland’s industry were excluded from the list of preferences.
On 1 July 1995, Poland became a founding member of the WTO. The
process of reducing conventional duty rates for industrial goods began on
1 January 1995. Conventional rates were applied to imports from WTO
member states and from the states that were not members of the WTO,
but which were subject to Poland’s most-favored nation treatment
(MFN). Thus, the reduction of conventional rates also applied to imports
from Russia and the other CIS states.
Thus, Poland reduced its duty rates for industrial goods on average by
38 %. The reduction was the most rapid for those rates that remained at a
relatively low level before the end of the Round (5—10 %). The
reduction was the slowest for relatively high duty rates (25—35 %) that
protected sensitive goods (fabric, clothes, metallurgic products). In
practice, the mentioned measures carried considerably less weight, since
in many instances they were implemented with respect to the bound rates,
rather than those applied de facto at that time. The reduced rates, i.e. the
rates applied to imports from states — signatories to FTAs with Poland,
were significantly reduced. Starting in 1995 and lasting for the next 5
years, duties for most industrial goods from the EU and EFTA countries
were reduced overall by 20 %. Automobile duties were the last to be
reduced (2002). Before the provisions on trade and trade-related matters
of the Europe Agreement and agreements with EFTA states came into
force, Poland abolished or reduced duties with regard to nearly one third
of imports from the above-mentioned states (raw materials and capital
goods) in order to accelerate the modernization of Poland’s economy and
to reduce production costs. Liberalization within the CEFTA framework
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went at a much faster pace. From the beginning of 1997, the import of the
majority of industrial goods from the member-states was duty-free.
Conventional duty rates for agricultural products were also subject to
reduction (on average, by 36%, however not less than by 15 %). In view
of the rate fixing of non-tariff instruments conducted at the Uruguay
Round, the initial duty rates for agricultural goods were much higher than
those for industrial commodities. However, the rates that were applied in
practice were even lower than those.
The liberalization of trade in agricultural products within the framework
of free trade agreements was insignificant. These agreements did not
guarantee free access to the Polish market, but only facilitated access to a
certain extent and only with regard to certain agricultural products.
As a result of multilateral regional liberalization of trade in 1995—
1999, the average level of duty rates in Poland was significantly reduced.
In 1999, the average weighted duty rate was nearly half that of 1995
(reduced from 6.1 to 3.2 %). Duty played a minimal role in the import of
industrial goods from EU and CEFTA states (see Table 4.13). About two
thirds of Poland’s industrial imports were duty-free (in 2003 the share
amounted to 87 %). The average weighted duty rate for agricultural goods
was several times higher than that for industrial goods.
Table 4.13
AVERAGE WEIGHTED IMPORT TARIFFS IN POLAND IN 1999
(IN %, ACCORDING TO THE 1998 COMMODITY STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS)
Without suspensions Including suspensions
HC Description
EU C
EF
TA
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I—XXI All goods 2.3 1.8 7.1 3.5 2.3 1.8 6.5 3.3
I—IV Agriculturalproducts 18.2 11.6 13.0 16.0 18.1 11.6 12.7 15.8
V—XXI Non-agriculturalproducts 0.8 0.5 6.1 2.3 0.8 0.5 5.5 2.2
Source: WTO, «Trade Policy…», 2000.
The increasing difference between reduced and conventional rates (so-
called reverse discrimination) (Kaminski B., 2001) has had a trade
diversion effect on Poland’s economy towards pro-European orientation.
The Europe Agreement and FTAs envisaged the application of a so-
called restructuring principle, which, for the purposes of protecting new
sectors and branches of the economy that were in the process of
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restructuring or facing various problems, allowed Poland, as a weaker
partner, to introduce additional duties for goods, the import of which has
already been subjected to liberalisation. The country utilized the
restructuring principle three times. In 1994, an additional duty on
telecommunications equipment was introduced (specifically, telephone,
telegraph apparatus, and teletypes). The import of such goods from EU and
EFTA countries was fully liberalized with the coming into force of free
trade agreements. Telecommunications were included in the category of
newly-created industries. The lack of customs protection discouraged
foreign enterprises from investing in Poland and hindered the development
of existing enterprises. Poland also utilized the restructuring principle in the
petrochemical (1996) and metallurgical (1997) sectors. In the first instance,
Poland raised the duty and continued the liberalization process until 2000
(according to the preliminary schedule, duties were expected to amount to
0 % as early as in 1999). In the other case, it slowed down the process of
duty abolishment, extending the domestic market protection period for two
more years (Zagraniczna polityka…, 1997). Poland’s authorities believed
that the industries would be restructured during the validity period of
additional protection, which would allow enterprises to compete in the
international market when zero tariff rates were in effect.
In December 1992, according to the GATT provisions on balance of
payment, Poland introduced a 6 % tax on the import of all goods, other
than alcohol and tobacco products, fuels and automobiles (DzU 1992…).
The tax introduction was due to the fact that as a result of an intensive
drought in 1992, currency reserves were under threat. The tax was
gradually reduced and on 1 January 1997 completely abolished.
The policy of conventional protectionism instruments, or in other
words, liberal non-tariff tools and trade restriction due to non-economic
reasons, required adjustment to WTO requirements (the customs law of
1989 was not in line with WTO requirements). On the day that Poland
acceded to the WTO, the Parliament adopted the Law on the General
Framework, Requirements and Rules of Introducing Additional Customs
Duties on the Import of Certain Agricultural Goods (dated 28 June 1995),
which was based upon a special protection principle of the WTO
Agriculture Agreement. In 1998, along with the Customs Code, four laws
came into force, which regulated the policy of market protection and
foreign trade turnover6. These included: the anti-dumping law, the law on
                     
6 The Laws of 11 December 1997 (DzU 1997 nr 157, poz. 1026—1029, ze zm.) on: 1)
safeguard from the import of goods onto Poland’s customs territory and dumping thereof; 2)
safeguard from excessive import of goods onto Poland’s customs territory; 3) safeguard from
excessive import of some textile goods and clothes onto Poland’s customs territory,
regulation of the turnover of foreign trade in goods and services and on special turnover.
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protection from the excessive import of goods onto the customs territory
of Poland (general and textile) and on the regulation of the turnover of
foreign trade in goods and services, as well as on a special turnover. The
anti-subsidy law took effect in November 2002 (dated 21 June 2002).
These laws (amended in 2001) were in force until Poland became a
member of the EU. Even though from the very beginning one could
predict that certain provisions of these laws would not be utilized in
practice, for instance, the anti-subsidy law or the law on the regulation of
the turnover of foreign services (no normative act was issued under these
laws), nonetheless, they helped Polish business entities to learn about the
EU principles. Following accession to the EU, the Polish government
retained its authorities associated with the issuance of export and import
transaction permits and the introduction of restrictions on foreign
economic activities pursued for non-economic motives. These issues are
regulated by the law on foreign trade turnover administration, which took
effect on 1 May 2004 (dated 16 April 2004).
Owing to the above-mentioned laws, non-tariff measures for the
protection of the national industry from foreign competition became
popular. The reduction of tariffs resulted in a rapid growth of the import
of goods at competitive prices from Asian countries and second-hand
goods from the EU. To counteract the negative consequences of unfair
and excessively increasing imports, Poland’s government, pressured by
representatives of national industry, took various, often ineffective
measures (for instance, an ad hoc protection investigation in the case of
tractors). This led to strong opposition from importers and generated
numerous warnings from Poland’s trading partners, primarily from the
European Union.
One of the protection tools utilised in Poland was investigations in the
case of excessively increasing imports (this phenomenon was also present
in other states of Central and Eastern Europe). The tools of protection
from unfair import (i.e. on dumping or subsidising) were not much
utilized.
Since the coming into effect of the anti-dumping law which was
amended to meet WTO requirements (1998), Poland has conducted only
six new anti-dumping investigations, including one against an EU
member-state (all initiated by producers). No anti-subsidy investigation
has been conducted. The utilization of both instruments required the
issuance of relevant implementing regulations, capacity-building efforts
for the administration and judiciary, producers’ awareness of complex
procedures and their relevant organisation. During this period, Poland
conducted 19 investigations against excessively increasing imports,
including 5 on the basis of the textiles law (13 resulted in the application
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of the protection instrument)7. The majority of investigations pertained to
imports from states — non-members of the WTO (China, Taiwan and
CIS states). This permitted the selective application of instruments and,
furthermore, did not require providing any proof of inflicted damages or
submitting an application to the WTO forum. The investigations
concerned goods that were often involved in a similar investigation in
other states as well (for instance, there was a domino effect in the case of
ammonium nitrate and some steel works). Several of the investigations
ended without the application of protection measures. Generally, this
happened due to insufficient evidence (lack of evidence of essential
damages inflicted upon the national industry or a threat of such, lack of
interrelation between the damages inflicted and imports). In some
instances, the instruments were utilized, however later cancelled by virtue
of a court decision or a decision rendered by a WTO body before the end
of their validity period.
Poland also introduced additional duties on the import of numerous
agricultural products (for instance, flowers, tomatoes, and poultry). The
above-mentioned duties were standardized when the tolerance quantity
was exceeded or when the goods were imported at a price which was
minimally 10 % lower than the ceiling price.
Pursuant to the Europe Agreement and other agreements on free trade
areas, Poland prohibited the import of passenger vehicles that were more
than ten year old and commercial vehicles that were more than six years
old until the end of 2001. New principles for the import of used
automobiles took effect in March 2001 (Ministerial Order …, 1997). The
import of de-registered or damaged automobiles was prohibited. These
rules were introduced consequent to a significant increase in the import of
used vehicles, which presented a threat to road safety and the
environment (the need to dispose of old vehicles), and an adverse impact
of the import of old vehicles on national automobile producers and other
enterprises pursuing their activities in this sphere (distributors and leasing
companies). In July 1994, Poland introduced a ban on the import of used
combine harvesters. The ban was abolished in 1997 under the pressure of
the European Commission, which concluded that the rules for the
introduction of such tool were not in line with the provisions of the
Europe Agreement.
Until 1997, according to the FTAs, quotas were applied to the import
of petrol, diesel and energy-producing fuels, while the import of
lubricants oils was subject to a relevant permit. As mentioned earlier,
                     
7 Previously, Poland introduced safeguards referring to the general safeguard principle
of the Europe Agreement and other free trade agreements (for instance, in 1994 in the
automobile sector).
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from 1996 the sector was subject to additional protection introduced
according to the re-structuring principle.
Export restrictions primarily arose from Poland’s international
commitments or from the limitations introduced by Poland’s trading
partners (the EU, the USA and Canada). Poland autonomously applied
restrictions to the export of raw and tanned leather, cast iron, steel and non-
ferrous metals waste and scrap, as well as live goose and goose eggs. The
procedure associated with the introduction of export restrictions on leather
and scrap and the lack of an explicit liberalization schedule generated
warnings on the part of European Commission and Member States
4.4.3. Poland and Ukraine: Comparative Analysis
The conditions for access to the EU market for Ukrainian and Polish
goods in the period of systematic transformation were established by the
autonomous decisions of the EU and bilateral agreements. The first group
included decisions about the abolishment of specific and non-specific
restrictions, the application of a generalized system of preferences, the
provision of a market economy status and the introduction of quantitative
restrictions on imports from Ukraine. The second group included: the
Europe Agreement, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between
the EU and Ukraine and sector-specific agreements between the EU and
Ukraine. The preconditions for the access of Polish and Ukrainian goods
to the EU market, established by the above-mentioned decisions and
agreements, are outlined in Table 4.14.
On the basis of the pre-conditions given above, Poland and Ukraine can
be placed in the so-called EU pyramid of preferences; however, since 1990,
Poland has had a much higher ranking. At the beginning of the 1990s, when
Poland was already enjoying the GSP customs benefits, imports from
Ukraine still faced a significant number of discriminatory barriers. In 1993,
when the EU granted GSP preferences to Ukraine8, Poland was already an
associate member of the EU and was developing a free trade area for
industrial products. Since then, regardless of various concessions from the
EU, Ukraine’s place in the EU pyramid of preferences has not changed, but
as a matter of fact has even regressed, for instance, in comparison to the
Balkan states and Albania. Ukraine’s position improved somewhat following
the signing of an agreement with the EU on a free trade area.
Paradoxically, irrespective of Poland’s more favourable status, Polish
exports faced significantly higher barriers to European market access,
                     
8 Regardless of the improved conditions of EU market access, the EU preserved
discriminatory restrictions on the import of steel and textile products from Ukraine.
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than the Ukrainian ones in the first half of the 1990s (Figure 4.4). The
goods exported at zero or low rates constituted a significant share of
Ukraine’s exports to the EU. The situation dramatically changed in 1996,
when Poland was granted free market access for the majority of goods
exported by Poland to the EU. The GSP customs preferences granted to
Ukraine did not materially affect EU market access for Ukrainian goods,
since such preferences did not cover many essential components of
Ukraine’s exports. Only in 2006, as the new GSP principles took effect,
did Ukraine have the opportunity to appreciate the benefits of the given
preferences.
Table 4.14
COMPARISON OF EU MARKET ACCESS CONDITIONS
FOR POLAND AND UKRAINE IN 1990—2008
Conditions Poland Ukraine
Abolishment of specific
restrictions 1990 1992
Abolishment of non-
specific restrictions 1990 1992 (suspension)
Customs preferences of the
GSP 1990 — 1 March 1992 Since 1 January 1993
General conditions for
market access
• Industrial products:
1992—1996 —
preferential
1997—2004 —duty-
free, with exceptions• Agricultural products:
preferential
MFN with exceptions
(steel, textile) on the basis
of the CPA in addition to
GSP benefits
Anti-dumping
investigations Applied until 2002 Still applied
Granting of market
economy status 1 March 1992 21 December 2005
Limits on the import of
textiles
Have not been applied
since 1998
Not applied since March
2001
Limits on the import of
steel
Have not been applied
since 1992
Applied until the date of
entry into the WTO
Average weighted customs
duty rate for EU market
access, %:
1992
2005
5.2
0
2.17
1.38
Source: Developed by the author on the basis of EU normative acts and the WITS
database.
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Poland
Ukraine
Figure 4.4. EU Customs Duty Rates, Average Weighted
by Poland’s and Ukraine’s Imports
Source: developed by the authors on the basis of the WITS database.
Another example of the EU’s discriminating attitude towards Ukraine
and Poland would be the decision of the Council of the European Union
to grant market economy status to the countries. Poland was granted such
status on 1 March 1992, while Ukraine was granted one over 13 years
later. In addition to the political nature, this was also of significance to
anti-dumping investigations (lower dumping limits and, consequently
lower anti-dumping duties).
The conditions for the access of goods to the Ukrainian market,
particularly that of agricultural products, as compared to those of the
other CIS states, Central Europe (in the time of associate membership)
and even the EU9, can generally be called liberal. This positive
assessment is primarily affected by a relatively low level of customs
protection. A considerable share of Ukrainian imports is duty-free (in
2006, nearly two thirds of the aggregate value). The primary users of free
access to the Ukrainian market are the CIS states, first and foremost
Russia. Before Poland’s accession to the EU, EU states, EFTA and
CEFTA states, as well as Turkey and Israel enjoyed free access to
Poland’s market of industrial products (in 1999 and 2003, the share of
duty-free imports in Poland’s aggregate imports of industrial goods from
the above-mentioned countries amounted to over 70 % and 87 %
respectively). Also, the duty-free conditions applied to a large share of
Polish industrial imports from the CIS states and the states with MFN
status (in 2003, over 74 % and 34 %, respectively).
                     
9 This may be supported, specifically, by the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index
(OTRI) of the World Bank, which includes MFN duty rates and non-tariff barriers, and the
Index of Trade Freedom of the Heritage Foundation. In 2008, this index for Ukraine
(82.2 %) is slightly lower than the index for Poland (86.0 %), while for Russia (44.3 %)
this index is significantly higher (World Bank, Ukraine…).
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In the 1990s, the level of customs protection in Ukraine was on
average lower than that of Poland (the simple average duties were lower
and in the case of average weighted rates, the difference was even
greater). It was only following the completion of the regional and
multilateral liberalization process in Poland that the situation changed
dramatically and Polish average rates became lower than Ukrainian ones
(Figures 4.5 and 4.6). In 2005, Ukraine significantly reduced the average
level of duty rates. Thus, consequently, it acceded to the WTO with
average rates which were significantly lower than those of Poland at the
time of Poland’s accession to the EU.
Figure 4.5. Simple average  Tariff Rates
Applied by Ukraine and Poland
Figure 4.6. Weighted Average Tariff Rates
Applied by Ukraine and Poland
Poland Ukraine
Source: the WITS database.
Note: the 2006 data for Poland is not available, as since 1 May 2004 imports to Poland
are subject to EU rates (in 2006, the simple average MFN rate in the EU amounted to
5.4 %, while the average weighted one equalled 3.4 %).
Reducing the level of customs protection pursuant to international
obligations, both countries willingly utilized other instruments of trade policy
in order to protect their national industry from foreign competition. In
Ukraine, metallurgy, automobile and food industry primarily enjoyed
government protection. Safeguards were also utilized to protect other capital-
intensive branches, for instance, the production of fertilizer and cement. In
Poland, during the period of economic transformation, two sectors enjoyed
special protection: the automobile and fuel sectors. The association of the
above-mentioned sectors with particularly sensitive branches of the economy
can be supported by the WTO decision not to establish binding duty rates for
automobiles, spare parts and petrochemical products, as well as by special
provisions of the Europe Agreement and other FTAs. Safeguards in the
production of consumer goods (footwear, textiles and clothes production)
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were established under pressure from national producers. Protection from
increasing and unfair imports became an element of the sector-based
Consumer Goods Production Strategy for 2000—2005.
Both states also took safeguards to protect newly-created sectors:
while in Ukraine the government was primarily pressured by national
investors (producers of household goods, specifically foodstuffs and
furniture), in Poland the government was mainly pressured by foreign
investors (for instance, extraordinary duties on telecommunications). In
Ukraine, the strategy of the protection of new industry also covered
export policy instruments.
The import of used goods from the EU presented a great problem for
Poland. In response to complaints filed by producers (clothes, agricultural
and construction machines, and automobiles), the government took
measures to cope with the issue, however initially with no effect. In
Ukraine, the problem mainly concerned used automobiles (import quotas
were in effect prior to entry into the WTO).
Undoubtedly, Ukraine’s customs policy was mostly distinctive in, and
characterised by the extensive application of export restrictions. The keep
goods at home strategy was intended to counteract the de-industrialisation of
Ukraine and the creation of a raw material base for Western states, as well as
to provide the industry with cheap raw materials in order to launch the
national production of consumer goods. In the 1990s, having regard for
processing industry interests, Poland also had problems with the excessive
export of raw materials (leather, ferrous and non-ferrous metal scrap). The
problem was exacerbated, since the replenishment of supplies with the help
of imports was problematic in view of export restrictions introduced in other
countries (in particular, in Ukraine). Pressured by the European Commission,
Poland gradually abolished such restrictions. Ukraine showed more
resistance in this matter. During WTO accession negotiations, it refused to
entirely abolish export duties, only agreeing to gradually reduce them.
Assessing the application of trade policy instruments, one must
mention the role of advocacy groups. In Poland, importers were
particularly active, while in Ukraine advocacy came from industrial
financial groups, which often controlled an entire branch of production.
The difference was in that the Polish importers utilized more formal
methods (for instance, appealing in court), while in Ukraine the pressure
was mainly unofficial, typical of an insider economy.
Ukraine adopted legislation on market protection based upon WTO
principles in the first half of 1999, thus slightly more than a year after
Poland, which became a member of the WTO in mid-1995. Both
countries included some EU elaborated materials into protection laws.
The application of European principles most vividly manifested itself in
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new customs codes. Pursuant to the Europe Agreement, Poland undertook
a commitment to approximate its customs law to EU norms and even
when there was no such commitment («protection laws»), it took EU
legislation as a basis almost immediately (EU legislation is adjusted to
WTO principles, however envisages a more detailed regulation of a
number of cases). Even though having committed to harmonize a
significant part of its customs legislation with that of the EU on the basis
of the 2004 Plan of Action, Ukraine failed to do so in a timely manner.
The adaptation of Ukraine’s legislation to acquis communautaire was
slowed down due to a lack of a clear prospect of EU membership and, to
a certain extent, negotiations with the United States within the framework
of WTO accession, during which other solutions were proposed to
Ukraine. Ukraine believed that concentrating on the EU alone, could do
harm to the successful completion of the negotiations.
The rules of introduction were an essential element in the application
of trade policy instruments. In Poland, market protection measures were
introduced by the Minister of Economy, while prohibition was within the
Council of Ministers’ competence. In Ukraine, until April 2004, the
Parliament made decisions in matters pertaining to the establishment of
import and export quotas and licenses on the basis of a relevant
submission by the Government, by adopting individual laws, which
enhanced the protection orientation of Ukraine’s economy. In April 2004,
along with changes to the Law on Foreign Economic Activities, a
principle was introduced that the establishment of quantitative restrictions
should be within the government’s competence.
In Poland, the customs tariff was established by the Council of Ministers
by issuing an instruction (in 1990—1997 in the form of an annex to the
Customs Law and from 1998 and until Poland’s accession to the EU — in
the form of an annex to the Customs Code). In Ukraine, duties were
introduced according to an administrative procedure until mid-2001, at which
time, the Law on Customs Tariff took effect, delegating the exclusive
authority of making changes to duty rates to the Verkhovna Rada.
Changes in the commodity structure of Poland’s and Ukraine’s
exports to EU-15 of 1996—2000 illustrate quite well the difference in the
economic transformation processes in the countries. In the mid-1990s,
capital-intensive goods prevailed in Ukrainian exports to the EU-15,
while labour-intensive products constituted a significant share of Poland’s
exports to the EU-15. However, Poland’s exports changed dramatically in
the relevant period: the share of machines and equipment, as well as
transport equipment and plastic materials grew considerably (overall,
from nearly 28 % to nearly 50 %). The share of textile materials shrank
significantly. The share of mineral products (coal) diminished as well.
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Instead, Ukraine reinforced its position as a supplier of raw materials and
goods with a low level of processing. Presently, two groups, mineral and
metal products (specifically due to increased quotas), constitute more
than half of exports to the EU. The exports of textiles and clothes,
irrespective of an insignificant reduction in the aggregate exports of
Ukraine to the EU, continue to maintain quite a high position, which is
affected by the procedure of applying a greater degree of processing. In
view of much higher labour costs, Poland is not competitive in this case.
The commodity structure of Poland’s imports to the EU-15 has
changed less. Machines and equipment, transportation equipment,
chemicals and basic metals continue to be the major commodities (57 %
and 63 % in 1996 and 2006, respectively). The first three groups also
have a substantially increasing share in the commodity pattern of
Ukrainian imports from the EU-15 (61 % in 2006). The share of machines
and equipment in the relevant period increased from 27.4 % to 33.1 %,
while the share of transportation equipment grew from 4 % to nearly
12 %. Summing up, we can say that the difference in the commodity
pattern of imports from the EU-15 to both states is considerably less than
that of the commodity pattern of exports to the EU-15.
Changes in the commodity structure of Poland’s and Ukraine’s trade
with the EU are also illustrated by indicators of intra-industry trade
intensity. Analysing them, it can be seen that the share in Poland’s trade
with the EU-15 in aggregate trade (calculated by the simple and adjusted
Grubel-Lloyd index) shows systematic growth from 1996, while the share
of Ukraine’s intra-industry trade with the EU-15 has been diminishing. In
1996, the simple G-L index for Poland was twice as high as that of
Ukraine. 10 years later this difference has increased twofold.
4.4.4. Conclusions
General results validate the thesis about the stimulating impact of
economic integration on the development of intra-industry trade and
illustrate the consolidation of the poor commodity structure of Ukraine’s
exports, as well as Ukraine’s non-utilization of the benefits arising from
its geographical location (proximity to large markets), as the basis for
attracting direct foreign investment and changing trade for the purpose of
greater diversification and specialisation. The Ukrainian economy
depends to a large extent on several sectors with low value added, low
productivity and high vulnerability with regard to smallest price and
currency fluctuations, as well as extraneous shocks. Export
diversification, along with the reduction of production energy-
intensiveness, is essential for the stabilisation of Ukraine’s economy.
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4.5. Commercial Diplomacy in Bilateral Relations
4.5.1. Introduction
The development of a global trade system under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization has resulted in dramatic changes in national support
systems associated with international economic activities. Firstly, the nature
of such systems has changed from primarily paternal and protectionist to de
facto supportive. While previously, in order to stimulate national production
and exports, governments actively utilized quantitative restrictions and
direct production subsidisation, after the de facto prohibition of the above-
mentioned, and pursuant to WTO rules, high priority was given to the
following methods: informational, methodological, organisational and legal
facilitation of international activities, diplomatic support for the
development of trade and economic relations, and the development of a
positive image of the country as such. Secondly, the role of support systems
for international activities in the social and economic development of
countries has been enhanced: while traditionally they were viewed as a
merely economic mechanism for increasing national exports on a par with
the increasing competitiveness of goods and services, and marketing efforts
for exporting companies, presently effective support of international
activities is transforming into a factor, contributing to the development of
the national economy’s competitiveness.
4.5.2. The Substance and Tasks of Commercial Diplomacy
The somewhat comprehensive notion of commercial diplomacy should be
interpreted as activities pursued by the officials of various governmental
and non-governmental institutions to promote national economic interests.
Commercial diplomacy has the following key forms: participation in bi-
and multilateral negotiations on economic matters; promotion of the
economic interests of the state in relevant international organisations;
activities of trade or economic missions and representations at embassies;
activities of foreign representative offices of national chambers and
associations of commerce and industry.
In global practice, commercial diplomacy is tasked with the
following:
— Creating the best and most advantageous conditions for the
participation of the national economy in the global economy, including
increasing the share of the country’s participation in the global economy,
reinforcing the opportunities to effectively impact international economic
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relations (the USA, the EU and the Russian Federation practice
commercial diplomacy to affect the structure and dynamics of
international economic relations, i.e. they seek to play a dominant, crucial
role in the development and regulation of such relations. Other countries
utilize commercial diplomacy methods to achieve equality in trade,
international organisations, etc.);
— Providing economic and political facilitation to domestic business
in its foreign activities, including in reallocation matters — by enhancing
its competitiveness, reinforcing the right of access to existing and
potential resources and markets;
— Promoting national interests and ensuring national security, which
would guarantee the accomplishment of national tasks and prevent market
interests and priorities from imposing their will on the entire society (in
general, this principle reads: a market economy does not mean a market
society); thus, it becomes clear that national interests prevail over others;
— Creating most favourable conditions for developing human capital
in the country, increasing the intellectual component in national wealth,
raising the standards of living and enhancing the quality of life, ensuring
the most advanced social standards (which may not be achieved
exclusively by a spontaneous action of market forces) (The New
Economic…, 2003; Soren Kjeldsen-Kragh, 2001; V. Shchetynnyk, 2001;
Global Trade…, 2003).
The above-mentioned tasks of the state system of commercial
diplomacy also include reconciling conflicting interests (for instance,
corporate and public), establishing mutually acceptable rules of the game
in bilateral relations and on the global level, bringing parties to interstate
commercial and economic conflicts to the negotiation table, resolving
disputes by reaching a compromise, etc.
Presently, the foreign economic policy of the state and even more so
its trade policy are affected by commercial diplomacy methods and
mechanisms and represent a product of efforts designed to balance
national interests, applicable provisions of international commercial law
and similar interests of other states and groups of states. Foreign
economic activities of governments in the form of commercial diplomacy
continuingly acquire marketing features, which manifest themselves in
the following:
— Implementing ongoing monitoring of the status and development
tendencies in global commodities markets and financial markets in the
search for market opportunities to be utilized by national producers or for
the purpose of developing cooperation relations;
— Determining regional priorities of economic activities and
designing relevant measures for the development of bilateral relations;
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— Orienting towards competition both while supporting competitive
industries of the national economy on the global market and taking
measures to develop state competitiveness as such;
— Strategically orienting economic activities, creating long-term
programs for the development of industries and regions, adapting the
structure to the imperatives of the international division of labour; and
— Creating a positive image of the country in the global arena by
demonstrating a progressive political position, participating in
peacekeeping and anti-terrorist actions and developing international
contacts in the sphere of culture, sports, science and education
(T. Tsyhankova, 2004 : 105).
Ukraine’s foreign economic activities are directed towards developing
such relations with other states that would contribute to the strengthening of
the national economic system, economic development based upon
innovations and high technologies, promotion of national products in
international and regional commodities markets, as well as the prevention
of extraneous threats to the economic sovereignty and economic security of
the state. The state has shifted its focus from direct control and participation
in foreign economic activities to the creation of favorable customs, tax,
legal and other normative conditions for exporters, as well as to the
protection of their interests on global markets and support through the
provision of information and consultations. It becomes increasingly more
difficult to draw a line between politics, economy and trade. In view of the
complexity of the current international business environment, specific
features of its components and the prospective intensification of
competition associated with the promotion of national interests on the
global market, states, including Ukraine, are tasked with bringing such
policy onto the track of acceptable trade-offs and reciprocal international
economic cooperation. This is precisely why Ukrainian business requires
higher effectiveness of all commercial diplomacy forms and methods at all
levels from all national players of commercial diplomacy (Table 4.15).
On the global level, the mechanisms and processes of the economic
diplomacy of various countries are coordinated through participation in
international organizations. Ukraine is a founding member of the United
Nations Organization (the UN or the United Nations), a member of the
Council of Europe and a participating state of the OSCE. As a founding
member of the United Nations, Ukraine is consistently committed to the
goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and makes an
essential contribution in its activities in the sphere of international peace
and security, disarmament, economic and social development, human
rights, international law, etc. Ukraine has repeatedly been elected a
member of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
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Table 4.15
LEVELS AND KEY ACTORS OF COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY IN UKRAINE
Levels Key Players
Global
Representation in international organisations:
— Intergovernmental (the World Trade Organization; the
World Customs Organization; the International Exhibitions
Bureau; the UN/UNCTAD, the UNCITRAL, the
International Trade Centre);
— Non-governmental (the International Chamber of
Commerce, the International Association of Fairs and
Expositions, the Consumers International);
— Mixed (the International Labour Organization,
international business associations).
Supranational — The Mission of Ukraine to the European Union;— Missions to the bodies of the CISs, BSEC, GUAM, etc.
Intergo-
vernmental
— Trade and economic missions at Ukraine’s embassies
abroad;
— Committees of heads of states;
— Intergovernmental commissions on trade and economic
cooperation.
Governmental
— The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
— The Secretariat of the President of Ukraine;
— The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;
— Industry-specific ministries and agencies (first and
foremost, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Economy);
— Regional authorities.
Business
— The Ukrainian Association of Producers and Businessmen
(UAPB);
— The Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI);
— Sector, production and trade associations.
Presently, Ukraine is a member of the Committee for Programme and
Coordination of the United Nations, the United Nations Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Committee
on Contributions, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Programme
of Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider
Appreciation of International Law, the United Nations Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, the United Nations Disarmament
Commission, the United Nations Commission on Population and
Development, the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the
Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme/United
Nations Population Fund, the Executive Board of the United Nations
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Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Governing Body of the International
Labour Organization, and the IAEA Board of Governors. The state
directs its efforts to develop cooperation with international economic and
environmental organizations, to engage their potentials to the benefit of
Ukraine’s social and economic interests, in order to accelerate the
integration of our state in the global economy and to resolve acute
environmental problems. The resolution of global development problems
by economic means is illustrated by Ukraine’s participation in projects
designed to deal with the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster, the
fight against AIDS and drug abuse.
At the supranational level, Ukrainian diplomats are trying to secure
the full and effective participation of Ukraine in regional cooperation
mechanisms, specifically in the CIS, the Central European Initiative
(CEI), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC),
GUAM, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Ukraine’s participation
in the work of the above-mentioned associations is intended to facilitate
the development of multilateral cooperation with the member-states and
to positively influence the advancement of the State of Ukraine towards
market reforms. The Mission of Ukraine to the European Union
coordinates bilateral relations between Ukraine and the European Union.
The intergovernmental level of commercial diplomacy operates
through the economic departments of Ukraine’s diplomatic missions and
intergovernmental commissions on trade and economic cooperation.
Presently, more than 70 intergovernmental commissions on trade and
economic cooperation have been established and operate on the basis of
the provisions of intergovernmental agreements on trade and economic
(economic) cooperation or bilateral arrangements at a higher level. The
majority of commissions were created in 1994—1996. The key function
of intergovernmental commissions is to promote the development of
bilateral cooperation with a partner-state, to analyse a relevant state of
affairs and to identify the most prospective directions and options for
improvement (the official website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)
On the basis of the results of the commissions’ meetings, the parties have
signed protocols according to which, Ukrainian sections of the
commissions, develop plans of action to implement joint arrangements,
which include specific deadlines and the responsible ministries and
agencies of Ukraine. The practice illustrates that bilateral
intergovernmental commissions for economic cooperation with European
states are an effective mechanism for stimulating the development of
bilateral trade and economic ties.
At the business level, commercial diplomacy tools operate through the
Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (UUIE), the
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Chamber of Commerce and Industry, sector trade and manufacturers’
associations.
It seems reasonable to illustrate the key forms and methods of
commercial diplomacy in Ukraine with the following matrix (Figure 4.7)
Government Civic organisations
A
br
oa
d
І• Participation in the activities of
international organizations• Permanent missions to
international organizations• Participation in the activities of
regional groups• Trade and economic missions
IV• Participation in the activities of
international non-governmental
organizations• Foreign offices of the UUIE, CCI,
associations
In
 U
kr
ai
ne
Figure 4.7. The Matrix of Key Forms and Methods
of Commercial Diplomacy
Source: T.M. Tsyhankova, O.O. Yevdochenko, 2006 : 160.
The forms and methods utilized by the government abroad belong to
Group I. Group ІІ includes those utilized both in Ukraine and abroad at
the level of government and civic organisations. The forms and methods
of commercial diplomacy presented in Group ІІІ are utilized in Ukraine
and are typical of both government authorities and civic organisations.
Group IV encompasses the forms and methods applied by civic
organizations abroad; Group V — both abroad and in Ukraine.
4.5.3. Bilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation
between Ukraine and Poland
Cooperation between the government and civic organisations on the
international level, specifically on the Ukrainian-Polish level, plays a
special role in the development of the system of commercial diplomacy in
Ukraine. The strategic partnership existing between Ukraine and the
ІІ• Negotiations• Intergovernmental commissions• Diplomatic events
V• Lobbying through
associations (producers,
exporters...)• Participation in
international
exhibitions/shows
III
Strategy elaboration / participation in the elaboration of a strategy and a
normative-legal framework for international economic activities
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Republic of Poland is implemented through the entire spectrum of
bilateral contacts — political, economic and humanitarian.
Recently, Poland and Ukraine established a number of bilateral
cooperation institutes, including the Advisory Committee under the
Presidents of Ukraine and Poland, the Joint Commission for Economic
Cooperation, the Ukrainian-Polish Conference on European Integration,
the Intergovernmental Coordination Council for Interregional
Cooperation, the Annual Ukrainian-Polish Economic Forum of
Entrepreneurs, the Civic Ukrainian-Polish Forum as well as the Inter-
Parliamentary Assembly of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. One
should also mention such trilateral bodies as the Polish-American-
Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative and the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania,
Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland. All of the above-mentioned
bodies have stimulated relations between our states.
The contractual-legal framework for Polish-Ukrainian relations
includes nearly 100 documents that have the status of international
agreements and regulate practically the entire spectrum of bilateral
cooperation. Bilateral arrangements between the entities of the
administrative-territorial system of Poland and Ukraine (numbering more
than 130) constitute an important component of the contractual-legal
framework.
Presently, in the legal sphere, there is a need to enhance cooperation
between contractual-legal departments of foreign policy agencies, for
the purpose of developing an inventory of the contractual-legal
framework between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. Implementing
such revision is extremely important in view of Poland’s accession to
the EU. Further extension of the contractual-legal framework with the
Republic of Poland will specifically permit the utilization of developed
models of the legal regulation of bilateral relations in cooperation with
the other EU states.
Since Ukraine gained its independence, bilateral relations with Poland
have remained the focus of the Advisory Committee under the Presidents
of Ukraine and Poland (the Advisory Committee), which was founded in
1993. It is within the Advisory Committee’s competence to determine
strategic lines of political, economic, military and humanitarian
cooperation and to resolve pending issues pertaining to bilateral relations.
As a rule, the Advisory Committee convenes every six months.
Since it was founded, the Advisory Committee has reviewed a broad
range of issues, such as: the stimulation of trade and economic
cooperation; the justification for, and implementation of co-projects in the
energy sector; prospects of Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU and
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NATO; the implementation of intergovernmental agreements; the
development of cross-border cooperation; options for the improvement of
existing cooperation formats in order to ensure that such formats
correspond to the realities of the present and to increase the efficiency of
the system of bilateral relations; the elaboration of co-tasks of foreign
economic policy and cooperation; the implementation of the EURO-2012
Football Championship final; the enforcement of Energy Summit
decisions, etc. Cooperation on the level of Prime Ministers also remains
active.
The development of trade and economic cooperation between
Ukraine and Poland is facilitated by the Commission for Trade and
Economic Cooperation, established on the basis of the
intergovernmental Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation
(October 1991). Seven joint meetings were held before Poland became a
member of the EU. The new intergovernmental Agreement on
Economic Cooperation was signed on 4 March 2005 in Kyiv, during the
visit of Poland’s Prime Minister to Ukraine, which permitted the Polish-
Ukrainian intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation to
resume its activities. Three working groups have been established for
the Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in the fuel and energy sectors, coal
industry and implementation of the Odesa—Brody—Plock pipeline
construction project. The Commission resumed its activities in full in
November 2007.
Ukraine and Poland prioritize cooperation in the following sectors,
which are constantly the focus of attention of their governments and
relevant working groups: energy (the implementation of the project
associated with oil supply through the Odesa—Brody—Plock pipeline,
the development of a gas transportation network, synchronisation of
electric power networks, etc.); transportation (Pan-European Transport
Corridor ІІІ; the introduction of new transit documents in the railway
sector; the development of transportation infrastructure, specifically
border-crossing points, etc.); communications (development
management, capital investment, regional and cross-border cooperation in
telecommunications and information systems); defence industry and
military hardware (the implementation of research and development, as
well as joint production projects).
The implementation of the final part of the EURO-2012 Football
Championship is an important joint project of Ukraine and Poland. The
Joint Coordination Council for the Preparation and Hosting of the EURO
2012 was created at the inter-state level; its members will be responsible
for a number of key issues: safety, visa policies, and the development of
customs border crossings and joint activities of customs offices. The
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Council will also deal with the construction of roads and railway tracks,
as well as a common information policy.
At the business level, the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs and the Confederation of Polish Employers have
established the Business Coalition for EURO-2012, which, in particular,
will be implementing a project associated with the construction of a
network of hotels along the Warsaw-Kyiv highway.
In the context of strategic partnership and the implementation of joint
projects, such as the EURO-2012, we believe that the interaction of
business associations of the countries needs to be more active. First and
foremost, this pertains to regional chambers of commerce and industry,
which should enter into long-term cooperation agreements with relevant
economic chambers of Poland or Ukraine in order to support national
companies entering the market of the neighboring state.
Taking into consideration the effectiveness of such form of
commercial diplomacy as bilateral business meetings, Ukraine and
Poland regularly arrange large-scale economic forums, which serve as a
particular instrument for identifying problems pertaining to bilateral
trade and economic cooperation as well as outlining options for their
solution.
A very broad range of industries and sectors, from the energy sector to
resort therapy, are generally referred to as high priorities of trade and
economic cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. From the perspective
of Ukraine’s national economic interests and in view of a relevant interest
demonstrated by Poland, the following spheres of bilateral cooperation
should be prioritized: fuel and energy sectors, coal industry,
transportation and communications, agro-industry, construction, small-
and medium-sized entrepreneurship, banking and finance, cross-border
cooperation.
For the purpose of facilitating the effective development of trade and
economic cooperation between Ukraine and Poland in the future and
enhancing the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy measures, we
believe the following is required:
— Determining (by the parties), approving and legislatively setting
forth a number of long-term cooperation priorities; elaborating relevant
joint projects;
— Ensuring operational continuity, constructiveness and efficiency
of the players of national commercial diplomacy and bilateral institutes of
Ukrainian-Polish cooperation;
— Developing reciprocal cooperation mechanisms on the
supranational and global levels, first and foremost, on the level of the
European Union and the World Trade Organization.
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4.6. Financial Mechanisms and Instruments
4.6.1. Introduction
Discussions about the convergence of the economies of Poland and
Ukraine prioritize an analysis of development tendencies in the banking
system of Ukraine in the context of the processes in the banking system
of the European Union. In this relation, one can ascertain that changes in
the banking system of a country transforming towards a market economy
should be viewed in the context of integration processes in the legal and
institutional dimensions, as well as in terms of the efficiency and stability
of banking institutions and financial instruments, since the phenomenon
of financial convergence is associated with the integration and
incorporation of national banking systems on the international level, as
well as the implementation of legislative measures, designed to eliminate
barriers to the transfer of capital, eliminate risks and enhance investors’
confidence in the financial instruments available on the market.
The prospect of EU integration dominates in reflections about the
form of Ukraine’s financial system, specifically since relations between
the European Union and Ukraine were entrenched in the above-
mentioned Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the
European Communities and their Member States and Ukraine (PCA). The
PCA establishes the basis for EU—Ukraine relations in the sphere of
political dialogue, trade, investment and legislative cooperation10. Within
the framework of the PCA, the EU and Ukraine endorsed the principle of
the most favored nation treatment (MFN), which establishes a limit of
restrictions on the import and export of commodities. Provisions of the
PCA emphasise the importance of adjusting Ukrainian legislation to
European standards. Harmonization in this sphere is intended to promote
the creation of economic, investment and trading relations between
Ukraine and EU Member States. In relation to the above, Ukraine has
adopted relevant legislative acts11 that determined the EU integration
strategy of the country. However, we have to admit that in view of the
slow pace of economic, public and political reforms, the implementation
of legislative preconditions for integration has not significantly affected
progress in this sphere so far (Bezrukowa I., 2005 : 188).
                     
10 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) dated 10 November 1994. The
Agreement took effect in March 1998.
11 The European Union Integration Strategy of 11 June 1998 has been approved by the
Presidential Decree «On the Approval of the Programme of Ukraine’s Integration into the
EU» of 14 September 2000 and the Law of Ukraine «On the Concept of the National
Programme for the Adaptation of Ukraine’s Legislation to that of the European Union» of
21 November 2002.
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One should mention that the consolidation and stabilisation of the
banking system of Ukraine and adaptation to EU practices pertaining to
financial mechanisms and instruments are presently regarded as a
precondition for accomplishing Ukraine’s strategic task –association with
the EU. In this context, it is important to research the development
tendencies of the banking systems of Central-Eastern European countries,
particularly their experience in the adaptation of banking systems to EU
standards. The results of the banking system reform implemented in Poland
can be informative to Ukraine, since Poland is a member of the EU and has
gone through the process of adjusting its banking regulatory policy to
operating in a uniform financial market, as well as since the banking system
model utilized in Ukraine is similar to that of Poland, in terms of the
dominating role that banks play on the financial market. Presently, due to a
low development level of the other segments, specifically such as the debt
securities market or stock market, commercial banks play a leading role in
the distribution of capital in Ukraine’s financial system. However, this level
is not sufficient for the needs of the economy.
An analysis of the current development level of Ukraine’s banking
system demonstrates that, irrespective of the dominant role of banks on
the financial market and considerable qualitative changes in the
institutional structure, forms of regulation and competition level, the
system still faces challenges in the context of transformation and
Ukraine’s aspirations for EU membership. Such challenges include the
need to introduce stable legislative regulation, similar to EU standards,
further strengthen the independence of the central bank, reorganise
banking supervision and apply the recommendations of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision and EU Council Directives, increase
the capital of Ukrainian banks and consolidate the disintegrated sector, as
well as improve the quality of bank assets.
4.6.2 Overview of the Development Model and Phases
of the Banking System in Poland and Ukraine
The development principle of Ukraine’s banking system is defined by the
World Bank as the new entry model. The model envisages the
liberalization of requirements for the creation of new banks concurrently
with the privatization or liquidation of state banks.
Poland utilized the rehabilitation model, which envisages reforming
the banking system by restructuring existing state banking institutions and
intensifying their development, as well as applying a more restrictive
licensing policy and privatizing state banks in the long-term
(Świderski E., 2002 : 65). In practice, the introduction of the
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rehabilitation model involved the creation of a new legislative
framework, which introduced the operational principles of Poland’s
banking system. The transformation of the banking system began in 1989
with the adoption of the «Banking Law» and the Law «On the National
Bank of Poland»12, as well as the dissociation of nine independent
depository and crediting banks from the National Bank of Poland. Thus,
the created banking system model was based upon the principle of
universal banking activities.
This was the beginning of the process of the banking sector’s
transformation towards a market economy model in Poland; it was of
primary importance to define explicitly the functions of the central bank
and to form a sector of competing commercial banks. In the next stage, in
the early 1990s, the NBP’s liberal licensing policy affected the growth of
the number of banking institutions. This period saw the emergence of
numerous new banks, quite often with insufficient capital. In terms of
ownership, state banks, banks — shareholdings and cooperative banks
existed and operated in Poland. All the above-mentioned groups had to
tackle the issue of high-risk credits and insufficient capital (Pietrzak J.,
2002 : 52—53).
In the next phase of transformation, bank privatization was of key
importance. As a result of the implementation of relevant measures,
which constituted a one-time or gradual receipt of control over a bank,
the share of state and foreign capital in Poland’s banking assets in 2000
amounted to 23.6 % and 72.7 % respectively13. In relation to the above,
it is possible to state that the acquisition (takeover) of Polish banking
institutions primarily involved the participation of foreign investors in
the privatization. The inflow of foreign banking capital through the
takeover generated numerous disputes, since opinions about the utility
of this phenomenon and associated threats at that time differed
significantly14.
In 1989, two new laws were adopted — «Banking Law» and «On the
National Bank of Poland»15. The introduced changes adjusted the Polish
                     
12 The «Banking Law» of 31 January 1989, the Law «On the National Bank of Poland»
of 31 January 1989.
13 The indicated value was composed of the following: (a) subsidiaries (branch offices of
foreign banks) — 10.1 %, (b) banks with a foreign strategic investor holding a majority
interest — 49.8 %, (c) banks with a smaller share of foreign capital (investors holding 30—
50 %) –— 12.8 %, (d) without foreign investment — 2.1 %, (e) controlled by the state and
associated with the cooperative sector — 1.6 %. Publication data: Jabłoński P., 2000;
Grzegorczyk W., 2001.
14 See: Bloch Z., 1998, page 78; Kostrzewa W., 1997, page 48; Rozmowa E.
Balcerowicz, 1996; Jurkowska A., 1998; Dobosiewicz Z., 1995; Romiszewska I., 1999,
page 43; Konopielko Ł., 2000, page 65.
15 The «Banking Law» of 29 August 1997, the Law «On the National Bank of Poland»
of 29 August 1997.
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banking system to European standards, completed the process of the
transformation of the Polish banking system and laid the foundation for a
new stage of the system’s development. The principal provisions related
to the establishment and licensing of banks, the minimum level of equity
capital, the maintenance of bank accounts and credit arrangements. The
laws also defined the tasks of the NBP, created the Monetary Policy
Council responsible for the implementation of an independent monetary
policy, the Commission for Banking Supervision and the General
Inspectorate for Banking Supervision. Official sources and expert
publications assessed the above-mentioned laws as such that ensured
adaptation to EU norms (Szczepańska O., Sotomska-Krzysztofik P. and
others, 2004 : 79).
Since the end of the 1990s, Poland’s banking sector has been in the
process of consolidation, which has resulted in the improvement of the
economic status of the banks and the updating of their proposals. One
anticipates that the consolidation process will continue and fewer
institutions will possess more capital in the future.
Based upon an analysis of the development phases of the banking
system in Poland, it is possible to conclude that for a number of years
Poland was in a transition from a mono-banking system to a ramified
free-market banking system. The legislation regulating the operation of
the banking system was created concurrently with the implementation
of national economy reforms and the performance of Poland’s
international commitments pertaining to the OECD and the European
Community. The dominant role of foreign capital on the Polish market
resulted in intensified competition pertaining to the creation of new
banking products, information technologies and innovative distribution
channels.
Ukraine’s banking system has been developing since 1991. In 1991,
Parliament adopted the Law of Ukraine «On Banks and Banking
Activities», which became the foundation for the creation of a two-tier
independent banking system16. The Law covered the activities of the
central bank and commercial banks. The newly created system in Ukraine
included the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) and commercial banks that
could carry out their activities on a universal and specialized basis. Five
industry-specific state banks played a key role in the composition of the
system existing at that time17.
                     
16 The Law «On Banks and Banking Activities» of March 1991.
17 Ukreximbank — banking services rendered to the Government and associated with
export and import transactions; Oschadbank — banking services associated with individual
savings and utilities payments; Agroprombank (later Ukraine) — concentrated on banking
services in the agricultural sectors; Ukrsotsbank — crediting services in the social and local
spheres; Prominvestbank — financing of strategic investment and sectors.
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The development of Ukraine’s banking system may be conditionally
divided into the following phases:
• 1991—1993 — extensive development;
• 1994—1995 — a crisis, the liquidation of banks and the
introduction of regulation designed to stabilize the situation in the
banking sector;
• From 1996 to mid-1998 — stabilisation and improvement of the
state of affairs in the banking system;
• From mid-1998 to mid-2001 — modernization of the banking
system;
• From mid-2001 to 2003 — entry of foreign banks into the system;
• 2004—2006 — acquisition of Ukrainian banks by foreign banks.
At the first stage of the transformation, the regulation was focused at
eliminating the dependence of the Ukrainian banking system upon the
Russian one (Kloc K., 2001 : 6). This was done by transforming the
National Bank of the Republic — a branch office of the central bank of
the Soviet Union into an independent bank of Ukraine. Also, all existing
banks were newly registered; the registered banks were provided with
new licenses for carrying out banking activities. In this period, Ukraine
introduced its own payment unit — Ukrainian Karbovanets (10 January
1992) and created the NBU currency market, where banks could purchase
or sell currency. In 1992, Ukraine started collaborating with the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
A number of factors affected the development of the banking system in
this period; such factors included unfavorable economic conditions, a lack
of stabilizing reforms and the policy of the central bank pertaining to the
issuance of permits to open new banks. Furthermore, the central bank did
not implement an active anti-inflation policy, which would have limited the
inflow of credits. Government spending was financed with another
emission of currency. The dependence of the central bank’s policy on
Parliament did not facilitate the implementation of the monetary policy,
stabilisation of the situation in the banking system or the implementation of
the structural reforms of the Ukrainian economy (Kloc K., 2001 : 13).
Large state banks, being the core of the system, were in financial
trouble. This presented a threat to the stability of the entire banking
system. In 1992—1993, within the framework of the central bank’s
liberal licensing policy, new banks were established18, which were
characterized by a low level of authorized capital and the small size of
said banks, thus contributing to reference to some of them as «pocket
bank». The overall number of banks increased from 73 in 1991 to 230 in
                     
18 In the early 1990s, the minimum capital requirement amounted to 5 million roubles,
while at the end of 1992 — 500 million Karbovanets.
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1995. Amidst hyperinflation, the banks engaged in credit expansion,
specifically by extending short-term loans, incorporating a high-risk
level. Thus, the systemic risk and the probability of financial
destabilisation increased.
The situation in Ukraine’s banking system in 1994—1995 was a
consistent result of the previously implemented policy, i.e. in the context
of low capital accessibility requirements, high inflation and the NBU’s
liberal licensing policy. The first bankruptcies of banks were registered
during this period, which resulted in the liquidation of eleven banks in
1994 and one bank in 1995. The banks’ equity capital remained low.
Only some of them possessed equity capital that exceeded the minimum
capital requirements established for EU Member States (ECU 5 million):
two banks in 1994 and seven in 1995. However, the equity capital of the
overwhelming majority of banks was less than ECU 1 million. Therefore,
the NBU introduced requirements to bank liquidity, financial solvency
and minimum equity capital (Kloc K., 2001 : 17—19). The NBU also
introduced an electronic system of payments, which permitted the
acceleration of the settlement of payments between entities. In this
period, the NBU focused on fighting hyperinflation by pursuing a
restrictive monetary policy, which was designed to restrict the emission
of money and to reduce the inflow of credits.
In the next phase, as the relative stability of the financial system had
been achieved, a second monetary reform was implemented. On 16
September 1996, a new currency was introduced into circulation; the
hryvnia replaced the kupon in the ration of 1 hryvnia to 100,000 kupons
(Świderski E., 2002 : 70). Concurrently, the NBU continued the policy of
curbing inflation. Commercial banks had already adjusted to operating in
the market environment, which was illustrated by the growing profits and
acquired skills associated with an effective distribution of resources. In
1996, profits increased twofold as compared to those of the preceding
year. International accounting standards were introduced in this period,
which permitted the assessment of the real banking situation and to
externally audit the banks. However, the financial crisis in Russia of 1998
caused a collapse of the banking system in Ukraine and the devaluation of
the hryvnia against the dollar. The bankruptcies of bank under these
conditions destabilized the situation in the financial sector of the state.
In the next development stage, measures were taken to stabilize and
modernize the banking system. In relation to the above, in 1999,
Parliament adopted individual laws regulating the activities of the central
bank and other commercial banks: the Law of Ukraine «On the National
Bank of Ukraine», dated 20 May 1999 and the Law of Ukraine «On
Banks and Banking Activities», dated 07 December 2000. The Law on
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the NBU authorised the central bank, through relevant instruments, to
implement the reorganization of banks that have liquidity problems
(including, the annulment of licenses and the liquidation of banks). In
addition to the above, the Law defined the types of specialised banks
(savings, mortgage and clearing banks) and permitted the establishment
of cooperative banks and the setting up of financial holdings.
The next period saw the development of the banking system, with the
main impulses coming from foreign banks. The presence of foreign banks
led to the expansion of the sphere of banking services, specifically such as
retail services, securities portfolio management and financial consulting.
In the same period, the Program for the Development of Ukraine’s
Banking System for 2003—2005, which was elaborated by the NBU,
identified major weaknesses of the banking system and possibilities to
tackle such weaknesses. The Programme emphasised the systematic
improvement of the operational environment of the banking system
concurrently with the identification of strategic problems impeding
further development. Generally, the latter could include insufficient bank
capital, lack of effective and adequate methods of banking risk
management in many banks, low quality of bank assets, high costs
generated by banks, as well as insufficiently effective banking
supervision, which primarily relates to issues of identifying and assessing
banking risks (Veremiyenko Y., 2006 : 116).
Within the framework of institutional provision for the banking system,
the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF) was created, the objective of which is
to secure the deposits of private individuals in banks and to guarantee the
reimbursement of deposited funds in the event of bankruptcy. However, at
this stage, the approach that was applied, failed to ensure the relevant
protection of the deposits of private individuals in view of a low level of
provision in correlation to the amount deposited. This approach was
essentially different from the practice of EU Member States.
4.6.3. Functions of Central Institutions of the Banking System and
Mechanisms of Ukraine’s Monetary Policy
The National Bank of Ukraine performs the functions of a central bank in
the national economy. The objective of the activities and functions of the
NBU are outlined in the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine
«On the National Bank of Ukraine»19. The Law is a separate legislative
act regulating the scope of activities of the Ukrainian central bank. Polish
legislation dedicated a separate legislative act to the issues associated
                     
19 The Law «On the National Bank of Ukraine» adopted on 20 May 1999, as amended.
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with the operation of the central bank — the Law «On the National Bank
of Poland» (NBP)20, regulating the scope of activities of the central bank
and the implementation of a monetary policy in Poland’s economy.
The Constitution of Ukraine defines the central bank as an institution
responsible for maintaining the stability of the national currency and
taking measures to secure financial stability. The NBU performs the task
by curbing inflation. As part of the efforts to perform the task, the NBU
also supports the economic policy of the Government and
macroeconomic stability and bears responsibility for creating conditions
for economic growth and full employment, unless this impedes the
maintenance of price stability.
The central bank implements a monetary policy strategy by exercising
control over the currency rate. The board of the bank justifies the
application of such strategy by citing the underdeveloped mechanism for
the transmission of the impulses of monetary policy and poorly
anticipated dynamics of demand for money. Furthermore, it seems that
maintaining a stable currency exchange rate is reasonable in the short
term, since such rate has a dominant impact on the inflation rate. For
comparison: the NBP utilizes the strategy of direct inflation targeting in
its monetary policy (DIT). It is intended to achieve the goal, which is a
relevant inflation rate. Its effectiveness requires stable relations between
various economic and financial variables, on one side, and the future
inflation rate, on the other. In 2004, implementing the strategy of direct
inflation targeting in the monetary policy, the Monetary Policy Council
set a constant inflation target at a rate of 2.5 % with a symmetric
fluctuation range of plus-minus 1 percent. The Monetary Policy Council
performs the task in the context of a floating currency rate, which needs
to be maintained until Poland’s membership in the ERM—II. The floating
currency rate system does not exclude intervention on the currency
market, if this is required for hitting the inflation target.
Similar to the functions of Poland’s central bank, the functions of the
NBU reflect the bank’s importance and the role it plays in Ukraine’s
economic system. The NBU is an issuing bank, a lender of last resort, a
bank of the State, a banking regulation and control body, as well as a
monetary and currency regulation body. The main bodies of the
Ukrainian central bank are the Council and the Board of the NBU.
The NBU performs its functions independently from government
authorities and does not bear responsibility for the government’s
commitments. In practice, the NBU and the Government cooperate to
elaborate an economic policy. Pursuant to the Law on the NBU, the
                     
20 The Law «On the National Bank of Poland» of 29 August 1997 (Dz.U nr 140, poz.
938 ze zm.).
Convergence and Divergence in Europe: Polish and Ukrainian Cases492
central bank cannot extend direct credits to finance state budget
expenditures. The provisions of Ukraine’s legislation in this sphere
correspond to a key requirement of the normative and legal convergence
of candidate countries for EU membership. The distribution of profits of
the central bank is an important sphere of the cooperation of the NBU and
the Government. The parties utilize the principle corresponding to the
international practice of central banks. On its basis, the NBU allocates an
established percent of the balance-sheet profit to the state budget.
An analysis of the NBU’s functions and powers demonstrates that the
tasks of the NBU associated with assuring financial stability include the
re-financing of banks, the regulation of banks’ liquidity and the
organization of the settlement system. The Law on the NBU also
establishes that the central bank must promote the maintenance of
financial stability by sustaining the stability of prices.
The NBU’s monetary policy instruments include the following:
• Provision requirements;
• Interest rate (discount, deposit);
• Refinancing of banks, deposit certificates of the NBU;
• Open market transactions; and
• Currency interventions.
The NBU’s provision requirements are distinguished by the type of
deposit. The provision requirement for demand deposits amounts to 8 %,
while for term deposits it constitutes 7 %. The provisions are held in the
national currency on the NBU’s account. Since 2004, banks have been
obliged to maintain a daily balance on a provision account in the amount
of 70 % of the average monthly provision amount.
The discount rate plays the role of the basic rate for the monetary
market players and determines the minimum value of money. It is the
lowest rate of the NBU. The deposit interest rate belongs to transactions
associated with the placement of funds in the NBU by commercial banks
for a period of 2—7 days, 8—21 days, 2—30 days. In 2006, as part of the
efforts to mitigate its monetary policy, the NBU reduced the discount rate
from 9.5 % to 8.5 %. This impulse facilitated a reduction in the cost of
money and a growth of crediting.
The NBU proposes refinancing transactions to commercial banks with
the help of overnight credits and refinancing credits with a maturity
period not exceeding 365 days. The interest rates for such transactions are
determined daily, depend on liquidity on the market and cannot be lower
than the NBU discount rate.
Setting a direct inflation target, the NBU sustains interest rates at such
a level that assures the hitting of the target and thus affects nominal short-
term interest rates on the currency market. The currency market rates
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have an impact on the credit and deposit interest rates of commercial
banks and, consequently, the total number of credits, economic demand
and the inflation rate. The NBU forms market interest rates with the help
of monetary policy instruments. The NBU’s instruments include
transactions on the open market, provision requirements as well as
depositary and crediting transactions.
In Polish legislation, the sphere of banking supervision is regulated by
the Law «On the Supervision of the Financial Market» dated 21 July
2006 and the Law «On Banking Law» dated 29 August 1997. The
Financial Supervision Commission supervises the financial market, while
the Banking Supervision Commission supervises the banks until the end
of 2007. Just like other EU Member States, Poland has utilized the
consolidated supervision model, which envisages that one institution
exercises supervision over all segments of the financial market. It should
be noted, that EU legislation does not regulate problems associated with
the application of the models and organisational forms of supervisory
institutions. It concentrates on regulative methods that allow supervision
to have an impact on subordinate entities. Therefore, in practice, EU
Member States utilize various schemes of institutional supervision forms
(Współczesna…, 2007 : 59).
Supervision arrangements existing in Polish legislation are the result
of the introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord standards adopted by
the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)21 in European legislation. The
provisions of the New Basel Capital Accord regulate the issues of the
elimination of banking risks (the payment capacity ratio, the principles of
capital requirements), as well as requirements to supervision and market
discipline.
In Ukraine, the central bank performs the function of banking
supervision22. It should be emphasised that in Poland banking supervision
was performed by the Banking Supervision Department, which was part
of the NBP until the end of 1997. It could be said that in the initial stages
of the transformation of Poland’s banking system, institutional
arrangements in bank supervision were similar to those in Ukraine.
                     
21 The main directives regulating the scope of activities of banks and supervision
issues are: Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June
2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Directive
2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions; referred to as the CRD — the Capital
Requirements Directive.
22 The Banking Supervision Department was created in 1991. Initially, the activities of
the Department were limited to the resolution of disputes between banks and clients and
the development of a system of commercial banks reporting to the NBU. In 1995—1996, a
system of banking criteria and requirements was introduced (for instance, Instruction
No. 10) and measures were taken to improve licensing requirements.
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However, as a result of the implementation of measures designed to
adjust Polish legislation to EU requirements, according to the Law of 29
August 1997, the supervisory functions were delegated to an autonomous
body — the Banking Supervision Commission, which, specifically, is
responsible for issuing licenses for the creation of banks, establishing
banking operational principles, performing oversight over bank
compliance with legislation and requirements, making periodic
assessments of banks’ financial status for further submission to the
Monetary Policy and assessing the impact of monetary and tax policies on
bank development. As has been mentioned earlier, the process of
incorporating banking supervision institutions into the Financial
Supervision Commission is presently ongoing. The process is a
manifestation of harmonization and the introduction of European
supervision standards, as well as the application of uniform bank
requirements in the integrated financial market.
Within the NBU’s structure, there is a supervisory and regulatory
body — the Directorate for Bank Regulation and Supervision, which
consists of five departments (the Methodology Department, the Bank
Registration and Licensing Department, the Regulation and Supervision
Department, the Bank Liquidation Department and the Department for
the Prevention of the Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of
Legalising Criminal Proceeds and Financing Terrorism) (The 2006
Annual…, 2007). Local offices of the NBU also perform the supervisory
function. The Commission for the Supervision and Regulation of Banking
Activities has been established by the NBU for the purpose of
coordinating activities associated with bank registration and licensing, as
well as supervision in key spheres of banking activities.
Banking supervision activities are regulated by the Law of Ukraine
«On the National Bank of Ukraine» and the Law of Ukraine «On Banks
and Banking Activities»23. Pursuant to their provisions, the main
objective of banking supervision in Ukraine is the financial safety and
stability of the banking system, as well as protection of the interests of
depositors and creditors. In relation to the above, the NBU performs the
ongoing supervision of banks’ compliance with the provisions of relevant
legislation, NBU regulations and banking requirements, which permits
risk control. The latter specifically include capital requirements (EUR 10
million — the minimal authorized capital amount), paying capacity ratio,
and capital concentration limits. Furthermore, the NBU determines an
operational strategy and the development of a methodology and drafts
normative acts for bank supervision. The NBU also exercises systematic
                     
23 The Law on the NBU of 20 May 1999 as amended, the Law «On Banks and
Banking Activities» of 7 December 2000 as amended.
CHAPTER 4. National economy convergence mechanisms… 495
control and supervision of the functioning of banks, from registration and
licensing, monitoring bank effectiveness and stability, to bank liquidation.
The procedures utilized in Ukrainian banking supervision practice are
designed to prevent risks associated with banking activities and to sustain
the stability of the entire banking system.
An analysis of Ukrainian banking supervision in the 1990s does not
permit one to render positive conclusions. The creation of legal norms
associated with central bank activities, the supervision of commercial
banks and legal norms for commercial banks was a relatively long
process. Banking supervision was developed, and banking normative
requirements were introduced with considerable delays. One should also
critically assess the processes of analyzing supervision and obtaining
information about the status of various banks. Reports submitted by
commercial banks at that time did not reflect the actual situation in the
banks (Kloc K., 2001 : 38).
We should emphasise that presently there is an ongoing process of
adjusting and creating opportunities for the development and introduction
of new standards of banking supervision. This is facilitated by
cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In
relation to the above, in 2005, the NBU took a number of measures
intended to improve the regulation and environment of banking activities,
as well as banking supervision.
General standards of deposit-guarantee schemes have been introduced
by the International Monetary Fund, European Directives24 and national
legislation. In Poland, the legal framework of deposit-guarantee schemes
was established by the Law «On the Banking Guarantee Fund» dated 14
December 1994, which was later amended. The key tasks of the Banking
Guarantee Fund are to guarantee deposits and to assure bank stability,
bank safety, and greater confidence in the banking system. The Polish
system of deposit guarantees incorporates the elements of an obligatory
guarantee system and a back-up system, which implies that it belongs to
the risk minimiser category25.
Participation in the Polish deposit-guarantee system is mandatory for all
banks registered in Poland. Protection covers the nominal deposits of
residents and non-residents, including interest in the Zloty and other
currencies, which belong to private individuals and legal entities, as well as
institutions with a legal capacity. Guarantees do not apply to commitments
of the bank with regard to the State Treasury and other financial
                     
24 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994
on deposit-guarantee schemes.
25 For more information on deposit-guarantee schemes see: Pawlikowski A., 2004.
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institutions, as well as to the deposits of the bank’s management and key
shareholders. The guarantees cover the following amounts of deposits:
• The guaranteed amount will be covered in full (100 %), if the
deposited amount does not exceed EUR 1,000 in the Zloty equivalent;
• If the deposited amount exceeds EUR 1,000 in the Zloty equivalent,
EUR 1,000 will be reimbursed in full (100 %), while the remainder will
be reimbursed as per the principle of joint assecuration (co-responsibility
of the depositor) at a rate of 90 % up to the amount of EUR 22,50026.
The deposit guarantee body in Ukraine was created in 2001 on the
basis of the Law of Ukraine «On the Deposit Guarantee Fund» of 20
September 200127. The principal task of the Fund is to secure deposits
placed by individual depositors in banks and, in the event of bankruptcy,
to reimburse deposited funds. By reimbursing funds deposited with
commercial banks, the Fund protects the rights of individuals (depositors)
and, thus, promotes stability of the Ukrainian banking system.28
The Fund is an independent non-profit state institution operating in
the sphere of deposit-guarantee schemes. The key bodies of the Fund are
the Administrative Council and Executive Directorate. The Fund is co-
managed (by the state and the private sector), which in practice means
that the Fund is administered by both representatives of state authorities
(the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NBU) and the private sector
(representatives of the Association of Ukrainian Banks) (Veremiyenko Y.,
2006 : 118). The Administrative Council is specifically responsible for
coordinating the activities of the Fund, approving the procedure for the
payment of funds deposited by individuals, approving the normative acts
of the Fund, supervising the activities of the Executive Directorate and
adopting decisions approved by the NBU on the establishment of a duty
for member-banks. The Executive Directorate resolves issues on the
reimbursement of funds to the depositors in the event of the non-
availability of such funds, develops and submits draft normative and legal
acts to the Council for approval, establishes reporting forms for member-
banks as approved by the central bank and analyses information on the
financial status of the Fund’s member-banks (Veremiyenko Y.,
2006 : 119).
The member-banks of the Fund are the banks holding a license for
pursuing banking activities and registered in the state register of banks
maintained by the NBU. Participation in the deposit-guarantee schemes
for such banking institutions is mandatory and subject to payment. For
                     
26 For more information on the BFG activities please go to the website www.bfg.pl.
27 The Law «On the Deposit Guarantee Fund» of 20 September 2001.
28 Information on the Deposit Guarantee Fund is available on the website
www.fg.org.ua.
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information purposes, every six month, the Fund announces the list of
member-banks in the state mass media. Member-banks are obliged to
place information pertaining to the deposit-guarantee schemes, the types
of guaranteed deposits, the guaranteed amount and the procedure and
mode of the reimbursement of guaranteed funds on their premises.
Pursuant to applicable legislation, the Fund guarantees the repayment
of deposited funds to every depositor, including accrued interest as of the
day on which the funds are no longer available, which presently shall not
exceed UAH 8,000 (the amount has since been significantly increased).
Nonetheless, joint assecuration does not exist in Ukrainian deposit-
guarantee schemes, since only individual deposits are covered by deposit-
guarantee schemes. The Fund guarantees deposits in all currencies;
however, the deposited funds will be repaid in the national currency. The
Law establishes the repayment procedure and the list of entities entitled to
the repayment, as well as those that are not. Also, the Law defines the list
of funding sources of the Fund. In general, the key source of financing is
initial and regular bank dues. Such funding method for a deposit-
guarantee institution is called ex ante, since funds are accrued «before the
event», according to the procedure established by the law on the Fund.
Taking the scope of authorities that the Ukrainian guarantee fund may
exercise into consideration, we can call it a pay box institution. The Fund
repays deposits; however, at the same time it does not take any preventive
measures or sanctions in the banking system.
4.6.4. Overview of the Commercial Bank Sector of Ukraine
The commercial bank sector of Ukraine is characterized by the existence
of a great number of banking institutions. For instance, in the 1990s, the
number of banks registered by the NBU amounted to over 200 (Table
4.16). This was a product of the liberal licensing policy of the NBU in
1991—1995. In the second half of the 1990s, more severe measures were
taken. Specifically, the measures related to minimum authorized capital
requirements, financial documentation required in the process of bank
creation and qualifications of candidates for bank positions.
Later, the number of banks in Ukraine diminished. In 2001—2006,
the number of banks holding a license issued by the NBU and pursuing
operational activities amounted to 150. For comparison: 69 and 54 banks
were pursuing their banking activities in the Polish banking sector in
2001 and 2005, respectively.
Presently, the Ukrainian banking sector remains significantly
disintegrated. The largest share in the market of banking services belongs
to Privatbank (about 15 %) and Aval (about 8.1 %). The shares of other
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banks in total assets remain relatively low. As per NBU classification, at
year-end 2005, commercial banks in Ukraine were divided into four
groups. The first group included the 12 largest banks the assets of which
were at the level of about UAH 3.9 billion (about USD 780 million). The
next group included 15 banks with assets within the range of UAH 1.8—
3.9 billion (USD 360—780 million). The third group encompassed 29
banks with assets within the range of UAH 0.5—1.8 billion (USD 120—
240 million). The fourth group included the banks (close to 80) with
assets at a level of UAH 0.3 billion (USD 60 million).
Table 4.16
TOTAL NO. OF BANKS REGISTERED BY THE NBU
AND PURSUING OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN 1994—2006
Year Total No. of banksregistered by the NBU
Total no. of banks holding an NBU
license for carrying out banking
transactions *
1991 228 220
1995 230 210
1996 229 188
1997 227 189
1998 213 178
1999 205 168
2000 195 153
2001 195 153
2002 189 152
2003 182 157
2004 179 158
2005 186 160
2006 186 165
* In Ukraine, banks are subject to registration by the Licensing Department of the
NBU. They remain on the register until completion of the bank liquidation process or the
announcement of their bankruptcy. Therefore, the number of banks carrying out
operational activities is lower than the number of banks included in the register.
Source: Developed by the author on the basis of NBU information.
The majority of banks included in the final group do not pursue a
wide range of banking activities. These are so-called pocket banks
operating in the political and business environment. The activities of such
banks are restricted to providing services to several or several dozens of
enterprises of a given business-group. They constantly face the problem
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of insufficient capital and, therefore, seek to raise capital from the
outside, most often on the inter-bank market.
With a relatively large number of banks, the Ukrainian banking sector
remains undercapitalized. According to NBU data, at the end of 2005, the
indicator reflecting the ratio of the equity capital of the banking sector to
GDP amounted to approximately 5 % in Ukraine, 6 % in Russia, 7 % in
the Czech Republic, and 8 % in Poland and Hungary; while in the
Eurozone states, the indicator equalled 120 %. Pursuant to the Law of
Ukraine «On Banks and Banking Activities» of 2001, for the purpose of
bank reorganisation, in view of a threat to paying capacity, capital
requirements were adopted in Ukraine. According to the capital
requirements, until 2007, commercial banks operating throughout the
territory of Ukraine, banks operating within the territory of one oblast and
cooperative banks were obliged to have minimum capital in the amount
of EUR 8 million, EUR 5 million, and EUR 1.5 million, respectively.
In 2005, the authorized capital of Ukrainian banks amounted to about
UAH 25.5 billion, which was an approximate equivalent of EUR 4
billion, while in Poland the indicator amounted to over EUR 250 billion.
We have to emphasise that in Ukraine’s banking sector this value may be
lower by approximately 10—15 per cent, since the banks in Ukraine
include, for instance, provisions associated with the creditor’s default on
payments or damages associated with currency transactions into their
equity capital. Such practice is not in line with equity capital
requirements introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision. The operational principles of the NBU and its supervision
require further adjustment in order to meet European standards.
Since 2000, the Ukrainian banking sector has seen a considerable
growth of assets, which amounted to about USD 67 billion in 2006.
However, the indicator reflecting the ratio of banking sector assets to
GDP, as compared to that of the other counties of Central-Eastern
Europe, remained relatively low — 64 %. For comparison: in Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Croatia and Slovakia the indicator fluctuated
between 74—101 %, while an average indicator for the developed
counties of the EU amounted to 224 % in 2005.
Comparing the banking sectors of Poland and Ukraine on the basis of
the share of banks with the essential participation of state or private capital,
it can be concluded that in 2005, two state banks operated in Ukraine and
23 out of 184 private banks were controlled by foreign investors
(Table 4.17). Therefore, the share of foreign capital in the total equity
capital of Ukrainian banks at that time amounted to about 14 per cent. In
the banking sector of Poland, the share of foreign banks in gross capital
amounted to approximately 75 % and was one of the largest in Europe.
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Table 4.17
TOTAL NO. OF BANKS IN POLAND AND UKRAINE IN 2005
AND SHARE OF THE IDENTIFIED GROUPS IN THE BANKING SECTOR
Division Poland Ukraine
Commercial banks, including:
With the significant participation of state capital:
— directly owned by the state;
— indirectly owned by the state
With the significant participation of private capital,
Including:
— controlled by national investors;
— controlled by foreign investors
54
11
4
7
50
7
43
186*
2
—
184
152
23
The share of the equity capital of banks controlled by
foreign investors in the commercial banks sector, % 74.6 % 14 %
* Banks as per the NBU state register.
Source: Developed by the author on the basis of Sytuacja finansowa…, 2006; Annual
Report 2005…
Intensification of the inflow of foreign capital to Poland’s banking
sector began after 1995, as the share of foreign capital in the authorized
capital of commercial banks amounted to 4 %. In the following years, the
figure systematically increased and in the year 2000, the authorized capital
of foreign financial institutions amounted to more than 55 % of the
authorized capital of Poland’s commercial banks. An analysis of the largest
foreign investors in the Polish banking sector implies that the majority of
investors began their activities with the opening of institutions with 100 %
foreign capital in Poland. These were either subsidiaries or new banks (for
instance, ING Group NV, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank AG). Since the second
half of the 1990s, foreign banks have been participating in the privatization
of Polish state banks (for instance, the acquisition of shares of Banku
Przemysłowo—Handlowego by Bayerische Hypo — und Vereinsbank,
Wielkopolskiego Banku Kredytowego by Allied Irisch Bank Plc, Banku
Śląskiego by ING Group NV) (Godula E., 2001 : 85).
In 2005, investors from 18 countries were participants in Poland’s
banking sector. Banks with the significant participation of Italian capital
had the largest market share. In 2005, as a result of the acquisition of the
shares of Bayerische Hypo — und Vereinsbank AG by UniCredit, the
Italian share in the Polish market grew by 9.9 %, while the share of banks
with significant participation of German capital shrank by 10.2 %. The
ranking then included banks with participation of Dutch (8.2 % of assets),
Irish (4.8 % of assets) and Belgian capital (4.7 % of assets).
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The active efforts of foreign financial institutions in Poland’s
banking sector consolidated bank capital and promoted the introduction
of modern technologies and management methods, as well as the
modernization and diversification of banking services. Instead, in
Ukraine, the access of foreign capital to the banking sector almost until
the end of the 1990s was restricted and, consequently, competition from
foreign banks was limited29. In relation to the above, in 2000, the
activities of foreign financial institutions in Ukraine declined, which
was an unfavourable phenomenon for Ukraine. Rabobank from Holland
withdrew from the Ukrainian market and Societe Generale closed its
subsidiary and reduced its activities to representation in 2001 (Kloc K.,
2001 : 37).
Presently, there is a gradual liberalization of foreign capital access, the
presence of which impacts the growth of foreign investment in the
Ukrainian economy to a certain extent and creates opportunities
associated with the receipt of cheap credit funds for Ukrainian debtors.
Another benefit arising from the activeness of foreign banks in Ukraine is
the introduction of high electronic and information technologies, which
permit the enhancement of the level of client servicing and the
development of a broader range of banking products, and the gradual
adjustment of operational principles of the banking system to
international standards (Bezrukowa I., 2005 : 194—195). Please see
Table 4.18 below for the participation of foreign financial institutions in
the acquisition of banks in the banking sector of Ukraine.
The first transactions associated with the acquisition of Ukrainian
banks by foreign investors took place in 2004. That year, 94 % of the
shares of Aggio Bank were sold to the SEB Group from Sweden and
66.5 % of the shares of Creditbank Ukraine were sold to PKO BP SA.
Consequently, the name of the bank was changed to Kredobank JSC,
which is indicative of the new strategic direction of the bank. The bank
became a member of a largest financial group in Eastern Europe — PKO
BP S.A. Pekao S.A. also actively operates on the Ukrainian market. It
controls 100 % of the shares of UniCredit Bank Ukraine, which
specialises in the segment of individual client banking. At the end of
2007, UniCredit Bank Ukraine merged with HVB Ukraine.
The transactions associated with the acquisition of Ukrainian banks by
foreign banks began to grow in 2005, as Raiffeisen Bank International
acquired 93.5 % of the shares of Aval Bank, the second largest bank in
terms of assets. In the same period, BNP Paribas acquired 51 % of the
shares of UkrSibbank.
                     
29 In 1998, the 15-pecent limit for foreign capital participation in the authorized capital
of commercial banks.
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Table 4.18
FOREIGN BANKS’ INVESTMENT IN UKRAINE’S BANKING SECTOR
Bank in Ukraine Acquiring bank Countryof origin
Transaction
amount (USD
million)
Share
capital
(%)
2005
Aval RaiffeisenInternational Austria 1,028 93.5
Ukrsibbank BNP Paribas France 360 51.0
2006
NRB Ukraine Sberbank Russia 100 100
Ukrsotsbank Banca Intensa Italy 1,240 88.55
Indexbank CreditAgricole France 263 98
Prestige Bank Erste Bank Austria 104 100
Universalbank EFGEurobank Greece 49 99.3
Raiffeisen Ukraine OTP Bank Hungary 833 100
2007
TAS-Kommerzbank Swedbank Sweden 735 99.98
Marine Transport Bank MarfinPopular Bank Cyprus 137 99.20
Source: Developed by the author on the basis of www.ukraine-arabia.ae/investment/banks
In 2006, Sberbank purchased 100 % of the shares of NRB Ukraine,
and Banca Intensa (currently, Intensa Sanpaolo) acquired 98 % of the
shares of Indexbank, OTP Bank — 100 % of the shares of Raiffeisen
Bank Ukraine.
As Table 4.18 demonstrates, presently, the largest share in the assets
of Ukraine’s banking sector belongs to Austrian capital (more than 8 %),
French capital (more than 7 %) and Italian capital (5 %). Since mid-2007,
the role of foreign capital in Ukraine’s banking sector has increased
significantly. The foreign share in the authorized capital and assets of
Ukrainian banks amounted to about 32 % and 32% respectively.
However, there is still a need for consolidating Ukrainian banks.
After an analysis the transactions associated with the acquisition of
Ukrainian banks by foreign banks, we can conclude that in all instances
the model of the sale of a part of or the entire package of shares of a
private Ukrainian bank to a foreign entity was utilized. The Ukrainian
banking sector did not accept the schemes associated with foreign capital
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entry through participation of foreign investors in the gradual
privatisation of large state banks. Such schemes were utilized in the
majority of countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic). The transformation model utilized in those
countries led to a practically complete acquisition of the banking sector
by foreign capital. The distinction of the Ukrainian practice may be due to
the fact that in Ukraine, the banking sector is comprised mainly of private
banks and, irrespective of a large capital segregation and insufficiency,
remains stable.
4.6.5. Financial Instruments
The provision of financial services in Ukraine is regulated by the Law of
Ukraine «On Financial Services and the State Regulation of Financial
Services Markets» of 22 August 2001. All financial institutions are subject
to mandatory registration in the state register of financial institutions. In
Ukraine, the notion of «a financial institution» covers banks, credit unions,
leasing companies, trust institutions, insurance companies, private pension
fund, investment funds and other legal entities that provide financial
services. The range of financial services specifically includes the following:
the issuance and servicing of payment instruments, payment cards, checks,
clearing and other settlement instruments; the management of financial
assets; currency exchange; financial leasing; lending; the provision of
guarantees; cash remittance; securities trading; and factoring. Loans can
only be extended by licensed credit institutions.
The range of financial services and instruments provided by Ukrainian
banks can be called universal. The range depends on the type of licenses
held by banks. The NBU issues a license for close to 30 types of banking
transactions listed in the Law of Ukraine «On Banks and Banking
Activities». To be more specific, such types include the following:
• Managing accounts in the Ukrainian and foreign currencies;
• Internal and international settlements;
• Transactions with cash and cash remittance;
• Crediting, lending and depositing;
• Currency exchange;
• Securities trading;
• Brokerage services;
• Trust, consulting and analytical services;
• Purchase and sale of currency on the domestic and international
interbank market.
In 2002—2006, the segment of retail banking services developed
rapidly. The portfolio of retail credits, including cash loans, credits using
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payment cards and consumer loans, grew nearly tenfold in the period and
was worth approximately USD 6.8 billion. It could be considered that in
this regard the Ukrainian market is developing along the lines of those of
the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The key factors
stimulating development are believed to be as follows: a low level of
market saturation with consumer finance services, the macroeconomic
climate and a rapid growth of personal income. This can be illustrated by
an increase in the amount of household deposits. In the last ten days of
2006, their share in the total number of bank deposits increased from
14 % to 57 %, and in 2006 grew 76 % as compared to the level of the
preceding year. That is, the increase in total deposits demonstrates the
increased confidence of Ukrainian society in the banking sector.
One may also note that the majority of banks in Ukraine, both
Ukrainian and foreign, regard the retail banking segment as a strategic
one30. Consequently, competition becomes more intense and thus, impels
banks to diversify their services and improve the quality of their services
and professionalism in managing bank transactions. The leading banks on
the deposit product market for private individuals include Aval Bank and
Privatbank. About half of their commitments constitute those associated
with deposits by private individuals (Dukhnenko V., Shapran V., 2006).
In Ukraine, cash transactions continue to be the predominant form of
settlement. The payment card market is also developing dynamically,
both in terms of the number of issued cards and the number of
transactions involving the use of such cards. In the first half of 2007, over
35 million cards were in circulation, including 28 million debit cards and
7.6 million credit cards. The number of cash machines (or ATMs)
amounted to 17,464. Leaders in this market include Privatbank, Nadra
Bank, Raiffeisen Bank Aval, Pravexbank, Ukrsotsbank and Ukrsibbank.
For comparison: in Poland, in the same period, the total of issued cards
amounted to 24.9 million (including 17.5 million debit cards and 6.8
million credit cards), while the total number of cash machines equalled
10,578.
Interbank settlements in Ukraine are managed with the help of an
electronic payments system (EPS) developed by the NBU. International
cash transfers are managed through the SWIFT system (Society for
Worldwide Inter-Bank Financial Transfer). Ukrainian banks manage a
ramified system of correspondent banks.
The mortgage market is developing relatively rapidly. In 2006, the
number of mortgages amounted to approximately USD 4 billion, and the
index reflecting the ratio of the amount of mortgages to the GDP totalled
                     
30 www.die-bank.de [15.12.2007].
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approximately 3.7 %. In the same period, the similar indicator for Poland,
Germany and Great Britain was equal to approximately 5 %, 36 % and
80 % respectively.
Ukrainian banks also provide services that belong to the corporate
banking segment, specifically: various funding services, leasing, home
banking (also referred to as electronic banking) services, investment
banking and corporate consulting. Citibank Ukraine is one of the banks
operating in this segment; the bank focuses solely on providing services
to corporate clients, specifically the Government of Ukraine and the
largest enterprises. ING Bank Ukraine, Calyon and HVB are also active
in the corporate finance market. However, Moody’s analysts emphasise
that too many banks compete for a relatively small group of creditworthy
institutional clients. It is also typical that the capital capacities of
Ukrainian banks are often insufficient to finance potential ambitious
projects.
4.6.6. An Attempt to Diagnose the Stability of Financial Mechanisms in
Ukraine and Poland in the Context of the Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis is affecting the situation of the financial
systems of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, both the EU
Member States, Russia and Ukraine to an equal extent. It can also be
considered that the degree of resilience in the face the financial crisis
depends in such instances on the status of the real economy, existing
institutional order, transparency and stability of legal decisions,
confidence in the national financial system and national currency, the
status of government finances, as well as preventive measures on national
and international levels. Furthermore, an obvious economic slowdown
impels investors to concentrate on the real economy and symptoms of
regression that emerges. According to the forecasts of the European
Commission, GDP growth of the EU economy in the next year is
projected at 0.2 %, while for Poland such growth is anticipated at 3.8 %.
Comparing the Polish economy with those of the other countries of
the region, we have to acknowledge that the state of affairs may be
recognised as stable. For instance, presently (2008), the economic growth
index is equal to 5.8 %, while in Hungary it amounts to 2 %. Public debt
amounts to 40 % of GDP, while in Hungary it goes beyond 60 % of GDP.
The budget deficit, current account deficit and interest rates are at a
somewhat lower level in Poland as well. Poland’s level of risk in the
market of derivative instruments called credit default swaps (CDS),
which demonstrates the probability of a country’s default on its debts, but
in practice is an indication of total additional funds to be paid to support
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government bonds to some extent, also seems to be optimistic for Poland.
Presently, the three-year CDS for Poland are estimated at 1.47 %, which
is more beneficial as compared to the Czech Republic by 0.22 %; for the
Czech Republic it amounts to 4.18 %, while for Ukraine — 19.44 %.
The situation in Poland’s banking system is also satisfactory, though
we must clearly state that the crisis in the global markets contributes to
the growth of risk in the national banking system, both in the short term
and in the long term. Interpreting in the most general manner, we can list
the following key factors creating a risk to the stability of Poland’s
banking system: the transfer of disorder from foreign financial markets to
the Polish market and a strong influence of economic slowdown in
Eurozone countries. We should also mention that it is doubtful whether
banks in the Polish banking system will succumb to the US subprime
credit market. For a short period, a risk emerges from decreased turnover
on the interbank market caused by a collapse of interbank trust. Instead,
for a medium term, the risk to the stability of the financial system is
associated with negative forecasts of economic growth in Poland and of
major commercial partners.
The banks in Poland demonstrate satisfactory financial results, as
previously, though we must emphasise that the credit risk increasingly
appearing in the banks’ balance sheets displays signs of materialisation.
This is the product of the intensification of the extending of consumer and
housing credits, predominantly in foreign currencies, which has been
progressing for a number of years. It is also associated with a currency
risk for credit beneficiaries, as well as possibilities of increasing the credit
risk adopted by banks depending on changes to the national currency
exchange rate [Przegląd stabilności... 2008 : 9]. It is envisaged that the
global financial crisis will have an impact on the reduction of the credit
supply in the Polish economy and the stiffening of credit criteria for retail
and corporate clients, as well as an increase in the banks’ margin.
As a result of the emergence of the above-mentioned threats to the
institution of the financial security network in Poland’s banking system, a
number of measures have been taken to sustain financial stability and to
resume the accurate operation of systemic mechanisms. The major
initiatives in this sphere include the following:
— Convocation of the Financial Stability Committee;
— Adoption of a regulatory package for financial stability;
— Adoption of the so-called Trust Package by the NBP, which must
offset the adverse effect of the financial crisis on interbank trust.
Among the above-mentioned measures, we should particularly note
the adoption of the draft Law on the Banking Guarantee Fund, intended to
modify the framework (to exclude the joint assecuration basis) and the
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deposit protection level in Poland from the existing one to EUR 50,000.
The principal objectives determined in the Trust Package concentrate on
creating opportunities for banks to acquire Zloty resources for a period
longer than one day, creating opportunities for banks to acquire currency
resources and enhancing opportunities for banks to receive Zloty turnover
through enhanced guarantees of NBP transactions [Przegląd stabilności...,
2008 : 11—12].
As compared to Poland’s banking system, the banking system of
Ukraine is characterized by a high level of risk and instability. This is
illustrated by ratings provided by global rating agencies. For instance,
Standard & Poor’s downgraded the foreign currency debt of Ukraine, as
both the Government and enterprises had to make accelerated payments
under their obligations in the amount of nearly USD 100 billion. The
effects of the global financial crisis coincide with an unstable political
climate in Ukraine, strong dependence of the banking system in the
current political situation, intensive inflation growth, slump in industrial
production and non-conformity of regulatory and control actions to the
development level of this system. Furthermore, the Ukrainian economy,
the primary sector of which is metallurgy (the share of metallurgy in the
GDP of Ukraine amounts to approximately 27 %), is suffering from the
economic regress, primarily due to the collapse in steel prices on global
markets. As a result of the significant weakening of the Hryvnia, imports
will become more expensive in the short run.
Overall, we can list the following distinctive symptoms of financial
instability in Ukraine:
— A lack of public confidence in the national currency, which results
in a large-scale pre-term repayment of bank deposits;
— A lack of turnover in commercial banks;
— The fall in the Hryvnia exchange rate.
To mitigate the effects of the ambient financial crisis and to prevent
turmoil, the NBU adopted immediate anti-crisis decisions. In connection
with massive repayments of resources accumulated on fixed-term deposit
accounts, the NBU introduced a semi-annual moratorium on pre-term
withdrawal of accumulated resources (this does not apply to current
accounts). The decision was supposed to prevent the collapse of several
banks lacking turnover and unable to immediately regulate liabilities to
their clients. The NBU also recommended commercial banks to ban the
extending of consumer credits and commissioned to open loan facilities
for exporters. The decision was intended to assure the improvement of
bank turnover and to support firms capable of exporting their products.
Furthermore, the NBU limited the permissible foreign currency spread at
currency exchange offices to 5 %.
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Due to the devaluation of the national currency by nearly 20 %, by
utilizing available instruments for monetary policy implementation, the
NBU conducted currency intervention, injecting close to USD 2.5 billion
out of USD 38 billion of Ukraine’s currency reserves. However, the
initiated measure delivered short-term results — following relative
stabilisation, the national currency rate, as previously, continued to
weaken (while in September 2008, one dollar was sold at about UAH 4.8,
in October 2008 it was sold for close to UAH 7). Within the framework
of the initiated measures, the NBU extended credits to 27 commercial
banks for a total amount of UAH 9.9 billion. However, due to paying
capacity problems, some commercial banks introduced restrictions on
cash payments through cash machines (for instance, at Khreshchatik
Bank, the daily limit on payments amounted to an equivalent of
USD 350).
To assure financial stability and mechanisms that guarantee payments
under obligations, the Ukrainian Government sought assistance from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of a stabilisation credit.
The stand-by arrangement was conditional upon the Parliament of
Ukraine meeting the IMF’s requirements to adopt a package of anti-crisis
measures, which, as per the IMF leadership’s instructions, included, inter
alia, cutting the budget deficit, the current account turnover deficit and
elaborating a bank support plan. The IMF’s Executive Board clarified,
that assistance to Ukraine should enhance investors’ confidence in the
country and the economic and financial stability of Ukraine. Therefore,
the IMF also emphasised the need to observe fiscal discipline, an explicit
currency system and bank re-capitalization. Consequently, the Parliament
of Ukraine adopted an anti-crisis law required for the receipt of the
USD 16.5 billion assistance from the IMF. The anti-crisis program related
to institutions and financial mechanisms included, inter alia, the following
specific decisions:
— Entitling the government to nationalize banks that are under threat
of bankruptcy;
— Simplifying the procedures associated to increasing bank
capital;
— Transferring UAH 1 billion to the Deposit Guarantee Fund;
— Raising the individual deposit-guarantee quota from UAH 50,000
to UAH 100,000;
— Establishing an ad hoc inter-governmental group to control the
situation on the financial market of Ukraine, which is authorized to
submit various draft normative acts to the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine, bypassing the agenda of the meetings of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine.
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4.6.7. Conclusions
The development of the institutional infrastructure of Ukraine’s banking
system and financial mechanisms in the 1990s was affected by both favorable
and negative factors. The favorable factors include the implementation of a
currency reform, the suspension of hyperinflation, the introduction of
international reporting principles and accounting standards for banks, as well
as the taking of measures designed to adjust the Ukrainian banking system to
European standards. The following barriers to the development of the banking
system should be singled out: non-transparency of the economic system, a
lack of trust in the banking system, a liberal licensing policy in the first half of
the 1990s and a weak institutional and legislative environment for the
operation of the NBU and banking supervision.
Having researched the development of the banking system in Ukraine
in the 1990s, we can conclude that the transformation of the banking
system into a market banking system and towards potential EU
integration was progressing at a relatively slow pace. This is illustrated by
a long-term, as compared to that of Poland, process for creating a legal
framework for the operation of the central bank and commercial banks,
regulating the sphere of supervision and introducing economic normative
requirements. However, we should emphasise that regardless of the
weaknesses of the system and considerable flaws that developed in the
processes of transformation, in 2000—2007, Ukraine did not experience a
banking crisis, with all its properties and features, including bankruptcies
and the massive withdrawal of banking holdings. In 2004, because of a
political crisis, there was a withdrawal of bank holdings, which created
the real threat of a crisis emerging in the banking system. In the Polish
banking system, the crisis occurred in 1992—1994. It was caused by the
degradation of the quality of extended credits. In 1994—1995, banks
started showing symptoms of recovery from the crisis.
Institutional and legal decisions pertaining to the central institutions of
the Ukrainian banking system can be assessed as significant, however
insufficient. The NBU and the Deposit Guarantee Fund were supposed to
take measures to enhance public confidence in the banking system and to
adjust the Ukrainian practice to international banking standards. The issue
of securing the independence of the central bank from political changes is
particularly important. The NBU can only accomplish its principal task,
which is to assure price stability and, thus, financial stability, if it remains
a fully independent body, both subjectively and objectively. The key
spheres that require bringing into compliance with the recommendations
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the EU Directives
are banking supervision and economic normative requirements.
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Lately, the situation with Ukrainian banks seems to be gradually
improving. This has been primarily due to the increasing activity of foreign
banks, which stimulates the competition and rapid development of the retail
financial services market. Nonetheless, the current transactions associated
with the acquisition of Ukrainian banks by foreign investors have not
resulted in a significant reduction in the number of banks. The sector
remains extremely disintegrated. Currently, there is a need to consolidate
small- and medium-sized banks and to raise more capital. The escalating
inter-sector competition, gradual integration in the European financial
market and continuing globalization of financial services will create a need
for the consolidation of Ukrainian banks in the next few years. Presently, in
the context of potential integration in the EU, the implementation of a
comprehensive programme for the development of Ukrainian banks
according to European standards is of particular importance. The key issues
include: consolidating the stability and credibility of the banking system,
raising more equity capital for the banks and utilizing long-term financing
instruments more actively, including the development of a mortgage
market, structural instruments and debt instruments for enterprises.
Summarizing, we have to state that Ukraine’s banking system will
further develop in the context of harmonization with international
banking standards. Research of the development and operation of the
Ukrainian banking system in the context of Polish practice can positively
influence the development of the banking system adjusted to the
requirements of a developing economy and facilitate the elimination of
barriers and threats associated with transformation.
4.7. Fiscal Policy Instruments
4.7.1. Overview of Taxation in Ukraine
The Ukrainian law on the tax system distinguishes as many as 26 types of
taxes and national payments adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine and
the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. These, inter alia,
include a value added tax (VAT), an excise duty, an income tax (personal
and corporate), a customs duty, a real estate tax, a land tax, a tax on
vehicles and other self-propelled machines and devices. There are also
payments associated with, for instance, the extraction of raw materials or
trademark registration, local taxes (a tax on advertising and a local tax)
and 14 types of local payments (all taxes and payments accrued to local
self-government budgets). Similar to those existing in Poland, their rates
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must stay within the limits determined by the law. Local authorities
autonomously determine the method of settlement of such taxes and
payments.
Two rates of value added tax31, which is an equivalent of the Polish
podatek od wartosci dodanej, are applied in Ukraine: the basic 20 % VAT
rate and full VAT exemption. The list of transactions that are zero-rated
or exempt from VAT is different from that of Poland. Instead, the basic
rate of corporate income tax amounts to 25 % of income, while, for
instance, the rate of income tax on insurance activities is equal to only
3 %. At the same time, personal income tax is of a linear nature and
amounts to 13 %; however, all excise goods are subject to an excise rate,
which may vary from 10 % to 300 %.
The criteria of tax liabilities are also somewhat different from those
in Poland. There is property accountability for such tax liabilities. A tax
liability is associated solely with a taxpayer. There are no provisions
that would transfer this liability to a third party. Thus, this is different
from Polish tax regulations, which envisage a transfer of liabilities to
the taxpayer’s relatives and his/her legal successors. However, there is
no system of tax evaluation, for example, at a 75 % rate, which is
acceptable in Poland, which is not covered in sources that have been
revealed. Ukrainian provisions basically do not envisage tax exemptions
for individuals.
Tax regulations are not very transparent and cause numerous
problems during their interpretation. However, this is not the only cause
of such problems, since provisions of individual laws often do not agree;
the provisions that in Poland do not relate to taxation frequently regulate
tax issues. For instance, the Commercial Code, inter alia, lays down
general criteria for tax charges. For example, the VAT charge criteria
defined in a relevant law on VAT and executive acts contradict numerous
provisions of budget laws.
4.7.2. Tax Law in Poland
Since 2 April 1997, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as well as
the below-listed executive laws and provisions based on the Constitution,
define tax law in Poland:
1) The law on taxation (No. 8, later No. 60 of 15 January 2005),
which regulates issues associated with tax liabilities, the tax process,
taxation control and inspection actions;
                     
31 The author often refers to the abbreviation of VAP for podatek od wartosci dodanej,
which is an equivalent of VAT. (Note by Ukrainian editors)
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2) The substantive tax law, which immediately regulates the
rights and duties of entities, as well as the rights associated with
each tax.
The law on taxation took effect on 1 January 1999. It substituted
the law on tax liabilities, a section of the Code of Administrative
Procedure, and other tax provisions dispersed in various legal acts.
The law on taxation created grounds for complying with the
following:
— Norms of legality and legitimacy, i.e. the obligation to base
decisions solely on the law, rather than on the so-called secondary
law;
— Norms associated with proving the material truth;
— Norms associated with providing legal assistance, i.e. the duty of
the tax authorities to provide important information that has an impact on
the restitution of rights and obligations in the taxation process;
— Norms associated with exercising legal control over the legality of
administrative decisions;
— Norms pertaining to the validity period of final resolutions at the
administrative forum.
The law on taxation also mentions the rights and duties of tax
successors, clarifies joint responsibility for tax liabilities, and, in a more
precise manner, elaborates on surcharges and the refund of such, the right
to inspect the bank accounts of taxpayers, as well as obligations and
sanctions associated with fiscal confidentiality.
The efforts to adapt the Polish tax system to the fiscal standards
mandatory for the EU started only in the year 2000.
The development of the currently operating tax system was
inclusive of the need to eliminate distinctions between non-private
fiscal rules of a centrally planned economy and those of a democratic
rule of law state, as well as an urgent need to adjust tax law to the
standards binding upon EU countries. The need to comply with other
international fiscal conventions associated with WTO membership
also played an essential role.
Developing its tax system, Poland utilized a relevant scope of
accumulated knowledge about a rational tax system corresponding to
the transformation challenges and a modern capitalist state. In the
context of disputes associated with the methods of interpreting the
fundamentals and functions of taxes in economic literature, the erasure
of neoliberal and interventionist options affected tax reform processes.
In practice, interest groups, which dominated the political arena for a
while, had an impact on the tax changes introduced. Weaknesses of the
political order often complicated the implementation of fiscal reforms,
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which were supposed to facilitate public and political solidarity and
sustained economic growth. Consequently, government finances remain
a partially open issue.
An acute crisis of government finances, which became apparent at the
end of the first and beginning of the second quarters of 1991, accelerated
the decision to reform the tax system. The crisis demonstrated in full, not
only the acute effects of shock macroeconomic stabilisation and
deregulation, but also the non-functionality of the centrally planned fiscal
regulation of the economy. In the case of Poland, the following reflected
the non-correspondence of taxes to the implemented public and economic
goals:
— A lack of guarantees of generating revenues at a sufficient level,
since taxes could not provide in full for public policy goals;
— Unequal development of individual sectors of the economy,
regardless of the legal form; and
— Non-facilitation of capital accumulation and economic activities.
It was also impossible to agree with the income tax burden imposed
via salaries and prices administered by the government, as the case has
been until now, since such tax burden distorted conditions for the rational
economic decisions of commercial entities.
The discrimination of owners and tax instability, which were typical
of a post-socialist fiscal system, could not be acceptable in the context of
a democratic rule of law state and competition. Regardless of shock
deregulation and macroeconomic stabilization, fiscal reforms were
gaining momentum, even though the progress was gradual and the
reforms were delayed.
In the first four years of commercial transformation, when the
fundamentals of a new tax system were developed, a liberal idea was
unquestionably dominant. Because of this, changes in the tax system were
aimed at neutralising the budget policy and ensuring macroeconomic
stabilization.
The implementation of fiscal reform was based upon compliance
with the norm of tax authority centralism. However, the norm was
restricted with regard to the centralized order of introducing fiscal
rules. This created opportunities for the decentralization of
government finances and delegation of a part of taxes and payments to
local self-government.
The process of liberal fiscal initiatives started with a self-
government reform. To provide financial assistance, on 12 January
1991, Parliament introduced a law on taxes and local payments (1991
No. 9, then 31, with subsequent amendments). Among them, the
following were critical to the financial independence of gminas: a real
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estate tax, an agricultural tax, a tax on inheritance and gifts, and a tax on
transportation (Table 4.19). These taxes were administered by local
authorities and protected by the law.
Table 4.19
STRUCTURE OF THE REVENUES
OF GMINAS BY SOURCE IN POLAND IN 1991—1998, %
Revenues 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Own revenues 45.4 47.3 46.5 40.4 41.3 36.4 37.6 33.5
Taxes and local
payments 29.0 33.9 32.9 28.0 28.3 23.8 23.5
No
data
Real estate 15.3 16.4 14.8 13.4 14.1 11.4 11.2 11.3
Agricultural 3.8 2.7 3.8 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
From
transportation 1.1 4.9 3.3 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.9 0.8
Tax card 2.4 3.2 2.8 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.0 Nodata
Share in central
taxes 28.9 22.2 25.4 23.1 23.0 24.5 24.2 24.7
Subventions 13.6 11.7 11.4 14.9 15.2 26.3 24.1 25.4
Targeted
subsidies 12.0 18.8 16.7 21.6 20.6 13.8 14.1 14.3
Source: Kosek-Wojnar, Surówka, 2007, page 157
The next step in the transformation of the Polish tax system was to
concentrate the financial power of the government on value added tax,
personal income tax, excise tax and, partially customs tax
(Table 4.20). However, the fastest reform was that of the direct tax
imposed on individuals. As of 1 January 1992, a personal income tax
replaced the previously existing taxes on income, including a tax on
income from economic activities of private individuals, a tax on
salaries and wages at enterprises irrespective of their form of
ownership, and an equalization tax.
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4.7.3. Personal Income Tax
The law on personal income tax was subject to numerous modifications in
relation to tax relief, deductions and contributions. Errors also occurred
during the process; the parties engaged in fierce bargaining to gain
political and professional benefits.
Nominally, personal income tax has a progressive nature; three tax
rates are binding — 19 %, 30 % and 40 %. Since 2009, only two rates
have become binding — 18 % and 32 %. In actual fact, personal income
tax in Poland is pseudo-linear, since the third tax bracket covers only 1 %
of taxpayers, while the first one encompasses approximately 95 %.
Irrespective of the above, the taxpayers of this tax bracket contribute over
50 % of revenues to the state budget, while taxpayers of the third tax
bracket account for close to 30 % of revenues, which distinguishes
Poland from the other EU Member States (Table 4.21).
Table 4.21
PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 2007
Country Initial rates Highest rates Number of levels
Austria 0 50 4
Belgium 25 50 5
Bulgaria 12 32 4
Cyprus 20 30 3
Czech Republic 12 32 4
Denmark 5.48 26.48 3
Estonia 22 … 1
Finland 0 32.5 6
France 0 48.09 7
Greece 15 40 3
Spain 9.06 29.16 5
The Netherlands 2.45 52 4
Ireland 20 42 2
Lithuania 15 33 2
Luxemburg 0 38 10
Latvia 25 … 1
Malta 0 35 6
Germany 0 42 32
Poland 19 40 3
Portugal 10.5 42 7
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Continuation of Table 4.21
Country Initial rates Highest rates Number of levels
Romania 16 … 1
Slovakia 19 … 1
Slovenia 10 40 3
Sweden 0 25 3
Hungary 18 36 2
Great Britain 10 40 3
Italy 23 43 4
Source: Owsiak, 2007, page 1257
The binding nature of the tax implies that all personal income
generated both domestically and abroad, is subject to taxation, apart from
the income of farmers liable for the payment of a separate agricultural
tax, with the following deductions:
— A minimum tax exemption32,
— Income from the work of employees and laborers, depending on
the total number of jobs.
The fact that no entity-ba sed Continuation of exemptions, apart from
those for disabled war veterans, are applied also illustrates the binding
nature of this tax. However, the tax envisages a broad range of subject-
based exemptions of a social nature (cash aid, scolarships, and grants), an
investment nature (revenues generated on the territory of special
economic zones) and an economic nature.
With regard to some sources of income, the law distinguishes between
lump-sum tax rates in the amount of 20 % and 50 % of income. The 20 %
lump-sum tax rate applies to the following:
— Income from independent artistic, literary, scientific and journalistic
activities;
— Remuneration for the implementation of tasks assigned by
government authorities, state or local self-government administrations,
courts and prosecutor’s offices; and
— Income from commissioning, if such services are not to the benefit
of the people.
Instead, the 50 % lump-sum tax rate applies to the following:
— Salaries, as well as licensing payments, the transfer of property
rights to inventions, topography of integrated circuits, trademarks or
design samples;
                     
32 The minimum exemption from taxation is significantly lower than the social
minimum in 2008: PLN 1,335 to PLN 2,502.
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— Income from the use of copyright and associated rights or disposal
of such rights by the inventors.
Personal income taxation can be conducted according to general
terms, in the form of a lump-sum taxation on registered revenues, «tax
card», and a lump-sum taxation paid by clerics.
The general basis applies to each individual. Married couples are entitled
to joint income taxation. The law on personal income tax does not cover the
following: agricultural income, other than income from special agricultural
productive activities, forestry taxation, income from inheritance and gifts,
partition of property jointly owned by a married couple, income from factors,
which cannot be the subject of legally effective cotract.
Income generated abroad is exempt from taxation in Poland, if this is
envisaged by an international agreement on avoiding double taxation or
another international agreement that Poland is a party to. Income
generated in the country that is not subject to the avoidance of double
taxation is taxed on a general basis; however, the tax imposed is
diminished by the amount equal to that of the tax on income generated in
another country, which has been paid abroad.
The Polish tax law envisages two forms of lump-sum taxation of
individuals pursuing business activities - at lump-sum tax rates on registered
revenue and by «tax card». Introduced in 1994, the lump-sum tax rate is
intended to simplify the taxation of small businesses and is an element of the
harmonization of taxes with the European legislation. Taxation in the form of
a lump-sum evidential tax rate can be utilized by private individuals doing
business, as well as partnership or full partnerships of private individuals.
The lump-sum tax rate applies solely to entities that in 2008 earned aggregate
revenue that did not exceed EUR 15,00033.
The following lump-sum tax rates on revenue apply:
— 20 % for revenue earned by liberal professions;
— 8.5 % for revenue earned from the provision of services, rent of
premises, sale on commission, services associated with childcare and fire
safety, goods produced from commissioned materials;
— 5.5 % of income gained from production and construction
activities, vehicles with a freight capacity of more than 2 tons, and
commission fee received from the trade activities mentioned in the law;
— 3 % of income gained from service activities in the scope of trade
and catering, with the exception of income on the sale of drinks with a
volume of alcohol of more than 1.5%.
The law determines the conditions for exemption from the lump-sum tax
rate, deductions from received income and coverage of expenses from previous
                     
33 In 2003—2007, the limit amounted to EUR 250 thousand.
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years. Health contributions and contributions to NGOs for public benefit
purposes can be deducted from the lump-sum tax rate (up to 1 % of the tax).
The entities liable to the taxation of their evident income at a lump-sum
tax rate do not maintain accounting and tax records of income and
expenditure in their cashbooks. They are obliged to maintain the records of
income and equipment, to keep confirmation of purchases and to have a list
of sustained resources, non-material assets and legal valuables. They can also
extend their tax credit. The lump-sum tax rate is calculated quarterly.
Taxation by «tax card» has been in effect since 1992; a «tax card» is
available to private individuals pursing independent entrepreneurial
activities in the form of a simple company. Income taxed by «tax card»
includes income from production and services in the sphere of retail trade,
non-alcoholic foodstuffs, education rendered by freelancers, home
childcare and nursing, as well as veterinary and entertainment services.
Separate tables outline limits on the number of employees (up to 5 people)
for each type of activity. The limits may be raised on the territories of
gminas that are under the threat of extremely high unemployment and with
regard to persons concurrently engaged in agriculture.
4.7.4. Corporate Income Tax
Since corporate income tax (CIT) in the context of a market economy is a
parameter of economic choice (investment-related decisions, raising
capital, return on launching a new business), there was a need for its
reform.34 Consequently, in 1992, identical terms for the assessment of the
CIT, irrespective of the form of ownership, form of incorporation and
sector, were introduced.
The numerous novelties of the law on CIT represented a successful
reduction of the tax rate from 40 %, which was binding until 1996, 38 %
(1997), 36 % (1998), 30 % (2000), and 28 % (2001) to 19 % in 2004, as
well as the reduction of more than 30 initially binding subject-based
exemptions, with only a few remaining in 2007. The exemptions apply to
the following: a comprehensive or partial sale of real estate that is part of a
farm; income of taxpayers whose statutory objective is to pursue research
and technology, education and cultural activities, which support public
initiatives; revenues from entrepreneurial activities carried out in a special
economic zone; subsidies allocated from the state budget or a territorial
self-government budget; income of ecclesiastical legal entities; and the tax
on lotteries. Total deductions from gifts cannot exceed 10 % of income.
Gifts to private individuals and legal entities, as well as some organisational
                     
34 Law of 15 February 1992 on corporate income tax
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units with no legal identity (producers of fuel goods, alcoholic beverages
containing more than 1.5 % of alcohol, tobacco products, electronics, as
well as goods made of or containing precious metals), are not deductible.
Irrespective of personal income tax and corporate income tax, a tax on the
sale of government shares and a lottery tax have been in effect since 1995.
Table 4.22
CORPORATE INCOME TAX (CIT) RATES
Country 1995 1997 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Austria … 34 … 34 25 25 25
Belgium … 40.17 … 33.99 33.99 33,99 33,99
Bulgaria … 25 … 34 34 34 34
Cyprus … … 28 15 10 10 10
Czech Republic 41 25 31 28 26 24 24
Denmark 34 34 30 30 28 28 28
Estonia … … … … 24 23 22
Finland … 35 32 31 31 31 31
France 36.66 36.66 34.33 34.33 33.83 33.83 33.83
Greece 35 40 35 35 32 29 25
Spain 35 35 35 35 35 35 32.5
Netherlands 35 35 35 34.5 31,5 29.6 25
Ireland 38 36 16 12,5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Lithuania … … … … 15 15 15
Luxemburg 40.29 30.34 30.38 30.38 30.38 29.63 29.63
Latvia … … … … 15 15 15
Malta … … … … 35 35 35
Germany 59 57.5 38.36 38.29 38.31 38.34 38.36
Poland 40 38 28 19 19 19 19
Portugal 39.6 39.6 33 27.5 27.5 27.5 25
Romania … … 25 25 16 16 16
Slovakia … 26 24.5 22 20 20 20
Slovenia … … 25 19 19 19 19
Sweden 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Hungary … 18 18 16 16 16 16
Great Britain 33 33 31 30 30 30 30
Italy 52.2 53.2 40.25 37.25 37.25 37.25 37.25
Source: Owsiak, 2007, p. 1258
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4.7.5. Value Added Tax
In view of a weakly developed treasury apparatus, indirect taxes
constitute the main source of budget revenues. Therefore, the greatest
transaction of tax reforms was the introduction of a value added tax on
goods and services adjusted to the requirements of the common system of
taxation, on 1 July 1993. The new tax substituted five binding indirect
taxes: the sales tax and the turnover tax. Along with regulatory changes,
the changes associated with the above-mentioned taxes also introduced
transitional indirect taxes: in 1994—1997 — an imports tax or an
extremely controversial tax on excessive salary increases, which was in
effect until 1996. Equalization payments on certain agricultural goods and
consumer goods brought from abroad were introduced (Law of 1994,
No. 43, then 160).
Numerous changes to the law of May 2004 complicated the process of
forecasting the effects of taxation on economic intentions. Presently, the
law on VAT of 11 March 2004 is in effect; this tax belongs to
exceptionally complicated and barely transparent taxes. Taxpayers often
have problems associated with its application.
Value added tax is applicable to the turnover of goods, i.e.:
— Supply of goods and services on the territory of the Republic of
Poland;
— Exports and imports of goods;
— Acquisition of goods in EU countries and supply of such goods to
the territory of the Republic of Poland.
A tax liability arises upon the release of goods or the issuance of an
invoice, however not later than within 7 days following the delivery of a
commodity. A «small taxpayer», i.e. a taxpayer whose annual turnover of
goods does not exceed EUR 800,000, has the right to settle VAT on a
quarterly basis. This means that having regulated transactions with
customers, the taxpayer must submit returns to a relevant tax office, while
a relevant tax liability must be regulated within 90 days following the day
of the supply of a commodity or the delivery of a service.
A tax liability arises in the place where a good is dispatched or a
service is provided, i.e. the place where transportation begins, installation
ends, goods (that will not be dispatched or transported) are stored and the
import of goods is immediately confirmed. The place where the dispatch
or transport of goods is complete is recognised as the place of the intra-
Community acquisition of goods. With regard to some services, the place
of their provision is the location of the service provider or the location of
the real estate that is the object of the turnover. The following tax rates
apply to VAT:
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1) A standard rate of 22 % applicable to all goods, other than the
exports of goods and services and intra-Community turnover, as well as
goods and services that are subject to other tax rates according to the law;
2) A reduced tax rate of 7 % is applicable to goods and services
associated with agriculture and forestry, healthcare, foodstuffs, books,
periodicals and press, transportation services, handicrafts, identified people-
oriented services along with services covered by a public housing program;
3) A rate of 3 % was introduced on 1 May 2008 for agricultural products
and services outlined in the law; the rate will later be increased to 7 %;
4) A rate of 0 % is applicable to the taxation of exports in goods and
the intra-Community supply of goods. A zero % rate is also applicable to
some goods and services provided on the territory of the Republic of
Poland, for instance, some ships, a part of marine transport, air transport
resources, international transportation services, and the delivery of goods
to duty-free zones.
Table 4.23
VAT RATES IN EU COUNTRIES, %
Country Preferential rates General rates
Austria 10 20
Belgium 0; 6; 12 21
Denmark 0 25
Finland 0; 8; 17 22
France 2.1; 5.5 19.6
Greece 4.5; 9 19
Spain 4; 7 16
The Netherlands 6 19
Ireland 0; 4.8; 13.5 21
Luxemburg 3; 6; 12 15
Germany 7 16
Portugal 5; 12 21
Sweden 0; 6; 12 25
Great Britain 0; 5 17.5
Italy 4.5; 10 20
Malta 0; 5 18
Cyprus 0; 5 15
Czech Republic 5 19
Estonia 0; 5 18
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Continuation of Table 4.23
Country Preferential rates General rates
Lithuania 5; 9 18
Latvia 5 18
Poland 0; 3; 7 22
Slovakia — 19
Slovenia 8.5 20
Hungary 5; 15 20
Source: Szczodrowski, 2007, page 194
4.7.6. Excises
An excise tax is another indirect tax playing an essential role in the state
budget. The attractiveness of the excise tax as a source of state budget
replenishment arises from the fact that this tax is easy to collect and
productive at the same time. For instance, in Poland, excise revenues are
constantly growing. While in 1994, they accounted for 14.3 % of state
revenues, presently their share is close to 30 %.
The substance of the excise tax is similar to that of value added tax,
were subject to substantial changes prior to May 2004. Since Poland’s
accession to the EU, a new law on the excise tax (No. 29, then 257, with
subsequent changes) defines the essence of the excise tax. The new law
on the excise tax adjusts the structure of this tax to EU requirements,
contains rules regulating the denoting of excise goods with treasury
excise marks. An annex to the law on the excise tax mentions excise
goods. Excise tax harmonization with the EU standards meant reducing
the list of excise goods to motor fuels, heating fuels, gas, energy,
passenger vehicles, cosmetics, decorative products, perfumes, fur and
leather products, playing cards, equipment of entertainment facilities, as
well as hunting firearms and gas weapons. To assure the complete
coordination of decisions related to the turnover and the basis of taxation,
as well as exemption from the excise tax, pursuant to EU rules, excise
goods in put into a separate category. There is an opportunity to suspend
the collection of excises with regard to harmonized excise products. Prior
to the forwarding of a commodity for consumption (for the storage
period), no benefits or tax exemptions apply to excises and excise rates
are determined as follows:
— % of the tax base;
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— Quota per unit of production;
— % of the maximum retail price;
— Quota per unit of production at the maximum retail price.
The law on the excise tax does not establish final binding excise rates.
This is a prerogative of the Ministry of Finance, which determines
preconditions to be taken into consideration during the establishment of
excise rates. Excise rates for a given year are changed as per minimum
rates directly arising from EU law provisions and fundamentals of the
budget law.
Table 4.24
MINIMUM EXCISE RATES, BINDING
ON INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTS IN THE EU
Product EUR
Mineral oils
Leaded petrol 421 (421)
Unleaded petrol 359 (359)
Diesel 302 (330)
Gas for vehicles 302 (330)
Heating fuels 0
Heavy fuel oil 15
LPG (per 1,000 kilogram) 125 (125)
Natural gas (per gigajoule) 2.6 (2.6)
Alcoholic beverages
Beer 0.748—1.87 depending on thecontent of alcohol
Wine 0
Ethyl alcohol 550
Prepared raw material products 45
Tobacco products
Cigarettes with cardboard holder (1000
each)
57 % of the retail price (not less than
EUR 60)
Cigars, cigarettes 5 % of the retail price or EUR 11 per1,000 each or EUR 11 per kilogram
Note. Values in brackets show excise rates for 2010
Source: Szczodrowski, 2007, page 204
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4.7.7. The Problem of Tax Harmonization
The freedom of the movement of goods, capital and people, which is
guaranteed by the common European market of States, which are
Signatories to the EU Treaty, raises the question of the role of taxes in the
integration process. The need for harmonizing taxes was determined in
the Treaty of Rome (Article 83). At the time of the drafting of the Treaty
of Rome, opinions were expressed, that the harmonization of indirect
taxes and the elimination of customs barriers were sufficient to put into
practice the idea of a common internal market.
The development of integration processes and the enhancement of the
role of global cooperation currently raise many questions associated with
the differentiation of direct taxes, particularly those associated with unfair
competition arising from differentiation, the complication of the turnover
of capital and revenues from capital, the impact of taxation on salaries
and wages and relevant labour migration, as well as the international
transfer of taxes, i.e. tax dumping. The issue also arises of fair taxation in
European countries. All these issues are part of the general tendency to
reduce direct taxes. Such reductions have features of spontaneous
harmonization, which by its nature remains distantly related to issues of
justice in taxation and fair competition.
Therefore, the harmonization of direct taxes, along with the discussed
harmonization of indirect taxes, has been increasingly relevant to EU
taxation-related debates.
A comprehensive harmonization of direct taxes requires an answer to
a number of questions pertaining to the impact of such harmonization on
the following:
— State budget and state finances imbalances;
— Opportunity to reduce personal income tax, if the harmonization of
direct taxes would lead to the reduction of government revenues;
— Effects on labor mobility, the raising of foreign investment and the
motivating of enterprises to invest;
— Marginal scope of economic aid to transportation corporations and the
reallocation of government debt arising from such aid between countries.
The harmonization of tax provisions is conditional upon an absolute
requirement for the prevention of unjustified benefits emerging from the
application of tax provisions by a given member-state. Discrimination or
tax prevalence of regions, productions or businesses, violates the
fundamental rules of well-defined markets, including the requirements of
various and similar conditions for competition.
The European Commission raised the problem of the excessive
differentiation of tax systems and harmonization efforts in this sphere as
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early as in 1985. The document «Completing the Internal Market: White
Paper from the Commission to the European Council» contained 282
proposals regarding the elimination of practical, technical and tax barriers
to the completion of a common internal market. Since that time, the
European Council is annually provided with a report on the status of the
implementation of the mentioned goals. The harmonization of direct taxes
is also complicated by the fact that it was not envisaged in the Treaty on
the European Union. Based on the above, the principle of subsidiarity is
the only binding condition with regard to the problem of tax
commitments. This implies that the European Union can intervene in
integration matters only when individual states fail to attain their goals
independently. However, pursuant to Article 94 of the EC Treaty, legal
regulations that have an immediate effect on the functioning of the
common market are subject to harmonization. Opportunities to take
action on the harmonization of tax law that arise from this Article require
compliance with the condition of a joint decision of the European Council
(Article 308 of the EC Treaty). These procedural requirements regarding
the heterogeneity of tax harmonization effects on the attaining of social
and economic goals in individual states illustrate that this process faces
great resistance; therefore, there is presently no common tax law for the
entire EU. Only indirect taxes are the exception. The creation of a
common internal market envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty of 1 January
1993 on border control established a need for preventing double taxation
and the violation of competition rules.
Guided by the Council Directive of 1967, the Member States of that
time replaced all multiphase taxes applied on the territory of the
Community with value added tax. However, some of the states retained
certain freedom to establish a tax basis and the majority of tax rates. The
process of VAT system unification began with the adoption of the Sixth
Council Directive on 17 May 1977. The following was subject to
harmonization: taxable persons, taxable transactions, the base of tax
liabilities, the tax base, tax exemptions, the mechanism of tax deductions,
as well as VAT taxation of small undertakings, farmers and travel agents.
However, the Directive did not formulate minimum or maximum tax
rates. The Directive has been subject to numerous updates. Presently,
Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 is a new legal act
regulating all elements of the VAT system. The VAT properties common
to all Member States of the EU relate to taxable persons, taxable
transactions, exemptions and the tax base. This illustrates the unification
of all elements of the tax except for the rates and deduction conditions.
Every EU Member State introduces its own tax rates. Since 1 January
1993, the tax rate has been set on a level not lower than 15 % and
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essentially reduced rates, bypassing the transition period, have been
defined at a level not lower than 5 %. For assuring the neutrality of the
tax system, in 1967, the harmonization of the excise duty was adopted,
based on the following conditions:
— Retaining excises with a large fiscal value for the budgets of
certain states and their further harmonization;
— Retaining excises with local effects without harmonization;
— Eliminating excises with low fiscal productivity or incorporating
them in the general tax on turnover.
The differentiation of the basic and preferential tax rates is sometimes
obstructed in free exchange of goods and services. However, they may
not be removed due to unresolved problems associated with the
harmonization of direct taxes and various social and budgetary problems
of individual Member States.
The problem associated with direct tax differentiation and their role in
the free movement of labor and capital has existed for many years. Since
all legal regulations that have an immediate effect on the functioning of
common markets are subject to unification, pursuant to Article 94 of the
Treaty of Rome, the harmonization of direct taxes is only acceptable
when relevant regulations can restrict the freedom of movement of
revenues, dividends, interest rates, concession fees and capital between
EU countries. Therefore, the key elements of the system of direct taxes
cannot be subject to harmonization. The requirement for the unanimity of
opinion also creates difficulties.
With regard to the above-mentioned restrictions, harmonization
primarily relates to corporate income. Legal entities carrying out
economic activity internationally have an impact on the exchange of
goods and services, as well as capital between the states. Since personal
income has a predominantly local impact on the operation of markets, the
harmonization of personal income tax relates solely to the double taxation
of persons operating in the form of a small cross-border movement
between the EU Member States. In the EU, personal income tax is
somewhat differentiated both in terms of the determining of a tax base
and a tax rate. The tax base differentiation relates to different
interpretations of income sources, different tax levels and benefits, which
in their own turn are subject to frequent and strong fluctuations. The
majority of countries apply a tax-free quota, which corresponds to a
biological minimum. Strong differentiations of fiscal encumbrances may
cause the emigration of job seekers, although we should emphasise that in
the case of Poland and the majority of new Member States, the pay gap
plays a greater role. In the context of present or future tensions in the
labor market of the EU associated with the ageing of society, substantial
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differentiations of personal income tax become a source of opposition
towards he harmonization of this tax and encourage continuing tax
competition. Taxation problems of persons changing their place of
employment and location between different countries are based upon the
conditions for avoiding double taxation according to arrangements
between individual states. High differentiations of corporate income tax
represent a much more serious problem in terms of unfair competition.
Although in 1995—2007, there was an explicit tendency towards CIT
reduction, there are still various secondary scales of this tax. Low
corporate income tax rates apply in Cyprus — 10 %, Ireland — 12.5 %,
Lithuania and Latvia — 15 %. The highest rates of corporate income tax
are in Germany — 38.7 %, Italy — 37.3 %, France and Belgium — 34 %,
and Spain — 32.5 %.
With regard to CIT harmonization, two directives and one
convention have been approved and signed. The directives pertain to the
harmonization of mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchange of
shares concerning various companies. Possible excesses of the value of
assets resulting from the above-mentioned processes do not create
grounds for the taxation of either companies or shareholders (Council
Directive 90/434 of 23 July 1990). This solution is designed to simplify
the restructuring utilized for improving the competitiveness of
companies. The next element of the harmonization of corporate income
taxes is the adoption of provisions establishing that the taxation of the
dividends of international companies may not be more restrictive, than
that of state companies. In practice, this means that if the share of a
parent company in the capital of a subsidiary located on the territory of
another Member State constitutes at least 25 %, income transferred by
the subsidiary to the parent company is exempt from taxation. Council
Directive 2003/49/EC of June 2003 establishes that the licensing
relations arising between a parent company and its subsidiary are
interpreted as a turnover of resources within an organization and must
be exempt from taxation if the entity receiving the payment is located
on the territory of the EU.
Conditions for the partial taxation of dividends and income for
international companies were also regulated by a directive. There are two
possible solutions: taxation of the company and refusal to tax the
shareholders or, on the contrary, the company does not pay the tax on
dividends paid to the shareholders and the tax liability is transferred to the
shareholders or participants. Instead, local law regulates the taxation of
dividends with regard to state enterprises. Irrespective of relevant efforts,
CIT harmonization prospects are not optimistic. This arises from the fact
that the largest Member States — France and Germany — have high
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fiscal needs associated with large social expenditures. In this context,
they seek CIT harmonization at a level of 30 %. On the other hand,
countries with smaller social needs resist this, even if they have relatively
high CIT rates, as for instance, the Netherlands, Austria or Sweden. The
unification of the tax base would also be integral. This would reduce the
tax burden on corporations.
Progress in the harmonization of personal income tax also does not
seem possible in view of its fundamental significance for assuring social
policy needs.
4.7.8. Conclusions
Guided by the experience in the sphere of fiscal regulations and
harmonization undertakings associated with such regulations, we can
formulate the following conclusions.
1. The Polish tax system is in line with the general taxation terms
respected by the EU. Its principal property is the reduction of corporate
income tax from 40 % to 19 % and the enhancement of the role of
indirect taxes in assuring fiscal needs of the state. The Polish tax system
is distinctive in that property taxes play a secondary role.
2. Undoubtedly, the fiscal policy of Poland and Ukraine should aim
to create a competitive tax system. An investment-friendly tax system
becomes one of the few economic trump cards facilitating the inflow of
foreign investment.
3. Irrespective of the fact that government expenditure in Poland is
similar to that of the old EU countries, it still remains too high and is a
product of uncompetitive fiscal encumbrances.
4. Reduction, on a level reaching nearly half of GDP, which was
typical of socialist countries, becomes a weighty factor of the suspension
of development and renders real convergence impossible. Facts illustrate
that only the richest countries under certain favorable circumstances can
rely on such a high reduction level without damage to GDP dynamics.
5. With regard to another prospect, public prosperity is easier to
achieve in an environment least burdened by taxes and regulations of a
market economy. If fiscal needs of the state need to be high, it is
recommended such needs are assured with the help of a maximally high
corporate tax and, respectively, higher direct taxes.
6. Poland should be moving towards the maximum simplification of
tax procedures, since all this relates to the reduction of revenues from
taxation and the enhancement of the efficiency of the punitive function of
taxation.
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7. Forcing a linear tax on personal income in a country with high
budgetary needs is not justified, since it complicates the assurance of
fiscal justice and can contribute to the exacerbation of deeply rooted
social inequalities.
8. A modern and effective fiscal policy should be moving towards the
reduction and simplification of the tax system in order to improve labor
conditions and especially the business environment. Such policy
improves the country’s image among potential investors. As possible
instruments of enhancing economic competitiveness, reductions and
simplifications should apply to income taxes, however in a manner
enabling effective competition for the inflow of foreign capital. EU
accession has had a significant impact on the development of the Polish
tax system and primarily this related to indirect taxes, since they are
subject to directives on the harmonization of taxes.
9. The taxation of farming remains an unresolved problem of the
Polish tax system. An optimal system of farming taxation must correlate
with the resolution of the problem of the KRUS insurance model, which
has a specific nature. A significant share of people and business entities
associated with agriculture are not subject to personal income tax or
corporate income tax. This shows that personal income tax is not a
universal tax.
10. Assessing the tax system, it is impossible to restrict oneself
merely to tax law. One should also take due notice of the problem
associated with the efficiency of the treasury apparatus and the need to
tighten the tax system, both with regard to indirect taxes and corporate
income taxes, particularly with regard to the problems related to the
transfer of revenues to a tax haven. A possible reduction of the tax burden
and a possible restoration of the balance of state funds will depend on
progress in the reduction of the share of the shadow economy and tax
evasion.
4.8. Mechanisms and Instruments for the Development of Human
Capital and Innovation
4.8.1. Innovation as a Challenge for Development and the Modern
Economy’s Effectiveness Criterion
An increasing gap in development between the countries of Western
Europe and the United States in the beginning of the 1970s oil crisis and
the preservation of a 35 % level measured by GDP per capita in the
following decades have directly contributed to the elaboration of
CHAPTER 4. National economy convergence mechanisms… 531
ambitious plans formulated in the Lisbon Strategy (LS) in 2000 to catch
up with America by developing an economy based on knowledge and
concurrently assuring social and economic cohesion. Following a series
of efforts to implement this strategy over a number of years and
amendments made to the LS (in 2005 and 2008), the fundamentals of the
LS as an instrument of European policy in the sphere of human capital,
innovation and social and economic cohesion were subject to criticism.
The criticism does not pertain to the role of innovation as a factor for the
competitiveness of businesses, national economies and regions, but rather
relates to the instruments, mechanisms and institutions utilized for
strategy implementation.
Innovation means the ability to create or seek new knowledge-based
decisions, to adapt such decisions to specific environments (a family,
household, business, region or country), to implement and then disseminate
it. The innovation perceived in this manner is a component of human
capital. Without a relevant quality of human capital aimed at creativity,
activity and, thus, innovations, which permits the assurance of business
interests, it is impossible to eliminate the gap in economic development and
catch up with transformations in the operation of the markets, states,
businesses, persons and entire societies. Such specific features of human
capital represent a key precondition for enhancing the role of innovation
and preserving innovation as a fundamental developmental challenge, as
well as a criterion for assessing the effectiveness of an economic system
built on an economy based on knowledge.
There are various reasons to pay attention to innovation as a
competitive factor. The reasons emerge from the dualistic nature of
innovation, which manifests itself in various forms. Innovation as a
resource associated with other factors initially acts as an expenditure
determinant in each organization (firm). Ultimately, it is a reflection of
the efficient activity of an organization and the economy as a whole.
Such dual role of innovation as a factor of expenditures and effects
illustrates the need to introduce innovation as a criterion for assessing
the effectiveness of economic systems. The use of the innovation
criterion in the development of an international ranking of individual
countries and their similarity to rankings based upon GDP per capita
seems practical, as it is based upon the feasibility of the formulated
postulate about innovation being a criterion of efficiency (the attaining
of goals) and effectiveness (the extent of resources utilization) of
economic systems.
Overall, innovation, co-existing with other factors, is of a positive
synergetic nature in the context of competition. Even its name contains an
element of novelty and changes. Its dynamic and creative nature
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corresponds to the increasing turbulence of an environment, the
development-related errors of which can only be corrected by the
utilization of the basic mechanisms of the development of innovation-
based competitiveness via the introduction of industrial, technological,
and managerial innovations.
Innovations are predominantly defined descriptively on the basis of a
sample provided by a forerunner of the innovation theory (Schumpeter
J. A., 1960), who identified cases which were later recognised as
innovations. In light of research and technology papers at the turn of the
century and the condition of the environment and human status in society
at the beginning of the 21st century, the need arose to develop approaches
to the essence of innovation. In our opinion, which is quite proper from
the perspective of the present, the following definition seems to be the
most appropriate: innovation is a change that has been introduced and is
generating defined benefits (economic, public, environmental, etc.), with
the aggregate of such benefits having a positive value. The above-given
definition consists of three elements: change, introduction and aggregate
benefit for all aspects of human life.
The change indicates the replacement of a previously existing state
of affairs with a new one and means the introduction of something new
in any sphere of human life. Therefore, it can relate to every sphere of
human life, not only economic. Such outlook implies a broad range of
opportunities to influence the development of innovation. Before a
person achieves professional maturity perceived as an active
participation in economic activities, he or she can train themselves to
introduce innovations to their relevant activities. However, changes
cannot remain conceptual. The best, most original concept to replace
something that already exists with something new, which, nonetheless,
has not been implemented, cannot in principle be referred to as an
innovation. Five-year plans utilized in the economies of the former
Soviet bloc were also abundant in ideas on the modernization of
production. The mechanism of ineffective bargaining typical of
hierarchical centralised coercive-distributive coordination virtually
eliminated innovation on the microeconomic level.
Introduction is a required structural element of innovation, although
insufficient for innovation to appear. The total value of benefit constitutes
a criterion of a required and sufficient condition. The above does not
concern economic benefits solely, since they do not assure full usefulness
as perceived in the theory of personal and public wellbeing. Making a
stake solely on economic effects and sometimes making fetish out of
economic effects, reveals aspirations to gain personal advantages (for
instance, in business) in relation to others and could lead to social
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inequalities. The neglect of environmental, public, genetic and similar
consequences is evidence of the irresponsibility of business, including the
irresponsibility of an individual, a company or business at large
(Promoting..., 2001).
Thus, we should emphasise that the added value of the benefit,
factoring in all aspects of human life, gives rise to the recognition of a
change being introduced by innovation. The rejection of benefits (as a
structural element of innovations) creates a situation whereby,
delivering microeconomic benefits, an introduced change may
concurrently result in an adverse external effects, for instance, in the
ecosphere, social capital, human biological potential, etc. Identifying
various benefits, including cultural and spiritual, is of paramount
importance, since innovations are traditionally associated exclusively
with technical aspects and economic benefits.
Innovations are simultaneously a product and a medium of
knowledge perceived as a factor of production, a component of welfare,
a stimulator of development, a subject of turnover, an instrument of
competition or, finally, an instrument for creating or mastering new
knowledge (Whitley, 2008).
Economists have always been aware of the important role of
knowledge in economic processes. However, the majority of economists
interpreted the subject matter of knowledge as too risky to deal with.
Until the television and information revolution, knowledge as an
economic resource was perceived as an element that supplemented the
traditional pool of production factors. At the current stage, knowledge has
become the most important endogenous factor of production, making an
essential contribution to production growth and expanding the boundaries
for well-balanced growth (Romer, 1986).
The approach of knowledge as a component of welfare is indicative of
the creation of the basis of material wealth from intangible knowledge
and the creation of the wealth of individuals, public groups and peoples.
The experience of leading countries in the development of economy
based on knowledge validates Drucker’s thesis that information and
knowledge are principal generators of wealth, since it is no longer
possible to raise great profits from the production and transfer of assets or
control over monetary resources (Drucker, 1999 : 149). A revolution in
information and telecommunications along with liberalization make
information and knowledge the key generators of wealth. In the context
of intense competition on open markets, particularly with transnational
corporations (TNCs), being successful on the global market is impossible
without applicable knowledge and comprehensive, accurate and timely
information (Stiglitz, 1999).
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For any case of an individual or an organization, only applicable
knowledge, i.e. knowledge that produces benefits for consumers, can
become a tool of competition. If knowledge is externalized in key
competences, it can be a key source and often the sole source of a
comparative advantage. This happens since in the modern economy
one deals with an extremely dynamic expansion of productions based
upon human intellectual potential. The dramatic economic growth of
some countries producing raw materials does not contradict the above-
mentioned either. The exhaustion of non-renewable resources and the
development of China and India accelerated by an incredible expansion
would be another argument in favor of strategies based upon the
innovation and acceleration of the economic dynamics of the ICT
sector. Human capital development and high technologies are the only
hope to tackle the energy crisis, problems associated with famine and
poverty, as well as a high mortality rate. One should not be of an
opinion that this is only particularly relevant to Ukraine, Poland and
countries undersupplied with the most efficient energy carrier
resources.
One of the functional aspects of knowledge is its role as a tool for
creating or gaining new knowledge. This is valid for the following: a
tool capable of self-improvement resulting from the utilization of such
tool becomes impeccable to the extent that available knowledge is
varied and profound. This is a phenomenal property inherent to no other
resource. However, a report developed by the OECD (OECD, 2007)
suggests that we have not yet developed the ability to utilize knowledge
systematically for creating new knowledge. This adds significance to
the postulate about creating intellectual capital, i.e. accumulating
knowledge, making knowledge applicable and beneficial for its owners.
Knowledge is a construction material for intellectual capital, and all its
components exist owing to some type of knowledge (including, patents,
innovation potential, client loyalty, reputation, willingness to act,
engagement, organisational culture, etc.), since it originates in the
human mind that makes the application of knowledge possible and
profitable. This also leads us to the definition of intellectual capital,
since one reckons that certain intangible assets, which are often hard to
determine, but must be associated with knowledge or with the results of
knowledge utilization, enhance benefits on a considerably larger scale
than do traditional types of capital (for instance, tangible or financial
assets).
Integrated knowledge is contained in the human mind in the form of
ideas, notions, impressions, intuition, opinions, concepts, beliefs, and
intentions, as well as in various mediums, such as documents, norms,
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procedures, processes and practices. However, it can only be articulated
and utilized thanks to people, who may build their capital by utilizing
knowledge and make such capital intellectual. People can also squander
knowledge, i.e. fail to utilize their knowledge. To protect the public and
the economy from such situations, one needs to effectively manage the
processes of knowledge production, dissemination, and utilization.
There is a need for comprehensive systems for creating, gaining,
transforming and accumulating knowledge based upon decisions
pertaining to the proposal of knowledge resources; functional
knowledge banks, which give access to knowledge and forward required
information; skills to master, utilize and apply available knowledge, as
well as relevant associated information and communications
technologies.
The application of knowledge in various spheres of human activity
and the availability of knowledge in various functions are possible due to
information and telecommunication technologies. Modern economic
theories have accepted a thesis about the expansion of a knowledge-based
economy, since this type of economy has recently emerged as an
important branch of theoretical thought and political activities on a
global, continental, national, and regional scale. The eEurope and ePolska
programs define knowledge economy as a new model of economy the
operation of which relies on a maximally exhaustive use of knowledge
resources and innovations and upon general access to information. We are
referring to the contribution of businesses to the enhancing of national
wealth, i.e. a contribution that depends on business performance. We
should emphasise that economy of knowledge is a model envisaging that
knowledge represents a factor of having a competitive advantage for the
majority of businesses.
We may only have the most developed economies in mind as we
talk about economy of knowledge. Less developed countries may not
rely on their economies becoming knowledge-based under the influence
of market forces. The creating of the economy of knowledge requires
market assistance at the macroeconomic, local and global levels through
the arrangement of an institutional framework, tools and favorable
mechanisms for innovation and human capital utilization in the process
of creating a competitive regime and a friendly environment for the
harmonious development of all spheres of human life. Thus, a special
role in this process is assigned to science, education, and technology,
which represent unique pillars of the economy of knowledge and are
reflected in research, which contributes to the formation of the
statistical effects of the sphere of qualitative social and economic
changes.
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4.8.2. Mechanisms for Coordinating Innovation Activities Pursued by
Business Entities
A market mechanism, regardless of all its flaws, remains the best method to
organize economic activities (Woźniak, 2004) and, therefore, market
mechanisms for creating human capital and innovation should be prioritized.
Prices that developed independently in the process of supplier and
consumer interaction are the essential method of coordinating actions that
enhances economic effectiveness in line with market rules. The
effectiveness of the market coordination of transactions is also conditional
upon clarified ownership rights, impeccable information, possible
safeguards from risks and uncertainties. The above-mentioned purpose
requires that the state guarantees the free disposal of capital and labor,
freedom to enter into contracts, and the receipt of signals.
At the same time, as has been proved, and as the author of this section
maintains, the market as a mechanism reacts to human egoism expressed in
the motivation for individual profits as a driving force of personal and public
welfare, and concurrently is a mechanism for the expansion of global threats.
To restrict such threats, one needs to specify the new role of the state and a
new international economic regime as related to technological issues and the
diffusion of innovations reducing global threats.
Within the framework of market coordination, ex ante and ex post costs
always appear in transactions. Ex ante costs are associated with receiving
and processing information, entering into an agreement, and negotiations
terms and conditions to minimize transaction risks. Ex post costs are
instead related to the control over activities, repeated discussions, disputes,
and implementation costs. Transaction costs cover both internal business
transactions based upon hierarchical relations and transactions between
autonomous firms (in the market) (Williamson, 1985).
However, the transfer of coordination to a firm (the hierarchical
system) does not always have an impact on the reduction of transaction
costs. If costs associated with market coordination or prices proved
smaller or equal to management costs, there would be no economic
justification for creating firms and should such firms emerge, they would
not exist long. According to the rules for calculating alternative costs, the
optimal marginal transaction cost coordinated internally is at a point
where the cost of an additional transaction executed internally is equal to
the cost of such transaction executed externally through the market
mechanism or by another entrepreneur who is more effective, i.e. will
have smaller business management costs (Coase, 1937).
Referring to positive aspects of hierarchical relations, we do not
diminish numerous adverse effects, particularly in the event of the abuse
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of power, i.e. excessive bureaucracy, which makes any initiative
impossible. However, the introduction of decentralization in operating
firms may cause new problems related to the coordination of activities.
The replacement of hierarchical control with market relations is not an
acceptable solution, if this generates additional transaction costs. One
should also not forget that an enterprise, as a specialized management
structure, can influence the duration of relations in order to prevent the
weakening of such relations under the pressure of a spontaneous
contraction in the market.
The issues of maintaining relations durable and reducing transaction
costs signal a need for coordinating activities in a different manner.
Furthermore, progressing globalization and high technological
developments permit the assumption that great hierarchical corporations
will be replaced with a new, less formalized, self-organized form of
coordination (Fukuyama, 2000), specifically with a network. A public
network represents moral relations of trust within a group of individuals
sharing informal norms or values going beyond the limits of those
required for executing standard market transactions (Fukuyama, 2000).
This new form of cooperation interpreted as an intermediary between
traditional markets and hierarchies must illustrate the typical properties of
a new method of actions coordination and market system operation. Such
properties emerge partially from a positive experience and partially from
the experience of hierarchical structures, however, are replete with new
elements awaited by the players in an increasingly complicated,
information-saturated economic life35.
In relation to the determination of connections in the network of
norms and values categories, an economic exchange within such network
is the result of such engagement, i.e. the internalization of values and
norms to one’s own benefit. On the other hand, market transactions can
also exist between anonymous parties. It should be noted that this is
currently the case, since it is facilitated by globalization. While
previously, the function of conflict prevention was assigned to firms, the
role is currently attributed to networks, for instance, clusters, which
eliminate problems associated with a lack of interaction, a lack of
coordination and insufficient differentiation of interrelations with the help
                     
35 Fukuyama believed that hierarchical structures would remain, as previously, an
integral part of the process for coordinating action due to three circumstances. First of all,
the emergence and operation of a network requires public capital and if this requirement is not
fulfilled, the hierarchy remains the only possible form of regulation. Secondly, the
hierarchy is sometimes functionally necessary to attain institutional goals. Thirdly, people,
by their nature, like being organized hierarchically, or in other words, people at the top of
the hierarchy feed on respect arising from their social status even more than they feed on
money (Fukuyama, 2000).
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of the following adopted provision: competitiveness is extraneous, while
cooperation and partnership exist within the cluster.
National innovation systems (NISs), which may utilize clusters as a pro-
innovation tool, also have a networking nature. NISs, as institutional systems
based upon a coordination model, are tailored to develop innovation and a
highly technological economy and constitute a basis for the development of
new potential for economic development in many developed countries.
Institutions facilitating cooperation within the framework of NISs and
assuring a relevant direction of the coordination of economic processes
facilitate the development of innovations (Grosse, 2007).
Networks as an economic coordination structure, for instance in the
form of NISs or clusters, are only beginning to spread in less developed
countries. Instead, being interpenetrating, various networks of other
structures have long been in existence. A good example of network
penetration could be the Internet or a public network in industry clusters.
The networks that gain a critical mass, namely a relevant number of firms
and institutions required for assuring an agglomeration effect and being
exceptionally successful in competition in individual activities, have a
powerful impact on virtually any national, regional, and local economy,
as well as on a large city economy, primarily in developed countries
(Porter, 2001 : 246). With respect to the American economy, we can talk
about the emergence of future layers of networks, as new clusters of
clusters. New partially clustered structures, overlapping each other, are
emerging in Poland. The idea of cluster initiatives also exists in Ukraine
(Bakuszwicz, 2008). Network partnership and cooperation promote
synergy effects; however, assuring similar effects within the limits of
other structures is complicated, since individual entities do not have
sufficient competences and other resources for the independent
management of system coordination processes.
In addition to clusters being innovation-oriented, innovation activities
can and will be part of specific hybrid structures for the coordination of
actions and processes. It is in hybrid structures created from the elements
of market, hierarchical and network coordination that the market
mechanism plays and will play a leading role. Therefore, such structures
are efficient with regard to innovation to the extent that a competitive
regime is developed. With accession to the EU, Poland approved and
borrowed the principle of the freedom of economic activities along with
the entirety of hierarchical regulations (within the limits of central
strategic regulation). However, due to Ukraine lagging behind in
disseminating a market basis for the operation of its economy, network
structures have to operate as part of underdeveloped markets. This must
have consequences in the form of additional transactional costs.
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A number of factors affect the efficiency of coordination mechanisms,
perceived as the effective launching of processes for achieving specific
goals. The internal cohesion of various tools operating by the logic of
market mechanisms is of fundamental significance. However, one should
mention that a market is self-regulatory. However, network structures can
also spontaneously react to the elimination of non-cohesion. However,
hierarchical structures with coordination implemented by the state run a
high risk of lacking internal cohesion and, particularly, cohesion with the
logic of markets operation. This implies that market instruments should
only be utilized if markets fail. Furthermore, pursuing goals other than
market goals may require support with the help of central hierarchical
coordination. Since human capital and innovation possess the features of
public property, their development requires support with the help of
hierarchical coordination at the macroeconomic level as well. From this
perspective, network structures are most suitable for creating innovation.
4.8.3. Development of Human Capital and Innovation in the Light of
Knowledge-based Economy
The World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM)
developed in 1999 as part of the Knowledge for Development Program
(K4D) represents an interesting attempt at interpreting quantitative
changes in human capital and innovation as qualitative factors of social
and economic development. The Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) is
now determined for 140 countries (KAM, 2008)36. The index
demonstrates a 15 % gap between Poland and Western Europe and a gap
close to 17 % between Poland and the United States in terms of
knowledge economy (KE). Meanwhile, the level of the identification of
KE development in Ukraine is slightly lower than that in Russia and
significantly lower than that in Poland (Figure 4.8). Since the gap in KE
development between Western Europe37 and the United States and these
two counties is close to 36 % and 40 % respectively, Russia is obviously
not a good example of KE development for Ukraine.
                     
36 To allow for a cross-country comparison, data is available on partial values
normalized relative to an average variable calculated for all countries included in the KAM
statistics. The methodology also uses the term of «an actual index», namely a variable
produced following the calculation of its past value determined for the year of the
publication of a relevant KAM report, for instance for the year t0 = 1995 according to the
current value for the year t0 + n = 2008.37In the KAM procedure, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy are viewed
separately, while the countries of Western Europe include other states of the EU-15, such
as Cyprus, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
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Guided by Figure 4.8, which contains individual groups of partial KEI
variables, it is possible to formulate the following conclusions about the
sources of KE development.
1. In the sphere of education and literacy in the reported period, both
Ukraine and Poland are characterized by high indicators approaching the
model level.
2. Ukraine has reached major progress in the restriction of tariff
barriers, which resulted in a rather small gap between Ukraine and
Poland, which essentially achieved a model level in this sphere (in
connection with its membership in the WTO and the OECD, as well as
accession to the EU).
3. Unlike Poland, Ukraine has not reached essential progress in the
improvement of the regulation and quality of court decisions, even though
in 1995 Poland did not show essential improvement in this sphere either.
4. Poland and Ukraine are separated by a significant and
differentiated gap in the development of an information society and
innovation, with Poland taking the lead.
Poland            Ukraine      Western Europe  USA          Russia 
Figure 4.8 KEI Changes: Cross-Country Comparison
Note. The methodology envisages the updating of the basis for comparison, i.e. the
data for 1995, for future assessment of the progress in KE development, which is illustrated
by the first three columns of the Figure.
Calculated on the basis of the following data: KAM 2005, KAM 2007, and KAM 2008
One should not forget that various economic issues inherited from the
preceding system continue to affect Ukraine’s lagging behind other
countries in KE development. Such legacy includes restricted capacities
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to introduce new technologies from the West, a lack of resolute market
reforms prior to the Orange Revolution, structural deformations emerging
from the coercive function of the state, which the government failed to
eliminate while implementing a pro-market policy for a number of years.
Big problems were also associated with internal and external
macroeconomic irregularities in the final phase of the operation of the
preceding system. The existence of powerful pressure groups with a
particularly negative attitude towards pro-market transformations could
become an essential obstacle to high-quality structural changes, since the
implementation of drastic economic reforms requires political will, as
well as determination and courage from others, not just the government.
Populism and the pretensions of a post-soviet society have an equally
adverse effect. The existence of the largest shadow economy in the world
does not facilitate the additional expansion of KE in Ukraine, even
though other results of positive changes in the Ukrainian economy may
be concealed in the shadow sector to a great extent.
The stagnation of KE development in Ukraine and a prolonged,
though slow growth of the KEI in Poland demonstrate that a gap in KE
development between the two states is increasing.
KEI covers 84 measures grouped in four so-called KE pillars,
specifically: education and human capital, innovation illustrated by
resources and innovation indexes, information and communications
technologies, and economic incentive and institutional regime. It is
possible to use KAM variables to present the sources of KE development
and an increasing gap in development. Due to the relative interpretation
of KEI values (for instance, calculated per thousand people), one can
exclude any statistical deviation related to the size of a given country.
The first three KE pillars are taken from the Knowledge Assessment
Methodology (KAM) in the form of the Knowledge Index (KI), since
they reflect a qualitative aspect of human resources. KI permits us to
make conclusions about the level of development of intellectual capital,
since all KE measures are indirectly or directly related to this resource. KI
also permits the assessment of the utilization of knowledge for economic
growth on the basis of GDP changes. Western Europe selected knowledge
development as a model, since the development of human capital and
human resources constitutes the key priority of strategic activities of the
EU Member States. Nonetheless, Sweden and Denmark demonstrate the
highest KI values on the global level. A large gap between KI values for
individual countries proves that even though the a. c. of the EU and
priorities of the Lisbon Strategy are justified, they still do not guarantee
an automatic advancement in KE development or high innovation indexes
(Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9 Gap in the Development between Poland and Ukraine
in 1995—2007 Measured by Basic KEI
Source: KAM 2003, KAM 2007, and KAM 2008
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Table 4.25 implies that tendencies in the sphere of KI changes remain
similar to those related to KEI38 for groups of selected countries.
Table 4.25
CHANGE IN KI INDEX IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN 1995—2007
Source Year Poland Ukraine WesternEurope USA Russia
KAM 2008 1995 6.98 6.44 9.01 9.61 6.57
KAM 2005 2003 7.02 6.04 8.48 8.80 7.07
KAM 2007 2005 7.29 5.88 8.72 8.91 6.92
KAM 2008 2007 7.56 5.94 8.72 9.09 6.92
Source: KAM 2003, KAM 2007, and KAM 2008
Ukraine has the lowest KI value, approaching that of Romania and
Bulgaria (Figure 4.10). Poland’s KI value is much higher than that of
Ukraine, but lower than that of EU-15 countries, apart from Portugal and
Greece. Poland is also less advanced in human capital development than
Slovenia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In terms of
knowledge development, the EU-15 is 10 % ahead of Poland and 30 %
ahead of Ukraine, while Ukraine is 20 % behind Poland.
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Figure 4.10 Knowledge Development in Poland and Ukraine
as Compared to the EU-27 according to Actual Normalized KI Values
(relative to the average EU-27 value)
Note. KAM does not provide data for Malta
Source: KAM 2003, KAM 2007 and KAM 2008
                     
38 The gap is illustrated by economic and political institutional conditionalities, which
will be discussed later on in the section.
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KI, as a derivative of the measures of innovation, education and
information and communications technologies in the researched countries,
only demonstrates sustained growth in Poland (Table 4.26).
Table 4.26
KNOWLEDGE INDEX COMPONENTS AND CHANGE
OVER TIME IN SOME COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO KAM, 2008
KI Innovation Education ICT
Selected
countries
19
95
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t
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Poland 6.98 7.56 0.58 6.08 6.91 0.83 8.14 8.82 0.68 6.71 6.95 0.24
Ukraine 6.44 5.94 –0.5 6.13 5.76 –0.37 8.16 7.70 –0.46 5.01 4.37 –0.64
Western
Europe 9.01 8.72 –0.29 9.21 9.23 0.02 8.6 8.03 –0.57 9.22 8.88 –0.34
USA 9.61 9.09 –0.52 9.58 9.45 –0.13 9.42 8.79 –0.63 9.83 9.02 –0.81
Russia 6.57 6.92 0.35 5.61 6.88 1.27 8.04 7.62 –0.42 6.05 6.26 0.21
Source: KAM 2003, KAM 2007, and KAM 2008
Among the mentioned countries, the United States is leading in every
dimension. At the same time, the countries of Western Europe are
significantly ahead of Poland and Ukraine in the sphere of innovation and
ICT development. However, the education index for Poland (8.82) does
indeed exceed that of Western Europe (8.03). This is primarily a result of
the complete elimination of illiteracy, a high indicator of education,
especially on the academic high school level. In Ukraine, the synthetic
index of education is also high (Table 4.27).
The assessments of individual aspects of human capital development
in the countries of Western Europe are more comparable, while in
Ukraine variables range from 1.99 (seats in parliament held by women) to
9.28 (females in the workforce) and an average variable equals 8.36
(public spending on education).
Innovation resources reflected by variables create a national system of
innovations (Table 4.28), are indicative of the possibility of including a
given country in the global knowledge resource, its assimilation and
adjustment to local needs, as well as the creation of new technologies.
The innovation potential of Ukraine and Poland represented synthetically
and by partial indexes (Table 4.28) illustrates that there is a significant
lagging behind Western Europe in terms of development. For Ukraine,
the distance is even greater.
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Table 4.27
HUMAN CAPITAL* IN POLAND AND UKRAINE AS COMPARED
TO THAT OF WESTERN EUROPE ACCORDING TO KAM, 2008
Poland Ukraine Western Europe
No. Variable
A
ct
ua
l
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
A
ct
ua
l
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
A
ct
ua
l
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
Education × 8.82 × 7.70 × 8.08
1 Adult literacy level 10.00 10.00 99.40 7.66 98.96 7.06
2 Average years of school 9.84 8.90 × × 9.25 7.65
3 Level of secondary schoolenrolment rate 99.55 8.12 91.80 6.39 106.80 8.98
4 Level of higher educationenrolment rate 64.07 8.33 72.78 9.05 62.25 8.06
5 Life expectancy 75.00 7.00 68.00 3.36 79.55 9.04
6 Internet access in schools 3.90 6.37 3.20 4.35 5.43 8.51
7 Public spending on education, asa % of GDP 5.40 6.91 6.40 8.36 6.19 8.00
8 Professional and technicalworkers as a % of the workforce 25.51 7.04 25.34 6.79 29.43 8.33
9 Achievement in math n/a n/a n/a n/a 502.00 6.12
10 Achievement in sciences n/a n/a n/a n/a 507.67 5.41
11 Quality of science and matheducation 4.50 6.61 4.60 6.94 4.98 7.80
12 Extent of personnel training 3.70 4.92 3.30 2.82 5.05 8.58
13 Quality of management schools 4.40 6.45 3.70 3.71 5.19 8.19
14 Brain drain 3.00 4.27 2.70 2.98 4.67 n/a
15 Gender inequality index 0.87 7.59 0.79 5.41 0.94 8.95
16 Females in the workforce (% oftotal workforce) 45.80 7.17 48.90 9.28 45.14 6.59
17 Seats in parliament held bywomen (as a % of the total) 19.10 6.10 8.70 1.99 29.33 8.68
18 School enrolment, secondary,female 97.30 7.50 84.80 4.92 108.33 9.13
19 School enrolment, higher, female 71.60 8.49 75.40 8.89 68.53 8.06
Notes: * Please go to the Knowledge Assessment Methodology at www.worldbank.
org/kam for detailed description of indexes
Source: KAM 2003, KAM 2007, and KAM 2008
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Table 4.28
INNOVATION RESOURCES PRESENTED
VIA KAM INNOVATION PILLAR, 2008
Poland Ukraine Western Europe
No. Variable
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Innovation × 6.91 × 5.76 × 9.23
1 FDI outflows as a % ofGDP 0.30 6.24 0.10 5.20 31.46 9.96
2 FDI inflows as a % of GDP 3.50 5.79 3.40 5.56 28.63 9.96
3 Royalty and license feepayments (USD m) 1,324.0 8.28 421.00 7.24 2,496.34 9.02
4
Royalty and license fee
payments (USD/m
persons)
34.74 7.50 8.94 6.03 479.51 9.87
5 Royalty and license feereceipts (USD m) 38.00 6.34 22.00 5.98 981.48 8.96
6 Royalty and license feereceipts (USD/m persons) 1.00 5.54 0.47 4.91 165.66 9.51
7 Royalty payments andreceipts (USD m) 1,362.00 7.95 443.00 6.88 3,477.82 8.97
8 Royalty payments andreceipts (USD/m persons) 35.74 7.12 9.41 5.59 645.17 9.77
9 Science and technologyenrolment ratio 19.98 3.51 26.23 7.45 23.32 5.48
10 Science enrolment ratio 8.25 3.72 4.08 0.85 10.34 5.51
11 Researchers in R&D 62,162.2 8.33 85.211 8.78 28,676.2 7.50
12 Researchers in R&D /mpersons 1,628.76 6.22 1,829.6 6.44 3,774.82 8.61
13 Total expenditure forR&D as a % of GDP 0.57 4.74 1.07 6.91 1.93 8.63
14 Trade of foreign goods asa % of GDP 48.10 6.85 53.60 7.46 54.40 7.58
15
University-company
research collaboration
(1—7)
3.20 5.97 3.10 5.08 4.49 8.35
16 Science and technologyarticles 6,844.00 8.63 2,105 7.34 5,704.00 8.47
17 Science and technologyarticles/m persons 179.32 7.70 44.69 5.97 634.44 8.97
18 Availability of venturecapital (1—7) 3.60 6.69 3.20 5.89 7.48 8.67
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Continuation of Table 4.28
Poland Ukraine Western Europe
No. Variable
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19 Patents granted byUSPTO 18.40 6.93 20.80 7.36 538.24 8.68
20 Patents granted byUSPTO/m persons 0.48 5.93 0.43 5.71 77.64 8.95
21 High-tech exports as a %of manufactured exports 3.80 4.03 3.70 3.95 18.95 8.04
22 Private sector spending onR&D (1—7) 3.60 6.85 3.20 5.32 4.56 8.47
23 Firm-level technologyabsorption (1—7) 4.50 4.19 4.40 3.95 5.58 8.47
24 Existence of a productionchain (1—7) 4.30 7.40 3.40 4.07 5.19 8.46
Source: KAM 2003, KAM 2007, and KAM 2008
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP represents a universally used
measure of the innovation potential of a national economy. The Lisbon
Strategy recognises R&D expenditure as a priority for the development of the
economy of knowledge and the overtaking of the United States. According to
this priority, in 2010, R&D must absorb 3 % of GDP.
In Ukraine, the variable exceeds 1 % of the GDP, as compared to
close to 2 % in Western Europe. In Poland, the variable tended to
diminish, but since 2005 has remained below a critical threshold of
0.57 % (Figure 4.11).
Figure 4.11 Share of R&D Expenditure in the GDP
of Poland and Ukraine in 1989—2006
Source: Science and Technology in 2007, www.stat.gov.pl/dane_spol-gosp/prod_bud_
inw/nauka_technika/2007/doc/ index.phd
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International research proves that for the protection of the national
economy in the face of an increasing technological gap, R&D expenditure
must constitute no less than 2 % of GDP; though, Poland has not achieved
this level since WWII. An insignificant share of R&D expenditure
contradicts the pompous declarations of readiness to support KE
development. Following accession to the EU, these issues became the focus
of attention of the Development Strategy for 2007—2015 (Strategia...,
2006). According to the fundamentals of the strategy, the share of R&D in
Poland’s GDP only had to grow to the level of 2 % by 2015.
Information and communication technologies, particularly the degree
of their dissemination and the pace of changes in the diffusion of new
decisions constitute infrastructure support of human capital and
innovation development (Table 4.29). With regard to the synthetic index
of ICT diffusion, the gap between Poland and Western Europe is close to
30 %, while the gap between Ukraine and Poland is close to 60 %. This is
because the majority of partial variables in Ukraine are significantly
lower than relevant variables for Poland, except for households with
television and daily newspapers per 1,000 people. In some cases, the
differentiation of variables is significant, for instance, as related to the
international Internet capacity and Internet users.
Table 4.29
DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES ACCORDING TO KAM 2008
Poland Ukraine WesternEurope USA
No. Variable
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ICT × 6.95 × 4.37 × 8.88 × 9.02
1
Total telephones
per 1,000
persons
1,073.5 6.86 621.60 5.29 1,542.2 9.25 1,286.3 7.93
2
Main telephone
lines per 1,000
persons
309.30 7.12 255.90 6.26 525.02 8.96 606.00 9.64
3
Mobile phones
per 1,000
persons
764.20 7.00 365.70 4.64 1,017.2 9.18 680.30 6.79
4 Computers per1,000 persons 192.80 7.12 38.40 3.26 492.19 8.52 749.20 9.77
5
Households
with a
television (%)
90.70 5.58 97.30 8.33 97.70 8.55 97.80 8.62
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Continuation of Table 4.29
Poland Ukraine WesternEurope USA
No. Variable
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6
Daily
newspapers per
1,000 persons
102.00 6.16 175.00 7.91 289.69 9.01 196.00 8.14
8
International
Internet
capacity (bits
per person)
559.95 6.84 17.16 3.46 10,003 9.60 3,306.4 8.68
9
Internet users
per 1,000
persons
262.00 6.86 96.90 4.57 520.81 8.88 630.00 9.36
10
Fixed broadband
internet access
tariff (USD per
month)
11.27 7.64 7.67 9.14 26.14 3.32 14.95 6.21
10
Availability of
e-government
services (1-7)
3.49 4.52 2.77 2.52 4.95 7.80 5.45 9.04
11
Companies’
online service
index (1-7)
4.20 6.86 3.20 2.80 4.93 8.22 5.50 9.15
12 ICT expenditureas a % of GDP 4.20 2.93 7.80 8.13 5.58 4.60 8.70 9.20
Source: KAM 2008
To accelerate the process of reducing the gap in the diffusion of
information and communications technologies, Ukraine allocates close to
7.8 % of GDP, while Poland assigns less than 3 %.
Table 4.30 illustrates that relative to institutional infrastructure
variables of the EU, Ukraine’s economy is in an exceptionally
unfavourable condition (– 0.47). However, we should note that flaws in
this institutional infrastructure are inherent not only to backward
economies, but also to developed economies (Italy: — 0.35; France: —
0.22; Sweden: — 0.13). Relative to the above mentioned, Poland’s
institutional regime is assessed as comparatively good (– 0.04).
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Table 4.30
POLAND AND UKRAINE COMPARED
TO EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES
Rank Country KI KEI
Hypothetical
impact of
institutional
changes
Assessment of
the institutional
regime
35 Poland 7.56 7.52 –0.04 7.39
57 Ukraine 5.94 5.47 –0.47 4.06
13 Austria 8.77 8.90 0.13 9.30
16 Belgium 8.72 8.75 0.03 8.82
1 Denmark 9.56 9.58 0.02 9.66
3 Finland 9.34 9.37 0.03 9.47
20 France 8.69 8.47 – 0.22 7.82
38 Greece 7.44 7.35 – 0.09 7.08
25 Spain 8.09 8.21 0.12 8.58
4 The Netherlands 9.34 9.30 – 0.04 9.18
14 Ireland 8.79 8.90 0.11 9.23
18 Luxemburg 8.42 8.67 0.25 9.42
10 Germany 9.01 9.01 0.00 8.99
33 Portugal 7.26 7.56 0.30 8.44
2 Sweden 9.69 9.56 – 0.13 9.18
11 Great Britain 8.81 8.92 0.11 9.28
29 Italy 8.22 7.87 – 0.35 6.84
34 Cyprus 7.45 7.53 0.08 7.77
27 Czech Republic 7.82 7.92 0.10 8.23
23 Estonia 8.17 8.30 0.13 8.68
30 Lithuania 7.62 7.70 0.08 7.94
32 Latvia 7.47 7.61 0.14 8.04
36 Slovakia 7.25 7.44 0.19 7.99
24 Slovenia 8.33 8.27 – 0.06 8.11
28 Hungary 7.70 7.88 0.18 8.39
41 Bulgaria 6.62 6.72 0.10 7.01
45 Romania 5.95 6.18 0.23 6.87
Western Europe 8.72 8.71 – 0.01 8.69
Source: KAM 2008
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According to KAM, conclusions about the impact of institutional
factors on economies’ capacities to utilize knowledge in practice rely on
the following:
• Economic regime variables, such as: gross capital formation as a
percent of GDP, foreign trade as a percent of GDP, tariff and nontariff
barriers, intellectual property protection, soundness of banks, export of
goods and services as a percent of GDP, interest rate spread, intensity of
local competition, domestic credit to private sector, cost to register a
business, days to start a business, and cost to enforce a contract;
• Institutional regime variables illustrating the specific features of the
operation of a state, such as regulatory quality, rule of law, government
effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability, control of
corruption, and press freedom.
The data reflecting individual institutions is presented by actual and
normalized variables on a scale of 0 to 10 relative to the comparison
group (Table 4.31).
Table 4.31
ECONOMIC REGIME AND GOVERNANCE IN POLAND
AND UKRAINE RELATIVE TO WESTERN EUROPE
Poland Ukraine WesternEurope
No. Variable and year
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Economic regime
1 Gross capital formation asa % of GDP, 2002—2006 19.40 3.12 19.40 3.12 21.74 4.89
2 Foreign trade as a % ofGDP, 2006 82.00 5.00 99.10 6.27 108.11 7.14
3 Tariff & nontariff barriers,2008 86.00 9.11 82.20 7.04 85.36 8.30
4 Intellectual propertyprotection (1—7), 2007 3.50 5.08 2.70 1.77 5.56 8.67
5 Soundness of banks (1—7),2007 4.90 2.74 4.50 0.73 6.55 8.91
6
Export of goods and
services as a % of GDP,
2006
40.60 5.29 48.20 6.59 56.16 7.57
7 Interest rate spread, 2006 4.00 7.65 7.60 3.22 3.23 8.48
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Continuation of Table 4.31
Poland Ukraine WesternEurope
No. Variable and year
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8 Intensity of localcompetition, 2007 4.70 4.63 4.40 2.85 5.57 8.37
9 Domestic credit to privatesector as a % of GDP, 2006 27.40 3.87 45.00 5.69 143.57 9.09
10
Cost to register a business
as % of GNI Per Capita,
2008
21.20 4.44 7.80 6.89 4.99 7.80
11 Days to start a business,2008 31.00 4.74 27.00 5.41 17.36 7.26
12 Cost to enforce a contract(% of debt), 2008 10.00 9.63 41.50 1.48 17.21 7.67
Governance
1 Regulatory quality, 2006 0.64 6.79 – 0.47 2.71 1.43 8.89
2 Rule of law, 2006 0.25 6.29 – 0.72 2.43 1.60 8.89
3 Government effectiveness,2006 0.49 6.71 – 0.57 2.79 1.66 9.04
4 Voice and accountability,2006 0.95 7.79 – 0.11 4.79 1.46 9.25
5 Political stability, 2006 0.22 5.93 – 0.27 4.29 1.00 8.96
6 Control of corruption, 2006 0.14 6.14 – 0.67 2.57 1.77 8.96
7 Press freedom (1—100),2007 22.0 7.71 53 4.29 14.60 9.25
Source: KAM 2008
We can notice the similarity of some variables, for instance, gross
capital formation received a similarly poor ranking, though the variable
for Western Europe is not very high (4.89). Soundness of banks in
Ukraine ranks the lowest among economic institutions; it is lower than
the bottom limit for the acceptable scale: 1—7 (1 — insolvent; 7 —
generally healthy with sound balance sheets). Similarly, on a 1—7 scale,
intellectual property protection ranks poorly, measured at 1.77. Costs to
enforce a contract in Ukraine are equal to more than 40 % of debt, which
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is four times more than the costs in Poland and nearly 2.5 times more than
the costs in Western Europe.
Flaws in the sphere of institutional arrangements may present a sort of
trap for development, which will not permit the utilization of potential
deeply buried in intellectual capital, particularly in human capital,
innovation, and ITC. EU membership alone does not constitute a
guarantee that the EU acquis communautaire and common developments
will eliminate the underdevelopment of the institutional infrastructure and
numerous other problems inherited from the communist system. One
should note that EU accession alone will ensure the convergence of
economic growth and living standards with those existing in highly
developed countries. Guaranteeing formal institutions related to the
competition regime is the first necessity; however, this is insufficient for
market efficiency. The norms should be internationalized in the rules of
human thinking and human activities; however, this process of
internalization is enduring and will continue for the lifetime of an entire
generation. Poland has already experienced one-generation-long training
to be functional in the context of open markets. Ukraine is only at the
beginning of this training process; moreover, it is now operating in the
context of an institutional infrastructure that is extremely non-
corresponding to the requirements of effective markets.
4.8.4. Innovation Potential and its Results
The European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) may be utilized to verify
KAM assessments of economies that are advanced in terms of human
capital and innovation development. EIS has been developed to identify
impact tools within the framework of a social and economic policy of EU
Member States, which permits the determination of the gap in
development39. The EIS focuses on projecting the creation of human
capital and innovation pursuant to the requirements and expectations of
the EU Parliament.
The subsequent reports of the EIS verify Poland’s low ranking based
upon the Summary Innovation Index (SII)40 (Drawing 4.12).
In 2007, Poland ranked sixth among 37 countries included in the latest
EIS 2007. Poland’s innovation performance compares to an average level
of the EU-27 and that of Sweden, a European innovation leader, at 1:2
and 1:3 respectively.
                     
39 In addition to EU countries, the analysis initially covers the United States, Japan,
and Turkey; the recent seventh EIS report also presents analysis data for Australia, Canada,
and Israel (Sea EIS 2007).
40 The SII may range from 0 (highest innovation level) to 1 (lowest innovation level).
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One should emphasise that except for KE priorities in 2003—2007,
the SII of European States ranking top in the table has diminished
(Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark), while the index has grown for
the new EU countries (Table 4.32).
Table 4.32
CHANGE OF SUMMARY INNOVATION INDEX FOR 2003—2007
Country EIS2007
EIS
2005
EIS
2003
2007 change
2005 = 100
2005 change
2003 = 100
Sweden (SE) 0.72 0.78 0.82 –0.06 –0.04
EU (EU-27) 0.45 0.42* 0.46** 0.03 –0.04
Estonia (EE) 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.02 0.00
Czech Republic (CZ) 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.03 0.01
Slovenia (СІ) 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.01 0.02
Cyprus (CY) 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.03 0.01
Malta (MT) 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.01 0.01
Lithuania (LT) 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.03 0.01
Hungary (HU) 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.01 0.01
Slovakia (SK) 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.00
Poland (PL) 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.02 0.01
Bulgaria (BG) 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.00
Latvia (LV) 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.01
Romania (RO) 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.00
Note. Country ranking relies on 2007 results
* EU-25
** EU-15
Source: EIS 2007 and EIS 2
No major reshuffle has happened with regard to SII changes. There
remains a tendency of the stabilizing of innovation performance for
groups of countries selected by SII value, the pace of growth and an
average value calculated for the EU-27.
The EIS-2007 based analysis illustrates that the process of reducing
the gap in innovation performance of modest innovators among new EU
Member States may last for decades, if current tendencies remain. Poland,
regardless of the improvement of numerous individual measures, is
envisaged to attain the European innovation average no sooner than in 18
years. The Czech Republic, included in the group of moderate innovators,
Lithuania, in view of a rapid pace of changes, and Cyprus and Slovenia
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could attain the European average of SII within 10 years. Estonia could
have such innovation performance level even earlier.
Partial innovation indicators are grouped into the EIS as inputs
interpreted as innovation potential and outputs. Three categories convey
innovation potential: innovation drivers, knowledge creation, innovation and
entrepreneurship, and knowledge application. The indicators of innovation
performance and intellectual property protection measure outputs.
Innovation drivers measure structural conditions required for the
creation of innovation potential. They are aimed at forming human
capital, since only those who can utilize applicable knowledge can find
their place in the information society, which may be facilitated by
properly functioning education and higher education systems, the
utilization of experience and continuous training. In education, the market
mechanism requires comprehensive support associated with a variety of
instruments. Such instruments include the following: a system of current
and prospective education coordination; a labor market and cooperation
of schools with businesses; flexible training systems teaching adjustment
skills, creativity, and entrepreneurship; the associating of education with
developing cooperation, honesty, and civic awareness; orientation
towards the flexible adjustment to new challenges; readiness to life-long
learning; entrepreneurship; and the development of systems thinking.
Educational instruments are presented by indicators pertaining to all
forms of secondary and higher education, science and engineering, and
general education, both at school and through life-long learning, with the
use of the Internet (Table 4.33).
Table 4.33
INPUT: INNOVATION DRIVERS
Poland EU-27 USA European leaders
No. Variable Poland2005 2007
1.1 S&E (Science andEngineering) graduates 9.00 11.10 12.90 10.60 24.50 Ireland
1.2
Share of working-age
population with higher
education
15.60 17.90 23.00 39.00 35.10 Finland
1.3 Broadband channels 0.50 3.90 14.80 18.00 29.60 Denmark
1.4 Participation in life-long learning 5.50 4.70 9.60 x 29.60 Denmark
1.5 Secondary educationattainment level 89.5 91.70 77.80 x 93.80 Croatia
Note: x — the data is unavailable or the provision of such data is inappropriate.
Source: EIS 2005 and EIS 2007
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In education, Poland demonstrates improved indicators. Science and
engineering education measured by the total number of graduates per
1,000 persons aged 20—29 lags behind that of Ireland, but exceeds that
of the USA, and as early as in 2008 reached the European level. The
share of working-age population with higher education per 100 persons
aged 25—64 grew in 2007. However, it is still close to half of that of the
USA. The broadband lines per 100 persons, the crucial role of the Internet
in developing the innovation of Poland’s economy, is the weakest
indicator in this group of expenditures and even the eightfold growth of
the 2007 level as compared to the 2005 level does not affect the
assessment. Activity in the sphere of capacity-building measured by the
total number of participants aged 25—64 in life-long learning (in a free
form) per 100 persons is not much higher than half of the EU-27 average.
Human capital resources measured by the share of population aged 20—
24 with minimal secondary education is equal to 92 % in Poland, while
Croatia’s record level equals 94 %.
The measures of expenditure depicting major innovation factors
reflect the innovation competencies of the population. The expenditures
are believed to result in intended actions for innovation support. High
indicators of education attainment in Poland are not supported by
innovation results. This paradox emerges as the qualitative development
of human capital lags behind the quantitative one. Negligence in post-
socialist countries in education and science is a universally known and
widely disputed fact. Education reforms initiated by the government and
implemented through bureaucratic procedures generally prioritize
changes of quantitative indicators and the growth of expenditure. So far,
such reforms have not targeted the reflexive modernization of human
capital. Thus, one cannot expect that such reforms will deliver outputs
associated with the diffusion of innovation.
Knowledge creation is reflected in the EIS by spending. In other
words, expenditures must create conditions for producing knowledge.
Therefore, they are interpreted as a foundation for KE development. This
gives the right to include such costs in the category of R&D expenditures,
since they are associated with engaging both the state and the private
sector in R&D funding. In addition, the creation of knowledge envisages
the utilization of public resources (Table 4.34).
The engagement of the state in assuring innovation measured by the
share of public funding for R&D in GDP in Poland considerably falls
behind that of the EU, which, however, constantly behind the targets
declared in the Lisbon Strategy, as has been mentioned earlier.
Disturbingly, the public funding for R&D is below the critical threshold
and, furthermore, has been recently decreasing, as previously. The
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consequences of the above can be split into two groups. Resources are
barely sufficient to cover the necessary costs of Poland’s scientists.
Furthermore, there are no effective stimuli for the private sector to
increase the share of financial engagement.
Table 4.34
KNOWLEDGE CREATORS (INPUT DIMENSION)
Poland EU-27 USA EuropeanleadersNo. Variable Poland2005
2007
2.1 Public R&D expenditures(% of GDP) 0.43 0.39 0.65 0.69
1,37
Iceland
2.2 Business R&Dexpenditures (% of GDP) 0.16 0.18 1.17 1.87
2,92
Sweden
2.3
Share of medium-high-
tech and high-tech R&D
(% of manufacturing
R&D expenditures)
77.40 80.00 85.2 89.9 92,70Sweden
2.4
Share of enterprises
receiving public funding
for innovation
0.70 3.10 9.0 n/a 39,3Luxemburg
Source: EIS 2005 and EIS 2007
The share of medium-tech and high-tech R&D as a percent of
manufacturing R&D expenditures adjusted by the indicator of the share
of B + R in GDP illustrates that Poland barely assigns 0.4 % of GDP for
high-tech, while the EU-27 and the United States allocate 1.6 % and
2.7 % respectively. Since government funding of innovation measured by
the share of enterprises receiving public funding is insignificant in
Poland, a gap in Poland’s stimulation associated with innovation creation
will grow inevitably and rapidly. Therefore, the key determinant factor of
the reduction of the technological gap must be the diffusion of
technologies with the help of FDI.
The indicators of entrepreneurship and innovation reflect primarily
the effectiveness of instruments encouraging enterprises, especially
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to take financial efforts
targeting innovation. Motivational tools designed to stimulate innovation
must comprise both technical innovations (manufacturing and
technological) and non-technical, so-called soft innovations, i.e. those
available in the sphere of organization and management (Table 4.35).
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Table 4.35
INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP (INPUT DIMENSION)
Poland EU-27 USA EuropeanleadersNo. Variable Poland2005
2007
3.1 SMEs innovating in-house(% of all SMEs) 12.50 13.80 21.6 n/a
37.3
Ireland
3.2
Innovative SMEs co-
operating with others (% of
all SMEs)
8.20 9.10 9.1 n/a 20.8Denmark
3.3 Innovation expenditures (%of total turnover) 2.25 1.56 2.15 n/a
3.08
Greece
3.4 Early-stage venture capital(% of GDP) 0.007 0.001 0.053 0.035
0.051
Denmark
3.5 ICT expenditures (% ofGDP) 7.20 7.20 6.4 6.7
9.90
Bulgaria
3.6 SMEs using organizationalinnovation (% of all SMEs) n/a 19.30 34.0 n/a
58.4
Luxemburg
Source: EIS 2005 and EIS 2007
Ireland ranks first in terms of the support of small and medium-sized
enterprises in introducing innovation measured by the share of innovative
firms in the total number of SMEs. In Poland, the situation has improved;
however, this is relevant to less than 13 % of SMEs, which represents less
than 37 % of the same indicator for Ireland. SMEs’ readiness for
innovative cooperation measured by the share of enterprises cooperating
with others with regard to innovations is relatively similar both in Poland
and in the EU-27. The inclination of enterprises towards innovation
measured by the share of expenditures on innovations in total turnover
permits Poland to hold a favorable position as compared to the average of
the EU-27. However, we must mention that in 2007 the capacities of
Polish enterprises deteriorated. The accessibility of high-risk capital
measured by the share of venture capital in Poland’s GDP is undoubtedly
insignificant and this funding tool is diffused with great difficulties.
The development of an information and communications infrastructure
measured by the share of ICT expenditures in GDP has attained a level
which exceeds the EU-27 average; and, what is typical, Bulgaria is a
European leader in this sphere. The scale of organizational innovations in
the total number of SMEs in Poland in 2007 amounted to only 19.3 % and
was close to 50 % smaller than that of Ireland.
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Economic instruments facilitating the development of medium and
high technology production and services are also represented by the
indicators of knowledge utilization results. The results appear in the form
of work improvements and various business activities in the sphere of
innovation. As instruments of central strategic coordination, they are also
targeted at improving the market mechanism. They constitute economic
policy instruments and can, specifically, cover the following: a structural
policy designed to transfer power and technological capacities for
assuring a competitive economy; facilitation in research and development
in the context of R&D expenditures; support of knowledge and
technology transfer, as well as an inflow of FDI; and the creation of a
network of business consulting services, etc. They are also based upon an
employment increase in the mentioned spheres and increased sales of new
products, particularly those representing medium and high technologies
(Table 4.36).
Table 4.36
APPLICATIONS (OUTPUT DIMENSION)
Poland EU-27 USA EuropeanleadersNo. Variable Poland2005
2007
4.1
Employment in high-tech
services (% of total
workforce)
n/a 2.37 3.26 n/a 5.06Sweden
4.2
Exports of high technology
products as a share of total
exports
2.70 3.10 16.7 26.1 54.60Malta
4.3 Sales of new-to-marketproducts (% of total turnover) 3.40 8.10 7.3 n/a
13.60
Malta
4.4 Sales of new-to-firm products(% of total turnover) 9.60 5.40 6.2 n/a
10.00
Germany
10.00 Spain
4.5
Employment in medium-high
and high-tech manufacturing
(% of total workforce)
4.35 5.13 6.63 3.84 10.75Germany
Source: EIS 2005 and EIS 2007
Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports vividly
illustrate the scale of the technological vacuum and low competitiveness
of the economy. In 2007, though systematically improving, this variable
for Poland was 5.5 times smaller than the average for the EU-27.
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The radically smaller-scale of Poland’s lagging behind the EU-27
measured by other indicators of knowledge utilization is indicative of
progressive modernization due to the dissemination of innovations. This
is reflected in the sales of new-to-firm products and a high rate of
employment in high-tech manufacturing and services.
A large number of patents, new registered trademarks, and designs are
a demonstration of the recognition of the successful application of
specialized knowledge in practice. Values for the variables represented
below are calculated per million of the population of a given country
(Table 4.37).
Table 4.37
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (OUTPUT DIMENSION)
Poland EU-27 USA Europeanleaders
No. Variable Poland2005
2007
5.1 EPO patents per million ofthe population 2.70 4.20 128.0 167.6
425.6
Switzerland
5.2 USPTO patents per millionof the population 0.40 0.60 52.2 273.7
167.5
Switzerland
5.3 Triad patents per million ofthe population 0.30 0.20 20.8 33.9
81.3
Switzerland
5.4
New community
trademarks per million of
the population
14.30 24.70 108.2 33.6 902Luxemburg
5.5 New community designs ofthe per million population 5.20 30.20 109.4 17.5
240.5
Denmark
Source: EIS 2005 and EIS 2007
Patents fall into three groups depending on the institution granting
ownership rights: the European Patent Office (EPO), the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and so-called triadic patent
families. In Poland, there is a huge gap between the level of all invention
activities and the degree of intellectual property rights protection.
According to simplified EIS methodology (Fedirko, 2007), Ukraine
would rank the lowest, after Turkey. This is also supported by statistics
(KAM 2008) implying that Ukraine, in addition to ranking poorly in KE,
inclines towards the end of the ranking as previously (ranks 57, with KEI
equalling 5.47).
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4.8.5. Conclusions
The creation of the system of innovation in Ukraine is undoubtedly at the
initial stage (Antoniuk, 2003). To accelerate the process, the state’s
economic policy needs to prioritize innovation activities, the development
of science and education, integration with global innovation spheres, and
the development of legal, financial, and public pro-innovation institutions
associated with venture capital.
The acceleration of innovation diffusion processes requires the systematic
government support of the competition regime consolidation, i.e. the
improvement of markets and competition and assistance to the markets to
engage instruments, procedures, and mechanisms of central strategic
coordination associated with market logics. In practice, with the beginning of
the 21st century, the intended level of innovation can be attained within the
framework of hybrid structures composed of various complementary
mechanisms, such as market, hierarchical and network mechanisms.
Due to historical, geographic, economic, and institutional arrangements,
hybrid structures may be arranged in various manners, representing every
time a particular combination of a market mechanism, hierarchy and a
network mechanism. Therefore, one should give thought to the idea of
utilizing human capital and innovation development samples tested by
other countries. However, such samples should be corrected as per the
specific nature of local (own) resources and possible combination of
facilitating innovation mechanisms and tools aimed at motivating activity,
creativity, cooperation, flexibility, riskiness, and risk assessment, as well
as a fair bonus payment for such attitude.
4.9. Information Determinants
of the Economic Convergence of Ukraine and Poland
4.9.1. Introduction
From the perspective of information, international relations arise when
relevant actors become aware that such relations deliver better results
than those arising from domestic opportunities. Thus, one may conclude
that by satisfying the information needs of national entities in the most
effective manner, a country assures the best business environment and the
best satisfaction of consumer needs, which will entail low economic risks,
low loan interest rates, a stable currency exchange rate, the minimization
of the cyclic character of economic development, as well as sustained
economic growth and public welfare. Decent international economic
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relations are possible when explicit specialization and cooperation are in
place and when entities have opportunities to utilize competitive
advantages created due to unique information resources or the best use of
such resources, let alone the situations with a monopoly over information
resources. Thus, the issue of information falls into two large blocs,
namely information resources and the infrastructure of information
resource movement.
Guided by the above, Ukraine should make maximum efforts to
develop competitive advantages for national entities, which is possible
solely in the context of market relations in the information sphere, where
the role of the state is limited to supervision over compliance with
legislation and coordination of efforts designed to promote national
interests. A low quality of information support of Ukrainian and Polish
economic entities results in the weak utilization of commercial potential
and small volumes of joint investment between the two countries. One
should particularly note that the development of the economies of Ukraine
and Poland in their movement towards information society is asymmetric.
4.9.2. Information society
Scholars tend to distinguish between the following major qualitative
criteria for the transition to the information society (Ilnytskiy D., 2004):
1) Economic — the sector of information is viewed as a means of
movement towards the information society and a leading role of
information resources in economic relations on the national and
international levels;
2) Technological — the extent of information technologies being an
integral part of human life and the economy;
3) Social — the achievement of a new level of social relations;
4) Political — the impact of a free flow of information on politics
and on the political situation, transition to new qualitative political
relations;
5) Cultural — the vaguest factor, the results of cultures interweaving
owing to new methods and opportunities for the exchange of information
are difficult to anticipate.
Since international economic relations have both tangible and a
intangible aspect, owing to the structure-forming function of information
resources, the global economy develops as a complex system.
Information resources of international cooperation, as a system object, are
characterised by the following elements:
• Object of characteristic;
• Functions;
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• Form of existence;
• Language;
• Value (price);
• Sources (media and carriers);
• Regulation;
• Level of usage;
• Access conditions (receipt, utilization, and disposition).
In the EU, and therefore in Poland, the practice of the existence of
information society illustrates that key policy vectors are regulating the
information society, stimulating its development and utilizing advantages
(the official EU website…). Each of the above-mentioned directions
consists of a number of components. The EU information society sector
has achieved such level of development largely owing to such regulatory
initiatives as the creation of a common market, television without
borders, the adoption of harmonized standards (for instance, GSM) and
the liberalization of the telecommunications sector.
Presently, one distinguishes between two major directions of the
regulation of the information society, namely the regulation of information
transfer and contents. With regard to the transfer of information, legislation
pertaining to the regulation of electronic communications took effect in
2003. The legislation primarily regulates issues of sector development,
stimulating competition, assuring sustainable growth and protecting the
rights of the public and other users. The policy of managing limited
resources of the radio spectrum is important in view of the current
development of wireless networks, mobile communications, television,
global positioning systems and research and development, etc. Thousands
of national regulations were replaced following the adoption of a directive
on radio and telecommunications equipment, which regulates a market
worth more than EUR 30 billion. In the sphere of contents, the European
audiovisual regulation assures freedom of the provision of services in the
entire market without any borders, the promotion of public interests, user
protection in commercial communication, minority rights and human
dignity, etc. Ukraine should gradually approximate the above-mentioned
conditions of market functioning.
The EU stimulates the development of the information society in three
major directions: the eEurope initiative, research and industrial policy,
contents and services. eEurope stimulates development by encouraging
the development of a relevant infrastructure (for instance, broadband
access to information, information security), providing services that
matter to the public (e-governance, e-health, e-education, the management of
digital rights, etc.), and stimulating e-business development. The research
and industrial policies are intended to assure the competitiveness of
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industry with the help of research and technological innovations. The
stimulation of the development of the information society depends largely
upon the success of the development of contents and services, the
majority of which are produced by the private sector. The European
cultural heritage constitutes a tremendous medium of contents. Europe is
making considerable efforts to digitalize its heritage.
Ukraine and Poland have the task of searching for an information
niche in the global economy. Though we should not deny the importance
of technical aspects of the information society, we should primarily pay
attention to the development of contents or, in other words, information
resources «breathing» life into equipment and technologies, as well as to
primary producers and consumers of such equipment and technologies,
namely people who make economic life possible. Data transfer networks
go through the territories of our countries; however, the utilization of a
transit potential is rather narrow. In our opinion, the principal task is to
visualise the role and the place of each citizen in the information society,
to utilize advantages and to eliminate flaws. This also includes the fight
against adverse aspects of the information society (assuring all-inclusive
information privacy, fighting against cybercrimes, neutralizing harmful or
illegal Internet contents, protecting consumers and health, etc.).
Taking into consideration such a multi-aspect nature of the economic
life of the information society, we can conclude that at the current stage
of Ukraine’s development, inter alia, there is a need for a certain tool kit
to regulate the economy’s provision with information resources. This
includes both information resources owned and administered by the state
and the information resources of other entities. We believe that the
following can become the key directions:
9 Regulating online access to information resources;
9 Regulating the price (value) of access to information resources;
9 Regulating ownership rights to information resources;
9 Regulating the activities of enterprises in the information sector
(fiscal and non-fiscal);
9 Indicative planning;
9 Regulating transparency of government authorities and structures
subordinate to the state.
4.9.3. Corporate Aspect of the Economy’s Information Development
We would now like to elaborate upon the corporate aspect of the
information development of the economy (primarily, transnational
companies, as a model of a high level of commercial development).
Considering the activities of TNCs, one should analyse the composition
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of their assets (unfortunately, carrying out an expenditure analysis is too
expensive). Intangible assets make up a considerable share of the assets
of TNCs, which is indicative of the important role of such assets in the
modern world, where globalization processes lead to the creation of a
global economy, whose key players are TNCs. The research conducted by
the author identified the meagre dependence of the effective performance
of leading TNCs in various sectors of the global economy upon intangible
assets, which include information resources, which can be attributed to
the high effectiveness of their utilization and a significant share in assets
— 14.1 % on average. Analyzing the dependence of revenues from the
sale (Ві) of intangible assets (NA) of leading global TNCs (Вtnc) and
Ukraine’s TNCs (Вukr), the researcher generated the following
dependencies (Ilnytskiy D., 2003):
Вtnc = 26,873.16 + 0.28 NA;
Вukr = 666.48 + 10.23 NA.
The dependence is high due to a low level of effectiveness of their
use in Ukraine and an insignificant share in total assets, namely
0.41 % on average or 3,432 times less than in leading global
companies. In the current context, investing in non-tangible assets is
more effective than in material assets in Ukraine. On average, leading
global companies depend on non-tangible assets 36.5 times less than
leading Ukrainian companies, which is attributed to the fact that TNCs
have achieved high effectiveness of the use of information resources.
Therefore, it is necessary to study the global experience and follow
suit. Ukraine should develop a system of incentives to enhance the
intensity and effectiveness of the use of information resources in the
national economy.
On the other hand, the share of provided services associated with
communications and information transfer in the composition of Ukraine’s
economy has stopped growing (Table 4.39), and the speed of the sector
development outstrips that of the GDP in recent years. However, the
development is somewhat hindered by the monopoly of Ukrtelecom Joint
Stock Company, a company that has been the target of privatization
efforts for many years. We can consider access to networks for a country,
as an indicator of information advancement (Table 4.38). Access to
networks assesses the use of mobile communication services, rather than
the use of fixed-line phones, as the case would traditionally be for
Ukraine.
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Table 4.38
TOTAL SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE SERVICES OF OPERATORS OFFERING
MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES (PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION)
Country 2003 2008 Country 2003 2008
EU-27 78 122 Poland 46 116
The Czech Republic 95 133 Austria 88 87
Germany 79 130 Slovenia 87 102
Estonia 77 121 Slovakia 68 102
Greece 81 169 Finland 91 130
Spain 90 112 Sweden 98 119
France 70 91 Great Britain 89 126
Italy 98 152 Bulgaria 45 137
Latvia 52 98 Croatia 57 110
Lithuania 61 149 Romania 32 114
Hungary 78 122 Turkey 40 93
Source: Developed by the author with the help of the official Eurostat website
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tin0
0060&plugin=11
As we can see in Table 4.38, the majority of countries (however, not
all of them) had resolved this task by 2007. For comparison, at the
beginning of 2007, the total of subscribers to the services of operators
offering mobile telecommunication services in Ukraine exceeded the total
population, while at the beginning of 2004, the share of such subscribers
was equal to only 13.6 % (at the beginning of 2010 — 120 %)41. Taking
into account the total number of owners of fixed-line telephones, it can be
ascertained that there is an absolute telephone penetration in the country.
However, presently, one of the key indicators in the EU is broadband
access to networks (the Internet, telecommunications, etc), and Ukraine is
somewhat lagging behind in this sector and a relevant indicator is not
even published.
                     
41 Data from the website of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
http://ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2010/tz/az/az_u/az2010_u.htm
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4.9.4. National Priorities — Time to Act
Ukraine’s integration in the global economy and approximation with
individual countries, for instance Poland, is a long-term and continuous
process, which may not happen immediately and envisages passing
through preceding phases, namely contacts, cooperation, and interaction.
At the contact level, one utilizes the smallest share of information in order
to have contacts and the largest share of unvaried information requests
pertaining to contractors and objects of relevant relations (most often,
registration data about relevant entities and their contacts, the price and
quality of goods, services, and works). At the contacts level, there is the
greatest probability of incurring costs due to inaccurate current
information on contractors. Cooperation requires a profound analysis,
forecasting, and elaboration upon common goals. Integrating, entities
develop a common mission, which requires impeccable information
efforts and resources.
Ukraine’s integration in the global economy requires primarily
effective competitiveness on the national markets. Analyzing
development in the institutional dimension, we would like to note the
high priority of the micro-level in terms of assuring human needs and the
social orientation of developed economies. Evolutionary development
assures stability and heredity of information resources; therefore, the
primacy in international economic relations must belong to micro-level
subjects, namely entrepreneurs and companies engaged in foreign
economic activities. By developing relations, they transfer signals and
indicators of development and experience to other subjects created for
assuring sustainable development. International organisations and states,
as subjects of international economic relations, operate for the micro-
level to have the best advantages. Assuring simple, but massive contacts
will result in an evolutionary and optimal formation of Ukraine as a party
to international economic relations.
Presently, the enterprises of Ukraine do not yet allocate sufficient
funds that are required for the information support of their international
cooperation. Two primary facts prove that:
• Companies that specialize in the provision of information and
consultation services account for an insignificant share of Ukraine’s
economy;
• Global information companies are underrepresented on Ukraine’s
markets.
There has been some progress lately in this direction. However, no
essential structural changes have taken place. Recently, some enterprises
have created their own web pages in the Internet, while fewer enterprises
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do that on a permanent basis (the share of such enterprises in Poland is
greater than that in Ukraine) (Table 4.39). Unfortunately, only a rather
limited number of users from other countries can utilize such data, since
this requires knowing a foreign language. Quite often, a company can
only receive necessary information about a Polish or Ukrainian partner
through a company in Germany or even in the United States. Therefore,
we can assess the provision of companies with business information as
being unsatisfactory. Polish trade missions are more active in this sphere,
and their Ukrainian colleagues should follow suit. Companies often
resolve the problem of a lack of information by attending national trade
shows and fairs, which is not the cheapest way to search for partners.
Information about the local and national environment accounts for a
considerable share of information resources utilized for international
cooperation. For various enterprises, the significance of information
resources depends on the specific properties of a relevant industry, the level
of integration in the international division of labor, competition, and factors
determining the competitiveness of such enterprises. However, national
competitive advantages generally rely on national information resources, the
effective utilization of which, in combination with international resources
creates the foundation for leading on the global markets.
Table 4.39
COMPARISON OF DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
FOR UKRAINE AND POLAND
Indicator Poland Ukraine
2004 2009 2004 2009
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D,
percentage of GDP 0.57 0.67 1.13 0.95
Researchers, thousands 96.5 97.3 105.5 92.4
FDI from the contractor’s country, USD
millions 21.3 49.4 225.0 868.8
Enterprises with access to the Internet, % 85 91 25* 50*
Enterprises reporting through the Internet, % 50 57 5* 9*
Regular internet users (individuals), % 34 52 18 54
ICT expenditure, % of GDP 7.2 4.2 7.7 5.1
High-tech exports, % of exports 3 4.3 4 3*
Human development index 0.85 0.88 0.77 0.79
* Expert assessment
Source: Developed by the author with the help of the Eurostate website… as of
October 2010, the official website of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
(http://ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2005/ni/indrik/indu/2002.html), and the UN Human
Development Reports for 2004 and 2009.
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One should strongly criticize the relations of local self-governance bodies
and enterprises, since they do not take advantage of available opportunities to
receive information from enterprises located on their territory or to facilitate
information support for the local community. The improved exchange of
information between local self-governance bodies of Ukraine and those of
Poland will promote enhanced economic cooperation between the regions.
For such purpose, at the local level, one should initiate the identification of
competitive advantages, the utilization of which by the representatives of
both states will be an impulse for international business.
Presently, only a few large cities in Ukraine implement a consistent and
active policy to improve the satisfaction of the information needs of their
partners, including prospective partners, associated with the development of
international cooperation. Such cities include Odesa, which is developing an
image of an attractive resort city; Kharkiv, which is engaging partners in
high-technology sectors; and Lviv, which is developing the image of a
Western city. Historic sites, cities, and their names are extremely powerful
and economically attractive trademarks and all enterprises located on the
territory of such sites or cities work for the benefit of such trademarks. It is
reasonable to utilize this potential and opportunities, which will entail
minimum costs and will facilitate an inflow of foreign tourists and
entrepreneurs, thus enhancing the public welfare and the utilization of the
country’s potential for participation in the division of international labour.
In EU countries, structural funds on the regional level allocate
significant amounts to fund the development of projects pertaining to
individual aspects of the information society. Such aspects include the
following most relevant:
— Elimination of a digital divide (asymmetry) of regions;
— Science and innovation;
— Networks of data transfer and exchange;
— Protection of intellectual property rights;
— Participation of small and medium-sized companies in the
information society.
Some of the above-mentioned projects are implemented in Poland.
Polish partners can engage Ukrainian companies, since the scope of work
to be implemented is extremely large. In view of the need to raise private
capital, capital from Ukraine could also be at hand, which would require
arranging an ongoing exchange of information about such opportunities
between the companies of Poland and Ukraine.
Presently, there is a number of major channels for the provision of
information to Ukraine from abroad. We would like to mention the following:
• Ukraine’s participation in international trade shows, fairs, and
conferences;
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• Collection and transfer of information about opportunities for the
development of international cooperation by trade and economic missions
of Ukraine abroad;
• Receipt of direct proposals from foreign companies;
• Activities of press correspondents from information agencies;
• The companies’ own sources of information.
We believe it is necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the
utilization of the above-mentioned channels. The functioning of the
majority of the channels does not have a systemic target-oriented nature.
Consequently, only a minimum of opportunities created by the global
economy are utilized. It is necessary to develop such channels as the
utilization of opportunities to participate in international organisations,
international exchange channels, auctions, bidding procedures, the
development of a network of business press centres, the analysis of
economic information coming via Internet channels, the facilitation of the
development of representative offices of Ukrainian companies abroad and
those of foreign companies in Ukraine. The collection and transfer of
information should not be the functions of the state, which should only
promote the performance of such functions by Ukrainian companies.
Ukraine’s participation in international trade shows, fairs, and
conferences has a sporadic nature, which restricts the effectiveness of
participation. The receipt of direct proposals from foreign companies is
non-permanent and hard to anticipate. Press correspondents of
information agencies operate only in some countries or in the form of
short-term business trips. Meanwhile, only trade and economic missions
of Ukraine abroad collect and transfer information about opportunities for
the development of international cooperation on a permanent and
systematic basis.
A survey of the employees of Ukraine’s trade and economic missions
demonstrated that most commonly, foreign entities request information
about companies engaged in or producing certain types of activities,
company contact details and the reality of a company’s existence, as well
as communicate proposals associated with a search for partners for
further cooperation in certain sectors. Such information does not
constitute a commercial secret in Ukraine; however, financial and
legislative restrictions hinder the free receipt and distribution of such
information. We have covered relevant implementation mechanisms
related to this issue above.
On the other hand, the channels delivering information about Ukraine
to the world differ to some extent, particularly in terms of their effective
utilization. We should note that economic information is virtually beyond
the scope of government interests in developed countries, while
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developing countries largely depend on the effective performance of the
state in this sphere. The primary channels of the receipt of information in
Ukraine are as follows:
• Representative offices of information agencies in Ukraine;
• Representative offices of companies, their unions and chambers of
commerce and industry;
• Participation in fairs and trade shows in Ukraine;
• International organisations.
We would like to mention that the utilization of Ukrainian information
resources is an issue of Ukraine. However, presently, the provision of
Ukrainian information resources to the foreign environment is insufficient.
There is a need for the permanent provision of information about Ukraine’s
capacities and opportunities to trade and economic missions of Ukraine
abroad, including in the language of the relevant country of location, which
requires the comprehensive utilization of Internet opportunities42, by assuring
the maintenance of web pages in leading foreign languages. The
development of market relations and commercialization in this sphere should
become the primary direction, which will facilitate the rapid resolution of
problems and the effective utilization of resources.
After analysing the promotion practices of Ukrainian companies on
foreign markets, we would like to point out the need for considerable
costs, which only the largest global companies can afford. The problem
can be resolved by the development of recommendations by Ukraine’s
trade and economic missions about optimal options for creating
representations of Ukrainian companies in the countries of their location,
and the coordination and consolidation of efforts of several companies to
establish common representative offices and to provide services to other
companies, which do not have such an opportunity.
Scientific information and information resources, which constitute an
object of intellectual property, are a part of information resources, which are
a target of competition. Authors and producers of such information goods can
be located anywhere in the world, and relevant ownership rights can be
transferred between entities, while relevant entities take into consideration the
unique properties of information as a commodity. Perceiving this as the basis
of the country’s wealth, developed countries created powerful systems for the
legal and economic protection of their wealth. The turnover of trade in such
goods between developed counties is extremely large relative to that of
developing states, which primarily trade in ready-made tangible commodities
or raw materials (World Trade Reports 2003-2010…).
                     
42 EU countries implement a policy aimed at accelerating and enhancing Internet use in
all spheres of public life, including both the economy and socially vulnerable groups of the
population. See the Opinion of the Economic…, 2002.
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We suggest determining education as a strategic element of the
economy of Ukraine. Education is a branch that must constantly aim to
improve the effectiveness of the use of information, particularly in the
sphere of international economic relations, where adopted decisions
generally entail long-term large-scale changes. Germany and Japan
offering free higher education to its citizens confirm the importance of
education for the national economy. In addition, the United States has
created substantial preconditions and incentives for obtaining high
qualifications by those willing to do so.
Since various risks present an obstacle to the development of
international economic relations, we deem it reasonable to propose risk
mitigation measures. First, we would like to analyse measures aimed at
risk mitigation on the national level. In addition to ensuring easy access to
primary national normative acts in a foreign language, one should
implement information campaigns about the opportunities and advantages
laid down in national legislation, the activities of local self-governance
bodies, special economic zones, priority-development territories, etc. The
state budget must make a provision for associated costs; in addition,
activated economic performance and increased profits of national
taxpayers will offset any such costs.
A lack of experience creates pre-conditions for the diffusion of the
trial and error method in economic life; therefore, it is reasonable to
introduce a system of experience exchange. Since such experience is very
valuable, one should stimulate those who will disseminate it with the help
of additional funding or tax incentives, reducing the tax burden for
companies participating in such measures. In terms of organization, the
higher educational institutions of Ukraine and Poland can deliver the best
results in this sphere.
The ill-timed receipt of information in the sphere of international
economic relations is a key element that increases risks. For the timely
supply of information at all levels, it is necessary to develop
telecommunications profoundly, providing high quality and inexpensive
communications to business entities. This is particularly important for the
formation of national markets of mass production goods and facilitates
the development of such goods due to competition and development to be
highly competitive on the international level. The development of
telecommunications should not be limited to the installation of
telephones, but supplemented with the development of associated and
more in-depth services (the Internet, facsimile, e-mail, teleconferences,
data transfer channels, mobile and 3G communications), and particularly
a software market. Therefore, the economy needs a well-developed
information and telecommunications infrastructure that will comply with
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global standards and satisfy consumer needs (both national and foreign)
in Ukraine and Poland.
Ukraine has a rather mature software component of the national
economy, which is illustrated by the fact that Ukraine ranks fourth in the
world with regard to the total of software developers licensed by Microsoft.
Our partners in Poland should utilise such advantages, and road shows
initiated by private business and supported by the state could facilitate this.
Ukrainian companies should be the key beneficiaries of this advantage,
since as a result of computer penetration the need for specialized software
has grown significantly and seems to be growing further.
Ukraine, which is moving towards an information society, needs
measures to increase the assessment of non-tangible assets, the main
component of which is information resources. An analysis of the current
situation with the use of non-tangible assets demonstrates that such assets
constitute an insignificant part of the total value of assets of Ukraine’s
enterprises. The situation varies depending on the sector, however in
general it needs drastic changes. It is necessary to enhance the effectiveness
of the system of intellectual property protection, to develop the information
culture of society and to support entrepreneurs. It is at the micro-level that
the entrepreneurs should realize that experience, business reputation,
trademarks and images, patent protection of goods, know-how and other
information resources are an integral and important part of the economy.
Since one of the marketing functions is to inform relevant
stakeholders engaged in economic relations about opportunities, such
stakeholders who are interested in the effective performance of the
function should be active in such processes. Therefore, the state should
support private initiatives with regard to the development of information
markets in Ukraine and the cooperation of private entities with foreign
partners. Overall, the role of the state must be limited to the supervision
of the development and regulation of the information market based on
national interests, as well as intervention and support, if required. The
following types of governmental e-service can be used as a
methodological basis (Table 4.40).
Political factors play an important role in the provision of sufficient
information in the sphere of the economy. Dependence of information
agencies, television, radio, press, libraries, and public information centres
for the political stance of their owners and upon funding often impedes
the free circulation of information. Therefore, at the national level, it is
reasonable to introduce, inter alia, a key criterion of the availability of
information in the sphere of the economy, namely the profitability of the
activities of information agencies, television, radio, press, public
information centres, and libraries.
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Table 4.40
GOVERNMENT E-SERVICES
Information services Communicationservices
Operational
services
Everyday
life
Information on business
issues, households,
education, health, culture,
transport, environment
Discussion of every-
day life issues;
information stands
Examples:
ordering tickets,
computer
registration
Tele-
management
Public services list;
management of
administrative procedures,
state registers and
databases
E-mail
communication with
government officials
E-submission of
documents,
applications and
reports
Political
participation
Laws, political agendas,
sub-legislative acts,
consultations and
clarifications; information
on decision justification
Discussion of
political issues, e-
mail communication
with politicians
Surveys,
elections,
referenda,
petitions
Source: Green paper on…, 1999.
The sole objective of overall efforts to ensure information penetration
at the micro-level should be responding to consumer needs for
information on non-tangible goods as soon as possible and providing
information about the best available options for satisfying material needs.
We can hold this thesis as a version of the modern marketing concept,
which permits the combination of the satisfaction of consumer needs and
the effective operation of commercial companies. Understanding and
pursuing this objective, Ukraine could become a leading country of the
world.
4.9.5. Conclusions
Overall, EU countries and Poland are somewhat ahead of Ukraine in
terms of information infrastructure development, generously funded by
the government and enterprises. Ukraine should utilize this gap to avoid
any errors and to select priorities in order to make the right choice.
A lot has been done lately in legal terms to improve the situation.
However, market relations with regard to intellectual property are
developing slower than scientific and technological progress, which could
result in their devaluation and loss, a lack of stimuli to create new ones,
outflow of intellectual property to foreign countries, where the market
economy will assign a higher value to such intellectual property. In our
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opinion, Ukraine needs long-term programs (and, most importantly,
accurate program implementation) pertaining to the development of
market relations in the sphere of intellectual property and the
development of a relevant consumption culture, since such objects will
constitute the basis of the information society and information policy,
which the world is seeking to create. In the context of information
economy, the share of material production is secondary, relative to the
production of intangible goods, i.e. the situation is drastically changing as
compared to the existing one. Timely responses to identified issues will
permit the creation of grounds for the future welfare of Ukraine, which is
famous for its talents, and competitive advantages for national companies,
which will be able to assess non-tangible assets realistically and to
enhance the significance of such assets.
Liberalism and the sporadic nature of the information progress of
Ukraine in creating an information society should be channelled at least
by indicative planning (even better, a strategy for the information
development of Ukraine) towards universally recognized and globally
tested directions. Poland’s experience, which is gradually approximating
its national legislation with EU requirements, would be relevant to
Ukraine. The correcting of the asymmetry of the informational
development of the economies of Ukraine and Poland will facilitate their
further convergence and future integration.
4.10. Contemporary Issues of Education Reforms in Ukraine and
Poland
4.10.1. Introduction
In today’s globalized world, education is one of the key strategic resources
for socio-economic activity, society’s development, and the assurance of its
technological advances and competitiveness. Both developed and
developing countries are constantly in the process of transforming and
developing new models for their education systems, which must conform to
the new demands of the information society. These transformational
processes vary in depth and the nature of implemented measures and aim at
finding systems for organizing, managing, and funding education more
effectively. These systems should provide for a high quality of educational
services and, thus, a higher level of general literacy, civil awareness and
professional competence of the citizens.
The understanding of the crucial role of education in the development of
modern-day societies became the basis for the adoption of strategic projects
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and programs by many countries. Such recent programs as «Education in
2000» (Germany), «American Education in 21st century» (USA), «Education
of the Future» (France), «Model for Education in the 21st century» (Japan),
among others, view the development of national education systems as a key
factor for improving a country’s competitiveness on the world arena and
securing its steady social and economic development.
The EU affirmed the importance of education by adopting the
Communiqué on the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy in the field of
European research and the role of universities in Europe. The
Communiqué dated 5 March 2003 establishes the functioning of the
knowledge of the European community as a fundamental part of the
European future. The key factors of this community are the creation of
new knowledge, its transmission in the process of education, diffusion
and utilization of knowledge in new services and production processes.
The Commission ascertains that European educational institutions do
not meet global competition from most of the partner states of the EU.
One third of Europeans (and up to 40 % of the population of Sweden and
Denmark) already work in education-oriented enterprises, which demands
relevant training. Currently, 20 % of the EU residents aged 35-39 have a
higher education while 20 years ago this index was at a level of 12.5% for
the same age group (Pawłowski, K., 2005 : 27).
The Commission’s communiqué outlines several new challenges for
the European institutions of higher education:
— Increased demand for higher education because of its wide-scale
nature;
— Progressing internationalisation in education and academic
research (the fact that the European universities enrol fewer international
students than their American counterparts);
— Development of close and effective cooperation between higher
education institutions and production (emphasis on the fact that this
connection today is the weakest link in the European education system:
less than 5 % of all innovative companies consider information received
from state academic institutions important and useful);
— Increase in the number of institutions responsible for the
development of sciences (tendency among manufacturers to involve the
resources of the best educational establishments, regardless of their
location, into research, which often means cooperation with non-
European educational institutions);
— Restructuring of knowledge (development of two opposite
tendencies: the growth of diversification and specialization of knowledge
and a growing gap between theoretical and applied research require the
more flexible management of research in applied sciences);
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— New expectations (for instance, an increased need for training new
professionals in applied and engineering sciences, as well as for life-long
learning).
Ukraine and Poland entered a stage of radical social transformations
with roughly similar potential. They both had to tackle similar problems
pertaining to education reforms, along with decreasing centralized
control, the private sector development and diversification of educational
institutions according to various consumer demands, as well as the
enriching of pedagogical content, forms and methods of education. Both
countries began education reforms in the 1990s. In this chapter, we will
not touch on the pedagogical changes (although they, too, were
substantial), but focus instead on the similarities and differences between
the changes that happened in the structure, management and funding of
the education systems of these two countries. These similar tendencies are
characteristic of the development of these countries and their education
systems in the early 21st century.
The challenges of modern-day globalization in education manifest
themselves in the need for increasing the scale of education, prolonging
the duration of education in the professional life of a worker, changing
requirements to the quality of human resources in today’s production
processes, and, finally, establishing various international forms of
educational activity. The internal transformational processes and the
civilisation challenges contribute to similar tendencies in the changes in
the scope, structure, organization and funding of both Ukrainian and
Polish education systems.
4.10.2. Reform Strategy
In the early 1990s, the State National Program «Education: 21st Century
Ukraine» adopted at the Congress of Educators in 1993 outlined strategic
tasks for the development and reformation of the Ukrainian education
system. The program called for aligning the Ukrainian education system
with those of developed countries; radically reforming the concept,
structure, and organization of education; and overcoming the state’s
monopoly on education. The period 1993-2000 mainly saw the
completion of restructuring of the education system based upon a new,
democratic foundation. Substantial changes took place in the organization
of educational activities, management, and economic and financial
mechanisms. The strategy and key directions in the development of
education in Ukraine in the first quarter of the 21st century are outlined in
the «National Doctrine for the Development of Education in Ukraine in
the 21st Century» approved at the National Congress of Educators in
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October 2001 («National Doctrine…,» 2001). According to this
document, «Ukraine must implement the strategy of accelerated,
outstripping the innovation-based development of education and
sciences» (Idem : 4).
Education reforms in Poland also began in the 1990s, when in 1990 a
new law was approved on higher education. It stipulated the creation of
private educational institutions and the wide-ranging academic autonomy
of higher state education institutions. This law limited the rights of state
controlling bodies which have now become reduced to the allocation of
budget funds between educational institutions (based on the algorithms
developed in agreement with the academic self-government, namely the
National Council for Tertiary Education) and providing permits to create
private education institutions (Pawłowski, K., 2005, page 80).
The adoption of this law resulted in the expansion of the education
system. In 1990, Poland had 404,000 students, with about 320,000
studying free of charge. In percentages, students comprised 12.9 % of the
population; only 7 % of the Polish people had higher education degrees
(in comparison to close to 20 % in Western European countries). In 1989,
in Ukraine, 9.5 % of the population above the age of 10 had higher
education degrees.
Before 1990, higher education was provided almost exclusively by the
state, both in Poland and in Ukraine. The only existing non-state
educational institution was a university funded by the Catholic Church
(without taking into consideration ecclesiastical educational institutions).
The structure of almost one hundred state educational institutions
consisted of 10 universities with numerous departments located in big
cities and around one hundred specialized educational institutions, such
as arts, medical, economics, polytechnic and agricultural institutes and
academies.
The education system responded actively to the measures taken. First,
the share of paid education (evening and remote studies) grew in state
institutions of higher education. Furthermore, private educational
institutions started appearing simultaneously, without outside influences,
in Warsaw and other big academic cities, and later on in smaller towns
where no institutions of higher education had existed before 1990.
4.10.3. Student Population
It is a worldwide tendency in the evolution of education that its
importance in preparing modern workers demands longer study terms. In
the current context, higher education is becoming more and more a part of
the ‘compulsory’ education of the population — the education that the
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new society of the 21st century is bound to provide to all of its members
before the start of their professional and adult, family life.
The process of the expansion of compulsory education and the
inclusion of higher education into its concept began in the leading
countries in the last quarter of the 20th century, gradually spreading to
more and more world countries. This tendency can be traced in the data
on the duration of compulsory education in some developed countries
(Table 4.41).
Table 4.41
EXPECTED AVERAGE DURATION
OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION FOR CITIZENS OF DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES (CALCULATED FOR CHILDREN AGED 5)*
Country 1996 2002 2004
Belgium
Spain
The Netherlands
Great Britain
Denmark
Germany
France
Greece
16.6
16.7
16.5
14.2
17.1
16.5
16.5
14.0
18.5
17.3
17.2
20.0
17.3
17.1
16.5
16.3
19.6
17.2
17.4
20.7
19.0
17.4
16.8
16.9
* Complied by the author with the help of the data from Education at a glance 2007//
http:// www.oecd.org/.
The growing need for higher education is objectively illustrated by the
growth of the student population. Both absolute and relative indexes can
reflect this tendency. For instance, in Ukraine in the 2008/09 academic
year, the number of students enrolled in higher education institutions of
all levels was equal to 2,763,900. Moreover, compared to the 1990/91
academic year, this index had a 59.2 % increase (1,638,300).
We can observe a similar tendency in Poland. However, its speed was
much higher. The student population increased almost five times: from
400,000 in 1990 to 1,927,800 students at the beginning of the 2008/09
academic year.
The number of students per 10,000 people is the most widespread
international comparative index. In Ukraine, the growth of the student
population on an absolute scale manifested itself in the growth of relative
indexes. In 2008/09, 599 out of 10,000 people were students in higher
education institutions (І—ІV accreditation levels), including 512 students
in institutions with ІІІ—ІV accreditation levels. Table 4.42 illustrates
comparative indexes for other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
CHAPTER 4. National economy convergence mechanisms… 581
Table 4.42
TOTAL STUDENTS PER 10,000 PEOPLE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE 2003/04 ACADEMIC YEAR*
Country Total students per 10,000 people
Albania
Macedonia
Slovakia
Romania
Moldova
Bulgaria
Croatia
Belarus
Hungary
Russian Federation
Poland
Estonia
Lithuania
Ukraine
Slovenia
Latvia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Czech Republic
220
253
275
285
287
292
334
343
403
451
484
486
495
512
522
550
…
…
* Compiled according to: Education at glance 2007// http:// www.oecd.org/.
At present, Poland has almost 2 million students. This means that the
student population has reached 46.2 % and exceeded the index of the total
students enrolled in many developed world countries. The year 2003 can
be characterised as the final year of vigorous changes in the Polish
education system. Due to a population decline, the number of Polish
students is expected to drop by 30 % in the years to come.
4.10.4. Funding
Public expenditure on education is the first proof that the country
understands the role of education; it should not depend on the country’s
economic situation. The state must guarantee the necessary funding for
education (5—7 % of GDP) not only by declaring these provisions, but
also by developing the mechanisms for their implementation and strict
monitoring. However, the beginning of reforms in Ukraine and Poland
was marked by a radical decrease in funding for the education system.
In the 1970s, on average, the USSR spent close to 7 % of its GDP on
education. In Ukraine, state expenditures in education were only 4.6 % of
GDP in 1992, 5.4 % in 1995, 3.15 % in 2000, and 6.1 % in 2008. We
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should mention that these dynamics do not prove the rapid oscillation in
the amounts of funding. According to absolute indexes, state funding has
been growing consistently; its decrease is attributed to GDP growth in
2000. In the meantime, the growth of this index in recent years is
conditional upon the mechanical unification of all the resources coming
from both the state and from private budgets.
The decrease in state funding is understandable in view of the
economic crisis during the transition period; however, regardless of the
state of the economy, state resources alone are not enough to fund an
education system that would meet contemporary demands. Therefore, in
the majority of countries, education funding is complemented by other
resources, such as private funds, contributions from business, charitable
contributions, etc. Private contributions to education are rather substantial
in developed countries. In the USA, for example, the percentage of the
GDP allocated for education is being increased from 5.5 % to 7.0 %. In
Germany, the education-directed funds are being increased by 38 %, thus
increasing the allocated portion of the GDP from 4.0 % to 5.4 %. In
Japan, private contributions add 25 % of state expenditures (Heyneman
St.P., 1998 : 20).
To a certain extent, the diversification of funding sources also
influences the functioning mechanism of educational institutions. The
need to manage various funding inflows coming to the institutions from
several sources not only asks for a legal foundation, but also complicates
the functioning of the institutions’ financial managers. This manifested
itself in the expansion of entrepreneurial activity of educational
institutions. In the USA, leading educational institutions are turning into
significant financial corporations that own sufficient fiscal portfolios and
invest in various entrepreneurial projects. This activity is also starting to
develop in Ukraine: the National University «Kyiv-Mohyla Academy»,
together with a bank, created a fund to support the teaching staff; the fund
is open to all types of contributions. Another widely known institution —
the Ternopil Academy of National Economy — is also turning into a
well-established financial corporation.
The state resources remain, at the current stage, the primary form of
financing education. This is characteristic not only of the countries in
transition that are now moving away from the system of state-guaranteed,
free education. Although the private portion of funding varies across the
countries, the following tendency can be seen: private funding is lower in
developed countries and higher in countries with medium and, in
particular, low incomes.
State expenditure on education in Ukraine was not stable in the 1990s
according to both absolute and relative indexes. In 1992, education-
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related spending was fixed at UAK 242.2 billion (Karbovanets), i.e.
12.1 % of total budget spending; in 1997, the number was equal to UAH
5,033.7 billion (Hryvnia) (11.7 %); in 2000 — UAH 7,085.5 billion
(14.7 %); in 2005 — UAH 26,801.8 billion (18.1 %); in 2008 — UAH
53,207.4 billion (20.5 %) (Statistical Yearbook…, 2005; Key indexes …,
2006). As a part of Ukraine’s GDP, the portion of education-related
expenditures has the tendency to increase: 1997 — 5.4 %, 2000 — 4.2 %,
2005 — 6.1 %, 2008 — 6.1 % of GDP.
While state resources remain the primary source of funding for
education, the mechanism itself, goals and methods of the state funding of
education take various forms in different countries. The key distinction
between funding systems lies in their orientation towards concrete or end
goals and the use of methods to reach these goals. Finally, the mechanism
of funding education can be an important factor for increasing
education’s internal and external efficiency.
4.10.5. Private Sector
The complication of the mechanism of funding education characterized
by convergence, the approximation and acquisition of common features
by state and private sectors manifests itself in the further expansion of
various sources of funding at each level of the education system. Along
with the traditional sources of funding (state, private, business), we see
the arrival of new and combined mechanisms of paying for education
(student loans, education vouchers, etc.), which aim at combining various
mechanisms of funding and providing education, as well as implementing
elements of competition and accountability for the quality of the services
provided. Private funds can be involved through the creation of private
educational institutions or the transition to private sources of funding.
During the 1990s, Ukraine saw a rapid growth of private education:
on the one hand, educational institutions of other forms of ownership
appeared; on the other hand, the portion of private contributions in the
revenue of state educational institutions increased. The share of private
secondary education institutions is the lowest, which is quite clear in view
of the state policy of Ukraine that guarantees full, free secondary
education to all citizens.
The largest share of the private sector belongs to the level of higher
education: almost one third of higher education institutions accredited at
ІІІ—ІV levels are non-state institutions. However, they enrol 15.5 % of the
student population. Hence, the rapid increase in the number of higher
education institutions does not necessarily imply that they have an important
influence on encouraging young people to pursue higher education.
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The expansion of other forms of the involvement of private resources
into education of Ukraine is on a much larger scale. Generally, state
educational institutions are funded through a combination of state
allocations (centralized or local) and student tuition payments. In 2008,
55.3 % of all students (56.3 % in 1999) were studying on full government
funding in І—ІІ accreditation level higher education institutions; 44.7 %
(31.2 % in 1999) of the students were funded by private individuals and
legal entities. The percentages in these categories for students enrolled in
ІІІ—ІV accreditation level higher education institutions are respectively,
36.2 % (48.3 % in 1999) and 63.8 % (38.4 % in 1999).
The share of enrolled self-funded students is constantly growing.
While in 1995, the government allocated full funding to 80 % of all
first-year students in І—ІІ accreditation level institutions and 74 % of
first-year students in ІІІ—ІV accreditation level institutions, 2008 saw
these numbers drop to 59.3 % and 44.8 % respectively. Although the
Law of Ukraine «On Higher Education» provides that not less than
51 % of all student population should receive state-funded education,
state-funded higher education institutions continue to see a decrease in
state-funded admissions and an increase in the self-funded student
population.
The first private institution appeared in Poland in 1991 in Nowy
Sącz with a population of 80,000. This was Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu -
National-Louis University. The success of this institution on the job
market was already evident within three-four years and stimulated the
advent of new private schools. Today, the number of such educational
institutions (more or less developed) located in smaller towns is more
than 100, including 28 specialized vocational state institutions created
by the state administration over a period of several years using the
German vocational school model (Fachhochschule). In such schools,
studies only cover a period of three years, until a student receives a
basic-level education diploma (licentiate’s degree). For small and
medium towns, which saw the decline and closure of unviable socialist
enterprises, these educational institutions become perhaps the only
opportunity for local development.
The education structure in Poland is rather complex. Due to budget
limitations, only 706,854 (39.3 %) of the total student population of
1,800,548 received full government funding to be enrolled in state
educational institutions in 2002. The rest of the students paid for their
education in state (31.3 %) or in private educational institutions (528,820
students, i.e. 29.4 % of the student population). In 2008, of the total
1,937,800 students, 1,277,000 attended state schools and 660,500 were
enrolled in private institutions.
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students in higher education institutions in Poland
students in higher education institutions in Ukraine
students in higher education institutions of 3rd and 4th accreditation levels
in Ukraine
Figure 4.13 Dynamics of Total Students Enrolled in Higher Education
Institutions in Ukraine and Poland in 1990—2005
Source: Pawłowski, K., 2005; Key indexes…, 2006
Higher education institutions in Poland fall into the following groups:
— State (in 2000, they enrolled 131,235 first-year students);
— Non-state cooperative, founded by cooperative societies of professors;
— Non-state private, founded by natural or legal persons.
students in higher education institutions in Poland
students in higher education institutions in Ukraine
students in higher education institutions of 3rd and 4th accreditation levels
in Ukraine
Figure 4.14. Dynamics of the Total Students Enrolled in Private Higher
Education Institutions in Ukraine and Poland in 1990—2005
Source: Pawłowski, K., 2005; Key indexes…, 2006
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There is obviously no clear line between cooperative and private
institutions. However, according to Krzysztof Pawłowski, a prominent figure in
Polish higher education, this line may be determined based on an analysis of
expenditure. It is most probable that funds (received from students’ payments)
in state and cooperative institutions are almost entirely directed towards salary
payments, and only in the institutions provisionally known as «private», a
portion of funds (in the form of financial investments) goes into the
construction of scientific and academic centres, the development of
infrastructure and student services. An analysis of the non-state higher
education sector shows that at least 30 institutions consistently invest into their
own development; they are and will be an alternative to state institutions. A
large part of the rest of the educational institutions (cooperative or purely
commercial) will disappear when their student enrolment decreases to a level
that is not sufficient to cover the current costs of their functioning.
In 2008, there were 456 functioning higher education institutions in
Poland, including 131 owned by the state. 65.9 % of the student
population studied in these institutions. The number of private and non-
profit institutions is growing regardless of the fact that present-day first-
year students are young people born in the years considered to be the
beginning of the demographic crisis. Another important fact is that
private educational institutions are emerging not only in big cities where
state universities and their highly qualified academic staff already exist,
but also in small and medium towns. Table 4.14 illustrates that the
dynamics of student numbers in Polish private institutions are sufficiently
ahead of the respective index of their Ukrainian counterparts.
In world countries, including those with a well-developed private
education sector, the share of tuition fees paid by individuals in the total
revenues of institutions is rather insignificant. On average, tuition fees
comprise 10 % or more of the revenues of state higher education
institutions, including 13 % in the poorest countries and 15-17 % in the
countries with moderate income. Therefore, the revenue coefficient coming
from tuition payments in higher state education institutions is 2 in France,
4 in Japan, 9 in China, 10.5 in New Zealand, 20 in Singapore and Spain,
25 in the USA, 40 in South Korea, and 10 in the UK (Теdеsсо J. С., 1977,
page 79; Higher education…, 1994, page 42).
Tuition fees are roughly the same in Ukrainian and Polish private
educational institutions. They are also not high when compared to global
standards. Annual tuition fees for the most expensive study programs do not
go above USD 2,000, and affordable tuition fees do not exceed USD 1,000
per year due to the limited financial capacities of Polish society. In most
private institutions, revenues from tuition fees amount to 90 % or more of
total earnings. Thus, tuition fees make up the largest share of resources.
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Overall, people tend to agree that private educational institutions
show effective financial management. For instance, expenditures related
to the maintenance of administration are much lower in these institutions,
than they are in state universities. In general, expenses associated with
implementing similar study programs (notably, programs that are
maximally similar in terms of quality) are 20-30% lower in private
institutions, than in state ones (without taking into consideration the funds
allocated for academic research).
4.10.6. Education Structure
During the 1990s, the total of young people enrolling in vocational/
technical colleges and І—II accreditation level universities was decreased
continuously; simultaneously, the total amount of students enrolling in
III—IV accreditation level universities almost doubled. Both economic
and demographic factors can provide an explanation for such tendencies.
The crisis in the Ukrainian economy manifests itself in a substantial
decrease in production (especially industrial) and thus, in a decrease in the
demand for workforce. Consequently, the enrolment and graduation numbers
decrease in the institutions of vocational and associate (junior specialist)
levels of training. While in 1985 the share of graduates from vocational
schools and І—II accreditation level higher education institutions comprised
81.6 % of total graduates, in 2004, the figure dropped to 57.7 % (Table 4.43).
Table 4.43
GRADUATES OF VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS IN UKRAINE,
1985/86—2004/2005 academic years *
1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 2000/2001 2008/09
thous
and %
thous
and %
thou
sand %
thou
sand %
thou
sand %
Graduates from
vocational schools 427.9 52.5 376.7 50.7 274.9 44.8 263.2 39.9 246.5 28.3
Higher education
institutions (1st,
2nd accreditation
levels
236.9 29.1 228.7 30.8 191.2 31.1 156.1 23.7 118.1 13.6
Graduates from
higher education
institutions (3rd,
4th accreditation
levels
150.6 18.5 136.9 18.5 147.9 24.1 240.3 36.4 505.2 58.1
Total 815.4 100 742.3 100 614.7 100 659.6 100 869.8 100
* Compiled according to: Pawłowski, K., 2005; Key indexes…, 2009.
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The data on the enrolment type and profession choices of secondary
school graduates is telling in this regard. For instance, such Germanic
European countries as Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Switzerland as well as Italy see up to 65% of young people
enrolling in vocational schools after the completion of their secondary
education. In Scandinavian countries, France, and the United Kingdom
only 20-40 % of young people enter the vocational education system.
The 1990 law in Poland established a two-stage process for higher
education comprising a 3-year course of professional training resulting in
such titles as licentiate or engineer and a complementary 2-year master’s
level course. Today, looking back on this format, it can be confirmed that
the first stage did not receive adequate social support and the vast
majority of graduates continue their studies to receive a master’s degree.
While analyzing the structure of higher Polish education, one should
take into consideration that the state institutions that were narrowly
specialized before 1990, later used their academic autonomy to
substantially expand the spectrum of their study programs and enriched it
with specializations that are particularly popular in today’s job market.
For example, technical education institutions, as well as some agricultural
and pedagogical universities today are training a much larger student
population in their business-related study streams. Students in these
programs, both state and private, are primarily self-funded (enrolled in
correspondence studies).
The present and long-term potential of Poland’s higher education in
the early 21st century can be more clearly presented on the basis of the
data on first-year, full-time admissions (the data for 2002 is presented in
Table 4.44).
Table 4.44
STRUCTURE OF FIRST-YEAR, FULL-TIME ADMISSIONS IN POLAND
Educational institutions Total full-time,first-year students Percentage
State universities 68,035 28.4
Non-state university-type institutions 2,360 1.0
Technical institutions 63,375 26.5
Economics institutions, including:
— state
— non-state
26,099
7,324
18,775
11.0
Agricultural institutions 16,251 6.8
Pedagogical institutions 13,944 5.8
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Table 4.44, continued
Educational institutions Total full-time,first-year students Percentage
Vocational higher education institutions,
including:
— state
— non-state
28,952
18,903
10,049
12.1
Medical institutions 6,988 2.9
Physical education institutions 3,476 1.4
Art institutions 1,801 0.8
Other 7,981 3.3
Total 239,262 100
Source: Pawłowski K., 2005.
Higher Polish education has a large potential in specialized vocational
education, specifically in the sphere of polytechnic and medical
education. This is an important factor in reaching competitive advantages
in the context of the EU. The share of private educational institutions’
full-time admissions in 2002 was about 17 % of total admissions.
There is one characteristic feature of both the Ukrainian and the
Polish higher education systems: a post-1990 growth of students in
business study streams. In the 2002/03 academic year, these students
totalled 460,000, including 154,000 full-time students and 306,000
correspondence students. Table 4.45 illustrates admissions to business
streams in various types of higher education institutions.
We can ascertain that the number of seats in business programs
exceeds demand on the job markets and that a decrease in first-year
admissions (particularly, full-time) is inevitable. This, in its turn, results
in strong competition for student enrolment between the institutions,
which is not always beneficial for the education system. Competition for
incoming students could cause the lowering of the quality of education
and admissions standards (which is inevitable in the expansion of the
scope of education).
A limited number of state-funded admissions in full-time programs
and practically unlimited admissions into paid correspondence or evening
study programs characterize higher state education in Poland. This is a
result of the limited capacities of the state budget (the number of state-
funded, first-year admissions in state institutions is slightly above
200,000, while the total annual number of admitted applicants is about
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470,000). Another feature worth noting is the absence of the citizens’
constitutional right to free education. In this context, private institutions
(which are not recipients of state grants) are limited in their ability to
compete with state institutions, especially when it comes to full-time
education.
Table 4.45
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS IN BUSINESS STREAMS
IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF VARIOUS TYPES
Full-time education Correspondence studies
Type of institution Total
students %
Total
students %
Polytechnic 34,139 22.2 38,555 12.6
State economics institutions 29,044 18.9 38,225 12.5
Private economics institutions 35,441 23.0 167,797 54.9
Universities 31,743 20.6 40,718 13.3
State agricultural institutions 6,842 4.4 8,379 2.75
State pedagogical institutions 2,761 1.8 4,730 1.55
State vocational institutions 13,947 9.1 7,376 2.4
Total 153,917 100.0 305,780 100.0
In practice (with a few exceptions), private institutions do not receive
aid from state or local authorities. However, during the past eight—nine
years, several dozen such institutions (at least 30) of the 252 established
institutions were able to build their own material foundation, which
makes them competitive relative to state institutions in terms of a study
environment. At the time of their emergence, with only few exceptions,
private higher education institutions did not have the required funds and
began by renting buildings and premises, gradually building up their
financial base (mostly from tuition fees) and investing in their material
infrastructure.
4.10.7. Demographic Situation
Demographics is another factor that will substantially influence education
and the job market in the near future. Unfortunately, it will adversely
affect the scale of the development of education in both Ukraine and
Poland.
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Birth rate is a key factor in the possible scope of the education system;
birth rate is, in its turn, influenced by many socio-economic factors and
has been constantly decreasing over the past years. Both countries have
been registering catastrophic declines in birth rates since the 1990s, which
resulted from radical transformations in society and the lowering of the
population’s socio-economic state.
High birth rates registered in the early 1980s caused an increase in
pupils graduating from secondary schools in 2006-2007. A decrease of
birth rates beginning in 1990 will result, first and foremost, in the
reduction of the number of students attending primary school, then a
decrease in the number of those attending junior and senior secondary
school. The total number of students is the key index in determining
school network capacity, demand for teaching staff and necessary
financial resources. In the future, birth dynamics will become a key
determinant of the existing amount of labor supply in the country.
In the current complicated situation on the job market and a somewhat
high unemployment rate among young people (according to some data,
they comprise a third of total unemployed), and a high rate in the inflow
of the new workforce will continue increasing the tension in the
employment sector. It could be possible to alleviate the situation by
actively involving minors into continued higher education, which is
exactly the case in today’s Ukraine. However, this process, regardless of
all its positive aspects, could have controversial socio-economic
consequences if the job market cannot provide commensurate work
places for graduates. The activation of entrepreneurial activity, an
increase in, and comprehensive structural development of production
could improve the situation. This development should be through an
increase in the number of enterprises of various forms of ownership
(private, state, collective, combined), the transformation of the sector
structure of the economy and its orientation towards contemporary high
technological sectors.
4.10.8. Conclusions
It is important for the present-day Poland and Ukraine to consider
global experience in the changes that occurred in education during the
late 20th — early 21st centuries. It is necessary to analyse the specific
features of reforms in education in various countries in order to avoid
repeating their mistakes and to implement changes in a very balanced,
non-radical manner. It is necessary to be particularly careful about
privatization in education. Although an expansion of private education
is a feature of the modern world, a leading role in this process belongs
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to the state virtually everywhere in the world. Ensuring the high
quality of education based on the unification and standardization of
educational services should simultaneously maintain the tendency to
preserve the national particularity and uniqueness of our education
system and its positive experience, which has been accumulating over
the centuries.
The civilized world understood long ago that society’s reckless
orientation towards market values could be ruinous. Society can only
be strong in its citizens, for whom social purposes are important, for
whom spiritual values carry real weight: patriotism, pride in their own
country, and responsibility for its fat, etc. and whose mentality is not
simply composed of views on and tastes in consumer goods. The
words of George Soros, a famous patron and financial expert who
made a fortune on stock markets, are telling in this respect. Overtaken
by the necessity of understanding the historical and global meaning of
today’s society, he writes in Open Society: Reforming Global
Capitalism (published in 1998; in Ukraine — in 1999): «I am deeply
convinced, that the market value, that are so widespread now, are not
what is necessary for the successful functioning of society» (Soros,
G., 1999 : 222). He expresses his deep concern about the fact that
market values penetrate more and more into spheres that are not
traditionally common for such values.
The problem of our countries is not to override the existing strengths
of these systems, when pursuing the direction of market transformation,
including those in education. The spiritual component, oriented towards
the highest human values, has always been fundamental in the
development of our education, regardless of the influence of ideology, an
isolated nature of education systems, and their inability to respond to
innovations and to worldwide progress in science and technology.
Therefore, the reforms that are objectively necessary and implemented
today, have to pursue one goal, namely the preservation and expansion of
the cultural heritage and wealth of a state.
4.11. The Economic Convergence of Poland and Ukraine
in the Context of Real and Regulatory Processes
4.11.1. Introduction
The growth rates of real GDP and GDP per capita, as well as the rates of
investment, unemployment and inflation, are a good reflection of the
convergence of countries. Our selection of variable indices for
macroeconomic research into convergence relies on the following factors:
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1. GDP per capita is considered to be the best, although imperfect,
indicator of economic development.
2. Along with neoclassic models of economic growth (Solow, 1956;
Mankiw, Romer, Weil, 1992), as well as the investment rate according to
Keynes (Harrod, Domar, Kalecki), GDP is an essential indicator of the
accumulation of human capital and knowledge in the sphere of research
and development. It is a widely outlined determinant of economic
growth43.
3. The unemployment rate is a measure of the non-utilization of labor
potential. It demonstrates the extent of employees access to existing jobs
on the market, also characterizes the degree of structural non-adjustments
to such market aspects, as demand and supply.
4. The inflation rate, as a measure of price stability in the economy,
also reflects the effectiveness of a macroeconomic policy (monetary and
fiscal).
Research into the evolution and transformation of economic
systems (see paragraph 2.2) imply the existence of a correlation
between changes in the sphere of regulations and the real course of
economic processes. Freedom to execute transactions creates
opportunities for the spontaneous development of tools, institutions
and market mechanisms similar to consummate competition, as well
as an explicit mechanism of price formation, which is a fundamental
condition for the functioning of effective markets. From this
perspective, we can analyse the convergence of regulatory processes
in Poland and Ukraine, measured by economic freedom indices,
namely the limitation of political rights and civil liberties, as well as
monitoring research.
Ukrainian experts and reputable academicians often justify the
selection of the Russian model of economic development for Ukraine. For
comparison reasons, the analysis of the convergence of real processes and
regulations is inclusive of the EU-15 countries, the countries who acceded
to the EU along with Poland in 2004 (EU-8)44, as well as the European
and Transcaucasian countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
and Russia.
                     
43 Due to the lack of comparable statistical data pertaining to the accumulation of
human capital and knowledge in research and technology (particularly, in the European and
Transcaucasian countries of the CIS), knowledge related to formulation is primarily
focused on the formation of stop investments in material capital.
44 We will later use the term «the EU-7» with reference to the same group of countries
without Poland.
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4.11.2. Dynamics of Major Macroeconomic Variables in Poland and
Ukraine Relative to the EU-15, EU-7, and the CIS states
On the brink of systematic transformation in post-socialist countries
(1990)45, the level of development of Ukraine measured by GDP per
capita was 23 % higher than that of Poland. At the same time, both
countries were clearly lagging behind Western Europe — the mentioned
indicator for Poland was on average equal to 35 % of that of the EU-15,
while in Ukraine it amounted to 43 %. Figure 4.15 illustrates this.
Poland
Ukraine
EU-8 (2004)
CIS
Figure 4.15 GDP Per Capita in Some Countries Relative to Western
Europe (GDP Per Capita in the EU-15 = 100); USD Based on PPP,
Constant Prices Since 2000
Source: calculated by the author as per statistical data available at
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/
Until 1991, the relative difference between Poland and Ukraine did
not change essentially; however, the distance between these two states
and the EU-15 increased. This marked the beginning of vital divergence
between Poland and Ukraine. In 1992, the GDP per capita index of those
two economies became equal, and in the following years, Poland
dynamically increased its advantage. In 1999, GDP per capita in Ukraine
amounted to only 38 % of that of Poland. In 1992—1999, Poland
consistently reduced its distance from the EU-15, while for Ukraine the
gap continued to increase. The above-mentioned tendencies began to
change fundamentally in 2000, as Ukraine started making moderate
efforts to tackle the «past collapse» relative to Poland. In 2006, GDP per
capita in Ukraine amounted to 51 % of that of Poland. At the same time,
Ukraine started converging with EU-15 countries: in 1999, GDP per
capita in Ukraine did not exceed 16 % of that of the EU-15, and in 2006,
the percentage increased to close to 25 %. We should note that this result
                     
45 The acceptance of this date as initial for research presented in this material stems
from the accessibility of the data compared. One should not forget that the exact date of the
beginning of transformation varies in different post-socialist economies.
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is expressly different from that of 1990; in the same period, the GDP per
capita in Poland increased to more than 48 % relative to the average in
EU-15 countries. Therefore, taking into consideration the entire analyzed
period, we can ascertain that the Polish macro economy was catching up
with the economies of EU-15 countries, while Ukraine was moving
further away from both the countries of Western Europe and Poland.
Trying to identify similarities in the economic development in a larger
group of countries, including the EU-7 and the CIS countries, it is possible
to see certain similarities between Poland and the EU-7 countries, as well
as between Ukraine and the CIS states. In a relatively short period of
divergence, at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU-7 countries, similar to
Poland, started the process of systematically reducing the distance from the
EU-15 countries. The period of growing dissimilarities with respect to the
EU-15 countries was longer, and the pace of eliminating such similarities
until 2000 was slower than that of Poland. However, from that point on, the
process of convergence with the EU-15 in those countries was faster than in
Poland. Therefore, in the 1990s, the gap in GDP per capital in Poland and
an average index for the EU-7 countries (in 1990, GDP per capita in Poland
was equal to 62 % of that in the EU-7; in 2000 the index grew to 86 %).
However, later on, the distance between Poland and the EU-7 countries
began to increase again. The above-mentioned ratio in 2006 amounted to
close to 79 %, which means that Poland clearly drew closer to this group of
countries within the analysed period.
In the context of the above-mentioned tendencies, it is not surprising
that until 2000, the distance between Ukraine and the EU-7 countries
continued to grow and it was only in 2001 that the economies began to
gradually draw closer together. At the same time, analogies between
Ukraine and the analysed CIS countries are obvious. These two cases
mark a prolonged period of deteriorating indices relative to the EU-15;
the tendency only ceased to exist at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries,
when the divergence between the CIS countries and the EU-15 slowed
down. The situation improved earlier than expected (1999). Thus, the
reduction of Poland’s lagging behind was more dynamic than that of
Ukraine. Consequently, in 2006, the distance between the CIS and the
EU-15 was approximately 15 percentage points less than that of Ukraine,
contrary to a similar situation in 1990. Of the group of analyzed CIS
countries, only Georgia and Moldova demonstrated declining GDP per
capita, approaching that of Ukraine (as compared to those of 1990 and
2006).
The above-mentioned processes of drawing closer or drifting away
within the boundaries of the analyzed group of countries emerge directly
from distinctions in the dynamics of economic growth (Table 4.46).
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Table 4.46
GDP PER CAPITA, GDP DYNAMICS IN POLAND AND UKRAINE RELATIVE
TO THE EU-15, EU-7, AND CIS COUNTRIES IN 1990—2006
(USD based on PPP, constant prices since 2000)*
GDP per capita GDP growth dynamics
Country
1990—
1995
1996—
2001
2002—
2007
1990—
2007
1991—
1995
1996—
2001
2002—
2007
1991—
2007
Poland 7,293 9,756 12,231 9,760 2.2 4.7 4.5 3.9
Ukraine 6,673 4,004 6,035 5,571 –13.7 0.2 7.6 –1.8
EU-15 21,358 24,029 26,604 23,997 1.6 2.8 2.0 2.2
EU-7 10,349 11,681 15,275 12,435 –2.3 3.3 5.4 2.3
CIS 7,310 5,918 9,466 7,565 –9.4 2.4 7.3 0.4
* Calculated on the basis of statistical data available on the following website:
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/
The initial period of market reforms in Poland’s economy, similar to
that of other countries of the post-Soviet bloc, saw a decline of GDP,
i.e. transformation regress. On the conclusion of the regress, a process
of continuous economic growth started (Figure 4.16). Taking into
consideration the international context, we should add that the
transformation regress was the shortest for Poland (terminated in 1991)
and long lasting for all the countries transiting from a centrally planned
economy (GDP decline in 1990 — close to 7 %) (Kołodko, 1999;
Fisher, Sahay, 2000; Neneman, 2000; Tokarski, 2006). For instance, in
1994, GDP in Poland exceeded the more than 4 % GDP of 1990, and in
2006, it was almost 79 % higher than the GDP of 1990. The average
annual growth rate in 1991—2006 in Poland amounted to 3.76 % and
was higher than the average growth rate for the EU-15 countries
(2.1 %), as well as the EU-7 (1.9 %). Among the EU and the CIS
countries in the analyzed period, only Ireland, Luxemburg and
Azerbaijan were developing faster than Poland, while Cyprus and Malta
were developing at the same pace (Tokarski, 2006). This attests to the
great success of the course of Polish transformation on the
macroeconomic level at that time, apart from associated mistakes (for
more information, please see: Kołodko, 2007; Sadowski, 2007; Welfe,
2007 or Zienkowski, 2007).
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Poland
Ukraine
EU-15
EU-7
CIS
Figure 4.16 GDP Dynamics in the Selected Countries in 1991—2006
(USD based on PPP, Constant Prices since 2000)
Calculated on the basis of statistical data available on the following website:
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the transformation regress only ceased to
exist in 2000, and the aggregate production slump exceeded 59 %. In
2000—2006, dawned the time of decisive changes and Ukraine began to
develop dynamically, with an average growth rate of 7.4 %. However, in
2006, the GDP in Ukraine amounted to almost two thirds of the 1990
level, with the average annual growth rate not exceeding 1.95 %. This
vividly illustrates the tendency of the same extent of Ukraine’s
divergence from both the EU-15 and Poland.
In 1991—2006, the EU-7 countries demonstrated a considerably smaller
average annual GDP growth rate than that of Poland. This was a product of a
prolonged transformational regress and growth dynamics relative to the year
2000, which were weaker than the Poland. However, we should note that
every country included in this group managed to tackle such recession
processes as early as in the first half of the 1990s (in 1995 the latest,
Lithuania and Estonia achieved a positive growth pace), i.e. significantly
earlier than Ukraine. In 2000, the total GDP for these economies exceeded
the 1990 level, which Ukraine has not yet managed to accomplish. One
should also not forget about the EU-7 growth rate (particularly that of the
Baltic States) after 2000, which permitted the gradual reduction of the gap in
development between such countries and the countries of Western Europe.
In addition, in 1991—2006, the analyzed CIS countries attained better
economic results than Ukraine. In 2006, the total GDP of their economies
approached the level of 1990, which means that the average growth rate is
close to zero. We should also note that in terms of GDP dynamics, the
analyzed group of CIS countries is rather heterogeneous. For instance,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia demonstrated a dramatic (up to 40 %
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per annum), but short-term production slump in the first years of
transformation, while in Russia, the rate of the production slump during
the regress period was not that noticeable, but even so, the country only
managed to get back on the track of growth in 1999.
Trying to understand why the development path of Poland and
Ukraine in the analyzed period was so different, one should first compare
the course of transformation reforms in these two countries. The analyses
of the Ukrainian transformation (Kołodko, 1999; Hrycak, 2000;
Neneman, 2000; Klich, Kryuchkova, Sidenko, 2004; Wilson, 2004 or
Teczke, 2006) demonstrate that Ukraine’s negative dynamics in the 1990s
is rooted in the institutional flaws pertaining to the inconsistency of
Ukrainian economic reforms, which we will talk about later on in the
section. In Poland, unlike Ukraine and similar to the other EU-7
countries, the explicitly defined and consistently implemented strategy
gave an impetus to the opening of economies and their integration in the
European market. It brought success, which may serve as a model for the
continuous transformation of Ukraine’s economy.
Among the numerous, widely discussed properties of one of the
indexes, which is GDP in the welfare dimension, we call mention its
synthetic nature. The most widely used measures of this type of life
quality include the Human Development Index (HDI) or Sustainable Net
Benefit Index (SNBI) (Woźniak, 2004, с. 29—30; Lawn, 2005). The
United Nations Organization contributed to the development of the index
in 1990. The index relies on the following indices: (a) average life
expectancy reflecting health condition, (b) illiteracy index and years of
schooling reflecting the level of education, and (c) GDP per capita
according to PPP as a measure of a standard of living (Borys, 2007,
page 286; Low, Aw, 1997, page 1—17; Kołodko, 2008).
We can learn about the above-mentioned index by analyzing the
convergence of Poland and Ukraine. Table 4.47 illustrates relevant
quantitative variables in 1975—2005.
Table 4.47
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX FOR POLAND
AND UKRAINE RELATIVE TO THE EU-15, EU-8 AND CIS *
Country Ranking 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Poland 37 0.806 0.822 0.852 0.87
Ukraine 76 0.809 0.756 0.761 0.788
Average for the EU-15 0.847 0.861 0.874 0.893 0.915 0.931 0.944
Average for the EU-8 0.786 0803 0.814 0.823 0.815 0.847 0.874
Average for the CIS 0.700 0.722 0.778 0.733 0.748 0.768
* Developed by the author: www.wedrujacyswiat.pl
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The above-given data illustrates that in 1990, Ukraine demonstrates a
better HDI than Poland; the spread was smaller than the distance
measured by GDP per capita. One should also note the relatively high
value of this index in the two economies relative to the countries of
Western Europe, primarily resulting from relatively well developed
systems of formal education in the countries of the socialist bloc. From
the very beginning, HDI transformations in Poland and Ukraine had their
distinctions. While Poland experienced systematic improvement, the
index was dropping in Ukraine and the tendency diminished only at the
beginning of the 21st century. We can note that divergence between
Poland and Ukraine in the transformation period, particularly in the
1990s, covered not only profitable aspects of the quality of public life.
Other alternative welfare indicators also illustrate this, which implies that,
according to subjective assessments, Ukraine has the lowest quality of life
among all countries undergoing transformation46.
The differentiated dynamics of economic growth in Poland and
Ukraine were equally a product of such factors as demand and supply.
Amidst demand factors, various tendencies in the sphere of investment
come to the fore, which is the principal reason for divergence between
Poland and Ukraine in the analyzed period. The greatest distinction
between those two countries in the group of proposal factors is in the
sphere of the utilization of human resources measured by the
unemployment rate.
The Ukrainian economy entered institutional transformation with a
very high level of investment relative to that of other post-socialist
economies (particularly countries of the former USSR). They were
primarily the result of the excessive development of capital-intensive
sectors of the economy and the core of the heavy industry, thus
rendering possible the production of goods satisfying the weapons needs
of the USSR and the member states of the Warsaw Pact. According to
official statistics, in 1990 Ukraine’s share of investment in GDP
amounted to 48.8 %, while in the majority of market economies the
variable fluctuated around 20 %. Such a high level, as well as a flawed
structure of investment, led to a situation whereby in the context of new
political conditions following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well
as the gradual introduction of the principles of business planning,
resulted in a destructive fall, as illustrated in Figure 4.17. In 1990—
1996, the level of investment in Ukraine fell by 30 percentage points,
which largely explains an essential slump in production during this
period.
                     
46 Specifically, the index of a subjective assessment of welfare is becoming
increasingly popular (Kołodko, 2008).
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Poland
Ukraine
Figure 4.17 Investment in Poland and Ukraine
in 1990—2006 (% of GDP)
Calculated as per statistical data available at: http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/
In 1990-1995, investment in Poland remained at a very low level (on
average 15.5 % of GDP), tending to grow insignificantly. We can
consider that in the first years of transformation in Poland, the impulse
towards a production decline was weaker than that in Ukraine and a
tendency of investment inflows was accelerating. Thus, positive
advancements on the microeconomic level began considerably earlier in
Poland than in Ukraine. This was followed by structural changes in the
entire economy.
Opposite tendencies in the dynamics of investment inflows, in
1995—2000, resulted in investment in Poland exceeding that in
Ukraine, achieving a higher level than in the majority of EU-15
countries (though it was lower than in the majority of EU-7 countries).
The level of investment in Ukraine (on average 18.4 % in 1996—2001)
was lower than that of all CIS and EU-7 countries, as well as the
majority of EU-15 countries. The situation started to improve after
2001, after Ukraine became more inclined towards investment than
Poland. In this period, investment in Poland was lower than that in
Russia or Belarus, while all European and Transcaucasian countries,
including CIS countries, outstripped Ukraine. During rapid economic
growth in Ukraine in 2002—2006, of the EU-7 countries, only
Lithuania demonstrated a higher level of the accumulation of
investment than that of Ukraine.
An inconsistent and unbalanced transformation of Ukraine’s economy
could not initiate relevant tendencies of effective economic growth or
make compensation of GDP losses possible, which led to declined
investment, as a result of the refusal of the national economy to utilize the
central planning mechanism. The processes had an impact on the labor
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market, since the above-mentioned tendencies in Ukraine were
fundamentally distinctive from those in Poland (Figure 4.18).
Poland
Ukraine
Figure 4.18 Unemployment in Poland and Ukraine in 1993—2006 (%)
Source: statistical data on the website http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/ (for Poland)
and from the Economic Survey of Europe No. 1/2005 available at http://www.unece.org/
ead/survey_new.htm і www.ukrstat.gov.ua (for Ukraine)
The stabilizing and balancing «shock therapy» implemented in Poland
caused a transformational regress as early as in 1994, as unemployment
reached close to 17 %. In Ukraine, similar to the majority of former
USSR economies, the unemployment rate was extremely low until 1995
and continued to be on a low level. Throughout the analyzed period, its
average remained lower than that of Luxemburg47 or EU-15 countries
with the lowest unemployment rate.
Unusually high unemployment rates in Poland, relative to those of
Ukraine or the EU-15 countries, resulted from not only a
transformational shock, intensive liberalization and the deregulation of
the markets of production factors, but also accelerated privatization and
the effects of competition from open markets, which put pressure on
the effective improvement of the utilization of production stock.
Meanwhile, Ukraine sustained a consistent balance as a result of the
lack of decisive actions — a legacy of the centrally planned economy,
and latent unemployment. The turmoil continuing in the following
years made the reduction of latent unemployment impossible,
particularly in the state sector of the economy due to the combination
of high rates of production decline and unemployment. It is possible to
see similar tendencies in other European and Transcaucasian countries
of the CIS, where the total number of employed reduced at a slower
pace than the GDP.
The new economic strategy implemented in Poland in 1994—1997
delivered significant results pertaining to the reduction of
unemployment (by 6 percentage points). Only a slowdown of
                     
47 Luxembourg has the highest GDP per capita index and the lowest level of
unemployment (about 2 %). (Note. Ukrainian editors)
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development dynamics in association with high production growth in
1999—2002 increased the unemployment rate. The tendency changed
after 2003 along with accelerated economic growth, an increase in the
number of jobs and demand for labor (Kwiatkowski, Tokarski, 2000,
2007; Rogut, Tokarski, 2001, 2002, 2007; or Tokarski, 2005, section 3).
Poland’s accession to the EU, as well as the migration of Polish labour
migrants primarily to Great Britain and Ireland, had an essential impact
on the drop of unemployment in Poland after 2004. We should note that
unemployment in Poland in the researched period was at a higher level
than that in the EU-8 countries.
Ukraine demonstrates symptoms of recovery pertaining to the creation
of new jobs starting in 2000, when a rapid GDP growth was recorded,
combined with stabilization of real unemployment at a level close to 4 %
and high growth of production, as well as a decline of latent
unemployment. One could observe similar tendencies in other analyzed
CIS countries, apart from Russia and Armenia, where the unemployment
rate continued to drop (Kwiatkowski, Roszkowska, Tokarski, 2004;
Adamczyk, Tokarski, Włodarczyk, 2006 or Tokarski, 2006).
Deep and prolonged economic instability, which manifested itself in a
high inflation rate, presented another adverse consequence of an inconsistent
approach to the market economy in Ukraine. At the beginning of the 1990s,
the problem of inflation was relevant to all economies undergoing systematic
transformation. However, it was at a much larger scale in the CIS than in the
EU-8 countries. At the same time, Ukraine recorded significantly higher price
surge indices than Poland. The average inflation indicator in Ukraine in
1990—1995 amounted to over 1800 %. In Poland, the annual inflation rate,
which is larger than the average for the EU-8 countries, does not exceed
130 % in this period (Figure 4.19).
Poland Ukraine
a b
Figure 4.19 Inflation Rates in Poland and Ukraine
in 1990—2006 (%, CPI index)
Source: statistical data available at: http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/
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In 1996—2001, the inflation rate dropped both in Poland and in
Ukraine. The average inflation rate in Ukraine reached close to 30 %,
while in Poland it was equal to over 11 %. Lower inflation rates were
recorded in the other EU-15 and EU-7 countries (except for Hungary).
The turn of the century brought about similar indices of easily
controlled inflation for both Poland (7.3 % in 1999) and Ukraine
(0.8 % in 2002). However, starting in 2000, inflation processes tended
to decline in Poland (except for 2004), while in Ukraine inflation
tended to go beyond control again. In 2002—2006, the inflation rate in
the Polish economy was close to that of the EU-15, while in the
Ukrainian economy it was close to twice as high as the inflation rate
in Greece, the economy of which was characterized by the lowest
price stability among the EU-15 economies. We should note that CIS
countries, particularly Belarus, Russia and Moldova, where inflation
reached 10 %, experienced the worst problems with inflation in
2002—2006.
The comparison of inflation rates in Poland and Ukraine illustrates
that in the past ten years while Poland managed to slow down and
stabilize inflation at low and accepted political, economic and social
levels, while in Ukraine inflation processes continue to present a threat to
the economy’s stability and development.
4.11.3. Convergence Effect
The theory of economic growth, or the application of economic convergence
research, relies in its entirety upon the utilization of statistical and
econometric methods (Tokarski, 2000; Barro, Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
The assessment of the parameters of the regression function, which
permit the verification of the hypothesis about beta type (β) convergence
in the analyzed groups of countries, has demonstrated that in most cases
statistics were characterized by a very low degree of freedom, as well as
very high critical values. We can find certain evidence of beta (β)
convergence in the EU-8 countries in the analyzed period, in the sub-
periods of 1990—1995 and 1995—2006, as well as in the CIS countries
in 1990—2006. In view of low quantitative attempts (6-8 for the EU-8, as
well as the CIS), these assessments are not sufficient for formulating
specific solutions pertaining to the originating of convergence or
divergence in the analyzed groups of countries. The results of this
statistical analysis would have largely had the nature of a fictional
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regression, which would have made the economic interpretation of
received results impossible48.
The results of beta (β) convergence assessments in the analysed
groups of countries did not create grounds for assessing sigma (σ) type
convergence49.
Taking into consideration research results and the imperfections of
the applied research procedure, we find it unreasonable to examine
economic convergence by assessing the impact of investment and the
effect of convergence on the growth of GDP per capita, relying upon
the impact of GDP on living standards, which follows from the
neoclassic growth model of Solow, 195650. It makes sense to do
research by extending the variable of the Solow model to the growth
of aggregate output (GDP per person employed). However, during a
prolonged period of growth, the dynamics of manufacturing and
produced output for living usually overlap; therefore, the factors
causing massive growth of production must also determine changes of
GDP per capita. The above-given model suggests the following (see
also Tokarski, 2007 : 168—169):
1) In the context of a steady state increase of the index, the indices
of exogenous progress in Harrod’s sense, represent growth of major
variables of population levels (the index of technical progress illustrates
directly increasing productivity of labor);
2) As an economy approaches the growth of output and capital per
capita, ceteris paribus becomes higher when investment grows (which is
perceived as investment participation in the GDP);
3) The effect of real convergence is conditional upon a reduction of
productivity of local output factors and associated capital absorption of
the coefficient of production processes, increasing along with capital per
capita. The effect is based upon GDP per capita growing along with
increasing capital per capita and GDP per resident (Tokarski, Gajewski,
2005 or Gajewski, 2007).
                     
48 The calculation has been done synchronously for annual data for 1990—2006 for the
EU-15, EU-8, and the CIS groups of countries, as well as for data for relevant sub-periods
(1990—1995; 1995—2006, as well as 1990—2006). 1990 — the base year and 2006 —
the final year; 1995 — the initial year, while 2006 — the final year, as well as 1990 — the
base year and 1995 — the final year. The received results revealed either the low
adjustment of the model to the empirical variable schedules or the low statistical
significance of structural parameters, thus making it impossible to test the convergence
hypothesis.
49 The correlation of α, β, σ convergences was covered in sections 1 and 2 in more
detail.
50 Please go to Romer 1996; Woźniak 2004 for the principles of the development of
the Solow model and its use in research into real convergence.
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Analysing the dynamics of GDP per capita, one should utilize the
equation of the indices of the growth of a macroeconomic variable as
follows:
( ) ( )10 lnln −β−γ−α+=Δ≈ tttt yinvtayg , (4.1)
where ( )tt yg lnΔ≈  represents a percentage growth rate of GDP per
capita in economy і during period t;
t — time variable in natural numbers51;
invt — investment rate in the period of t;
yt – 1 — GDP per capita in the period t – 1;
a0 ∈ℜ a constant that (in the author’s opinion) does not have a direct
economic interpretation;
α ≥ 0 — depicts the impact of technical progress in Harrod’s sense on
the growth of GDP per resident;
γ > 0 is a parameter determining the impact of investment on the
growth of output per resident in the period of approaching the Solow
model long-term equilibrium;
β ∈ (0;1) a parameter determining the intensity of the effect of
convergence. Instead, α/β determines the Harrodian rate of technical
progress.
If equation (1) applies to the 30 previously analyzed economies (the
EU and CIS), it should read as follows:
( )10 ln −β−γ−α+= ititit yinvtag , (4.2)
where the subdocuments і (i = 1,2..., 30) belong to the following
countries.
If in the equation (4.2) we assume that t changes annually by 1,
this would imply that the growth rate of GDP per resident in the
period of the dependent t (or git) depends on the investment rate in the
period t (thus, invit), as well as on the GDP per capita in the period t –
1 (yit – 1). This assumption does not fully correspond to the reality of
functioning economies. This emerges from the fact that the majority of
current GDP per capita is affected by the value of GDP on the scale of
the entire economy. In the context of a conjunctural cycle, this may
not only be an effect of the current investment rate and GDP per
                     
51 The time variable t assumes the values of 1991, 1992, and 2006 in the below-given
assessments of annual data; 1993, 1994 ..., 2006 for the assessment of three-year variable
averages, as well as 1995, 1996 ..., 2006 for data calculated on the basis of five-year
variable averages..
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capita, but also a consequence of the impact upon the current GDP,
whose factors are determined by demand in the economy. Therefore,
in the author’s opinion, it is safer to interpret time segments by an
identical measure of GDP per capita, as well as the investment rate,
applying, for instance, the procedure of the variable average ex post,
as then variable macroeconomic time segments will emerge primarily
from the impact of factors that come from the proposal side of the
economy. Having agreed the time lines for labor and investment, we
can replace the variable average of the equation (4.2) with the
following dependence:
( )jitjitjit yinvtag ln0 β−γ−α+= , (4.3)
where
j
g
g
j
i
j
it
∑−
=τ τ=
1
0
j
inv
inv
j
ij
it
∑−
=τ τ=
1
0 ,
as well as
j
y
y
j
i
j
it
∑−
=τ τ=
1
0 , (4.4)
where j denotes a series of calculated variable moving averages jitg ,
j
itinv , as well as jity  variable averages of the series j with a dependent
variable and independent variables in the equation (4.3). The analysis
presented below will utilize variable averages of the series j = 1, 3,
and 5.
We should note that even after levelling the variable average for the
variables jitg , 
j
itinv , as well as jity  in equation (4.3), implicite the
assumption is made that in all previously researched economies the same
growth rates of GDP per capita correspond to the same rates of
investment and GDP per resident. Frequently, the assumption has no
restrictions (primarily, in view of the lack of homogeneity of the
researched material); therefore, the author decided to weaken it, applying
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the procedure of constant diversification (fixed effect; see Pindyck,
Rubinfeld, 1991, page 223—226). Then, the equation (4.3) will extend to
become a dependency and will look as follows:
( )jitjit
k
kk
j
it yinvtdaag ln0 β−γ+α++= ∑ , (4.5)
where a0 ∈ℜ is a constant in a so-called based economy52;
dk — singe zero-sporadic for the following non-base economies;
and ak corrected for the constant a0 for non-base economies.
Furthermore, independent variables in the extended equation (4.5) include
variable averages with inflation ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ j
itinf  and unemployment ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ j
itur  rates.
Therefore, we can write the equation as follows:
( )jitjitjitjit
k
kk
j
it yurinvtdaag lninf0 β−φ+δ+γ+α++= ∑ (4.6)
Or (following the exclusion of the unemployment index from the
equation (4.6)):
( )jitjitjit
k
kk
j
it yinvtdaag lninf0 β−δ+γ+α++= ∑ , (4.7)
Where δ and φ parameters describe the intensity of the impact
(respectively) of inflation and unemployment indices upon the index of
GDP per capita growth.
Evaluated by the method of least squares, the parameters of the
equations (4.6—4.7) with variable averages of the series j = 1, 3 and 5
are presented in Table 4.48. Columns (i), (iii) and (v) (formula 4.6)
take into consideration the assessments of equation parameters (4.6),
while columns (ii), (iv), and (vi) take into account equation parameters
(4.7).
                     
52 The economy of Luxemburg, as the most typical among the discussed economies, is
the base economy in the presented further assessments of the determinants of the indices of
GDP per capita growth. The choice of a base economy is not more significant for the
assessment of the parameters given with respect to independent variables in the quotations
presented further on.
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We can make the following conclusions based upon the assessment of
the parameters of these quotations presented in Table 4.48:
• The evaluation of the parameters of equations (4.6—4.7) for the
given annual data implies that the growth rate of GDP per capita of
the preceding materially statistical, depends on investment, inflation
and the effect of convergence (by 1 % of the level of materiality), as
well as on the unemployment rate (by 5 % of the level of materiality).
However, the assessment of the equation parameters (4.7) indicate that
the rate of investment, the rate of inflation, and the effect of
convergence explain the growth rate of GDP per capita in the analysed
group of countries by 1 % of the level of materiality. The variables
explained in equation (4.6) for the given annual data explain the
changes of unsteadiness (or the formation of the growth rate of GDP
per capita) interpreted as 45 %.
• We can come to such conclusions, contemplating the equation
assessments (4.6—4.7) as per annual data. In this case, the indices of
investment and inflation, as well as the effect of convergence, explain
the change of the index of GDP per capita growth within the limits of
57 %.
• The assessments of the analyzed equations of the data for five years
have validated conclusions similar to those pertaining to data assessments
for one and three years, with the exception that then the effect of
convergence turned out to be statistically insignificant. One can attribute
this to the fact that the five-year data depicts growth steps approximated
to long-term steps in the context of steady growth. Thereby, it illustrates
that the effect of convergence does not have a statistically substantial
effect on the index of the GDP impact on life, since in the context of
steady growth the convergence effect does not emerge from the nature of
things.
The evaluated variables of the quotation variables (4.7) and annual
data have created the need to develop simulations of changes of GDP per
capita in Poland and Ukraine relative to the extensive and rich economies
of EU countries, namely the Germany economy. The simulations assume
that investment indices in Germany, Poland and Ukraine will amount to
19.2 %, 19.7 % and 20.1 % respectively; the inflation rates will be equal
to 1.6 (Germany), 1.9 (Poland) and 7.5 % (in Ukraine)54. Table 4.49
presents some of the simulations.
                     
54 For the most part, they correspond to investment and inflation rates of Germany,
Poland, and Ukraine in 2002—2006.
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Table 4.49
SIMULATIONS OF GDP PER CAPITA IN GERMANY,
POLAND AND UKRAINE UNTIL 2030 (GDP PER CAPITA IN GERMANY
IN 2006 WAS TAKEN AS 100 %)
Year Germany Poland Ukraine
2006 100 48 24
2010 111 54 28
2015 135 67 35
2020 171 85 45
2025 225 113 60
2030 301 152 81
Source: calculated by the author as per equation assessments (4.7) and annual data
The simulation (please see Table 4.49) implies the following55:
• By 2010, GDP per resident in Germany will grow 11 % relative to
that of 2006. In Poland, GDP per capita can reach close to 54 % of GDP
per capita in Germany in 2006, while in Ukraine — 28 % of GDP per
capita in Germany in 2006. This means that in 2006—2010, the ratio of
GDP per capita in Germany, Poland and Ukraine did not change
substantially, since in 2006 the ratio was 100:48:24, while in 2010 it will
be 100:49:25;
• Subject to the same positions, in the next five years, GDP per
resident in Poland will be equal to close to two thirds of the German 2006
GDP per capita, while in Ukraine this macroeconomic variable will only
slightly exceed one third of the German 2006 GDP per resident. The ratio
of GDP per capita of these three economies will be close to 4:2:1;
• Irrespective of the insignificant statistical effect of convergence,
GDP per capita in Poland will be equal to the German 2006 GDP per
capita by 2023. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s economy will attain only close to
81 % of the German 2006 GDP per capita by 2030;
• The ratios of GDP per capita in these economies during the
simulation period will develop similarly. In 2030, the Polish GDP per
capita is expected to remain at 50 % of the German GDP per capita, while
the Ukrainian GDP per capita will be equal to almost 27 % of the
macroeconomic majority;
                     
55 One should be particularly cautious with such simulations, since they contain the
assumption that macroeconomic processes in Poland and Ukraine will be similar to those
of 1990—2006.
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• Compiling average annual growth rates of GDP per capita in Poland
and Germany in 2000—2006, 2001—2006, and 2002—2006 with GDP
per capita in 2006 in these countries, we can see that income per capita in
Poland and Germany equalled 31, 29, and 24, respectively;
• Similar assessments of Ukraine’s economy illustrate that with the
average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in Germany and Ukraine in
2000—2006, 2001—2006, and 2002—2006, absolute convergence
between those two economies in the sphere of GDP per capita will be
attained in 24, 22 and 23 years respectively. However, one should approach
such assessments with caution. The experience of developing countries has
validated the neoclassic growth theory of Solow and the theory proves that
the countries at a lower stage of economic development are capable of
attaining a higher rate of economic growth. However, as revenues grow
(GDP per capita), production growth decreases. Nonetheless, it is hard to
agree fully that Ukraine’s economy will manage to make its GDP per capita
equal to that of Germany in such a short period of time.
4.11.4. Convergence in the Domain of Regulation in Poland and Ukraine
as Analyzed against Select Groups of European Countries
Along with the rules of systematic analysis, we should accept as a proven
fact the thesis that changes in real economy, hence, the convergence or
divergence of economic growth happen under the clear influence of
traditions. The primary factors that stimulate the shortening of the
developmental distance include legal order and competition regime;
accepted and evenly enforced regulations; and finally, social, ethical,
religious, and mental examples and values. Thus, determining the causes
of real economy divergence, which has been taking place between Poland
and Ukraine during the transitional period, and identifying conditions and
possibilities for convergence in the coming years should rely on a
comparative analysis of institutional changes currently taking place in
these countries.
Tackling problems pertaining to the evaluation of institutions is of key
importance for researching the processes of convergence and divergence
with respect to institutional decisions and, even more so, determining the
influence of regulatory evolution on real convergence. Changes in the
sphere of regulation, due to their complexity and the nature of the
institutions themselves, make precise validation impossible. Attempts to
approximate evaluation are not rare, thus enriching the dominant
descriptive analysis, allowing for international comparisons, and
increasing the exactitude of evaluation.
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Among the indexes pertaining to the international institutional condition,
we list the indexes of economic liberty processes published by the Fraser
Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and above all, the indexes used by
Freedom House56: the index of political rights (PR) and the index of civil
liberties (CL). They are synthetic indexes and measure the general level of
citizens’ freedom or their ability to exercise spontaneous activity beyond the
control of the state or other institutions of political and social influence
(political parties, unions). The construction of these indexes is based on the
principles laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as
on the basis of the belief that civil and political liberties are most guaranteed
in the societies with liberal-democratic institutional order. In this way, they
become universal and internationally comparative. The methodology for
evaluating these liberties is free from deformities that could be caused or by
differences in the mentalities of nations developing in disparate cultural,
geographical, religious and anthropological conditions.
The applicability of the above-mentioned indexes in the analysis of
economic convergence between Poland and Ukraine is determined by
civil liberty components, which reflect the course of economic processes
in these countries. Both political rights and civil liberties indexes are
synthetic indexes with superimposed partial measurements from other
spheres of societal functioning.
The political rights index is influenced by three factors:
• electoral process (EP), which indicates the level of freedom and
equality in the election of a state’s top administration;
• political pluralism and participation (PPP), which determine the
freedom to create unions and socio-political parties, conduct politically
oppositional activity, and form political views in a way unobstructed by
pressure groups (totalitarian parties, clerical hierarchy, armed forces,
other states, etc.);
• functioning of government (FG), which determines the level of
corruption, transparency, and society’s trust in the government, as well as
the freedom of representatives to be elected to the administration on an
independent basis.
In its turn, the civil liberties index is composed of four determinants:
• freedom of expression and belief (FEB), which means freedom and
independence of the media; freedom of religion; system of education free
from political dogmatism; and freedom of discussion and dialogue;
• associational and organizational rights (AOR), which signify
freedom of assembly and demonstration; open public debates; freedom of
NGO activity, trade unions, and village organizations;
                     
56 Fraser Institute — www.fraserinstitute.org; Freedom House —
www.freedomhouse.org; Heritage Foundation — www.heritage.org
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• rule of law (RL) which means independence of courts; blocking of
political terror and the unwarranted incarceration of citizens; and equality
of all citizens before the law and politics;
• the specific features of autonomy and individual rights as described
in PAIR (personal autonomy and individual rights), i.e. gender equality;
protection of property rights; freedom of economic activity; and non-
interference of the state into the right to move, work, and obtain
education.
The evaluation of the synthetic political rights and civil liberties
indexes is done by posing 10 questions to each of the positions of the
partial PR and by applying 15 determinants to each partial CL. Each of
the partial indexes assumes a level from 0 to 4, where 0 is a low and 4 is a
high level of freedom. As a result, the highest possible level for political
rights is 40, and for civil liberties — 60. Ranges of political and civil
liberties are then based on the partial indexes of PR and CL, where 1
signifies the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom.
Therefore, the liberty indexes determine the freedom of economic
activity and immunity of property; being components of a competitive
regime and a state ruled by law, they also determine the fundamental
elements of institutional order regarding the functioning of free markets,
attaining economic growth, and hence developing substantial convergence-
conducive factors. Basing our research on such reductionism of the
neoclassical approach, we remark that other liberty indexes mentioned in
the methodology used by Freedom House are primarily related to the
problems of social capital and civil society and are also important factors
of socio-political development.
Hence, basing the analysis of regulation in Poland and Ukraine on
these indexes would allow not only for an interpretation of the processes
in the real economy, but also for the evaluation of the differences in
material and non-material aspects of living standards.
 The use in this analysis of measuring instruments published by
Freedom House is due to pragmatic reasons, namely to the fact that
Freedom House has at its disposal long and comparative lists of indexes
of political rights and civil liberties for over 150 world countries.
Freedom House conducted its first surveys of the state of freedom in the
world in 1950. Beginning in 1972, the organization has been using a
unified methodological measurement of the protection of political rights
and civil liberties57.
                     
57 Over the course of many years, beginning in 1972, Freedom House has repeatedly
changed its methodological evaluation of the levels of indexes of political rights and civil
liberties, however, forseeing in each case their evaluation for the previous years.
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Various constitutional principles observed in Western democratic and
post-socialist states made for rather disparate evaluations of indexes of
the use of political rights and civil liberties in this group of countries.
From the start of the monitoring of these indexes according to the 1972
methodology, most West European states were classified as free, with
indexes of political rights and civil liberties registered at level 1, while
these same indexes reached levels 6-7 in the USSR and Central-European
states, which is interpreted as the absence of freedom.
While no improvement in the above-mentioned indexes was noted in
the USSR (including Ukraine) until the late 1980s, in Poland already by
the late 1970s the index of civil liberties fell to 5. This, in a way, was a
reflection of symptoms of improvements in economic activity. It should
also be emphasised that, of all the post-socialist states, Poland had the
largest level of freedom in economic activity, namely in the large sphere
of private property (agriculture, small business, some areas of the service
industry). One can presume that the above-mentioned differences
between Poland and Ukraine, although barely noticeable in the statistical
data, could have a substantial influence on the practical implementation
of reforms in years to come. Even the limited freedoms in economic
activity had an impact on society’s mentality; therefore, they were
establishing informal internal regulations. The entrepreneurial potential
that accumulated in Poland developed into the implementation of market
reforms and allowed for their relatively quick and well-organized
completion, all of which made Poland’s entrance into irreversible socio-
economic changes possible. In Ukraine, however, ruination of the
existing regulations proved to be much more difficult, which had negative
effects for reforms on both macro- and micro-economic levels.
 Radical improvements in political indexes began after the political
turning points in the second half of 1989 in Poland and after Ukraine
declared independence in 1991. In Poland, already in 1990, the indexes for
the protection of political rights and civil liberties dropped to 2. In 1991 these
indexes dropped to 3 in Ukraine, which, considering the unstable Ukrainian
situation, indicated the existence of a similar tendency.
The following years brought a systematic growth in the sphere of
freedom in Poland (figures 4.20 and 4.21) that was manifested in the
decline of the political rights index to 1, a characteristic of democratic
and liberal countries of Western Europe. Simultaneously, positive
changes were taking place in civil liberties, stimulated by the European
integration process. It was completed successfully — the civil liberties
index reached level 1 in 2004, the year Poland joined the EU.
In Ukraine, however, the improvements observed in 1991 turned out
to be temporary, and already two years later the positive tendencies in the
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spheres of political rights and civil liberties deteriorated. Up until 2003,
the civil liberties index stayed at level 4 while the political rights index,
after a short deterioration in 1993, dropped to 3 in the following years.
Nonetheless, in 2000, as a result of a decrease in political pluralism and
the growth of corruption and despotism in state administration, the
political rights index went to level 4. Consequently, in 2000—2003, the
functioning of the markets was similar to that of the CIS where the
vertical index of liberties was very high during this period.
Poland Ukraine EU15
EU8 CIS
Figure 4.20. The Level of Political Rights in Poland and Ukraine
against those in EU-15, EU-8, and CIS Countries
Source: the author’s Figure based on the data available as of 9 October 2007
Poland Ukraine EU15
EU8 CIS
Figure 4.21. The Level of Civil Liberties in Poland and Ukraine
against those in E-U15, EU-8, and CIS countries
Source: the author’s Figure based on the data available as of 9 October, 2007
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Thus, up until the arrival of the Orange Revolution, one observed an
explicit divergence between Ukraine and Poland in the sphere of
institutional changes reflected by these indices. This divergence was also
accompanied by a growing gap in the real economy. Beginning with
2005, the state of political rights and civil liberties in Ukraine started
rectifying. One can state that it was only from this moment that the sphere
of regulation in Ukraine began nearing the judicial and competition
regime as well as the principles of West European democracies.
The lack of Ukraine’s results in the process of implementing
institutional change was detrimental to the opportunities it received after
gaining independence. Moreover, the efforts made during the first years
of reforms proved to be largely appropriated. Apart from the positive
results of the Orange Revolution, the distance between Ukraine and EU-
15 countries, as well as Poland and the other EU-8 countries, in the
sphere of regulation remains substantial. It is worth emphasising that the
absence of progress in reforming the formal situations and general
deterioration of living standards has a negative impact on the process of
transformations in the nation’s mentality. On the contrary, the desired
effect should have been in the growth of activism, entrepreneurship, self-
responsibility, and development of social capital. Changes of this kind are
evolutionary in nature; hence, their disturbance results in weighty losses
for society and the economy. One cannot make up for these losses in a
short time period.
Synthetic measurements of the freedom level in political rights and
civil liberties shed light on the general direction in the evolution of
regulation, but they do not examine the details of liberty types respected
or limited in nationwide economic systems. Additionally, to expand the
evaluation of institutional order in the countries under examination, the
researchers chose partial indexes of political rights and civil liberties in
2007 (Figure 4.22 a—c).
As can be seen in the above-mentioned diagrams, the distance that
separates Ukraine from EU-15 and EU-8, including Poland, can be
observed in all partial indexes for the protection of political rights and
civil liberties. One should note that this distance varies depending on
specific aspects of the liberties that reflect the institutional regime.
The researchers note comparatively small differences between Poland
and Ukraine in the indexes of freedom of expression and belief (FEB),
associational and organizational rights (AOR), rule of law (RL), and
political pluralism and participation in a state’s life (PPP). Indexes that
directly and essentially determine the conditions for the effectiveness of
real economic processes are, alarmingly, much lower: these are the
indexes that reflect electoral process (EP), personal autonomy and
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individual rights (PAIR), and especially, functioning of government (FG).
Bearing in mind that institutional changes in the particular domains of
social life are largely complementary in nature58, this type of
disproportion in the sphere of specific components of civil liberties can be
dangerous for the process of reforms in Ukraine.
PolandUkraine
b
EU8
a
Poland
EP
PPP
FG
FEBAOR
PL
PAIR
EP
PPP
FG
FEBAOR
PL
PAIR
c
EP
PPP
FG
FEBAOR
PL
PAIR
Poland
Ukraine
CIS
EU15
Figure 4.22. Cross-Section Graph of PR and CL Indexes
for Poland, Ukraine, and Several European Countries, 2007
Source: the author’s Figure based on the data available as of 9 October 2007
Similarly to its use in the analysis of the real economy, the
econometric instrument can be applied in convergence analysis to the
indexes reflecting changes in regulation. While studying similarities
between processes of regulation in selected country groups (EU-15,
EU-8, and the CIS), researchers also tested the hypothesis of beta-
                     
58 For instance, the chances of exercising one’s associational and organizational rights
in the form of building civil society increase, along with an increase in prosperity.
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convergence performance (more on this issue in Gajewski, 2007, Chapter
1 and in paragraph 1.5 of this monograph). In the period under
examination (1991-2006), the accomplished convergence of the
regulation processes type «у» was noted only in the EU-15 regarding both
of the freedom indexes; this is a direct result of the fact that in all the
countries of this group the above-mentioned indexes were at 1. Similarly,
in EU-8 countries, beta-convergence was observed on a similar scale in
the indexes of civil liberties (1991-2006) and political rights (although to
a lesser extent). In the case of CIS countries, a principal σ-divergence
diagnosis was made for such measurements. This shows that the
European integration process stimulated the institutional changes that
took part in the process of co-integration for the EU-8. Other post-
socialist countries, including Ukraine, failed to determine the model for
socio-economic development in such a clear and unequivocal way.
Additionally, they did not create their own, alternative model for the
institutional order; the regulation observed in this divergent group is
direct proof of this. Under the conditions of complex and interconnected
institutional changes, convergence turned out to be a difficult task and the
decrease of the distance to developed countries was significantly slowed
down.
4.11.5. Conclusions
Poland and Ukraine, as well as other European and Transcaucasian post-
socialist countries (EU-8 and CIS countries), had possibly aimed for a too
speedy convergence of the economic development when in the early
1990s they began the transformation process in the system. The analysis
of developments in the real economy and institutional changes during
1991—2006 in select countries proves that cutting the developmental
distance was very important but did not result in the desired outcomes in
all countries concerned. Considering as an example both real economy
and regulation in West-European countries, we can state that the
transformations in Poland had unequivocally positive results. They are
manifested in the observed convergence between Poland’s indexes
describing these two domains and the correspondent indexes of EU-15.
However, Ukraine shows an increase in the developmental distance
relative to both the EU-15 and Poland, along with the other EU-8
countries.
 Based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, we can state that
institutional changes were of key importance for the dynamics of
economic growth and hence for the creation of disparities in the
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developmental pace between Ukraine and West-European states and
Poland. During the period of increase in the basic political and civil
liberties, Ukraine saw accelerated economic growth, GDP per capita
growth, and an increase in investments. However, the development of
political rights and civil liberties slowed down considerably during 1994-
2003. This proves that the adverse course of the real economic processes
in Ukraine was largely conditioned by the failures of regulatory reforms.
We should also mention that in Ukraine’s economy the implementation of
primary system reforms was selective and partial; the reforms were
excessively spread out in time; ultimately, many of the projected changes
in the fiscal and monetary domains remained mere plans and goals. Made
in this hybrid fashion, unrelated decisions on regulation did not help the
country to enjoy the advantages of a market economy; they had shortfalls
linked to the ineffective administration of a large part of economic
processes through a state apparatus. This had a negative influence on
economic growth. Thus, the process of decreasing the distance between
Ukraine and developed countries requires necessary modernization in the
institutional order, in particular regarding the implementation of
regulations for democratic, free-market economies.
This statement can be especially misleading because of the present
dilemma of choosing a model for Ukraine’s economic development.
Comparative studies of transitions to a market economy in the post-
socialist countries (including studies of EU members and European and
Transcaucasian CIS countries) show that the countries that chose the kind
of institutional modernization which allowed for most freedom of choice
in direction, had the highest level of success in catching up with the EU-
15. In particular, this concerns entrepreneurial freedom, civil liberties,
transparency in government functioning, and the promotion of judicial
order and competition regime.
 Bearing in mind that the transformation of the post-socialist states’
economic systems should also take into consideration a social goal, we
can state that the optimal model for economic development is that which
will allow for the harmonization of a competitive regime with central
strategic coordination. This is the model enforced in EU countries by the
Lisbon Strategy and consumer rights. This model provides for long- and
medium-term economic efficiency and a high rate of economic growth
while considering the principles of social justice, social market economy
and sustainable development. It seems that this particular model should
be the most pertinent example for the economic development of Ukraine.
The objective analysis of economic processes in various regions of the
modern world makes us think that the present-day model for the
realization of the above-mentioned concepts in the EU is unsatisfactory.
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On the other hand, China’s example might seem favorable. There, a
hybrid, system-based decision brought economic growth results
unprecedented in the history of world economies59. The feasibility of this
example is limited by a large cultural distance (disparate informal
institutions) between China and Ukraine. We should also mentioned that,
according to the institutional view of economy, the «catching up»
countries such as Ukraine should be solely relying on the experience of
the developed countries that historically developed in similar cultural,
historical and anthropological conditions.
The development of the real economy and the decrease in sufficient
distance between Ukraine and the EU-15 can be achieved by relying on
EU development models, simultaneously applying Poland’s experience of
the implementation of institutional modernization during the transitional
period, in Ukraine. This process cannot rely on an automatic copying of
specific decisions; instead, it should rely — within the framework of the
EU judicial regime — on those institutional decisions that would make
use of the chances provided specifically by the social capital, human
capital and other local factors of socio-economic development. To
shorten the developmental distance between the EU-15, Poland and
Ukraine on the existing time horizon, the country needs in-depth and
enhanced institutional reforms, which would guarantee not only the
effective market level characteristic of leading EU countries, but also the
systematic achievement of high indices and effective use of productive
potential in the EU-15. Such transformations require understanding of the
interdependence of the market efficiency and institutional environment in
which these markets function, as well as the coordination of the efforts
and actions of the key players in social life (political parties, self-
governments, scientific and intellectual spheres, professional unions, etc.)
to promote meaningful institutional changes.
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Instead of conclusions
The internal and external economic behavior of national governments
and all business entities is significantly adjusted during crises that ac-
company the history of human civilization, as an obvious manifestation of
the dual nature of the conditions and factors of life — political, economic,
social and general civilizational. In a market unified world economic
system the economic crises are the primary causes for society: on the one
hand, industrial and financial (budget, stock, currency, banking, debt),
and on the other – cyclical, structural and systemic.
Until recently, the most common in market economy were industrial
crises, which were closely connected with long and short economic (busi-
ness) development cycles as confirmed by the practice of leading coun-
tries and economic theory, since the global economic system always de-
veloped unevenly. Within the long period of 1950—2000 we observed
more than 1,000 recessions of different duration and degree of disequilib-
rium, which reflected the impact of short and medium economic cycles
and their modifications: crises occurred more often, overproduction of
capital was observed instead of overproduction of goods, pricing dis-
creditation weakened, phases of depression (recession) shortened and
phases of revival and recovery extended. In the second half of the 21st
century it was the result, on the one hand, of the technological moderni-
zation of the economies of developed countries, the formation of innova-
tion management, the growing internationalization of business, and on the
other – very effective policy of state countercyclical fiscal and monetary
regulation: lower interest rates, rate of compulsory bank provisions, taxes
on profits of enterprises and income of citizens, increasing share of gov-
ernment spending to stimulate innovation, promote social construction,
etc.
Despite the optimistic scenario of the long-term economic progress of
the world in the 21st century, its first decade demonstrates the profound
social and economic upheaval caused by the unexpected critical combi-
nation of those objective and subjective processes and factors, that did not
accidentally coincided in time, — technological (primarily, the exhaus-
tion of the energy potential of traditional technological structures), eco-
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nomic (global financial imbalances along with the institutional and regu-
latory incapacity of national, inter- and supranational structures), political
(lack of adequate modern projects of safe world order being adequate
with the global realities), socio-cultural (inter-civilization confrontation
and spiritual degradation).
The world economy is affected by various economic crises, which are
largely of national origin, international implications and potentially of a
global nature, which resulted in many ideas and hypotheses of theoretical
and practical orientation regarding their causes, mechanisms, distribution,
impacts on national, international and global safe development.
The cyclical nature of both national and global economic development
is due primarily to fundamental technological change. When conflict
between the needs of social labor productivity growth and production ef-
ficiency, on the one hand, and the inability of existing technologies to
provide it due to the exhaustion of their resource, on the other hand, a
critical level is reached – the transition to a new technological structure is
observed. Each technological structure emerged in the forefront of the
key innovations that embodied a new level of science and technology de-
velopment being adequate to the growing needs of humanity. Signifi-
cantly, the social demand for fundamental innovations always appeared in
the periods of technological crises, which by challenging outdated ele-
ments of the technological system, brought a powerful positive impulse of
updating the economic system of society, caused profound changes of the
basic technologies and industries, modes of macroeconomic regulation
and major economic institutions and principles of the internationalization
of economic activity that corrected the disposition of countries on the
world economic map. In a developed market system the entrepreneurs–
technology innovators become market leaders attaining exclusive super-
profits and an enormous technological income. In general, the change of
the technological structures bears a strong positive impulse of develop-
ment, providing a reduction in production costs and prices for goods and
services and quality upgrade of their nomenclature. At the same time,
there is a rapid «washout» of traditional goods from the markets that not
always reflects a change in real social needs and tastes. Moreover, new
goods and rising prices in proportions that are inadequate to purchasing
power are, in fact, imposed on the mass consumer. Evidently, there is an
opposite trend – the conservation of fundamentally new technological in-
novation by the monopolists of the global market, especially in its energy,
food, pharmaceutical and other sectors (phenomenon of the so-called
«closing» technologies).
During the transition from production and goods to the financial ex-
pansion of the leading countries with the transmission of the leverages of
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their influence on the world market, financial crises have the most sig-
nificant impact on global economic development: in 1994 (Mexico), 1997
(South Asia), 1998 (Russia).
In all cases the main stimulating conditions of crisis situations were
the fixed exchange rate policy, excessive amounts of short-term debt, a
weak financial system and a state budget deficit. The similar characters
(logic) of the development of crisis phenomena and processes are also in-
dicative.
The main effects of the financial crises of the 1990s: for the econo-
mies directly affected by the crises – the collapse of fixed exchange rate
regimes and the transition to free or managed floating regimes; bank-
ruptcy of institutions of the financial system and non-financial corpora-
tions; significant increase of external debt; for the economies of other
countries and regions of the world and the world economy in general –
slowing economic growth and deterioration of basic macroeconomic in-
dices due to the worsening of conditions of foreign trade, falling prices
for export commodities, increasing competition on their traditional for-
eign markets; significant reduction in external financial flows to devel-
oping countries, particularly of debt financing; for the international fi-
nancial organizations – awareness of the broad governmental,
intergovernmental and scientific community of the need to reform the in-
ternational financial architecture, in view of its inability to prevent the fi-
nancial crises and their spreading; understanding of unprecedented un-
productive and even harmful use of huge financial resources accumulated
in the international financial organizations and redistributed in a tradi-
tional way without considering the latest global transformations for the
establishment of new effective economies.
The awareness of destructive expansion of the «speculative asset» of
market economy at discrediting its real sector becomes virtually univer-
sal. Born on the commodity markets, initially due to sales and then the
production activities of TNCs, in recent years globalization is largely de-
veloping on a financial and investment basis, facilitated by the free
movement of capital in the global information and communications net-
work, with significant restrictions on the markets of goods, commercial
services and manpower. Currently, the volume of transactions on the in-
ternational lending, investment and especially foreign exchange markets
exceeds the volume of production and goods sales activity by hundreds of
times. The volume of transactions on global stock market in the transpar-
ent segments exceeds global GDP more than twofold. The shares of cor-
porations and government debt obligations, which were previously domi-
nant in the developed stock markets, are displaced by financial
derivatives, the annual circulation of which is estimated in the hundreds
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of trillions of US dollars. New instruments, appearing in the hundreds and
thousands on the global stock market, are not oriented towards the pro-
spective resolution of the problems of the real economy. Speculative
transactions reach 95% of their total volume and daily volumes of cur-
rency speculation, which are in the trillions, are tens of times higher than
the value of the international exchange of commodities. Separated from
the parameters of the real economic environment in the process of the ac-
cumulation of speculative financial capital, said capital manifests itself in
real production assets, as well as commercial and personal real estate, ig-
noring price proposals and ethics, which poses the threat of global desta-
bilization.
It fully demonstrates the permanent nature of financial crises, which,
on the one hand, integrate crisis phenomena and processes in the indus-
trial, financial and investment sectors, and on the other – cause the super-
rapid spreading of a «crisis infection» on cross-national, regional and
global levels.
Even in a very contentious environment of the 20th century, crises
were mostly functional and local regional in nature, and their conse-
quences were more or less predictable. The financial crisis usually began
in a given country as a result of internal and/or external factors that
caused real or monetary shock, followed by entrepreneurial or speculative
euphoria, market anxiety and pursuit. In the event of a successful anti-
crisis policy in the effective cooperation with international financial in-
stitutions at their different stages it would be possible to calm the market;
reach stabilization, resolve the financial crisis, prevent default and so on.
However, the financial crises of late 1990s, which fully demonstrated
the destructive potential and mechanisms of the transmission of global
negative impacts from the group of Asian countries to East European
countries, including Russia, showed that one could hardly speak of the ef-
fective anti-crisis policies of some states and international financial or-
ganizations. In the 21st century, financial crises, first of all, become a
mandatory component of development, and, secondly, a priori have a
global nature with the mechanisms of instant transition of crisis infection
between sectors, industries and regions of the globalized economy.
The modern world economic situation, the instability level of which
can obviously be considered unprecedented, confirms the permanent na-
ture of a crisis of global economic development. In addition, the logic of
the emergence and development of a current crisis «fits» the traditional
scheme quite well, i.e. it is not phenomenal or even original: crisis im-
pulse (mortgage crisis in the USA) and crisis infection (mortgage and
credit markets in other countries); the unsuccessful attempts of national
governments to neutralize the initial manifestations of a financial crisis;
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crisis synergy («financial — real sectors of the economy»); the first at-
tempts of international consolidated intervention that are likely to become
more and more institutionalized and rigid in form.
A current crisis can be called global only in terms of unprecedented
geography and the total helplessness of governments of most world
countries (except leading countries) and global organizations — IMF,
WB, WTO, European Union. Given the ongoing measures in almost all
countries, which are actually reduced to providing social «aid» to private
entities, one can question the objectivity of the present crisis. It offers
broad opportunities for implementing very popular ideas of «global sub-
jectivism» when the reasons for global economic turmoil are due to the
interests and actions of individuals (top financial speculators, odious for-
mal and informal political leaders, etc.) or their legitimately or illegiti-
mately institutionalized groups (the US Federal Reserve System, top
management of TNCs, bureaucracy of the EU, ethnic and religious com-
munities).
Currently, crises do not develop independently, but interact, causing a
synergetic effect. The operation of mechanisms for spreading financial
crises depends on the degree of integration of national financial markets
on the global capital market: the higher its level, the more vulnerable to
external crisis shocks is the national economy. Conversely, countries with
limited access to international markets are less vulnerable to the effects of
the financial crisis infection.
The high openness of the Ukrainian economy along with poorly de-
veloped internal market self-regulation mechanisms causes its clear de-
pendence on global crisis fluctuations. In 2008 there was a very negative
macroeconomic dynamic: industrial production (over 30%) and GDP
(about 20%) reduced significantly, the stock index fell by 70%, external
debt exceeded USD 100 b. It was accompanied by: a rapid growth of the
foreign trade balance deficit through export restrictions resulting from the
adverse conditions on the world markets of metal and chemical products;
increase in systemic energy dependence with high energy prices and the
extreme energy consumption of the economy; collapse of the national
banking system due to the liquidity crisis, caused by excessive external
corporate borrowing and rampant distrust of the population; decline of the
official hryvnia exchange rate in view of the uncertain exchange policy of
the NBU, reduction of its currency reserves; failure of the government’s
fiscal and social policies, along with substantial progressive inflation;
collapse in construction due to the significant reduction in mortgage
lending in view of unprecedented price disparities on the housing market.
A specific accelerator of economic crisis processes was the unstable
political cycle and unpredictability of its results in view of the total cor-
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ruption of the state apparatus, which was dependent on industrial and fi-
nancial groups, the influence of the uncoordinated actions of different
branches of power, the underdevelopment of civil society institutions and
the degradation of the institutional system as regards property rights and
justice.
Research interest of the Ukrainian scientists should focus on the as-
sessment of the dependence of our state on both external (global) impacts
and the quality of state and business crisis management. Priority measures
are as follows: ensuring the social capacity of the state, support of infra-
structure facilities, optimization of external corporate and sovereign obli-
gations, restructuring of the financial and real sectors of the economy.
However, the systematic strategic analysis of modern crisis processes
both in the world and in Ukraine is in a deficit. If affluent on short-term
speculation «businessmen» and brainwashed by «tomorrow» elections
politicians can be understood, then all the others — cannot.
If in the national and international synergy levels are of a largely
functional orientation (economic — political crises, social — political
crises, banking — debt — systemic financial crises, etc.), on the global
level it gains qualitatively new dimensions in a complex system of «man
— nature — economy — society — civilization». In other words, the
global crisis can have political, economic, environmental or other precon-
ditions, but cannot be functionally or geographically determined by na-
ture. Hypothetically, the global crisis will have only two alternative solu-
tions – a quality upgrade of the world in all system components or global
disintegration. In modern history there were no global crises, because
there were no really global challenges and humanity managed to ensure
more or less safe development.
Further in-depth study of the anti-crisis opportunities of the conver-
gence of country patterns of economic development in the context of
European integration under apparent global disproportion and the asym-
metry of development is also important. The national strategy of pursuing
an upgrade of the Ukrainian economy which is industrial according to its
fundamental features is inefficient. Modern economic policy is to ensure
the transition from the current practice of gaining competitive advantages,
mainly due to price factors, to factor advantages, such as natural re-
sources wealth, human capital, scientific and technological potential, geo-
economic factors and so on. It should be innovation-oriented, i.e. devel-
oped, taking into account the global trends of the intellectualization, in-
formatization and humanization of the economy. The ambitious strategy
as an integrated system of actions aimed at implementing a national goal,
objectives and priorities can be considered as a separate «virtual re-
source» that can, over time, offset the lack of financial resources neces-
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sary for the development of society. Therefore, the development and im-
plementation of a coherent strategy ensuring a competitive national econ-
omy, will enable Ukraine to overcome the crisis, by realizing the Euro-
pean integration development potential.
* * *
THE Ukrainian editors of this monograph were originally convinced
that «Conclusions» should summarize all the information provided in
each section and offer a sort of «recipe» for Ukraine in the coming years.
However, over time this idea was rejected, firstly, because every para-
graph contains quite substantiated conclusions and recommendations, and
secondly, the system of measures proposed, has repeatedly become a list
of dreams, because without real financial instruments and implementation
mechanisms, they once again become just intentions, and thirdly, the
authors, as professional economists, are deeply convinced that to attain
real convergence between Ukraine and Poland, and thus with the whole
European Union, it is necessary to make significant effort not only in
economic terms.
We are well aware that the young Ukrainian democracy is only mak-
ing its way, however over the years that have passed since the «Orange
Revolution» it would be expedient to move away from constant quarrels,
recriminations, conflicts and so on, which has used up a lot of time, forc-
ing the government to work as a «fire brigade». It should then gradually
move away from European control mechanisms and instruments, real
convergence with the EU through the implementation of «Common heri-
tage» and the creation of joint projects of innovative modernization of the
economy, etc. Territorial-administrative reform «was lost» somewhere in
a fit of passion, all negotiations with the EU on simplification for getting
Schengen visas did not result in practical application, thus the Ukrainians
still have to queue up, to submit derogatory references confirming their
loyalty in order to obtain a permit to travel to Europe, while being in its
center. Constant changes of geographical priorities in the country have
significantly damaged its image abroad, causing the so-called «fatigue of
Ukraine». Can it promote convergence with the EU?
However, we believe that convergence is necessary and that the only
possible movement of Ukraine is to the fraternal family of European na-
tions, and that the experience of Poland, as described above, is invaluable
for our state, as is the advice of leading Polish economists, written by
people who are professional and tolerant in regards to Ukraine.
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